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Political Science Quarterly

Vol. 89 No. 1 March 1974

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The Academy of Political Science

Paradigms of American Politics: Beyond the One, the Two, and the Many
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON

The Burger Court in Historical Perspective
ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON

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Iran and Control of Its Oil Resources
JANE PERRY CLARK CAREY

Book Reviews

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Contents

Paradigms of American Politics: Beyond the One, the Two and the Many — SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON — 1

The Burger Court in Historical Perspective — ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON — 27

Politics and the Changing Law of the Sea — LOUIS HENKIN — 46

Press Coverage and Voter Reaction in the 1968 Presidential Election — DORIS A. GRABER — 68

Is There a Revisionist Thesis on the Origins of the Cold War? — MICHAEL LEIGH — 101

The Iranian Crisis of 1945-46 and the Cold War — GARY R. HESS — 117

Iran and Control of Its Oil Resources — JANE PERRY CLARK CAREY — 147

Book Reviews — 175

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Book Reviews

Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy; *Schwartz*, Political Alienation and Political Behavior — Robert E. Lane — 175

Minow, Martin, and Mitchell, Presidential Television — Erik Barnouw — 178

Barber, Lally, Makarushka, and Sullivan, Research on Human Subjects: Problems of Social Control in Medical Experimentation — Frank P. Grad — 179

Riesman and Stadtman, eds., Academic Transformation: Seventeen Institutions under Pressure — Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. — 181

Fried, Rivlin, Schultze, and Teeters, Setting National Priorities: The 1974 Budget — Marion Hamilton Gillim — 183

Hamilton, The Bench and the Ballot: Southern Federal Judges and Black Voters — Lucius J. Barker — 184

Katznelson, Black Men, White Cities: Race, Politics, and Migration in the United States, 1900-30, and Britain, 1948-68 — Michael Lipsky — 186

Meier and Rudwick, CORE: A Study in the Civil Rights Movement, 1942-1968 — Charles V. Hamilton — 188

Holden, The Politics of the Black "Nation"; *Holden*, The White Man's Burden — Wilbur Rich — 189

De Toledano, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man in His Time; *McGarvey*, C.I.A.: The Myth and the Madness — John T. Elliff — 192

Landau, Kissinger: The Uses of Power — Arnold A. Rogow — 194

Schultz, The Culture Factory: Boston Public Schools, 1789-1860 — Francis A.J. Ianni — 195

Chafe, The American Woman: Her Changing Social, Economic, and Political Roles, 1920-1970; *Grimshaw*, Women's Suffrage in New Zealand; *Sochen*, The New Women; Feminism in Greenwich Village, 1910-1920 — Barbara Miller Solomon — 197

Ross, G. Stanley Hall: The Psychologist as Prophet; *Billington*, Frederick Jackson Turner: Historian, Scholar, Teacher — Robert A. McCaughey — 200

Maddox, The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War; *Siracusa*, New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians: The American Revisionists — Bennett Kovrig — 202

Brodie, War and Politics — Thomas C. Leonard — 205

Caldwell, A Secret War: Americans in China, 1944-45; *Buhite*, Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy — O. Edmund Clubb — 207

Pole, Foundations of American Independence: 1763-1815 — Linda K. Kerber — 209

Preston, ed., The Influence of the United States on Canadian Development: Eleven Case Studies — Robin W. Winks — 210

Koss, Fleet Street Radical: A. G. Gardiner and the *Daily News* — Kenneth O. Morgan — 212

Semmel, The Methodist Revolution — Gertrude Himmelfarb — 213

Ulam, Stalin: The Man and His Era — Robert G. Wesson — 215

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Bruegel, Czechoslovakia Before Munich: The German Minority Problems and British Appeasement Policy; *Oxley, Pravda, and Ritchie*, eds., Czechoslovakia: The Party and the People — Frank Dinka — 217

Wiatr, ed., The State of Sociology in Eastern Europe Today — Melvin Croan — 220

Whitson, ed., The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970's — Kurt Lang — 222

Pasternak, Kinship and Community in Two Chinese Villages — Bernard Gallin — 224

Goldberg, Cave Dwellers and Citrus Growers: A Jewish Community in Libya and Israel — Myron J. Aronoff — 225

Bretton, Power and Politics in Africa — L. Gray Cowan — 227

Peil, The Ghanaian Factory Worker: Industrial Man in Africa — Elliot Berg — 228

Office of Public Information, United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, Vol. 24, 1970 — Leland M. Goodrich — 230

Elmandjra, The United Nations System: An Analysis — Martin Hill — 230

Dunn, Modern Revolutions: An Introduction to the Analysis of a Political Phenomenon; *Higham*, ed., Civil Wars in the Twentieth Century — Robert E. Bedeski — 232

Gluckman, ed., Ideas and Procedures in African Customary Law; *Kuper, H. and L.*, eds., African Law: Adaptation and Development — Elizabeth E. Hopkins — 234

Eckstein, ed., Comparison of Economic Systems: Theoretical and Methodological Approaches — Kenneth E. Boulding — 236

Lazitch and Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern, Vol. 1 — Warren Lerner — 238

Nzimiro, Studies in Ibo Political Systems: Chieftaincy and Politics in Four Niger States — J. H. M. Beattie — 239

Porter, ed., The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics, 1919-1969 — Harold K. Jacobson — 241

Black and Falk, eds., The Future of the International Legal Order, Vol. III: Conflict Management — Linda B. Miller — 242

Kirkpatrick, Leader and Vanguard in Mass Society: A Study of Peronist Argentina — Eldon Kenworthy — 244

Stanley, ed., Social Development: Critical Perspectives — Richard H. Brown — 246

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From the Managing Editor:

In this issue . . .

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the consensus, progressive, and pluralist paradigms in the analysis of American politics. He argues that focusing on two recurrent conflicts—between ideals and institutions and between generations—may yield more useful insights into the dynamics of political controversies in the United States.

ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, after analyzing the antecedents of "judicial activism," "judicial self-restraint," and "preferred freedoms," applies these labels to the Burger Court's constitutional jurisprudence.

LOUIS HENKIN explains why the long-established law of the sea is currently in disarray, what political and economic forces are reshaping it, and what is likely to result from the upcoming Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference.

DORIS A. GRABER examines the information about presidential candidates that was available through the press in the 1968 election. She goes on to appraise how useful this information was to the general public in making a prudent presidential selection.

MICHAEL LEIGH reflects on the continuing attempts to label as "revisionist" or "non-revisionist" conflicting analyses on the origins of the cold war. Leigh calls for the abandonment of this practice of attaching labels so that new data and interpretations of what led to post-war Soviet-American conflict can be evaluated in a non-polemical way.

GARY R. HESS presents fresh, detailed data about one of the earliest Soviet-American confrontations of the cold war, that over Iran in 1945-46. Without worrying whether his interpretation is "revisionist" or not, Hess sheds new light on how not only national security considerations but also powerful domestic pressures to demonstrate a "strong" stand against the Soviet Union shaped the vigorous American support for Iran.

JANE PERRY CLARK CAREY traces the drastic changes that have taken place in recent years in the relationship between Iran and international oil companies. She documents how Iran's oil revenues have soared as a result of the passing of control over oil resources from the oil companies to the producing nation—a shift that began long before the Yom Kippur war.

Demetrios Caraley

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Paradigms of American Politics: Beyond the One, the Two, and the Many

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON

"In American social studies," Louis Hartz observed eighteen years ago, "we still live in the shadow of the Progressive era."[1] The book in which he wrote these words played a major and, in some respects, decisive role in dissipating that shadow and moving the study of American society into the bright, warm, soothing sunlight of the consensus era. For a decade thereafter, the dominant image of American society among scholars and intellectuals was that formulated and expressed in the works of Boorstin, Hofstadter, Parsons, Potter, Bell, Lipset, Hartz himself, and many others. The consensus theory was the product of a new scholarly concern with what was "different" about American society and, indeed, "American civilization." The consensus theory marked not only a rejection of the earlier progressive paradigm of American politics. It also differed from, although it was not entirely incompatible with, the pluralistic model which, from the early decades of the century, had been the most popular paradigmatic child of the American political science profession. The progressive theory stressed class conflict; the pluralist model stressed the competition among a multi-

[1] Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955), p. 27.

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON is Frank G. Thomson Professor of Government, Harvard University, and editor of the quarterly magazine, *Foreign Policy*. His books include *The Soldier and the State, The Common Defense, Political Power: USA/USSR* (with Z. Brzezinski), and *Political Order in Changing Societies*.

Political Science Quarterly Volume 89 Number 1 March 1974

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plicity of groups; and the consensus view, the absence of serious ideological or class conflict and the presence of a fundamental agreement on values. Could American politics best be understood in terms of one consensus, two classes, or many groups? Such was the issue dividing the paradigms.

Even in the 1950s the consensus theory had its critics,[2] but the critics were themselves only additional evidence of its intellectual dominance. For they were in fact *critics*, and in scholarly debate to criticize a theory is to testify to its importance and perhaps to its persuasiveness. A paradigm is threatened not when it is criticized, but when it is ignored, when people find a different paradigm a more compelling and useful way of organizing their thoughts. In the rather turbulent latter half of the 1960s, the criticism of the consensus model intensified, and there were frequent expressions of the need to move "beyond consensus" in interpreting American society and politics. But just what it was one was to move to remained rather vague. Did going beyond consensus mean going back to the progressive or pluralist models? If American politics were not thought of in terms of either the one, or the two, or the many, how could they be thought of? Did not these just about exhaust the possibilities? The purpose of this paper is to review the way in which these three paradigms developed, to analyze sketchily the advantages and disadvantages of each, to take a quick look at American politics in the perspective of comparative politics, and to suggest that the conflicts between ideals and institutions and among generations may provide alternative approaches to the tyranny of the one, the two, and the many in the study of American politics.

Class Conflict and Pluralism

The progressive theory to which Hartz referred was, of course, that reflected in the works of Beard, Parrington, J. Allen Smith, Turner, and other social scientists, primarily historians, at the turn of the century. The two key elements distinguishing the progressive approach were, first, a stress on the significance of economic interests, as distinguished from idealistic purposes, as the motive moving men in history, and second, the emphasis on the extent to which American history could be interpreted in terms of the clash

[2] For the first major attack, see John Higham, "The Cult of the 'American Consensus': Homogenizing Our History," *Commentary*, 27 (February 1959), 93ff.

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between two contenders for power: the popular party and the elite party. Over time the particular groups in this conflict might change, but the struggle itself continued. The essence of the progressive paradigm was well summed up by Parrington in some notes which he wrote for but did not use in *Main Currents in American Thought:*

> From the first we have been divided into two main parties. Names and battle cries and strategies have often changed repeatedly, but the broad party division has remained. On one side has been the party of the current aristocracy—of church, of gentry, of merchant, of slave holder, of manufacturer—and on the other the party of the commonalty—of farmer, villager, small tradesman, mechanic, proletariat. The one has persistently sought to check and limit the popular power, to keep the control of the government in the hands of the few in order to serve special interest, whereas the other has sought to augment the popular power, to make government more responsive to the will of the majority, to further the democratic rather than the republican ideal—let one discover this and new light is shed on our cultural tendencies.[3]

In stressing the continuing cleavage in American society between elite and mass, the progressive historians were, as Hartz noted, reacting in large part against the earlier "Patriotic" historians who had celebrated the unity of the country and the beneficence of its founders. They were also echoing a viewpoint which was not, however, unknown among the founders. What the progressives saw as parochial dialectic of American history, the federalists had earlier seen as a common characteristic of all societies. "All communities divide themselves into the few and the many," said Alexander Hamilton. "The first are the rich and well born, the other the mass of the people." John Adams similarly argued that "The people, in all nations, are naturally divided into two sorts, the gentlemen and the simplemen. . . . The great and perpetual distinction in civilized societies has been between the rich, who are few, and the poor, who are many."[4] The difference between progressives and federalists, of course, lay in their evaluations of this conflict. For Hamilton the rich were good; for Adams both were bad (or, at least, could not be trusted); while for the progressives, of course, the poor were good. The federalists accepted the elite-mass division as an inevitable feature of any society, including American society, which was

[3] Quoted in Richard Hofstadter, *The Progressive Historians: Turner, Beard, Parrington* (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), p. 438.

[4] Alexander Hamilton, in Max Farrand, ed., *The Records of the Federal Convention* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1911), I, p. 299; John Adams, *Works* (Boston: Little, Brown, ed. by Charles Francis Adams, 1850-56), VI, p. 185; IX, p. 570.

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not in any way unique: "There is no special providence for Americans," as Adams said, "and their nature is the same with that of others." Governmental institutions, consequently, had to reflect this division. For the progressives, on the other hand, the division was bad because one of the parties was bad, and hence governmental institutions should promote the victory of the popular party over the elitist party. Until that victory was achieved, however, American history would be a continuing conflict between the good guys and the bad guys, and, as Hartz pointed out, one of the comforting aspects of the progressives' theory was that it "always had an American hero available to match any American villain they found, a Jefferson for every Hamilton."[5]

At almost the same time that the new historians were setting forth the progressive paradigm, other scholars, primarily political scientists, were delineating a related but also different image of American politics. This pluralist paradigm stemmed from the coming of age of the new discipline of political science. The American science of politics, to use Bernard Crick's challenging but accurate label, was fundamentally a product of the Progressive period in American history.[6] Before the 1890s, the first steps had, of course, been taken toward a more systematic study of politics and government. American students had attended the German universities, absorbed the standards of scholarship and concepts of *Staatswissenschaft*, and returned home to attempt in some measure to duplicate and to apply them. John W. Burgess founded the Columbia School of Political Science in 1880; Johns Hopkins also developed a significant graduate program before the end of the century; Woolsey, Burgess, and Willoughby produced *Political Science* (1877), *Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law* (1890), and *The Nature of the State* (1896). These and other studies were general, comparative, formalistic, and, in part, historical. This was, as it were, the period in which the preconditions for the scholarly takeoff of the science of politics were being laid.

That takeoff occurred during the first decade of the twentieth century. Political science as it developed during these years became realistic rather than formalistic, reformist rather than conservative,

[5] Hartz, *Liberal Tradition*, p. 31.

[6] When capitalized, Progressive refers to the intellectual and political currents generally dominant in the first decade of this century; when in lower case, it refers to the particular ideas and approaches of the "progressive" historians, especially Smith, Turner, Beard, and Parrington.

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and parochial rather than comparative. The development of the discipline was one element in the Progressive movement. This take-off involved, in the first place, a shift from a sympathy for conservatism to a commitment to reform. This change was reflected, in part, in the breaking away from the stress on moralism and natural law to a greater emphasis on a pragmatic approach to political life. "To call the roll of the distinguished social scientists of the Progressive era," Hofstadter has argued, "is to read a list of men prominent in their criticism of vested interests or in their support for reform causes. . . ."[7] The means of promoting reform was the exposure of the inequities, vested interests, corruption, and attendant evils which were interwoven into the dominant pattern of political and social life. Hence the emphasis on realism—how people in politics actually behave—rather than upon the description and analysis of formal institutions. The student of politics, as Woodrow Wilson put it, "must frequent the street, the counting-houses, the halls—yes and the lobbies—of legislatures." He must study "the life, not the texts, of constitutions."[8] He must investigate his subject in much the way the superior journalist does. He must, in short, become a muckraker, and that, indeed, was precisely what the American political scientist at the turn of the century did become. No clear line separated the journalistic muckraker from the scholarly one. In both, the emphasis was on the exposure of facts—facts which simply by virtue of their exposure would serve to generate demands for reform. "The documentation of the muckraking journalism and its alleged objectivity makes it only in style and published location different from the empirical studies in the city government that the sociologists and the new political scientists were beginning to interest themselves in. . . . Facts, once put before the people, would do their own work."[9]

In addition to being reformist and realistic, the political science of the first decade was also increasingly parochial. These were the years of the "'Americanization' of Political Science," in which American scholars less frequently studied in Europe and less frequently read or used European sources. In 1896, for example, forty

[7] Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 154.

[8] Quoted in Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, *The Development of American Political Science* (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1967), p. 32.

[9] Bernard Crick, *The American Science of Politics* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959), p. 84.

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percent of the books reviewed in the *Political Science Quarterly* were published in languages other than English; in 1915 and 1920, these figures had dropped to fourteen and four percent respectively. The proportion of references to foreign language sources in articles published in American political science journals similarly declined and American government supplanted comparative government as the most widely offered undergraduate course.[10] The progressive historians, epitomized in Beard and Turner, were, of course, almost totally preoccupied with the American historical experience to the exclusion of any significant comparisons of it with Europe. American political scientists similarly became almost totally preoccupied with American politics; the reality which they studied was an American reality. As the "emerging political science," in Crick's words, ". . . tried to become more scientific, it in fact became more parochial."[11] The study of comparative politics in both Europe and America declined; in the United States the decline was more marked, but it was also associated with what can only be termed a more healthy emphasis on the realistic analysis of political behavior, which soon came to the fore in the Chicago work of Merriam, Gosnell, and Lasswell. "The narrow notion of science in politics concerned with the extension of 'hard data' techniques to trends in behavior was the American answer to European theory, but it remained almost exclusively concerned with American problems. There remains a paucity of materials using behavioral methods and dealing with governments and institutions of countries other than our own."[12]

The reformism, realism, and parochialism of American political science led eventually and naturally to a stress on the pluralistic character of American politics and the critical role of groups, particularly organized groups, in shaping the course of public life. The group approach received its most explicit formulation, of course, in Bentley's *Process of Government* published in 1908. In Bentley the emphasis was analytical; it stressed the utility of the group concept as a category for political analysis. In others, the approach became more descriptive; the stress was on the multiplicity of groups as the distinguishing characteristic of American politics. The Ameri-

[10] Somit and Tanenhaus, *American Political Science*, pp. 61-62.

[11] Crick, *American Science of Politics*, pp. 111-112.

[12] David E. Apter, "Comparative Politics and Political Thought: Past Influences and Future Development," in Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter, eds., *Comparative Politics: A Reader* (New York: The Free Press, 1963), p. 730.

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can pluralists were not, however, generally favorably disposed toward groups as were the English normative pluralists such as Laski and Cole. If anything, the thrust was in the opposite direction. If the progressive historians harked back to an inverted Hamilton, the pluralist political scientists harked back to a semi-inverted Madison. The group concept was hailed as a scientific and realistic category for analysis, but the role of groups in politics was seldom viewed as better than ambiguous and was often viewed as nefarious. The machinations of interest groups were exposed. The extent to which organized groups threatened the rights of the individual and the power of the majority was emphasized.

At times the analytical and descriptive elements of the model were tangled together. The usefulness of the group concept when applied to American politics often led to the assumption, not generally tested until much later, that it would be equally appropriate to the study of other polities, an assumption which could be far from the truth. "Had the disciples of Bentley," as Hartz observes, "tried to apply his analysis to the Dreyfus Affair as they did to the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, they would hardly have found the procedure so easy. . . ."[13] The pluralist political scientists were thus using a category of limited territorial applicability to analyze American politics, often implicitly assuming that that category and analysis could also be applied equally well to other political systems. The progressive historians, on the other hand, were using categories of much more general applicability (elite-mass; class) and implicitly assuming that they were useful and relevant to the analysis of the American political system.

The emergence of political science was thus part of a broad movement of Progressive reform in American intellectual and political life. The nature and focus of the discipline plus the critical role of the pluralist paradigm also reflected the extent to which political science in some measure was a substitute for political theory in America. The discipline's empiricism and realism and the assumption that facts exposed became evils reformed were themselves evidence of the extent to which, despite the progressive and pluralist paradigms, there did indeed exist a consensus on basic political values. In its scope, sophistication, and general scholarly achievement, American political science soon easily exceeded the much more primitive levels which continued to prevail in Europe. American

[13] Hartz, *Liberal Tradition*, p. 30.

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political theory, on the other hand, remained as underdeveloped and primitive as European political science. Political theory is most likely to flourish where there is a need to rationalize some forms of authority and to invalidate others; it normally flourishes during periods of intense conflict and controversy over fundamental issues of political and social organization. If, however, there is a relatively broad-gauged consensus on basic political values, there is little need for political theory. There is, however, a need for an empirically oriented political science to analyze and to expose the extent to which political institutions and practices in the society are in fact congruent with its political values. This process of exposure, of establishing the gap between the ideal and reality, is also both a cause and a consequence of the low status which politics itself has in such a society. In this context, to study politics is almost necessarily to criticize it.

The Consensus on Consensus

Until World War II, the progressive paradigm was thus preeminent among historians and the pluralistic paradigm among political scientists. The years after World War II saw the rise of the consensus paradigm as an intellectual construct. It reflected a focus on issues which had been almost totally absent from the intellectual world prior to World War II: How unique is the American experience? How relevant is the American experience?

The consensus interpretation of American politics was a product of the absence of social revolution in the 1930s, the success of the New Deal, and the development of the cold war. If Hamilton was the devil figure for the progressive historians and Madison the patron saint of the pluralists, Tocqueville was, of course, prophet of the consensualists. The central thesis of the consensus argument was advanced in most blatant form in Boorstin's *The Genius of American Politics* (1953) and in its most sophisticated form in Hartz's *The Liberal Tradition in America* (1955). The latter remains probably the most significant interpretation of the American experience written since World War II. Hartz's analysis is outstanding among the consensus writings for three reasons.

First, while the consensus theorists were generally much more comparatively inclined than either the progressive or pluralist theorists, Hartz made the comparison with Europe the central theme of his analysis. He viewed the American experience from a European

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vantage point and argued, persuasively, that from that vantage point the dualism which had been the central theme of the progressives shrank almost to insignificance. Unlike Europe, America lacked both feudalism and socialism. The controversies of American history were simply between different variants of liberalism. Subsequently, Hartz elaborated his concept of the "fragment" to view the United States not just in comparison with Europe but also in comparison with the other societies created by European colonization and settlement.[14]

Second, Hartz married Marx to Tocqueville. His basic categories of analysis were Marxist, much more explicitly so, indeed, than those of the progressives. Viewed in class terms, the United States, except in the South, had lacked an aristocracy; because of this, it also lacked a class-conscious proletariat. Instead, the middle class had from the first predominated; liberalism, the political philosophy of the middle class, had been unchallenged. In a brilliant manner, Hartz thus used Marxist categories to arrive at Tocquevillian conclusions. Hofstadter once called Calhoun "the Marx of the Master Class"; Hartz could equally well be described as "the Marx of the middle class."

Third, unlike many other consensus writers, Hartz also saw that consensus was not simply a cause for celebration; it was an ambivalent legacy. The absence of class conflict might be a blessing, but it was gained at the price of liberalism turning in and shadow boxing against itself. Unchallenged liberalism became irrational liberalism. America's "colossal liberal absolutism," Hartz concluded, "hampers creative action abroad by identifying the alien with the unintelligible, and it inspires hysteria at home by generating the anxiety that unintelligible things produce."[15]

Probably the most important contribution of the consensus theorists was to place the American experience in some form of comparative perspective. The issue of "American exceptionalism," of what is different or the same about American life and thought, was at the heart of this theory. As Marcus Cunliffe has argued, "the assumption that the Americans were set apart from other peoples was taken almost axiomatic."[16] In a sense, the consensus theorists took the dichotomy which the progressive historians saw within

[14] Louis Hartz et al., *The Founding of New Societies* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1964).

[15] Hartz, *Liberal Tradition*, p. 285.

[16] Marcus Cunliffe, "New World, Old World: The Historical Antithesis," to

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American experience and transformed it into a dichotomy between America and Europe. America was defined as the antithesis of Europe; the theme was, of course, an old one which could be formulated in a variety of ways to serve a variety of purposes. In the years after World War II, the scope of the argument was also broadened to encompass not just the difference between America and Europe but the uniqueness of America with respect to all the rest of the world. Was the American Revolution a real revolution or something different from those of Europe, Asia, and Latin America? Was the United States the "first new nation" whose experience had parallels with and lessons for the new nations of the twentieth century? Could Americans transcend their limited experience to understand and to act effectively with people of other societies and cultures? If the American experience was unique, it was irrelevant to the rest of the world; if it was relevant, it could not be unique. The preoccupation with this set of issues implied that there was indeed something different about the United States. In how many other countries have scholars and intellectuals debated the historical experience of their society in terms of its uniqueness or relevance? The very fact that this issue was debated was, in some measure, evidence if not of American uniqueness at least of American hubris. Implicit in the argument for uniqueness was the assumption that no other society was as good as the United States; implicit in the argument for relevance was the assumption that every other society should be like the United States. Each side of the argument had its own form of national pride. Lost in the debate was the chastening possibility—which, I would suggest, was closer to actuality—that the United States could well be neither unique nor relevant.

The consensus interpretation of American politics was elaborated and developed in a variety of ways by historians and sociologists. Within the historical fraternity, the progressives and their disciples had "pushed polarized conflict as a principle of historical interpretation so far that no one could go further in that direction without risking self-caricature."[17] There was a need for a fresh start. While historians rode off in a variety of directions after abandoning the progressive interpretation, the major stream, insofar as there was one, clearly flowed from the springs of consensus.

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be published in Richard Rose, ed., *Lessons from America* (London: Macmillan, 1974).

[17] Hofstadter, *Progressive Historians*, p. 439.

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In sociology the "end of ideology" school plus the popularity of structural-functionalism and equilibrium models all tended to parallel, supplement, and reinforce from other methodological directions the message of the consensus school.

Within the discipline of political science, consensus did not play quite the same role as it did within sociology and history. It did not lead to the displacement of the earlier pluralist paradigm; rather it led to its reformulation and redefinition in conservative rather than radical terms. In history, Hofstadter argues, the last two major works clearly in the progressive tradition were Schlesinger's *The Age of Jackson* (1945) and Jensen's *The New Nation* (1950). In political science, however, the main stream of pluralist analysis, which had flowered earlier in the writings of Bentley, Merriam, Herring, Holcombe, and Schattschneider, was carried forward and given a new lease on life in the works of Key, Truman, Dahl, and many others. Earlier the "discovery" of pluralism in American politics had been "shocking" in that it meant that American politics was not contained simply in the concepts of majority rule and individual rights. Organized groups, not popular majorities or individual citizens, were the hard reality of American politics. By the 1950s, however, pluralism was redefined from a bad thing to a good thing: it was a way of dispersing power and of insuring (through cross-cutting cleavages) moderation in politics. In the first decade of the century, the pluralist paradigm had been born of the same impulse to exposure and reform which produced the progressive interpretation: Beard could be indulgent toward Bentley.[18] In the 1950s, on the other hand, the pluralist interpretation became a corollary of the consensus model: Hartz could be indulgent toward Truman.[19] Within the basic ideological concensus of American politics, the only conflicts which could take place were the relatively minor ones among interest groups over their marginal shares in the economic pie. The pluralist interpretation was used to defend American politics against the C. Wright

[18] Beard praised Bentley for his efforts "to put politics on a basis of realism where it belongs" and for making "effective use of the idea of 'group interests,' as distinct from class interests in the Marxian sense." *Political Science Quarterly*, 23 (December 1908), 739-41, quoted in Hofstadter, *Progressive Historians*, p. 186n.

[19] In Hartz's words, "Bentley went deeper than Beard, for the free and easy play of pressure groups was a real characteristic of the American liberal world, inspired by the moral settlement which underlay it and hence obscured class lines." *Liberal Tradition*, p. 250.

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Mills and Floyd Hunters who argued that power was concentrated at the national and local levels. Its political and ideological functions shifted from the exposure of the evils of American politics to the celebration of its virtues. In due course, of course, this pluralistic celebration itself came under attack with the familiar arguments, first, that not all sectors of the population are equally represented in the group process and hence the interaction of groups produces a skewed and biased result in public policy, and second, that there are public interests which transcend group interests and which do not receive appropriate recognition in the group process.[20]

Tests of Paradigmatic Usefulness

To be accepted and useful, a paradigm has to meet two tests. First, in one way or another it has to be meaningful and relevant; that is, it has to make sense to people in terms of what they see about them and what they feel they need. The progressive and then the pluralist paradigms met these tests during the reformist years of the early part of this century; the consensus and the redefined conservative pluralist paradigms met the tests in the cold war years of the mid-twentieth century. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, domestic upheaval—racial conflict, student unrest, political controversy—combined with subsequent international detente to make consensus make less political sense than it did a decade earlier. Second, every paradigm also has to "make sense" in terms of the historical and political experience it purports to explain. It cannot be way off the scholarly mark no matter how useful it may be politically and ideologically. More specifically, in terms of explaining the principal characteristics of politics in a society, a paradigm should do three things: (a) It should highlight some aspect of social reality; it should distinguish what is of critical importance in the political experience of the society from what is of peripheral significance. (b) It should be comparative; it should call attention to the principal similarities and differences between the politics of the society and those of other societies. (c) It should be dynamic, in the sense that it should account for change (and continuities) in the political experience of the society. As they have been developed by histo-

[20] See Henry S. Kariel, *The Decline of American Pluralism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961); Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966); Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969).

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rians, political scientists, and American civilizationists, the three paradigms we are considering differ considerably in the extent to which they meet these criteria. The progressive paradigm makes somewhat more provision than the others for change: it is rooted in a theory of conflict which, like the Marxist class struggle, can be interpreted as looking forward to the progressive victory of one party over the other. On the other hand, the sandwiching of the complexity of American political struggle into a dualistic framework scarcely did justice to the complexity of that struggle, and the progressive theory had virtually nothing to say about the similarities and differences between American politics and other politics. The pluralist paradigm, on the other hand, came to grips with a critical reality of American politics, but had no theory of change (except in terms of the replacement of one interest group by another) and also shed little light on the comparisons and contrasts between American politics and that of other societies. Finally, the consensus theory was very much a product of an explicit comparison of the American experience with Europe, but it also had little to say about change and obviously failed to account for the conflict and violence which had taken place in American history. In this respect the Marxist categories of the consensus theory, at least as it was formulated by Hartz, became blinders. Implicitly it was assumed that the only real conflict was class conflict, and hence the absence of class conflict meant the presence of consensus. The United States, however, may well have had less class conflict but also more social and political violence than many European countries. "Americans," as Hofstadter neatly put it, "do not *need* ideological conflict to shed blood on a large scale." And, as Dahl has argued, the case can be made that the United States has experienced relatively severe conflict about once every twenty years.[21]

While the paradigms of the one, two, and the many may differ in their particular strengths and weaknesses, they also have one important characteristic in common. Each explains politics in terms of social structure. The decisive influence on the nature of American politics is held to be the nature of American society: it is not political values, or institutions, or practices, or the nature of development and change. It is whether American society can best be understood in terms of one consensus, two classes, or many groups.

[21] Hofstadter, *Progressive Historians*, p. 461; Robert A. Dahl, *Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and Consent* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), p. 283ff.

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The social structure also shapes the nature of the values, interests, and ideologies which are manifest in politics. There is a presumption of congruence between social unit and political outlook. The consensus is liberal; the classes are conservative and progressive; the groups are materialistically self-interested. In addition, the picture of society and hence of politics is, by and large, a static one. The progressive interpretation does hold open the possibility of the eventual victory of the popular party, but even with it and to a much greater extent with the consensus and pluralist schools, there is little provision for change. How will American society and politics in the future differ from what they have been in the past? At best, consensualists, progressives, and pluralists all suggest more of the same.

The Comparative Context of Modernization

For a good part of this century American political science was political science of America. The strand of parochialism which developed in the 1890s remained strong; it coincided with the noncomparative, if not isolationist, inclinations of the progressive and pluralist paradigms. With a few exceptions comparative government (which, in any event, meant European government) was not at the center of the discipline. Even in the late 1930s, the two outstanding texts on comparative government were the products of two recent immigrants: Carl Friedrich and Herman Finer. After World War II, however, the expansion of American influence throughout the world created the environment and the impetus to develop foreign area studies programs and to attract political scientists to the analysis of what had been rather esoteric regions of the world. For political scientists, this work was originally and in larger part the study of foreign governments and then subsequently and in smaller part the study of comparative government. Comparative government, in turn, came to be defined as a subfield within the discipline distinct from American government, thus tending to separate the political science analysis of comparative politics from that of American politics.

This tendency was in some measure tempered by the fact that the study of comparative politics requires typologies for the classification of political systems. In the years after World War II, two such typologies successively played critical roles. The first, the distinction between constitutional and totalitarian regimes, was an

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obvious product of World War II and the early cold war. It provided a neat way of collapsing two enemies, Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia, into one intellectual pigeonhole. It also brought the United States together in a single category with Western Europe, minimizing the differences in political institutions and practices between the two. In a sense, by stressing the similarities between America and Europe, these political science categories provided an intellectual rationale for post-World War II foreign policy.

In the late 1950s the distinction between constitutionalism and totalitarianism in the study of comparative politics was supplemented and, in large part, supplanted by the distinction between modern and traditional societies and developed and underdeveloped political systems. "The field of comparative politics," as Lucian Pye observed, "has suddenly stopped being merely the study of the major European powers and has become the analysis of political development, one of the most youthful and vigorous subfields of the entire discipline of political science."[22] As the central concerns in the study of comparative politics, modernization and political development provided a more or less common intellectual framework for analyzing and comparing the politics of Asian, African, and Latin American countries. In due course, they also were seen to provide a framework within which the earlier experience of Western Europe and North America might be compared with the contemporary experience of Third World countries. Political scientists studying developing countries developed concepts, hypotheses, and theoretical frameworks which could be applied back to the historical analysis of more familiar societies.

Inasmuch as the United States was clearly the most modern society in the world and inasmuch as, in many dimensions, it was also one of the most politically developed, did it not make great good sense to look at American politics in terms of a paradigm of modernization? Such a paradigm would clearly provide the basis for the comparative analysis of similarities and differences with other societies, as, for instance, in Lipset's *The First New Nation*.[23] It also clearly would provide a framework for analyzing continuity

[22] Lucian W. Pye, "Advances and Frustrations in Comparative Politics," in Fred W. Riggs, ed., *International Studies: Present Status and Future Prospects* (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, Monograph no. 12, October 1971), p. 94.

[23] Seymour Martin Lipset, *The First New Nation* (New York: Basic Books, 1963).

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and change within American society. Why could we not learn a lot more about American politics by looking at it within a modernization framework and in comparison with the experience of other countries? The "modernization" and "political development" of America seemed to offer fertile fields for such scholarly exploration.

Alas, it has not exactly worked out that way. To the best of my knowledge only one recent volume had been written with this goal explicitly in mind, and that, Clinton Rossiter's last book, *The American Quest* (1971),[24] leaves one with the undeniable feeling that the concepts of modernization and the experience of America do not really fit together. The reason is a familiar one which flows in part from the valid insights of the consensus theory. The United States was in many critical senses "born modern" as well as "born equal." Consequently, it has not had to modernize in the way in which most European and Third World societies have had to, and hence the concepts and themes of modernization are not all that relevant to its history. In other societies, the critical issues have been whether, how, and under whose leadership modernization occurs, how the traditional elites take the leadership in the process or attempt to oppose it. The central feature is the conflict between old and new values, leaders, social forces. It is, however, precisely this sort of conflict which has, with one notable exception, been almost entirely absent from American history. It has generally lacked the tensions and traumas of modernization which have been central to the experience of other societies.

At its most fundamental level, modernization involves changes in human attitudes, which, in turn, requires conflicts within men and among men over traditional versus modern values. The modern syndrome of attitudes has perhaps been well summed up by Alex Inkeles in his "OM" (Overall Modernity) scale which includes: openness to innovation and change; wide-ranging interests and empathy; a tolerance of differences of opinion; present and future rather than past orientation; a belief in planning and organization; a sense of efficacy, that is, a belief that men can learn from and dominate their physical environment; a freedom from fatalism; an awareness of the dignity of others and a willingness to respect that dignity; a faith in science and technology; and a faith in

[24] Clinton Rossiter, *The American Quest, 1790-1860: An Emerging Nation in Search of Identity, Unity, and Modernity* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971).

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distributive justice: to each according to his contribution or work.[25] Traditional man would have just the opposite views. But the question then is: When were there traditional men in America? One cannot administer questionnaires to an eighteenth-century sample of Americans, but all the descriptions of American attitudes in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries highlight precisely those attitudes which Inkeles has defined as modern. When Crevecoeur asks who is this American, this new man, the answer is Alex Inkeles' "OM" man. The central problem of modernization, that of making men modern, was never much of a problem on these shores, and hence theories which see that as the central problem of development are of only dubious relevance.[26]

What is true of man is also in large part true, as Hartz has argued, of society. And as I have pointed out elsewhere, because there were no traditional or feudal institutions to be overthrown, there was no need to create a modern system of government to carry out that purpose.[27] Modernization theories are thus irrelevant because American society was born modern without having to be modernized and American government could be left as it was because its society was modern. The concept of modernization has, however, had a demonstrated usefulness in the analysis of the one segment of American society, the South, where there was something which could be called a fully developed traditional social order. The actors in Southern history clearly have their counterparts in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe and in twentieth-century Latin America. There is a land-owning aristocracy, commercial oligarchs, foreign capital, a poor peasantry, slaves, politico-economic entrepreneurs, and populist demagogues. (To understand Huey Long, as Arthur Schlesinger has said, think of him as a

[25] Alex Inkeles, "The Modernization of Man," in Myron Weiner, ed., *Modernization* (New York: Basic Books, 1966), p. 138ff.; David Horton Smith and Alex Inkeles, "The OM Scale: A Comparative Socio-Psychological Measure of Individual Modernity," *Sociometry*, 29 (December 1966), 353ff.

[26] That is, they are of limited relevance so far as understanding the American past is concerned. They may be considerably more useful in understanding the transition which appears to be taking place in America and some other affluent societies from industrialization to postindustrialism. The parallels of this transition with the earlier transition from agrarianism to industrialism are at times rather striking. See my "Postindustrial Politics: How Benign Will It Be?," *Comparative Politics*, 6 (January 1974), 163ff.

[27] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 125ff.

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Latin American populist dictator.)[28] Modernization concepts illuminate Southern experience precisely because it is different from other American experience, and hence H. Douglas Price, Lester Salamon, and others have been able to analyze aspects of Southern development in much the same way as other social scientists have analyzed development in the Middle East, Latin America, and Asia.[29]

While the concept of modernization generally is not of much help in understanding American development, other more specific, functional concepts and theories may be drawn from the comparative study of political development and applied usefully to the American experience. There is, moreover, still the need to reintegrate American politics into comparative politics, which was where it was in the 1880s, and from which it was dislodged by the parochialism of the Progressive movement.

The Conflict of Ideals vs. Institutions

The problem then remains: How to capture the valid elements of the unity, dualism, and diversity of the American experience embodied in the consensus, progressive, and pluralist paradigms and also take into account the changes and continuities within the American political system and the similarities and differences between that system and other systems? More fundamentally there is the whole question of the relation between socioeconomic interests and politics. All three familiar paradigms rested on the assumption that political behavior and political ideas were outgrowths of socioeconomic interests. That this is often and, indeed, generally

[28] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Politics of Upheaval* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), p. 68: "At bottom, Huey Long resembled, not a Hitler or a Mussolini, but a Latin American dictator, a Vargas or a Perón. Louisiana was in many respects a colonial region, an underdeveloped area; its Creole traditions gave it an almost Latin American character. Like Vargas and Perón, Long was in revolt against economic colonialism, against the oligarchy, against the smug and antiquated past; like them, he stood in a muddled way for economic modernization and social justice; like them, he was most threatened by his own arrogance and cupidity, his weakness for soft living and his rage for personal power. And, like them, he could never stop."

[29] See H. Douglas Price, "Southern Politics in the Sixties: Notes on Economic Development and Political Modernization" (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting, American Political Science Association, September 1964); Lester Salamon, "Protest, Politics, and Modernization in the American South: Mississippi as a 'Developing Society'" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1972); and idem, "Leadership and Modernization: The Emerging Black Political Elite in the American South," *Journal of Politics*, 35 (August 1973), 615-646.

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the case is clearly true. But the assumption of the correspondence between economic interests and political behavior—so dramatically reflected in their different ways in Beard, Bentley, and Hartz—also may leave much of politics unaccounted for.

This paper presents no paradigmatic panacea, but it does seem to make some sense to suggest at least two other lines of approach to American politics which may in some small way supplement those of the one, the two, and the many. The first involves the relation between political ideas and political institutions in the United States. All three familiar paradigms tend to minimize the autonomy of politics and particularly the independent role which political ideals may play as a stimulus, guide, and shaper of political action. They have generally, and correctly, assumed that political theory has been relatively underdeveloped in comparison with Europe. The highly systematized ideologies rooted in social classes have been notably absent from the American scene. But it is a mistake to move from this truth to the assumption that political ideals have played a less important role in the United States than in Europe. In fact just the reverse may be true. American politics has been characterized by less sophisticated political theory and more intense political beliefs than most other societies.

Political ideals have played a critical role in the American experience in two ways. First, more so than in any other major society apart from the Soviet Union, political ideas have been the source of national identity. In Europe political ideology and nationalism crossed each other. Ideologies expressed and shaped the interests of "horizontal" units, social classes, while nationalism, in its various manifestations, expressed and shaped the interests of "vertical" units, ethnic and linguistic communities. This produced a system of cross-cutting cleavages. In nineteenth-century Europe, it was not immediately clear who had more in common: two aristocrats (or two bourgeoisie or two socialists), one of whom was a Frenchman; or two Frenchmen, one of whom was an aristocrat (or bourgeois or socialist). This interplay between nationalism and ideology led each to be expressed in more extreme form but also meant that each exercised a restraining effect on the political manifestations of the other. In the United States, on the other hand, nationalism was defined in terms of a set of political beliefs, a political creed, which formulated in imprecise but highly meaningful fashion the basic ideals of the American way of life. From Crevecoeur to Tocqueville to Bryce to Myrdal to Brogan, foreign

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observers, as well as domestic ones, have not failed to comment on this striking phenomenon. A society produced by immigration needed such a way of defining its identity just as much as a society produced by revolution. If it were not for the "American creed," what, indeed, would Americans have in common?

Political beliefs thus played a necessary and positive role with respect to national identity and integration. They reinforced American nationalism and yet also in some respects moderated it. In this respect there was an American consensus. The consensus theorists, however, often tended to emphasize the *extent* of consensus over the *substance* of the consensus. The substance of that consensus was basically liberal, egalitarian, individualistic, populist. In 1889 Bryce summed it up in words which Tocqueville might have used fifty years earlier and which Myrdal did, for all intents and purposes, use fifty years later. The key dogmas of American thinking, according to Bryce, were: (1) the individual has sacred rights; (2) the source of political power is the people; (3) all government is limited by law and the people; (4) local government is to be preferred to national government; (5) the majority is wiser than the minority; and (6) the less government the better.[30] The distinctive thing about the substance of the liberal consensus or American creed was its antigovernmental character. Populism, individualism, egalitarianism formed the basis for a standing indictment of any political institutions including American ones. The political creed which formed the basis of national identity also was the threat to governmental legitimacy. The more intensely Americans committed themselves to their national political beliefs, the more hostile and cynical they became about their political institutions. The legitimacy of American government varied inversely with belief in American ideals.

The extent to which people take those ideals seriously changes from time to time and from group to group. Commitment to political beliefs will be particularly strong during periods of rapid social and economic change when the relations between social forces are changing, new groups are emerging on the scene, and old ones are fading. Certainly at times substantial groups of Americans have rededicated themselves to the creed, have been appalled at the gap between their ideals of how government should operate and the ways in which it actually does operate, and have made

[30] James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* (London: Macmillan, 1891), I: 417-418.

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vigorous efforts to bring reality into conformity with the ideal. At other times, Americans have mouthed the rhetoric and clichés of the creed but have not been intensely concerned about the extent to which political practice measured up to these political ideals. Americans take pride in their governmental institutions only when they do not believe very deeply in American political ideals.

In this sense the dualism of American politics between American political ideals and American political institutions is rooted in the broad consensus on political ideas which has existed in America. This consensus has, in turn, furnished the basis for alternating periods of institutional stability, on the one hand, and ideological renewal, on the other. Until the present, the reaffirmation of American political ideals has taken place in four major historical instances: the Revolution against British imperial institutions; the Jacksonian movement against the undemocratic and elitist aspects of the established political and economic order; the struggle culminating in the Civil War to restrict and eventually to eliminate the "peculiar institution" of slavery in the South; and the Populist and Progressive movement at the turn of the century to impose limits on the emerging concentrations of corporate economic power. In these invocations, American ideals of equality, individualism, and popular sovereignty have been used for anti-imperial, antielitist, antislavery, and antibig-business purposes. The principal invokers of the creed have been the spokesmen for yeoman farmers and independent entrepreneurial and professional types. Their relative success in challenging hierarchical institutions has declined steadily with each successive invocation. British imperial rule was effectively eliminated in the 1770s and 1780s. The existing political and economic system was in large part, but not entirely, democratized in the 1820s and 1830s. In the 1860s and 1870s the legal basis of slavery was eliminated, but the social, economic, political, and even legal basis for a caste system in the South remained for almost another century. Finally, the Populist-Progressive effort to curtail and break up corporate power had, in many respects, the air of a movement reacting against the mainstream of historical development; it was a partial success at best.

Political ideas have thus had a role in America, albeit a purgative role which is not characteristic of other societies. In countries in which there are a variety of ideologies and belief systems, there are a variety of sources of challenge to governmental institutions but also almost invariably a variety of defenses for major institu-

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tions. Tradition and social structure furnish a basis for the legitimacy of some institutions, and particular ideologies and political theories can be utilized to legitimize individual institutions. Attacks on one set of institutions from the perspective of one ideology generate equally intense defenses of that institution from the perspective of other ideologies. In the United States, on the other hand, the consensus is basically antigovernmental. What justification is there for government, for hierarchy, discipline, secrecy, coercion, the suppression of the claims of individuals and groups, within the American context? In terms of American beliefs, government is supposed to be egalitarian, participatory, open, noncoercive, and responsive to the demands of individuals and groups. Yet no government can be these things in any wholehearted way and still remain a government.

The ideological challenge to American government thus comes not from abroad but from at home, not from the conspiracies of anarchists but from the idealism of liberals. To the extent that Americans become carried away by their political ideals, they are in danger of doing away with their political institutions. In this conflict and interaction between ideals and institutions, between the invocation of the former by some social forces for an attack on the latter, lies a critical dimension of American politics which reflects its consensual, dualistic, and pluralistic quality, distinguishes it from most other political systems, and throws some light on both the cyclical and secular trends in American political evolution.

The Conflict of Generations

American society has been distinguished by an unusual degree of consensus. It has also been characterized by an unusual amount of social and economic change. Change, however, usually involves conflict. How can large amounts of change coexist with large amounts of consensus? Part of the answer, of course, lies in the extent to which the opportunities for mobility and expansion have permitted social-economic change to be carried out apart from the political realm. And another part of the picture concerns the relative preeminence of a type of group cleavage in America which is closely associated with the tensions between its political ideas and political institutions.

Conflict and change in Europe have normally been analyzed in

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terms of the rise and fall of social classes. Class analysis clearly has some relevance to the American experience, but also considerably less than to the European experience. Much more important in America than in Europe has been the role of generations and generational differences. In this sense, one can argue that a consensus has existed in the United States and its fundamentals have remained relatively stable, but its particular manifestations in attitudinal outlooks and public priorities and policies have changed from one generation to another. In Great Britain, for instance, the middle-class ethos and the working-class ethos (including in each social values, life styles, political attitudes, and speech) are relative constants of the social structure. In the United States, on the other hand, classes are less sharply differentiated and generations more sharply differentiated than they are in Europe. This is true both in terms of the leading elements of particular age groups—those who articulate and express its values in literature, art, politics—and even, in a different way, for the mass of the public as a whole. The massive swings of public opinion from the progressivism of 1912 to the stand-pattism of 1920 to the reformism of 1932 clearly cut across class lines and, while the evidence is inconclusive, are yet susceptible of interpretation in terms of generational changes. More recently, survey data have revealed marked differences in outlook among generations, which can, in varying degrees, be explained as much by the interaction and experiential theories of generational differences as by the maturation theory.[31]

[31] The *maturation* theory holds that intergenerational differences are the result of differing positions in the life cycle, and that each generation in effect repeats the cycle of earlier generations (e.g., each moves from youthful liberalism to elderly conservatism). The *interaction* theory holds that the outlook of a later generation is a reaction to that of the earlier generation (e.g., if one generation values economic success, the next generation will assign low priority to that value and instead pursue cultural achievement). The *experiential* theory holds that a generation is produced by a shared historical experience at a formative time in its development (late teens or early twenties) which shapes its outlook and distinguishes it from earlier and later age cohorts whose views were the product of different experiences (e.g., Munich and Pearl Harbor shaped the outlook of one American generation on foreign policy which remained dominant until an equally traumatic event—Vietnam—generated a different outlook in another generation). On the role of generations in political analysis, see Karl Mannheim, "The Problem of Generations," *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 276-322; Marvin Rintala, "A Generation in Politics: A Definition," *Review of Politics*, 25 (1963), 509-522; Norman B. Ryder, "The Cohort as a Concept in the Study of Social Change," *American Sociological Review*, 30 (1965), 509-522;

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"Among democratic nations," Tocqueville argued, "each new generation is a new people."[32] In some measure, American history is divisible into phases, or "peoples," which more or less coincide with different generations: the Founding Fathers; the new generation of Western political leaders which emerged in and after 1810; the generation focused on sectionalism and slavery which emerged in and after 1840; the post-Civil War generation of politician-plutocrats; the populist-Progressive generation; the stand-patters of the 1920s; the New Deal generation; and the cold war generation which emerged after World War II. During each phase, leaders sprang from a different age cohort and embodied a different set of values and policies which came to reflect a high degree of popular consensus. The major political struggles took place between the advance guard of the new generation and the rear guard of its predecessor. The extent to which conflict has been intergenerational also explains why conflict in the United States has so often had such a fleeting quality. By its very nature, intergenerational conflict tends to be intense but brief, as in due course the consensus of one generation supercedes that of the earlier generation.[33] The shift in consensus pioneered by one generation, however, often means an abrupt and vicious turning on those associated with the consensus of the earlier generation. In the 1940s the Red scare and McCarthyism produced the capture of some Soviet spies, but also the pillorying of many well-meaning liberals of the New Deal generation as security risks and subversives. By 1970, the latter (in almost classic Soviet fashion) were being resur-

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Philip E. Converse, "Of Time and Partisan Stability," *Comparative Political Studies*, 2 (1969), 139-171; Neal E. Cutler, "Generation, Maturation, and Party Affiliation: A Cohort Analysis," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 33 (1969-70), 583-588, and "Generational Analysis in Political Science" (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting, American Political Science Association, September 1971).

[32] Samuel P. Huntington, *Democracy in America* (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), 2, p. 62.

[33] For a striking recent illustration of this point, see Graham Allison, "Cool It: The Foreign Policy of Young America," *Foreign Policy*, (Winter 1970-71), pp. 144-160. Allison contrasts ten "axioms of the postwar era" of foreign policy with their opposites which were the "axioms of elite young Americans" under thirty and argues that there is a fundamental generational difference on foreign policy. And, indeed, there was—for all of about five years in the 1960s. It is quite clear that an overwhelming consensus exists now among elite Americans in their fifties on the validity of Allison's "axioms of young Americans."

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rected and rehabilitated as heroes and martyrs, while a new generation was, in turn, denouncing the foreign policy leaders of the intervening years as imperialists and war criminals.

The relevance of generations to American politics is also underscored by the extent to which various aspects of American experience have been interpreted in terms of cycles which normally approximate a generation in longevity: Schlesinger's liberal and conservative tides, Klingberg's introversion and extroversion moods, Burnham's party realignments, and Harris' oscillations in social mobility serve as examples.[34] Has the history of any other modern society been so frequently interpreted in such generational cycles? In addition, of course, the generational notion has been explicitly applied to the differences between first, second, and third generation immigrants; to the nature of the leadership during the Revolution by Elkins and McKitrick; and to the populist-Progressive era by Hofstadter.[35]

Like classes, generations have objective and subjective existences. Objective existence exists in part simply from age differences, but also from the facts of generational interaction and differences in generational experience. Generational consciousness, however, is a rarer phenomenon and only such consciousness turns the generation from a categoric group into an interaction group and a meaningful political actor. Generational consciousness is not constant: some age cohorts in some places are much more conscious of themselves as a cohesive unit than are others. The generation as a source of political action is also one whose interests cannot normally be defined in familiar economic terms. The generation is an experiential and attitudinal group, not an economic interest group. And, as has been suggested, one of the most significant

[34] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "The Tides of National Politics," *Paths to the Present* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), pp. 89-103; Frank L. Klingberg, "The Historical Alternation of Moods in American Foreign Policy," *World Politics*, 4 (January 1952), 239-273; and Samuel P. Huntington, *Military Intervention, Political Involvement, and the Unlessons of Vietnam* (Chicago: Adlai E. Stevenson Institute of International Affairs, 1968); Walter Dean Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970); P. M. G. Harris, "The Social Origins of American Leaders: The Demographic Foundations," *Perspectives in American History*, 3 (1969), 159-344.

[35] Margaret Mead, *And Keep Your Powder Dry* (New York: William Morrow, 1943); Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, "The Founding Fathers: Young Men of the Revolution," *Political Science Quarterly*, 76 (June 1961), 181-217; Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform*, pp. 165-168.

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differences which can exist between generations is precisely the extent to which they have serious commitments to American political ideals. In addition to the other phases and cycles in terms of which American history can be interpreted along generational lines, the cycle of political idealism and institutional stability clearly plays a major role.

Beyond the One, the Two, and the Many

Contrary to the implications of the consensus thesis, conflict has played a significant role in American political development. Contrary to the images of the pluralist and progressive paradigms, the most significant forms of conflict have not been simply between upper and lower classes or among economic interest groups. They have instead been the product of differing degrees of intensities of belief in American political ideals and of commitment to American political institutions. They have also reflected the differing experiences and priorities of successive generations. The predominant role of these types of conflict helps to differentiate American politics from those of other societies. It also helps to explain some of the patterns of continuity and change which have characterized American politics. In the development and refinement of other comparative, dynamic, and realistic concepts, of which these are only limited specific examples, new paradigms of American politics may eventually emerge which will be more illuminating, useful, and relevant than those of the one, the two, and the many.

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The Burger Court in Historical Perspective

ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON

Every court is the product of its time and reflects the predilections of fallible men in black robes. Whatever the orientation of conflicting values, judicial activism involves a paradox at the heart of constitutional orthodoxy: the Supreme Court considered as the mouthpiece of self-interpreting, self-enforcing law.[1] While wearing the magical habiliments of the law, Supreme Court justices take sides on controversial issues. In a moment of judicial candor, Justice Robert H. Jackson remarked: "We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final."[2]

Even those inclined to think of the Supreme Court as "brushed with divinity" do not accept constitutional theology at face value. Few Americans were shocked in 1968 when the GOP presidential candidate made the Court a major political issue, and bluntly announced his determination to restore "law and order" by changing

[1] Alpheus Thomas Mason, "Myth and Reality in Supreme Court Decisions," *Virginia Law Review* 48 (1962), 1385 and "The Supreme Court: Temple and Forum," *Yale Review* 49 (Summer 1959), 524.

[2] *Brown* v. *Allen*, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) at 540 (Jackson concurring).

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judicial personnel. Presumably the president, given an opportunity, can mold the Constitution simply by a discriminating choice of Supreme Court nominees.

Richard M. Nixon is not the first president to recognize the judicial function as unavoidably political.[3] When Chief Justice Marshall died in 1835 after thirty-four years on the Supreme Court bench, soothsayers and politicians, mindful that President Jackson would choose Marshall's successor, predicted the deluge. President Taft rated his six Supreme Court appointments during four years in the White House a signal achievement, glorying in the fact that President Wilson made only three appointments in twice that time. In the 1920 presidential campaign, former President Taft spoke out emphatically. Not unlike Nixon in 1968, Taft underscored the major domestic issue—appointment of judges who would maintain the Supreme Court as the "bulwark" of property.[4] Thanks to Warren G. Harding's landslide election, Taft himself as chief justice translated political conviction into Supreme Court decisions.[5]

President Eisenhower's most noteworthy act during eight years in the White House was the appointment of Earl Warren as chief justice of the United States. Under Warren's leadership the Court spearheaded a revolution. Looking back dourly on the unforeseen consequences of his choice, Ike called it "the biggest damn fool mistake I ever made in my life."

It fell to Richard M. Nixon, vice president during Eisenhower's administration, to attempt the undoing of the Warren Court's revolutionary decisions. It was, and is, a large order. Can President Nixon fulfill this commitment? The answer is uncertain. Significant clues may be found in the context of history.

[3] More, however, than any president in this century, perhaps more than any in our history, President Nixon's nominations have been made with an eye to politics and ideology rather than to merit or professional distinction. Even the conservative American Bar Association deplored his narrow, political approach to Supreme Court nominations. *American Bar Association Journal* 57 (December 1971), 1209-10.

Nixon was especially critical of the Warren Court's decision expanding the rights of criminal suspects. He supported Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control Act, designed to nullify the Warren Court's decisions in this area. See Louis M. Kohlmeier, *God Save This Honorable Court* (New York, 1972), 250.

[4] William Howard Taft, "Mr. Wilson and the Campaign," *Yale Review* 10 (October 1920), 19-20.

[5] Mason, *William Howard Taft: Chief Justice* (New York, 1964), chap. 10.

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The Judicial World of Penumbra

Descriptive labels enter the stream of judicial politics long after the values and techniques they reveal are commonplace in practice. There are numerous examples: "judicial activism," "judicial self-restraint," "preferred freedoms," "separate but equal," "penumbra." All these catch phrases are well known except "penumbra." In 1965, Connecticut's anticontraceptive statute, though violative of no express provisions of the Constitution, foundered on the penumbral right of privacy. "Specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights," Justice Douglas reasoned for a majority of seven (mentioning Amendments 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 14), "have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that give them life and substance."

"We do not sit," the justice observed, "as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs or social conditions. This law, however, operates directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife and their physician's role in one aspect of that relation."[6]

The reasonable inference is that, in Justice Douglas' mind, the Court *does sit* as a superlegislature in safeguarding the penumbral right of privacy. The distinction thus drawn between the Court's responsibility toward economic and personal rights, if legitimate, could be important, even crucial, as we shall see.

Dissenting justices, Black and Stewart, exploded. Black accused the majority of amending the Constitution under the guise of interpreting it, thus converting the Court into "a day-to-day Constitutional Convention." "I like my privacy as well as the next one," the eighty-year-old justice commented feelingly, "but I am, nevertheless, compelled to admit that government has a right to invade it unless prohibited by some specific constitutional provision."[7]

Nor, according to Black, is the Court's veto power enlarged, as Justice Douglas implied, when confronted with government regulation of personal rather than economic rights. Sounding the note of "strict construction," Justice Black declared war on penumbral embellishments.

Webster defines *penumbra* as a "marginal region or borderland of partial obscurity or some blighting influence as of doubt or cha-

[6] *Griswold* v. *Connecticut*, 381 U.S. 479 (1964) at 482.
[7] *Ibid.*, at 570 (Black dissenting).

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grin." Small wonder Justice Black was outraged. Yet penumbra was not unprecedented. It is, in fact, among the most conspicuous weapons in the arsenal of constitutional interpretation.[8] There are numerous illustrations.

In 1895, Chief Justice Fuller fashioned the "direct and indirect effects" penumbra to undermine the national commerce power, permitting a 95 percent monopoly in the manufacture of sugar to do what the Court denied to Congress—the power to regulate commerce.[9] To dilute the state police power, defined as the authority "to govern men and things," the Court invoked a penumbral right not mentioned in the Constitution—"liberty of contract."[10] Scores of state statutes, including hours-of-labor and minimum-wage laws for women, fell under this nebulous label. The phony "separate but equal" formula kept public schools racially segregated for half a century.[11] A newcomer in the ever-lengthening list of penumbra is "executive privilege."[12] For none does Webster's foggy definition seem more apt.

Less esoteric are the terms "preferred freedoms" and "judicial activism." Both have recently gained widespread currency. Yet both denote values and procedures going back to the beginning of judicial history. "Preferred freedoms" first appeared in a Supreme Court opinion of 1940 to describe constitutional values entitled to special judicial scrutiny.[13] Thereafter it was used to identify the priority

[8] Paul G. Kauper, "Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case," *Michigan Law Review* 64 (1965), 235; Robert G. Dixon, Jr., "The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for an Expanded Law of Privacy?," *Ibid.*, 197; Robert B. McKay, "The Right of Privacy: Emanations and Intimations," *Ibid.*, 259.

[9] *U.S.* v. *E. C. Knight*, 156 U.S. 1 (1895). Dissenting Justice Harlan (the elder) commented: "We have before us the case of a combination which absolutely controls, or may, at its discretion, control the price of all refined sugar in the country." Denial of Congress' power to regulate this monopoly meant that "the Constitution has failed to accomplish one primary object of the Union, which was to place commerce *among the states* under the control of the common government of all the people, and thereby relieve or protect it against burdens or restrictions imposed, by whatever authority, for the benefit of particular localities or interests," at 24, 44.

[10] *Lochner* v. *N.Y.*, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

[11] *Plessy* v. *Ferguson*, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).

[12] See Louis Henkin, *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution* (Mineola, N. Y., 1972) and Raoul Berger, *Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth* (Cambridge, 1974).

[13] The first use of the term, apparently, is in Chief Justice Stone's dissent, *Jones* v. *Opelika*, 316 U.S. 484 at 600, 608.

Justice Rutledge (*Thomas* v. *Collins*, 323 U.S. 516 at 529-30) speaks of "the

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accorded speech, press, religion, and sometimes other Bill of Rights freedoms. Previously property rights were "preferred," but that term was not used to identify them.

Since 1938, Supreme Court justices have tended to rank traditional individual freedoms and assign a larger degree of constitutional protection to one rather than another, depending on judicial preference. This tendency has an illuminating historical background.

John Locke listed man's natural rights as life, liberty, and estates, the latter being his "general name for property." In the Declaration of Independence the Lockean trilogy became "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Did Jefferson intend his euphonious third category to convey something more than property? Commentators are still debating whether this historic sequence implies ranking according to importance. But there can be no doubt that the Revolu-

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preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment. . . . That priority gives these liberties a sanctity and sanction not permitting dubious intrusions. And it is the character of the right, not of the limitation, which determines what standard governs the choice."

In *Lloyd* v. *Tanner*, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), Justice Powell refers to "a special solicitude" which the "courts properly have shown for the guarantees of the First Amendment," at 568.

For an all-out attack on "preferred freedoms," see Justice Frankfurter, concurring, *Kovacs* v. *Cooper*, 336 U.S. 77 (1948) at 90-91. Frankfurter deplored not only the concept itself but also the way in which it entered the stream of constitutional politics. "This is a phrase that has uncritically crept into some recent opinions of this Court. I deem it a mischievous phrase, if it carries the thought, which it may subtly imply, that any law touching communication is infected with presumptive invalidity. . . . I say the phrase is mischievous because it radiates a constitutional doctrine without avowing it. . . . A footnote hardly seems to be an appropriate way of announcing a new constitutional doctrine. . . ."

In 1972 (*Lynch* v. *Household Finance Corp.*, 405 U.S. 538), Justice Stewart, speaking for the Court, declared:

> The dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one. Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or right to travel, is in truth a "personal right," whether the "property" in question be a welfare check, a home, or a savings account. In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither could have meaning without the other. That rights in property are basic civil rights has long been recognized.

Cf. Madison's 1792 *Essay on Property*. Quoted in Mason and Beaney, *American Constitutional Law*, 5th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1972), 292.

The dichotomy Justice Stewart adumbrated is increasingly evident in the Burger Court. See *Lloyd* v. *Tanner*, 405 U.S. 551 and *Pittsburgh Press Co.* v. *Commission on Human Relations*, decided June 21, 1973. *Law Week* 41 (June 21, 1973), 5055.

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tionary Fathers had an abiding concern for property. Eighteenth-century Americans warmly endorsed John Adams' deep-seated conviction that "property is as sacred as the laws of God."[14]

The Founding Fathers, recognizing life, liberty, and property as basic, rejected legislative supremacy. Our Constitution embodies a variety of institutional and written restrictions on all organs of government, capping these with the peculiarly American device—judicial review. In England the fate of property depends primarily on the legislature, in America on courts. Judicial review has been described as "an attempt by American democracy to cover its bet."[15]

During a good part of our history, especially between 1890 and 1937, courts, including the Supreme Bench, gave property priority. In 1922 a federal district court judge declared: "Of the three fundamental principles which underlie government—life, liberty, and property—the chief of these is property."[16] Supreme Court decisions in the 1920s reflect this ranking. While resisting legislative encroachments on property, the justices often upheld government restrictions on freedom of thought. Noting an apparent inconsistency, Professor Felix Frankfurter tried to explain it.

> That a majority of the Supreme Court which frequently disallowed restraint on economic power should so consistently have sanctioned restraints of the mind is perhaps only a surface paradox. There is an underlying unity between fear of ample experimentation in economics and fear of the expression of ideas.[17]

Frankfurter's comment was both perceptive and prophetic. At that very moment—1938—the Court was beginning to reassess constitutional priorities.

Another caption of recent vintage is "judicial activism." Some observers would have us believe that this phenomenon, so conspicuous in decisions of the Warren Court, has no antecedents. The fact is that all Courts have been activist in one way or another.[18]

[14] Quoted in Mason, *Free Government in the Making* (New York, 1965), 179.

[15] Edward S. Corwin, *Book Review, Harvard Law Review*, 56 (1942), 484, 487.

[16] Justice van Orsdel, *Children's Hospital* v. *Adkins*, 284F. (November 6, 1922). Said the humanist, Paul Elmer More: "To the civilized man *the rights of property are more important than the right to life.*" *Shelburne Essays*, 9th series (Boston, 1915), 136. More's italics.

[17] Felix Frankfurter, *Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court* (Cambridge, 1938), 62.

[18] See Mason, "Judicial Activism: Old and New," *Virginia Law Review*, 55 (1969), 385-426.

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John Marshall was an activist. His Court focused on nation building. Under his leadership, national power was expanded and state power curtailed. Property and contract rights ranked high in Marshall's scale of constitutional preferences.

Roger Brooke Taney was an activist. His Court wrestled with sectionalism, asserting for the states a power-generating doctrine called "police" and fashioning at the national level the power-hampering theory of "dual federalism."[19] The Taney Court's misguided activism in *Dred Scott* helped to precipitate the Civil War.[20]

The Courts headed by Chase, Field, and Fuller, preferring an unregulated economy, read the laissez-faire dogma into the Constitution, carrying judicial activism to unprecedented heights. Judicial *review* was rapidly becoming *supremacy*.

The Taft, Hughes, and Stone Courts tried to reconcile conventional "hands off" attitudes with a popular-legislative mandate for government regulation of the economy. In the 1930s judicial activism in defense of property led to a crucial impasse between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Supreme Court. To break that deadlock FDR threatened Court-packing. In an incredibly short time—one year—the justices first vetoed and then legitimatized the New Deal.[21]

Revealed, almost overnight, was the capricious element in the judicial process. In 1936 judicial activism in defense of property had been the Court's posture. One year later, without a single change in judicial personnel, "self-restraint" became the order of the day.

Any inference, however, that the justices abdicated is in error. The Court had merely relinquished its self-acquired guardianship. Under the "self-restraint" banner, the justices would leave protection of property to what Madison called the primary control on government—"dependence on the people," the ballot box.[22] Judicial activism old style was dead; judicial activism new style was just around the corner.

Shortly after the judicial backtrack, Princeton's Professor Edward S. Corwin suggested what lay ahead. The Court, having abandoned

[19] Corwin, "The Passing of Dual Federalism," *Virginia Law Review* 36 (1950).
[20] 19 *Howard* (1857) 393.
[21] See Mason, *The Supreme Court from Taft to Warren* (Baton Rouge, 1968), chaps. 2 and 3.
[22] "A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions." Edward G. Bourne, ed. *The Federalist* (New York, 1937), No. 51, 354-55. Judicial review is among the "auxiliary precautions."

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its role as defender of property, would thereafter "be free, as it had not been in many years, to support the humane values of free thought, free utterance, and fair play"[23] Corwin predicted that surrender of the Court's protective role for economic privilege would allow the justices "to give voice to the conscience of the country." The Court would have plenty to do if it intervened "on behalf of the helpless and oppressed against local injustice and prejudice, rather than intervening in the assertion of out-of-date economic theories, as it has done too often since 1890."[24]

The same year that Professor Corwin made these prognostications Justice Stone, leader of the drive for judicial self-restraint before 1937, pondered with his law clerk, Louis Lusky, the Court's future course. If the judicial baby was not to be thrown out with the bath, the Court must find other interests to guard. The upshot was the three-paragraphed *Carolene Products* footnote, suggesting special scrutiny—judicial activism—in three areas: legislative encroachments on First Amendment freedoms; government action impeding or corrupting the political process; and official conduct affecting adversely the rights of racial, religious, or national minorities.[25] In other words, the limits of judicial self-restraint are reached when First Amendment freedoms are encroached upon, when rights of minorities are infringed, and when the political process itself is thwarted or corrupted.

The brand of judicial activism Professor Corwin and Justice Stone adumbrated reached a high point under the leadership of Earl Warren. Coming to grips with the hard, often unpleasant facts of contemporary American life, the Warren Court translated our longtime commitment to racial equality into a certain measure of social and constitutional reality. The reapportionment decisions brought us closer to the ideal professed in 1776, just governments rest on the consent of the governed. New rules of criminal procedure were formulated, giving a ring of truth to Equality under Law. Of course, it would have been better if reform could have been accomplished by the political arm of government. But this had not been forthcoming, and the prospects were dim.

Opposing the new activism were powerful and persistent dis-

[23] "Statesmanship on the Supreme Court," *American Scholar* (1940), 159, 163.

[24] Corwin, *Constitutional Revolution, Ltd.* (Claremont, Ca., 1941), 110-12.

[25] *United States* v. *Carolene Products Co.* 304 U.S. 144 at 152-53, n.4 (1938). For the story of the footnote's evolution, see Mason, *Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law* (New York, 1956), 512-17.

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senters, notably Justices Frankfurter, Harlan, and, finally, erstwhile libertarian Black. All deplored it as vehemently as did critics of the old activism prior to 1937. Rejecting any particular ranking of constitutional verities, calling for across-the-board judicial self-restraint, they repeatedly warned that "the Constitution does not confer on courts blanket authority to step into every situation where the political branch may be thought to have fallen short."[26] The Court, they argued, was not only ill-equipped but also unauthorized to do so. The dissenters' primary target was Chief Justice Warren himself, who held with Jefferson that the Bill of Rights is "the heart of any constitution."[27]

Once again the judicial fat was in the fire. Once again the Court became a major political issue, in Congress and in the hustings. Just as judicial activism of the 1930s in defense of property and contract rights (then preferred freedoms) became an explosive political issue in 1937, so the Warren Court's activism in support of civil rights (the new preferred freedoms) heated up the 1968 presidential campaign.

Judicial Activism in the Burger Court

The 1968 GOP candidate committed himself to the appointment of "strict constructionists"—presumably those who would call a halt to the Warren Court's activism. During his first term, President Nixon made four appointments, including a chief justice. Yet, even with a nucleus of support carried over from the Warren Court, his pledge remains unfulfilled.

The three major pillars in the Warren Court's constitutional edifice—Race Relations, Reapportionment, and Rules of Criminal Procedure—though somewhat eroded, are still virtually intact. Within a few weeks after taking the Court's center chair, Chief Justice Burger announced, in the face of Attorney General Mitchell's foot-dragging, that "continued operation of segregated schools under a standard of allowing all deliberate speed for desegregation is no longer permissible."[28] A break in the solid judicial dike erected in 1954 against the "separate but equal" formula occurred in 1972,

[26] Dissenting in *Baker* v. *Carr*, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) and *Reynolds* v. *Sims*, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Addresses of John M. Harlan at the American Bar Center, August 13, 1963, and at the Dedication of the Bill of Rights Room, New York City, August 9, 1964.

[27] Henry M. Christman, *The Public Papers of Earl Warren* (New York, 1959), 7.

[28] *Alexander* v. *Holmes County Bd. of Ed.*, 396 U.S. 19 (1969).

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when four Nixon appointees, voting as a bloc and speaking through the chief justice, declared: "The goal is to dismantle dual school systems rather than to reproduce in each classroom a microscopic reflection of the racial proportions of a given geographical area."[29] Underscored are the complexities and limitations of school desegregation. The historic *Brown* decision remains unaltered.

The reapportionment pillar, constructed by a six to three margin, shows least disintegration. Despite decisions endorsing deviations in congressional and state redistricting that departed from the one man, one vote formula, judicially mandated reapportionment is still the "success story of the Warren Court."[30]

New rules of criminal procedure, the Warren Court's most audacious and controversial innovation, have been whittled down but not eliminated. The record is mixed; the rules have been both qualified and extended. Inroads on the rights of the accused occurred in an area where tradition had become almost sacrosanct—trial by a jury of twelve.[31] Arguing that the unanimous vote of twelve jurors was a historical accident, the Nixon-appointed justices, joined by swing-man Byron White, struck a blow for "law and order," upholding a nine-to-three jury conviction in Louisiana and a ten-to-two vote in Oregon. In a biting dissent, Justice Douglas deplored the Burger Court's activism. The majority had discarded two centuries of American history, "restructuring American law . . . for political, not for judicial action."[32] The activist shoe was now on the other foot.

The rights of defendants apparently suffered another setback on December 1, 1973, when the Court upheld two unrelated convictions, one for a traffic violation, the other possession of narcotics.[33] Rejecting the defendants' contention that their Fourth Amendment guarantees against "unreasonable searches and seizure" had been violated, the majority ruled that after a "custodial arrest," no additional justification was necessary to search for other incriminating evidence. Justices Marshall, Douglas, and Brennan dissented. Denouncing the decision as "a clear departure from our long tradition,"

[29] *Wright* v. *Emporia*, 407 U.S. 451 (1972) at 474.

[30] *Connor* v. *Williams*, 404 U.S. 549 (1972); *Mahan* v. *Howell*, 404 U.S. 1201 (1971); *Gaffney* v. *Cummings*, *Law Week*, 41 (June 18, 1973), 4891; *White* v. *Weiser*, 41 (June 18, 1973), 4900. See Robert B. McKay, "Reapportionment: Success Story of the Warren Court," *Michigan Law Review*, 67 (1968), 223.

[31] *Johnson* v. *La.*, 406 U.S. 356 (1972): *Apodaca* v. *Oregon*, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).

[32] *Johnson* v. *La.*, at 394.

[33] *U.S.* v. *Robinson*, 14, *Criminal Law Reporter*, 3043.

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they were concerned lest "a police officer, lacking probable cause to obtain a search warrant, will use a traffic arrest as a pretext to conduct a search." This decision, along with others of a similar nature, indicate a cutting back rather than full retreat from the Warren Court's advances.

On occasion, the Burger Court has extended the rights of defendants. In the 1963 landmark Gideon case, the Warren Court had ruled that an indigent convicted of a felony must be furnished counsel.[34] The Burger Court went further, holding that no person can be jailed for a petty offense unless he has been furnished free counsel or had waived that right. Chief Justice Burger, exponent of efficiency equaled only by William Howard Taft, was relaxed in the face of a more crowded docket certain to result from the ruling. Calmly reassuring his colleagues and the bar, he declared: "The dynamics of the profession have a way of rising to the burdens placed on it."[35]

President Nixon's "law and order" pledge was dealt its most serious blow in the Court's ruling against capital punishment as "cruel and unusual," violative of the Eighth Amendment.[36] The Nixon appointees, voting solidly, could not win the support of Justices Stewart and White. Stewart, stressing the moral and capricious aspects of the death penalty, compared it to being struck by lightning. White's major objection was that capital punishment failed to accomplish its objective—deterrence. For the Nixon-appointed justices the outlawing of capital punishment was judicial activism at its worst. Once again, as before 1937 and in the heyday of Earl Warren, the justices apparently entered an area reserved for legislators.

It is as risky to apply labels—"preferred freedoms," "judicial self-restraint," "judicial activism," or even "strict construction"—to Nixon appointees as to the justices they replaced.[37]

A striking illustration occurred January 22, 1973, when the Court, voting seven to two, upset abortion laws in Texas, and many other states.[38] Ironically, to buttress its ruling the majority, speaking

[34] 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

[35] *Argersinger* v. *Hamlin*, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) at 44.

[36] *Furman* v. *Georgia*, 408 U.S 238 (1972).

[37] Justice Frankfurter, admired by President Nixon as a "strict constructionist," observed: "The words of the Constitution are so unrestricted in their intrinsic meaning, or by their history or by tradition or by prior decisions that they leave the individual justice free, if indeed they do not compel him, to gather meaning not from reading the Constitution but from reading life." Cited by James Simon, *In His Own Image: The Supreme Court in Richard Nixon's America* (New York, 1973), 6.

[38] *Doe* v. *Wade*, *Law Week*, 41 (January 22, 1973), 4233.

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through Justice Blackmun, drew on Justice Douglas' penumbral weapon—"right of privacy." In 1973, three Nixon appointees (Burger, Blackmun, and Powell), all presumably "strict constructionists," opposed to judicial activism, sanctioned a constitutional embellishment too extreme even for Justice Black!

Dissenting Justice White called the abortion decision "an exercise of raw judicial power." Refusing to fly in the face of President Nixon's avowed opposition to abortion, Justice Rehnquist charged that the Court's usurpation of the legislative function rivaled Justice Peckham's discredited activism in the Lochner case of 1905, which featured the "liberty of contract" penumbra. Reputedly the most conservative member of the present Court, Rehnquist placed himself in the enviable self-restraint tradition of Mr. Justice Holmes.

The Supreme Court: Bastion of Freedom

The line-up in the abortion and other cases indicates continuing cleavage among the justices concerning the Court's role. Raised are questions of enduring significance:

Is it reasonable to censure judicial activism on behalf of economic interests and applaud more searching judicial scrutiny of encroachments on First Amendment and other Bill of Rights freedoms?

Does our political and constitutional heritage accord weightier sanction to judicial activism on behalf of human rights than to its activism in halting legislative effort to make government an instrument of economic and social reform?

Can the Supreme Court, a politically nonresponsible body, block the will of the majority in the name of minorities and still be considered a democratic institution?

These questions may be narrowed to two: If the Court has any positive or creative role, what is it? What interests, rights, or values should the Court serve?

Supreme Court history provides conflicting answers to these queries. One is that social and economic change should be left to the political process rather than to the judiciary. The contrasting view is that the Court should bring about needed adaptations which, for one reason or another, have failed in their accomplishment by other means.[39]

The most persistent and outspoken exponent of judicial hands-off

[39] For Justice's Harlan's views, see *U.S. News and World Report*, December 18. 1967, 36.

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in the Warren Court was Justice Harlan. Often joined by Frankfurter, Harlan made no bones, in judicial opinions and in off-Court pronouncements, concerning his endorsement of judicial self-restraint. Justice Abe Fortas endorsed Harlan's position. During the Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings on Fortas' nomination to the chief justiceship, a committee member asked: "To what extent and under what circumstances do you believe that the Court should attempt to bring about social, economic or political changes?" Justice Fortas, an activist second only to Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, gave an answer as surprising as it was self-serving. "Zero. Absolutely zero."[40]

Other justices, including some of the most eminent, insist that the Court has a positive function. The Court's "chief worth," Justice Cardozo declared, is in making "vocal and audible the ideals that might otherwise be silenced."[41] "Our judges are not monks or scientists," Chief Justice Warren observed, "but participants in the living stream of our national life."[42] At the Conference on World Peace Through Law in 1973, Justice Thurgood Marshall argued that "Courts have a special responsibility to preserve and enforce the moral pillars on which society is built."[43]

Activism, not restraint, has been the judicial practice. In 1896, seven Supreme Court justices put "separate but equal" into the Constitution. In 1954, nine justices took it out. Each of these decisions illustrates judicial activism—one restricting human freedom, the other enlarging it. "Judicial self-restraint" is itself sometimes a disguise for promotion or protection of a deeply cherished interest.

The Warren Court's constitutional jurisprudence, in all its aspects, stands as a testimonial to the conviction that the Supreme Court should reflect and enforce the social conscience of the nation. Change of judicial personnel may have dimmed but not erased this image. With the support of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, in 1970 the Court attributed to the Founding Fathers the intention to make courts "palladiums of liberty," "citadels of justice."[44]

The cleavage that one witnesses in the Supreme Court throughout its history and in our own time is rooted not so much in an ideo-

[40] *U.S. Congress Senate Committee on the Judiciary Hearings.* Nomination of Abe Fortas, 90th Congress, 2nd session; July 16, 1968, 105-06.

[41] Benjamin N. Cardozo, *The Nature of the Judicial Process* (New Haven, 1921), 94.

[42] Quoted in Christman, p. 226.

[43] *New York Times*, September 21, 1973.

[44] *Illinois* v. *Allen*, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) at 346-47.

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logical clash as in fundamental differences concerning what judges, as judges, should do. Justice Holmes waged unrelenting war on the social Darwinism that motivated the judicial activism of his day. Yet, in off-Court comments, Holmes warmly endorsed the laissez-faire dogma. For Holmes the "Constitution is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel, and even shocking, ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question— whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States."[45] Justice Holmes was the champion even of opinions "we hate." Justice Stone, a New Hampshire Republican, distrusted the New Deal and all its works, but cast his vote to sustain it. The explanation is simple: neither Holmes nor Stone could discover anything in the Constitution forbidding the contested legislation.

Black and Douglas' latter-day quarrels stemmed from divergent conceptions of the Court's role, not from ideology. The division among Nixon-appointed justices in the abortion case reflects basic differences concerning the judicial task. After donning the robes of Chief Justice, Warren Burger commented: "Six months ago if you asked what the Supreme Court should and should not do, I probably could have given you a quick answer. But now I'm not so sure. The hardest question is when the Court should step in."[46]

Logic, history, judicial precedent, eminent Supreme Court justices, and the Constitution itself indicate that the Supreme Court has a special responsibility toward human rights; toward minorities, helpless in the face of majority rule; and toward the unimpeded, uncorrupted functioning of the political process. In 1941, after the Court had reversed its position on preferred freedoms, Robert H. Jackson rationalized the Court's new posture. The justice saw "nothing covert or conflicting" in decisions upholding social legislation, while vetoing legislative repression of religious freedom, free speech, and free assembly.

> Ordinarily, legislation whose basis in economic wisdom is uncertain can be redressed by the processes of the ballot box or the pressures of opinion. But when the channels of opinion and of peaceful persuasion are corrupted or clogged, these political correctives can no longer be relied on, and the democratic system is threatened at its most vital point. In that event the Court, by intervening, restores the processes

[45] *Lochner* v. *N.Y.*, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) at 76.
[46] Quoted in Mason and Beaney, *American Constitutional Law*, XXV-VI.

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of democratic government; it does not disrupt them.[47]

Two years later, as a Supreme Court justice, Jackson expressed these views as the Court's spokesman: "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and establish them as legal principles to be applied by Courts."[48]

Jackson echoed Justice Stone's *Carolene Products* footnote, the groundwork for which had been laid, as Stone acknowledged, in the opinions of certain of our most distnguished justices, including Hughes and Holmes. In 1937, Chief Justice Hughes wrote:

> Freedom of speech and of the press are fundamental rights. The rights themselves must not be curtailed. The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the Constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic the very foundation of constitutional government.[49]

[47] Robert H. Jackson, *The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy* (New York, 1941), 284-85.

In Jackson's final pronouncements, commentators note qualifications of his liberal stance. See Robert H. Jackson, *The American Supreme Court in the American System of Government* (New York, 1955), 57-58. Likewise, libertarian Justice Black felt obliged to respond to "current comments that I have changed my views." *A Constitutional Faith* (New York, 1968), xiv. In 1945, when Chief Justice Stone found himself pitted against judicial activists on the left, he dolefully reminisced. See Mason, *The Supreme Court from Taft to Warren* (Baton Rouge, 1968), 168.

[48] *West Virginia Bd. of Ed.* v. *Barnette*, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1942). Cf. letter from Madison to E. Randolph, May 31, 1789. *The Writings of James Madison* 381 (G. Hunt, ed., 1904). Madison said: "The great object in view is to limit and qualify the powers of Government, by excepting out of the grant of power those cases in which the Government ought not to act, or to act only in a particular mode. They point these exceptions sometimes against the abuse of the Executive power, sometimes against the Legislative, and, in some cases, against the community itself; or, in other words, against the majority in favor of the minority."

[49] *D. Jonge* v. *Oregon*, 299 U.S. 353 at 365 (1937). In an off-court pronouncement, Hughes said: "We protect the fundamental rights of minorities, in order to save democratic government from destroying itself." *Proceedings in Commemoration of the 150th Anniversary of the First Congress*, H.R. Doc. no. 212, 76th Congress, 1st session 32 (1939).

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Of Holmes, Professor Frankfurter said: "He attributed very different legal significance to those liberties of the individual which history has attested as indispensable conditions of a free society" and "was far more ready to find legislative invasion in this field than in the area of debatable economic reform."[50]

Justice Jackson penetrated and reconciled the "surface paradox" Frankfurter detected five years earlier in the Court's decisions of the 1920s—a jaundiced eye toward government regulation of property and leniency toward restrictions on First Amendment freedoms. Yet, in 1943, when Jackson took up the judicial cudgels in support of religious freedom, Frankfurter, then a Supreme Court justice, dissented. Deploring the new activism, Frankfurter protested that "judicial review is itself a limitation on popular government."[51] So it is. That is what the Founding Fathers intended it to be. Judicial review is not an alien appendage, not, as Alexander Bickel says, "a deviant institution in American democracy."[52] "Fear of popular majorities," Professor Corwin observes, "lies at the very basis of the whole system of judicial review, and indeed our entire constitutional system."[53] In a free government (and that is what we have), judicial review is an essential auxiliary, safeguarding minorities against the arbitrary will of majorities.

For Jefferson and Madison the argument of "great weight" in support of the Bill of Rights was the "legal check which it puts in the hands of the Judiciary."[54] "Independent tribunals of justice," Madison predicted, "will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardian of those rights . . . against every assumption of power in the Legislative or Executive."[55]

Former Justice Goldberg's Northwestern University lectures of 1971 propound this theme, and apply it to contemporary issues. Building on a long and eminent judicial tradition, he observed:

> A proper view of judicial restraint applies with far greater force to laws that regulate economic and social matters than to laws that inhibit the

[50] *Mr. Justice Holmes and the Constitution*, p. 51.

[51] Justice Frankfurter in *Minersville School District* v. *Gobitis*, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) at 600.

[52] Alexander Bickel, *The Least Dangerous Branch* (Indianapolis, 1962), 18.

[53] Edward S. Corwin, "The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment," *Michigan Law Review*, 7 (1909), 643, 670.

[54] Letter from Jefferson to Madison, March 15, 1789, Julian P. Boyd, ed., *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson* (Princeton, 1950), 659.

[55] 1 *Annals of Congress* (1789-90), 1834, 432, 439.

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> exercise of basic personal liberty. . . .[56] "judicial restraint" has only limited applicability when the treatment of minorities, the fundamental liberties of individuals, or the health of the political process are at issue. . . .[57]

Goldberg believed that inevitable change in personnel would not end judicial activism in this area:

> Our system has now been operating under a Supreme Court for almost two centuries. Yet during all that time the Court has never overruled precedent to any significant degree in order to facilitate a significant contraction of human liberties. . . . Once fundamental rights have been recognized, there has never been a general reversal of direction by the Court, a going back against the trend of history.[58]

"There is an enormous difference," Goldberg concludes, "between not opening new frontiers of human liberty and closing ones formerly open, between declining to move forward and legitimatizing repression."[59]

Justice Goldberg was speaking in 1971. In the Pentagon Papers case, the Court, headed by Warren Burger, had outlawed prior restraint on the right to publish.[60] Though the vote was six to three (Burger, Blackmun, and Harlan dissenting) the chief justice told an interviewer that on the substantive issue the justices were "actually unanimous."[61]

In June 1972, with four Nixon appointees in their seats, the Court adjudicated a hotly contested issue at the heart of the administration's "law and order" commitment. Involved was the government's claim that electronic surveillance approved by Attorney General Mitchell, but without prior judicial endorsement, was lawful as a reasonable exercise of the president's power to protect national security. Two lower federal courts had ruled against Mitchell and the president. The case had been appealed and was then pending in the High Court.

Disinclined to speculate on the outcome, Goldberg argued that the

[56] Arthur Goldberg, *Equal Justice: The Supreme Court in the Warren Era* (Evanston, Ill., 1971), 41.

[57] *Ibid.*, 61.

[58] *Ibid.*, 90.

[59] *Ibid.*, 93. Goldberg's thesis was anticipated in Mason, *The Supreme Court from Taft to Warren* (1958), chaps. 5 and 6. See also Mason, *The Supreme Court: Palladium of Freedom* (1962), chap. 2.

[60] *New York Times* v. *United States*, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

[61] *New York Times*, July 6, 1971, p. 15, col. 2.

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Supreme Court ought to rule in accordance with its function as ultimate guardian of constitutionally protected fundamental rights. The justices, speaking through Powell, a Nixon appointee, did just that —unanimously. Framed in the idiom of basic principles, the Court's words are pointed and unqualified:

> There is, understandably, a deep-seated uneasiness and apprehension that [electronic surveillance] will be used to intrude upon cherished privacy of law-abiding citizens. . . . Those charged with investigative and prosecutorial duty should not be the sole judge of when to utilize constitutionally sensitive means in pursuing their tasks. . . . Official surveillance, whether its purpose be criminal investigation or on-going intelligence gathering, risks infringement of constitutionally protected privacy of speech. . . .
>
> History abundantly documents the tendency of government—however benevolent and benign its motives—to view with suspicion those who most fervently dispute its policies. The danger to political dissent is acute where the government attempts to act under so vague a concept as the power to protect "domestic security". . . . The price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread of subjection to an unchecked surveillance power. Nor must the fear of unauthorized official eavesdropping deter vigorous citizen dissent and discussion of Government action in private conversation. For private dissent, no less than open public discourse, is essential to our free society.[62]

Upheld was the people's right to know. Protected were rights deemed fundamental in both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution—the right to consent, to criticize and oppose, the right to persuade, and the willingness to be persuaded. As to these values, Justice Powell expressed sentiments worthy of Jefferson, of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis D. Brandeis, Harlan Fiske Stone, and Earl Warren.

Without equal opportunity to utilize crucial preliminaries—press, speech, and assembly—the idea of government by consent becomes an empty declamation. In a free society, majorities are in flux. Tomorrow's majority may have a different composition as well as different goals. Judicial defense of the political rights of minorities thus becomes, not the antithesis of majority rule, but its very foundation. The current majority must leave open the political channels

[62] *United States* v. *United States District Court*, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) at 312, 314, 317, 320.

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by which it can be replaced when no longer able to command popular support.

Free interchange of ideas and integrity of the political process became all the more urgent after 1937, when the Court, surrendering its self-acquired activism, restored the primary control on government— "dependence on the people." Thereafter, the justices exercised the "auxiliary" function Jefferson and Madison anticipated in urging Bill of Rights amendments. Ironically, the Supreme Court, in structure and organization the most oligarchical branch of our government, bears the responsibility for maintaining the sine qua non of free government—uninhibited discussion and dissent as valid forces in public action.

"Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent," Justice Jackson warned, "soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard."[63]

Identification of the Warren Court's constitutional jurisprudence with the Bill of Rights is its hallmark. President Nixon is committed to the selection of Supreme Court justices who will undercut it. Will he succeed? Thanks to a vigilant Senate, he has not yet done so. On the basis of the record to date, it is safe to predict he will not prevail even with the appointment of a Court entirely of his own making.

[63] 319 U.S. 623, at 641.

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Politics and the Changing Law of the Sea

LOUIS HENKIN

The Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference is scheduled to begin its working session this coming June.[1] It will reconsider every facet, singly and together, of the complex that is the law of the sea. The law that will probably emerge will differ radically from that codified and developed only fifteen years ago at the First Law of the Sea Conference,[2] creating new concepts and perhaps new institutions to govern the seventy percent of the earth that is sea. Agreements reached—or failure to

[1] An organizational session was held at the United Nations Headquarters in December 1973. The second, substantive stage of the Conference which begins in June will be at Caracas. See United Nations General Assembly Resolution (hereafter, UNGA Res.) 3067 (XXVIII), 16 November 1973.

Many of the source materials referred to in this article are available conveniently in two volumes compiled and edited by Lay, Churchill, and Nordquist, for a conference on "New Directions in the Law of the Sea" of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law (1973); they are cited hereafter as *Documents*.

[2] At the First Law of the Sea Conference, p. 50 below. The Second Law of the Sea Conference held in Geneva in 1960 was essentially a postscript to the 1958 Conference, devoted to a second (also unsuccessful) attempt to define the width of the territorial sea and the extent of coastal-state jurisdiction over fishing. See UNGA 1307 (XIII), 10 December 1958.

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agree—will affect vital and important interests of all nations.

For two hundred years the law of the sea had been stable and generally accepted. Today, that law is in disarray, beset by uncertainty, and subject to conflicting claims and counterclaims. Once the law of the sea was the special concern of the few seafaring peoples, and the shape and content of that law were determined largely by the dominant interests of maritime powers. Today the law is being molded by many states, principally the weaker and poorer states, including those that have small use of the sea. Once the law of the sea governed principally the use of the sea as a highway of navigation and a source of food. Now the law has added new dimensions to govern new and varied uses, and the recovery of a wealth of new mineral resources. Once the hallmark of the law of the sea was "freedom," meaning essentially nonregulation and laissez-faire. Now we hear new claims by coastal states to exclusive rights in more and more of the sea for more and more purposes, new claims by states generally in the seas at large, new proposals for exploitation of resources by "mankind," new emphasis on regulation of other uses of the sea for the general welfare.

To the student of international politics the changing of the law of the sea drives home old lessons in new garb. For lawmaking is a political activity. In the international system law is made, or remade, by the political actors, principally the governments of states; but the policies of governments are sometimes shaped by a complex of domestic, transnational and international factors. Such law is observed, and survives, if it continues to serve the purposes for which it was made and if its principal beneficiaries have the will and the ability to resist violations. New law that emerges results from vectors of political force, but political force is itself a resultant of a complex of influences.

What has changed in the sea, and in the political universe that produced its old law? What are the issues that divide states? Which are the principal protagonists? What are the political forces that will determine the outcome? How material are the ideological divisions of our times, and political disputes in ideological guise? What law is likely to emerge? What will happen if there is no agreement?

The Old Law

The law of the sea has for long been subsumed in the slogan "the

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freedom of the seas."[3] That has meant primarily freedom for all to navigate in security subject only to "rules of the road," at least in time of peace. The seas were also free for other uses such as recreation or dumping waste. The principle of freedom, or one closely related to it,[4] also implied that the resources of the sea, principally fish, were free for all to take.

There was one small exception to this freedom. Coastal states early claimed the right to exclude hostile vessels, and the warring vessels of other states, from a narrow band of sea adjacent to their coasts.[5] They asserted authority in coastal areas to prevent smuggling and other violations of their laws. They also claimed exclusive rights to the fish of the coastal waters and the sedentary species of their sea-bed, and to mine that sea-bed or the subsoil by digging under water or by tunneling from shore. In time it became accepted that a coastal state has effective sovereignty (and therefore full title and authority for all purposes) in its territorial sea, subject only to a right of "innocent passage" for foreign vessels.[6] The dominant view—shared by the United States, Great Britain, Japan, and others—was that this territorial sea extended three miles from shore. In addition, coastal states enjoyed rights to enforce their immigration, customs, sanitation and other laws in a contiguous zone of undefined breadth beyond the territorial sea.

The principles I have described were largely accepted through the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries. Occasional claims by coastal states to extend their territorial sea were effectively rejected. There were issues about "innocent passage," particularly as to whether it applied in time of war, or to military vessels even in time of peace, and uncertainties about the contiguous zone. Outside of territorial waters there were occasional claims to exclusive fishing rights by virtue of long uninterrupted usage ("historic" rights). In time of war coastal nations excluded belligerent acts from a wider zone.[7] After the Second World War the

[3] For a brief survey, see Henkin, "Changing Law for the Changing Seas," in *Uses of the Seas* (E. Gullion, ed., 1968).

[4] Strictly, the right to fish depended on who "owned" the seas or the fish. There has been a classic debate as to whether they belonged to everyone or to no one, but all accepted the right to fish and to keep what was caught.

[5] The classic history is T. W. Fulton, *The Sovereignty of the Sea* (1911).

[6] See generally P. C. Jessup, *The Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction* (1927). But aircraft have no right of "innocent passage" in the air space over the territorial sea.

[7] See, for example, the Declaration of Panama, 1 *Dept. State Bull.* 331 (1939).

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United States and Canada established Air Defense Identification Zones of several hundred miles, requiring approaching planes—usually from the sea—to identify themselves. But these, too, were considered minor and reasonable extensions of traditional law.

A major blow for change in the law of the sea was struck by the Truman Proclamation.[8] The Second World War had emphasized the need of the United States for new sources of energy and the importance of being independent of foreign sources. Geologists had confirmed huge resources of oil and gas off the shores of the United States, outside her territorial seas, and technology was making them economically accessible. In 1945, President Truman proclaimed that these resources should be used and, since their exploitation depended effectively on the coastal state, that it was "reasonable and just" that the coastal state take them. He therefore claimed for the United States exclusive rights to the resources of her continental shelf.[9]

By the Truman Proclamation the United States asserted an exclusive authority outside her territorial sea. Other nations, however, did not protest; rather, they followed suit, and the doctrine of the continental shelf became "instant" international law. But it was limited new law. While the coastal state acquired exclusive rights to the mineral resources of the sea-bed and subsoil of the continental shelf, the waters above the continental shelf, outside the three-mile territorial zone, remained high seas, with the usual freedom for navigation, and with fishing open to all.[10]

But the United States taught better than it had intended. If the

[8] Presidential Proclamation 2667, September 28, 1945: Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, 10 *Fed. Reg.* 12303 (1945), 59 *Stat.* 884; also in 1 *Documents* 106.

[9] The continental shelf is the underwater plateau extending from the low-water mark to where the sea-bed begins to slope radically. It generally includes much more than the three-mile sea-bed of the territorial sea, and, while its extent differs from place to place, it is accepted as a convenient approximation that the shelf runs to the 200-meter isobath, i.e., to where the waters are 200 meters deep. See L. Henkin, *Law for the Sea's Mineral Resources* (1968), p. 1, n. 2.

[10] President Truman established at the same time fishing conservation zones in areas of the high seas contiguous to U. S. coasts, but even for this limited purpose he claimed no exclusive jurisdiction there for the United States if nationals of other countries also fished there. See Presidential Proclamation 2668, September 28, 1945: Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High Seas, 10 *Fed. Reg.* 12304 (1945), 59 *Stat.* 885; Also in 1 *Documents* 95. But compare note 20 below.

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United States could claim coastal minerals, why could not others claim coastal fish, or other rights beyond their territorial sea? Between 1945 and 1958 there came a series of new claims by coastal states, some to wide fishing zones, some to wide territorial sea (although these, too, may have been designed principally as a way of claiming the resources of more sea or sea-bed).[11] The United States and many other nations resisted such coastal-state expansion. The experts of the International Law Commission, charged to codify and develop the law of the sea, prepared drafts essentially reflecting the traditional law plus the postwar doctrine of the continental shelf. The comments of governments on the commission's drafts also generally reflected that law.

The First UN Law of the Sea Conference, meeting in Geneva in 1958, produced four conventions.[12] Basically these reaffirmed the freedom of the seas as long conceived, the coastal state's sovereignty in its territorial sea and its ancillary rights in a contiguous zone, and its sovereign rights to resources in the continental shelf. There was pressure for a wider territorial sea, principally from states which wished a wider exclusive fishing zone, but extravagant extensions had no serious support.[13] In the end, the width of the territorial sea remained undefined, but in the general view it was surely no greater than twelve miles.[14] Claims to wide fishing

[11] A table of coastal-state claims as of 1958 is reproduced in *Manual of Public International Law* (Sørensen, ed., 1968) at 244. For a more recent table see "National Claims to Maritime Jurisdictions, International Boundary Study No. 36," January 3, 1972, issued by the Geographer, U.S. Department of State. See also 2 *Documents* 833 *et seq.*

[12] Convention on the High Seas, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, T.I.A.S. No. 5200; Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, T.I.A.S. No. 5639; Convention on the Continental Shelf, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, T.I.A.S. No. 5578; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, 559 U.N.T.S. 285, T.I.A.S. No. 5969. Also in 1 *Documents* 1, 101, 257, 353. For a table of ratifications of these conventions see 2 *Documents* 799.

[13] The widest zone which had a substantial number of adherents was twelve miles, supported by the Soviet bloc and the Arab states.

[14] There was an agreed provision that the contiguous zone beyond the territorial sea extended to no more than twelve miles from shore. See Article 24(2) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, note 12 above. Earlier, the International Law Commission, noting the lack of agreement on the width of the territorial sea, had concluded that "international law does not permit an extension of the territorial sea beyond twelve miles." See 1956 *Report of the International Law Commission*, comment on draft Article 3.

At the Second Law of the Sea Conference in 1960, a proposal for a six-mile territorial sea with an additional six-mile exclusive fishing zone (subject only to the historic rights of others) came within one vote of the required two-thirds majority.

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zones had only limited support. The continental shelf was defined so as to give the coastal state exclusive rights to resources of the sea-bed out to the 200-meter isobath, "or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters" permitted exploitation of the resources (but clearly the authors contemplated only minor extensions).[15]

In sum, the law of the sea that emerged from the first UN Conference was essentially the traditional law. And it was widely accepted. Although many states refrained from adhering to the 1958 Conventions,[16] they did not necessarily reject them: many saw no need to adhere since they enjoyed the same rights without doing so, and the principal provisions of the Conventions constituted also customary law.[17] Of course, many coastal states still wished, and some claimed, wider fishing zones, but for the most part these claims were not consistently pressed.

The Old Law and New Politics

It is difficult to date precisely when the old consensus on the law of the sea, essentially reaffirmed little more than a decade ago, began to fall away. It is also difficult to identify and weigh the forces responsible for that erosion, but, surely, one must look for them at least as much outside the seas as within them.

Since about 1960, changes in international society have modified the prevailing political forces, beating against several pillars of the international system and of its law. Decolonization (and other "self-determination") has increased to more than one hundred and forty the number of states, the units of the political system which have authority to make and to change law. The mass of new states share with older states in Latin America, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa, bonds of poverty and underdevelopment, and some resentment against the Western, developed states which have long

[15] For a debate on the extent of the continental shelf under the convention, see, for example, "International Law and 'the Interests': the Law of the Seabed," 63 *Am. J. Int'l L.* 504 (1969); Finlay, "The Outer Limit of the Continental Shelf. A Rejoinder to Professor Louis Henkin," 64 *Am. J. Int'l L.* 42 (1970); "A Reply to Mr. Finlay," 64 *Am. J. Int'l L.* 62 (1970). The convention also applied the doctrine of the continental shelf to living resources, i.e., to the sedentary species of the sea-bed, and extended the doctrine to the "coasts of islands." Article 1(b).

[16] See Henkin, *Law for the Sea's Mineral Resources* (1958), p. 14, n. 33.

[17] Compare the Judgment of the International Court of Justice in the *North Sea Continental Shelf Cases*, (1969), *I.C.J. Rep.* 3.

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dominated the international scene. This "Third World" has developed loose forms of political and economic cooperation including "bloc" voting in international organizations. With varying success they have cooperated to complete decolonization and end white racism in Southern Africa, to begin their own economic development, to change the laws and patterns of international trade, to assert national sovereignty and control over their natural resources against the claims of foreign investors, and in other ways to resist "economic imperialism."

In these efforts they have had some support from the USSR (when her own interests would not be jeopardized, of course); and recently Communist China has sought to emerge as their champion. The United States and other Western powers, often the principal targets of proposed changes, have supported some efforts and resisted others; but even resistance has not been as wholehearted as it might have been in the past. This attitude comes perhaps from some guilt over past imperialism and present wealth, from some sympathy for the aspirations of the underdeveloped, and from some reluctance to allow these many states to identify their interests with those of the Communist powers. Even when smaller nations challenged cherished principles of traditional law, even when they attacked important Western interests—as when they expropriated (without meaningful compensation) major American investments—resistance and retaliation were restrained. Certainly there have been no ready uses of force or of "gunboat diplomacy" for they would violate the United Nations Charter and are otherwise impolitic. The threshold of national interest that will support them is very high; in particular, only very big stakes will cause larger states to use force against smaller ones, and economic interests are usually not big enough.[18]

The winds of political change also blew over the seas, particularly the coastal seas. Ecuador and Peru insisted on a 200-mile fishing zone and seized United States tuna boats that flouted it; they were confident that the United States would not react strongly.[19] Such examples and their erosive consequences for the traditional law probably encouraged others:[20] Iceland closed a large zone to ves-

[18] See L. Henkin, *How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy* (1968), Chapters X, XI.

[19] The United States government even paid substantial fines imposed on the captains of the American tuna boats who fished in the disputed zones.

[20] The example of other states supported pressures from national fishing in-

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sels of Great Britain, her ally, that had long fished there. In 1970, Canada unilaterally announced a 100-mile antipollution zone in the Arctic, over strong protest by the United States.[21]

The once-accepted law of the sea has been shaken hardest through the United Nations; there the new politics is concentrated and has many voices and votes. In his famous intervention in the General Assembly in 1967, Ambassador Pardo of Malta asked that the mineral wealth of the sea-bed beyond "present national jurisdiction" be reserved for mankind.[22] His initiative has evoked proposals for a radical new law for the international sea-bed; it has also helped explode the "present national jurisdiction" in the sea and opened for revision other fundamentals of the law.[23]

Conflicting Interests in the International Sea-Bed

In response to Ambassador Pardo, the General Assembly established a Sea-bed Committee which became a forum for preliminary negotiation. In 1970 the Assembly adopted, without dissent, a declaration of principles:[24] notably, that the sea-bed beyond national jurisdiction is not subject to national appropriation and sovereignty but is "the common heritage of mankind"; it shall be exploited for "the benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of the geographical location of States, whether land-locked or coastal, and taking into particular consideration the interests and needs of

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dustries, which led even the United States, long a champion of narrow coastal-state jurisdiction, to proclaim a twelve-mile exclusive fishing zone. 80 *Stat.* 908 (1966). Compare the European Fisheries Convention of 1964, 581 U.N.T.S. 57 (1 *Documents* 41), which provides for an exclusive fishing zone of six miles, and an additional six miles open only to the coastal state and to states that had habitually fished there between 1953 and 1962.

[21] 18-19 Elizabeth II, c. 47 (1969-70), 9 *Int'l Legal Materials* 543, 598; also *id.* at 605 (1970); also 1 *Documents* 199-229. See Henkin, "Arctic Anti-Pollution: Does Canada Make—or Break—International Law?", 65 *Am. J. Int'l L.* 131 (1971).

[22] For the original agenda item and the accompanying memorandum see UN Doc. A/ 6695 (1967). The item has appeared on the agenda of the General Assembly every year since then.

[23] Although the agenda item refers only to the sea-bed, the ocean floor and its subsoil, it soon became the occasion for discussing other sea-issues as well. Compare note 30 below. On the other hand, although the item spoke of reserving the sea-bed "exclusively for peaceful purposes," issues of disarmament and arms control were largely left for consideration in the context of disarmament discussions generally. See p. 66 below.

[24] UNGA Res. 2749 (XXV), 17 December 1970, 2 *Documents* 740.

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the developing countries."

While the agreed principles preclude assertions of national sovereignty, they settled little else. Unanimous agreement could be obtained only at a high level of generality and ambiguity leaping over major conflicts. The sea-bed is the heritage of "mankind" but there has been no agreement as to who is or represents mankind, or how mankind should enjoy that heritage. Only a few, developed states have the capital, the technology, and the enterprise to exploit the resources of the international sea-bed; they, of course, prefer maximum freedom to do so and maximum revenue for themselves and their nationals. They resist international organizations with substantial authority, surely organizations run by simple majority. Mankind, they might say, would enjoy the benefits of its heritage, and enjoy them most quickly and cheaply, if the developed states were allowed to exploit it competitively for profit (though some revenue for international development might also be provided).

The many poor states have no hopes of exploiting those resources themselves, but they demand a share in that wealth and a voice in its exploitation. Some, perhaps, also see an opportunity to establish international institutions with authority over these large areas of the earth, eventually giving the mass of small nations control also over other uses of the sea-bed and perhaps of the sea. A group of Latin American and other developing states have insisted that the sea-bed should be exploited exclusively by an international authority governed by all states voting equally,[25] with all the revenue going for international development.

Since the developed nations have similar interests in the international sea-bed their ideological differences—e.g., between the U.S. and the USSR—bring differences only in the degree, means, and style with which they meet the aspirations of the many "unaligned" states.[26] The United States is more willing to generate revenue for international development and to build international in-

[25] Some of these states believe that this authority should be able to control the exploitation of these resources so as not to compete unduly with national mining industries of developing states. Compare UNGA Res. 2750A (XXV), 17 December 1970, 2 *Documents* 738; Report of the UN Secretary General, A/AC. 138/36 (1971); UNGAOR 26th Sess., Supp. No. 21, A/8421, 1971.

[26] Compare their cooperation to achieve the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof, 10 *Int'l Legal Materials* 146 (1971), 1 *Documents* 288.

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stitutions and authority; the Soviet Union is more forthcoming in principle and in rhetoric, but resists major contributions of funds and strong international institutions. The People's Republic of China is strongest in championing the cause of the underdeveloped, but it would be surprising if, when law is ready to be made, she did not see herself as a soon-to-be, if not already, developed nation as regards sea mining, and perceive her interests accordingly.

With the interests of the underdeveloped arrayed generally against those of the few advanced states, the majority sought to improve its prospects by using its votes to declare a "moratorium": no one may exploit the resources of the international sea-bed until a new regime is agreed upon (and then, presumably, only in accordance with its terms).[27] The United States rejected the moratorium as contrary to accepted principles of freedom,[28] and has stated that it will proceed unilaterally, or in concert with like-minded states, unless an acceptable regime were established early.[29] American companies will be among the first capable of mining "beyond national jurisdiction," and the United States is determined to protect their opportunity.

Expanding National Jurisdiction

The suggestion that the future law of the international sea-bed is an issue essentially between the few developed and the many underdeveloped states requires a substantial modification. For the discussions to date have carefully avoided a key element: where would national jurisdiction end and the international sea-bed begin? The extent and content of coastal state jurisdiction, moreover, are issues that regard not sea-bed minerals alone. That all sea issues—notably, coastal state jurisdiction for various purposes—were related and should be reexamined and resolved together, was a principal

[27] UNGA Res. 2574D (XXIV), 15 December 1969, 2 *Documents* 737; compare the Assembly's Declaration of Principles, note 24 above.

[28] For a statement of the U. S. position, see 9 *Int'l Legal Materials* 831 (1971). On the present law governing mining beyond national jurisdiction see Henkin, *Law for the Sea's Mineral Resources* (1968), pp. 24-31.

[29] The Executive Branch announced that position in opposing legislation that would authorize immediate exploitation of the international sea-bed by U.S. nationals. See Letter of Charles N. Brower, Acting Legal Adviser, to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 1, 1973. Compare USUN Press Release, March 19, 1973, set forth in 68 *Dept. State Bull.* (1973). And compare note 44 below.

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impetus for another comprehensive law-of-the-sea conference.[30]

Most states of the world, rich or poor, are coastal states and, in principle, might wish to extend their national authority. But law extending coastal-state jurisdiction would benefit different states differently, depending on their particular geography, on what resources lie off their coasts, on other facts and factors, political and economic, domestic and international. Some coastal states, moreover, have other interests in the sea which would not be served well if other coastal states extended their authority.

The drive to extend coastal-state jurisdiction has come particularly from Latin-American states. Those rich in off-shore minerals have been reasonably content with their rights under the Convention on the Continental Shelf, especially with extravagant interpretations that would give them the resources of the entire submerged landmass out to the ocean abyss. Some states, having little continental margin, have asked "compensation" in the form of rights in the deep sea-bed for many miles from their shores. Principally, however, fishing states have pressed for monopoly over fish equivalent to that enjoyed by their neighbors over coastal minerals. Within the general campaign of the poorer states for change in the international economic system and its law, and the general reexamination of the law of the sea that has followed upon Malta's initiative, mining and fishing states in Latin America have joined to propose a "patrimonial sea" of 200 miles in which the coastal state would have exclusive rights to all resources.[31] A group of

[30] UNGA Res. 2750C (XXV), 17 December 1970, 2 *Documents* 738. Compare the UN Sea-bed Committee's List of Subjects and Issues to be discussed at the Law of the Sea Conference, adopted August 16, 1972, UN Doc. A/AC.138/83, 18 Aug. 1972; GAOR Supp. No. 21 (A/8721) pp. 5-8; also in 11 *Int'l Legal Materials* 1174 (1972), 2 *Documents* 745. See also UNGA Res. 3067 (XXVIII), 16 November 1973.

[31] While this is sometimes proposed as new law, there have also been suggestions that under existing law a coastal state is entitled to extend into the sea as far as is reasonable for any national purposes. See the Principles of Mexico on the Judicial Regime of the Sea, adopted at the 1956 Meeting of the Inter-American Council of Jurists at Mexico City. Variations on the same theme, and the concept of the "patrimonial sea," have been declared periodically, for example, in the Declaration of Montevideo, UN Doc. A/AC. 138/34, 9 *Int'l Legal Materials* 1081 (1971); the Declaration of Lima, UN Doc. A/AC. 138/28, August 14, 1970, 10 *Int'l Legal Materials* 207 (1971); Declaration of Santo Domingo, UN Doc. A/AC. 138/80 (1972), 11 *Int'l Legal Materials* 892 (1972); *cf. id.* at 894; see 1 *Documents* 235, 237, 247. Compare the preamble to UNGA Res. 3029C (XXVII), December 18, 1972. That coastal states can decide their jurisdiction for themselves is not in accord with existing international law. See *Fisheries Case* (United Kingdom *v.* Norway), (1951) *I.C.J. Rep.* 116, 132. Compare the conclusion of the International Legal Commission, note 14 above.

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African states has also proposed such an "exclusive economic zone."[32]

In support of such proposals, proponents have invoked the solidarity of the underdeveloped Third World, under the banner of national sovereignty of the poor over their resources. To some members of the Third World, however, that is not persuasive, at least as regards the mineral resources of the sea-bed. For if the sea-bed beyond national jurisdiction is the common heritage of mankind, every additional inch claimed by a coastal state is denied not to would-be economic imperialists from afar, but to mankind. In whatever form and to whatever degree mankind will partake in and benefit from the exploitation of the resources of the international sea-bed, coastal state expansion will reduce that part and that benefit for the rest. (The coastal states are also, of course, entitled to share in the common heritage but not in their capacity as coastal states, and their share may be more or less, but surely different from what they would get under law permitting national expansion by coastal states.) What is more, the sea-bed of the submerged landmass beyond the continental shelf is apparently rich in resources (notably petroleum) and will be economically exploitable early, and if coastal states take those resources there will be little for mankind.

The issue of coastal-state authority over resources in the sea, then, is linked to the kind of regime that will govern in the sea-bed beyond national jurisdiction. Assuming a regime that will include some revenue for international development and some authority for international institutions, the land-locked states, and the "shelf-locked"[33]—those coastal states that cannot expand because they face the continental shelves of other states—which get nothing from coastal-state expansion, have good reason to resist it. Other coastal states, too, must inevitably ask themselves whether they have more to gain if they and all other coastal states had exclusive jurisdiction out to x miles, or if all coastal states were restricted to less, and more were left for the "common pot." That would depend, of course, on their particular coastal geography, on

[32] See Kenya's proposal before the UN Sea-bed Committee, UN Doc. A/AC. 138/SC. II/L.10, 7 August 1972. The Kenya proposal reflected recommendations of an African Seminar held at Yaoundé in June 1972. See UN Doc. A/AC. 138/79, 21 July 1972, 1 *Documents* 250.

[33] For a classification of states by such geographical criteria, see Alexander, "Indices of National Interest in the Oceans," 1 *Ocean Development and International Law Journal* 21, 37 *et seq.* (1973).

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estimates and guesses as to what wealth lies off their own coasts, how much lies off other coasts and in surely international waters, and on how the "common heritage" will be exploited with what benefit to particular states.

The politics of expanded coastal-state authority over the resources of the sea suffer an additional complication. For few states have coastal seas richly endowed in both fish and sea-bed minerals. Proposals for an "exclusive economic zone" (or "patrimonial sea") are attempts by fishing states and mining states to join political forces and votes. But while a larger coastal state monopoly over minerals would not impinge on "vested" rights of any other state, there are powerful states that claim established fishing rights and would resist a wide coastal-state fishing monopoly. Coastal fishing states, however, are not content to continue to have a narrower fishing zone than other states enjoy for minerals. In the end, a single economic zone might emerge, but, if so, it might be less extensive than the mining states might like.

Coastal States and Sea Powers

The seaward press of coastal-state authority runs also, of course, into the traditional freedom of the seas, and the maritime interests it supports. Indeed, the choice between expansion (for oneself and for others) and self-restraint (with concomitant freedom from expansion by others) has troubled principal participants in international lawmaking.

Consider the United States.[34] She has extensive coasts. Her coastal waters and the bed and subsoil beneath them, to the end of the continental margin and well beyond, are apparently blessed with plenty of minerals and fish. The United States is also concerned for her security and is sensitive to intrusion from the sea. She is increasingly troubled also by danger to her coastal environment from polluting activities at sea (e.g., oil spills).

The United States, then, would benefit more than most coastal states from extending national authority far into the sea. The temptation to do so is great, and occasionally she has succumbed to it, as in President Truman's initiative to establish coastal-state rights over the resources of the continental shelf.[35]

[34] On the various interests of the United States in the sea, compare Henkin, *Law for the Sea's Mineral Resources* (1968), Chapter I.

[35] Compare also the U.S. claim to a twelve-mile fishing zone, note 20 above,

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And yet, the United States has long been a leading champion of maximum freedom in as much of the seas as possible, with the narrowest jurisdiction for coastal states. For the United States freedom of the seas has long been an important political principle, her leaders believing it to be essential to commerce and to peace, eliminating a large area of the earth from competition and conquest, maintaining a buffer between states and reducing the likelihood of international conflict. Today, too, maximum freedom with minimum interference from coastal states furthers various United States interests in the large seas—navigation and military deployment, fishing and mining, scientific research and recreation. She is concerned to maintain maximum freedom to send her navy wherever it might be needed, say in the Middle East. With strategic stability and balance now based on submarine vehicles and weapons, the United States is particularly sensitive to possible restrictions on her freedom to move them or to take measures to locate those of the USSR.

The United States, then, would surely resist any new doctrine that might permit a coastal state to exclude American military vessels or submarines, or submarine-detecting devices and other defensive military activities. She would oppose, too, any law that might encourage an unfriendly coastal state to exclude her oil tankers or other commercial vessels. The United States has therefore opposed extension of the territorial sea, especially since such extensions might convert some important but narrow international waterways into territorial seas of one or more coastal states and make them dependent on the notions of "innocent passage" held by the riparian state. (In 1970 the United States announced[36] that she would agree to extend the territorial sea to twelve miles only if it were also agreed that there would be a right not merely to "innocent passage"—which has abiding ambiguities and does not include passage of submerged submarines or free aerial overflight—but to wholly "free transit" through established international waterways.)

Concern for the freedom of other uses is also a principal reason why the United States has resisted expanded coastal state jurisdiction over resources, or pollution control. For she has feared that

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and her establishment of an air-defense zone, p. 49; the United States has also long been a leading proponent of the principle of the contiguous zone, p.48 above.

[36] As part of the Nixon Plan, discussed p. 61 below.

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coastal state authority for one purpose will "creep" and expand, in time converting zones for one purpose to include other and all purposes, and essentially into wide territorial seas.

The United States might resist the expansion of coastal state authority over resources also because she would gain less from the extension of her own authority than she would lose if other coastal states extended theirs. Whether under the traditional notions of freedom or under some acceptable new international regime, few if any states could effectively compete with the United States in the exploitation of resources in coastal areas outside her present exclusive jurisdiction; but she could do very well in the coastal areas of other, less-developed states. The United States may not wish to see more of the sea's resources under the unfettered control of possibly unfriendly or unstable foreign governments. Surely she does not like to have her fishing boats driven from seas where they have long fished freely.

The case of the USSR is different but also instructive. Her sea interests, too, are varied and conflicting. She has substantial coast lines on various seas. For a long time, her naval and maritime capacities were limited. She sought to protect her shores and coastal interests, and she favored a wider territorial sea and a large fishing zone. She was interested in preserving freedom of navigation primarily for others to bring goods to her ports.

Now the USSR is a major naval and maritime power, interested—like the United States—in maximum freedom for her ships and submarines in as much of the sea as possible, resisting extensions by other coastal states that would hamper that freedom or exclude her substantial distant fishing fleet.[37] The Soviet Union has not abandoned her earlier support for a twelve-mile territorial sea, but—like the United States—she insists on free transit through international straits. As regards sea-bed resources, while Russia is "shelf-locked" on some of her coasts, elsewhere extension of her jurisdiction would give her large additional areas of sea-bed.[38] But she, too, might prefer a larger area for her developed capacities to compete in, rather than enlarged monopoly for all coastal states. She, too, might fear "creeping jurisdiction."

[37] See, generally, W. Butler, *The Soviet Union and the Law of the Sea* (1971).
[38] See Alexander, note 33 above.

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Some Plausible Resolutions

The issues on the law of the sea are not simple and they will not be resolved in simple contest between states with clear, conflicting interests. The array of forces with regard to one issue may depend on how others are resolved, and larger political considerations not directly related to the sea will not be irrelevant.

The resultant coastal-state jurisdiction might depend on the regime which governs the international sea-bed. The land-locked and shelf-locked states alone are numerous enough to prevent a two-thirds majority for a large coastal-state expansion,[39] and the likelihood that they will vote together, and even attract some coastal-state votes, will increase with the benefits offered them by the regime for the international sea-bed. Without agreement, or even in the face of an agreement that limits their expansion, some coastal states might persist in wider claims, but they would face continuing resistance and controversy, and would have a weaker political-legal position in that controversy.

The developing states could readily muster a two-thirds majority for a draft regime for the international sea-bed favorable to their interests. But even if they were agreed on the regime they wished to pursue, a draft convention would mean little if it were not acceptable to the United States and other developed states, for these could proceed to dig in the deep sea-bed, individually or in concert, without regard to any draft convention to which they were not party.[40] The majority could not prevent the developed states from such unilateral action, although they might disturb it by closing markets to the minerals extracted, and by other forms of noncooperation. That the developed states could proceed to exploit without agreement would, of course, exercise strong pressure for a compromise acceptable to them.

On both major issues—the authority of the coastal state and the law that should govern beyond coastal-state jurisdiction—then, there will be some disposition to accommodate competing interests. One such accommodation was attempted by the United States in 1971, in the Nixon Plan.[41] Under that proposal the coastal state

[39] *Ibid.*

[40] And in disregard of the Moratorium Resolution, p. 55 above.

[41] Later elaborated in a working paper for the UN Sea-bed Committee in the

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would have exclusive jurisdiction of the resources of the sea-bed only out to the 200-meter isobath—essentially where President Truman fixed it and where the 1958 Convention confirmed it (but without its expansive "exploitability clause").[42] Beyond the 200-meter isobath, out to the end of the continental margin, there would be an intermediate zone in which mining would be managed by the coastal state, but would be otherwise subject to the international regime that will govern the deep sea-bed. The revenue from exploitation in this intermediate zone would be divided, in proportions to be agreed, between the coastal state and the international community. Beyond the intermediate zone the international sea-bed would be under an international authority which would issue licenses to states to exploit sections of sea-bed, would receive fees for such licenses that would go for international development, would enforce necessary regulations, and would resolve disputes.

The United States plan obviously sought to compromise competing interests of different states as well as her own conflicting concerns. In the intermediate zone the coastal state would have managing authority over, and substantial revenue from, the resources of a large additional extent of sea-bed; but "mankind" would also receive a substantial share of that revenue. That the intermediate zone is subject to the international regime would entail some international control, would emphasize that this area does not belong to the coastal state, and reduce the likelihood that the coastal state's authority over resources would spread to other purposes and other uses. In the international sea-bed (beyond the intermediate zone) developed states would exploit under license from the international authority; but developing states, even land-locked states, could also apply for licenses and buy or hire the necessary technology. States which obtained licenses would have substantial autonomy but would be subject to some international authority, administered so as to give some voice to all states and special voice to those with special interests and skills in the sea. There would be revenue for the exploiting states (and for the companies they use) and some for the international community.

The United States plan fell onto diplomatic tables before most

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form of a draft Convention. See UN Doc. A/AC.138/22 (1970); 62 *Dep't State Bull.* 737 (1970); UN GAOR, 25th Sess. Supp. No. 21, A/8021, Annex V; 9 *Int'l Legal Materials* 1046 (1970); 2 *Documents* 751, 753.

[42] See p. 51 and note 15 above.

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states understood the needs, the issues, their own interests, and possible accommodations. As regards the coastal areas, the intermediate zone did not appeal to coastal states which sought full, exclusive, jurisdiction there. It was opposed also by forces within the United States which favored such full expansion by the United States.[43] In the international sea-bed, international licensing of governments or companies was opposed by states which insisted that the heritage of mankind should be exploited only by an international operating agency, run by the community of states on the basis of equal voting, with all the revenue going to develop poor states.

Some, major, coastal-state expansion is certain. Coastal states have effective "possession" and few others have the strong interests and acceptable means of resisting them. There is no significant resistance to a twelve-mile territorial sea. Opposition to extended coastal-state monopoly in fishing comes from distant, developed "economic imperialists" and has no wide support. (The United States has proposed a compromise: different jurisdictions for different species, with the coastal state's monopoly in a wide zone for coastal species only.) The opposition of land-locked and shelf-locked states to coastal-state expansion on the sea-bed seems—surprisingly—less than united and firm, perhaps because they have been mesmerized by appeals to the needs for solidarity of the underdeveloped, perhaps because the immediate import of that solidarity outweighs the uncertain promises to them of the "heritage of mankind." Torn by its own ambivalence, pressed by domestic forces and the insistence of some coastal states, United States resistance also has weakened and it has even stopped talking of the Nixon Plan. That Plan would have denied coastal-state expansion in principle, but would have given the coastal state new rights in a substantial area of the international sea-bed. Now, reversing presumptions and emphasis, the United States seems to be conceding the principle of wide coastal-state jurisdiction and trying to obtain some limitations on the coastal state's authority in its new domain.

[43] See, e.g., National Petroleum Council, Committee on Petroleum Resources Under the Ocean Floor, *Petroleum Resources Under the Ocean Floor*, 1969, and Supplemental Report, 1971; Report of Special Subcommittee on the Outer Continental Shelf, U.S. Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong. 2d Sess., December 1970; compare *The Law of the Sea Crisis*, Staff Report to the U.S. Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., December 1971. See, generally, Hollick, "United States Oceans Politics," 10 *San Diego L. Rev.* 467 (1973).

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The United States is seeking assurances against expropriation of American industry mining in foreign coastal sea-bed, and against interference with the United States military and other uses, including scientific research. She is seeking compulsory settlement of disputes and she has proposed "revenue sharing" by coastal states with the international community.[44]

To obtain these derogations from the new coastal state autonomy, the United States is counting on support from other developed states, from land-locked and shelf-locked states, and even some coastal states. To obtain assurances against interference with other uses, especially with navigation, the United States is counting also on the support of many "zone-locked" states—those coastal states which would have access to the ocean only through some other state's economic zone. (The Soviet Union, for example, is zone-locked as regards access to the Atlantic Ocean.) It is not yet clear that the United States will obtain these limitations and assurances. It will be some years before we will know whether any limitations and assurances obtained will be honored and will effectively safeguard other interests of other states in coastal areas.

Other Issues: Pollution, Scientific Research, Disarmament

There are other issues, brushed too lightly in the past. The sea is central to concerns for the world environment. There have been conflicts between maritime states and coastal states about oil pollution, and the latter have begun to assert various controls to protect their environment.[45] Particular problems of marine pollution have been addressed by special conventions under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO),[46] but some issues at least will be among those in a com-

[44] So as not to delay exploitation by United States industry in the deep sea-bed, the United States has proposed that any agreement reached should go into effect provisionally before the accessions necessary to put it into effect formally and permanently. Similar provisional effectiveness has been proposed for a new regime on fisheries.

[45] See p. 53 above.

[46] See, e.g., the various conventions dealing with oil pollution, and dumping of waste, 2 *Documents* 557 *et seq.*, 670; Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matters, 12 *Int'l Legal Materials* 1294 (1972); Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 13 *id.* at 1319 (1973). There have also been regional conventions in Western Europe, e.g., The North Sea Convention, 2 *Documents* 632.

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prehensive review of the law of the sea. Since coastal states have a strong bargaining position, the new law will doubtless give them more authority than is now recognized, though maritime states will resist intensive controls that would hamper or greatly raise the cost of shipping. The United States has proposed international standards with a mixed system for enforcing them—by coastal states, port states and the vessel-flag states—but initially, at least, that proposal has not been received enthusiastically.

Coastal states are themselves principal polluters, however, for land wastes must be disposed of and the seas have been a convenient, inexpensive receptacle. It has been suggested that any state, as a representative of the common interest in the seas, should be able to protest and take necessary measures against any polluter, but that principle seems a distant prospect. And few states will wish to roil their friendly relations with an offending state for the sake of a general undifferentiated interest. Perhaps an international authority for the international sea-bed will be given authority to deal with pollution from mining there, and in time with other pollution as well—perhaps even that coming from land. For some issues one can only expect general undertakings and exhortations which in the past have not been very effective.[47]

One may hope, too, that there will be greater care for the freedom of scientific research. The 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf provides that mining there must not "result in any interference with fundamental oceanographic or other scientific research carried out with the intention of open publication." [Article 5(1).] And while the coastal state's consent is required for research on the Shelf, "the coastal States shall not normally withhold its consent" for purely scientific research by a qualified institution, though the coastal state shall have the right to participate in such research. [Article 5(8).] In fact, however, consent has been commonly withheld and scientific research on the continental shelves of the world by foreign scientists has virtually ceased; in few places, moreover, have national scientists been available to do such research.

[47] Compare Article 24 of the Convention on the High Seas, note 12 above, requiring states to draw up regulations to prevent pollution by oil from ships or pipelines, or resulting from sea-bed mining; and Article 25 requiring them to prevent pollution from dumping of radioactive materials. In Article 5(7) of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, coastal states undertake, in the safety zones around mining installations, all appropriate measures for the protection of the living resources of the sea from harmful agents.

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Especially in the light of expanding coastal-state jurisdiction, the United States has proposed that the need for coastal-state consent be eliminated, but that research must be bonafide and open, and the coastal state should have the right to participate. Many coastal states, however, will doubtless insist on retaining the requirement of consent and will continue to discourage research. On the other hand, any convention covering the deep-sea will doubtless also reassert the freedom of research there, and shore it up against invasion by mining and other new activities.

Any disarmament in the sea will not be achieved in a revision of the law of the sea, but in the context of disarmament negotiations. The United States and the USSR have already agreed not to emplace nuclear weapons on the sea-bed.[48] Many would like to see additional controls and limitations on armaments in the sea, but, since the strategic balance now depends on submarine weapons, controls that would affect those weapons are not likely (and, many believe, would not be desirable).

Law by Agreement or Default

Whether by agreement at the Third Law of the Sea Conference, or as a result of smaller local agreements and unilateral actions if the conference fails, the law of the sea will soon be very different from what it has been. The new law will not be determined by the superpowers, though ideological divisions between East and West are now attenuated, the military and economic interests of the U.S. and the USSR (and even China), as coastal states and as major naval and maritime powers, are essentially similar, and the positions they will take will not be markedly different. To a high degree the new law will reflect, rather, the "solidarity" of the many "unaligned," underdeveloped states, banding together, sometimes even against the apparent national interests of some of their group.

The principal outcome will be something Ambassador Pardo's initiative surely did not intend or anticipate, but probably helped to achieve. By throwing open the law of the sea to change, at a time of political militancy and daring by small nations, UN consideration, though focused on the sea-bed beyond national jurisdiction, loosed forces seeking especially to expand national jurisdiction. Large expansion of coastal state jurisdiction for most pur-

[48] See note 26.

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poses noted in this paper will be accomplished in fact and accepted in principle. The United States, Soviet Russia, and China, all having extensive coasts, will make major gains in resources and authority, but their interests in the coastal areas of other states will inevitably suffer. The price of agreement to expansion by coastal-states may include some restrictions on their autonomy in their new economic zone, and perhaps some "revenue sharing."

Small-state solidarity and militancy will doubtless assert itself also as regards a regime for the international sea-bed. But the United States and Russia (and, less openly, even China) will not agree to establish an international "enterprise" run by majority vote. If the majority insists, the result may be no agreement, no international revenue, no new institutions, with the seas effectively open to unilateral exploitation by the developed countries and their nationals.

Whether in coastal areas or beyond, whether as regards resources, protecting the environment, or maintaining freedom of navigation, there will be sharp issues, principally between those states blessed by geography and the rest of mankind, and between those blessed by wealth and technological prowess and the rest of mankind. There is time for states to consider, to exercise self-restraint and demand it of others, for the sake of longer, deeper interests. If narrow national egoism prevails, if coastal states grab what they can reach, if developed states grab in areas beyond national jurisdiction, there will be no agreement, and much of the law of the sea will be replaced by chaos and controversy for years to come. Whatever happens, the student of politics will learn much about perceptions of national interest, about how nations behave and negotiate, and about the politics of lawmaking in the international system of the 1970s.

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Press Coverage and Voter Reaction in the 1968 Presidential Election

DORIS A. GRABER

Most students of political opinions would concur that it is "a rather disillusioning experience" to push "beyond the expression of narrow and superficial attitudes in the mass public to the cognitive texture which underlies these attitudes."[1] Despite rising educational levels and dramatic increases in the quantity and quality of political news, the mass public still has little factual knowledge about politics.

Many political analysts believe that the mass public ought to know more than it does to perform its political functions properly, particularly in voting for the presidency.[2] They measure citizen performance against the ideal citizen model of normative democratic theory. According to that theory, the ideal citizen informs himself fully about political issues and then decides rationally

[1] P. E. Converse, W. E. Miller, J. G. Rusk, and A. C. Wolfe, "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election," *American Political Science Review*, 63 (1969), 1096.

[2] See, for instance B. R. Berelson, P. F. Lazarsfeld, and W. N. McPhee, *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), 307-308 and sources cited there.

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what his opinions and decisions ought to be.[3]

This essay examines the supply of information that was available to the voter in the press during the 1968 presidential election. It seeks to determine whether a reasoned choice among the candidates was possible and how closely actual choice criteria that the voter used approximated the ideal citizen model. Such an inquiry must begin with an outline of the types of information needed for making a reasoned choice among presidential candidates. An examination of the literature suggests three essential kinds of knowledge:[4] (1) People must know the nature of the structure and powers of the presidential office and the decisional issues likely to face the new president; (2) they must have a value system to determine which of several suggested policies on each issue is feasible and best; and (3) they must know enough about the candidates' personalities, experiences, and abilities to judge which candidate is apt to perform most effectively.

In modern societies, the tasks of providing this type of information to the mass public in readily comprehensible form has fallen largely to the mass media, primarily newspapers, television, and radio. We will concern ourselves here with a cross-section of the daily press of the nation.

The Newspaper Sample

Judged by the requirements of a "reasoned-choice model" (i.e., a model based on the type of knowledge noted above), how adequate was information supply to the voter in the 1968 presidential campaign? To answer this question, we analyzed a sample of press information drawn from the last four weeks of the 1968 campaign, October 8 - November 4, 1968. It was thought that campaign news would be particularly rich during this peak political period. We selected the press rather than television because the press gives

[3] The capacity of mass publics to cope rationally with political problems remains a matter of controversy among social scientists. Many consider the ability to order one's life rationally an exceptional talent which only few people can be expected to possess. For a fuller discussion, see B. Berelson, "Democratic Theory and Public Opinion," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 16 (1952), 313-330.

[4] Neither the literature on democratic theory nor recent court decisions dealing with the legality of literacy requirements for voting specify explicitly what type of knowledge is required for rational choices. See, for example, *Lassiter* v. *Northhampton County Board of Elections*, 360 U.S. 45 (1959), especially 50-52 and *Katzenbach* v. *Morgan*, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), especially 662-663.

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the widest coverage to the kinds of data required by the reasoned-choice model.[5] Newspapers are conveniently available to the average person and can be read and reread at his pleasure. In 1968, 75 percent of a national sample reported reading campaign news in newspapers; half of these readers claimed to use papers regularly or frequently.[6] Even those who did not read the newspapers were apt to benefit from newspaper information through word-of-mouth contacts with people who did.

To find out what information the press supplied, we used content-analysis techniques to examine 28 consecutive weekday issues of 16 daily American newspapers. This meant reading each story carefully and systematically tabulating all its themes. The tabulating or "coding" scheme was developed from prior analysis of the content of a sample of 1968 campaign news stories. The newspaper sample was selected to disclose availability of information under diverse political and social circumstances. For instance, to test for regional variations, we selected papers from the four standard regions of the country. For the Northeast, papers were the *New York Times, Philadelphia Inquirer, Boston Globe,* and the *Bangor Daily News.* For the Midwest, they included the *Chicago Tribune, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Detroit Free Press,* and the *Topeka Daily Capital.* Southern papers were the *Houston Chronicle, Miami Herald, Raleigh News and Observer,* and the *Atlanta Constitution.* The Western group consisted of the *Los Angeles Times, Seattle Daily Times, Denver Post,* and *Salt Lake City Tribune.*

The sample was fairly evenly divided between papers published

[5] Comparisons of the types of political information found in television, radio, and newspapers are presented in W. Schramm and S. Wade, *Knowledge and the Public Mind* (Stanford: Institute for Communication Research, 1967); L. Bogart, "Changing News Interest and the News Media," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 32 (1968), 560-574, and P. Clarke and L. Ruggels, "Preferences among News Media for Coverage of Public Affairs," *Journalism Quarterly,* 42 (1970), 464-471.

[6] This figure (75 percent) is fairly typical. See A. Campbell, P. E. Converse, W. Miller, and D. E. Stokes, *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: John Wiley, 1966), 149. All survey research data for the 1968 campaign were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research from its Survey Research Archives. Comparative data for earlier campaigns come primarily from J. P. Robinson, J. G. Rusk, and K. B. Head, *Measures of Political Attitudes* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Survey Research Center, 1969), 591-625; Michael J. Shapiro, "Rational Political Man: A Synthesis of Economic and Social-Psychological Perspectives," *American Political Science Review,* 63 (1969), 1112-1119, and Survey Research Center data files for earlier elections. Computing services for the newspaper analysis were provided by the Computer Center of the University of Illinois, Chicago Circle.

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in large, medium, and small size cities. This division made it possible to look for variations based on community size. The papers came from both Republican and Democratic states and cities so that party-related influences could be assessed. Newspaper endorsements in the sample, as in the nation, ran two-to-one in favor of the Republican candidate. Variations in endorsements permitted comparisons between pro-Nixon and pro-Humphrey papers. The *Topeka Daily Capital* served as an example of a paper which made no endorsements. No papers in the sample endorsed Wallace, the American Independence party candidate.

The sample was also controlled to shed light on the effects of selected newspaper operating conditions on news output. Papers represented various stages of competition, ranging from monopoly control to a minority share of the market. They varied in their use of wire services and syndicated columnists. The choice of "typical" papers which met the criteria noted above was made by a panel of judges.[7]

The content of all 2,675 campaign stories in the papers was analyzed to reveal the type of campaign information which an average reader would gather from a newspaper story.[8] Presidential qualities and issues mentioned more than 10 times in the sample were coded and included in the reported figures. A quality or issue was coded only once for each story, regardless of the number of repetitions, since we were primarily interested in the availability of information. The reliability of coding was carefully checked and controlled.[9] Broadly, the analysis showed that newspaper stories appraised the personalities and capabilities of the candidates along 26 different dimensions. Twenty-eight issues were mentioned repeatedly as important political factors in the campaign.

[7] The usefulness of such nonrandom samples is discussed by O. R. Holsti in G. Lindzey and E. Aronson, eds., *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, 2nd ed., II (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1968), 654.

[8] Data from Sunday editions for four of the daily papers and stories from four specialized papers have been excluded from this article, though they were part of the original sample.

[9] The consistency of coding by individual coders and the reliability of coding the same materials by different coders were checked by recoding and triple-coding 10% of the stories. In no category was there less than 75% consistency in the same coder's work or less than 67% agreement in coding among different coders. Average agreement among coders, excluding simple identification categories, like newspaper name and date, hovered near 80%. This is considered acceptable reliability for this type of analysis.

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In appraising the credibility and importance of a story, a reader would be apt to check its source and note the candidate who was being discussed. Thus, we coded the source of each story and the candidate discussed by it to estimate the likelihood of readers' use of that information. We also noted whether the story was cast in a positive or negative vein, describing the candidate as possessing or lacking the qualities under discussion. If the story stated that the candidate ideally ought to have the qualities, we labeled it "normative." The mode in which information is cast is important because of its possible influence on readers' perceptions of politics, their attitudes toward political action, and even their willingness to expose themselves to the press information.

Information Supply in 1968

Our sample revealed substantial, nationwide uniformity in the type of campaign information available in daily newspapers and the proportions of coverage allotted to various issues and presidential qualities. Region, community size, party politics, endorsements, or any other criteria potentially responsible for differences in coverage did not seem to matter. Uniformity also characterized the proportional amounts of coverage given to presidential and vice-presidential candidates and the allotments of favorable and unfavorable stories. For instance, in a given paper, out of 100 stories about candidates, an average of 47 would deal with Nixon, 30 with Humphrey, and 23 with Wallace. The same 100 stories would on the average include 47 stories coming from sources known to be favorable to Humphrey, 35 stories by pro-Nixon sources, and 18 stories by Wallace supporters. These proportions meant that Nixon received more exposure than Humphrey but much of it came from critical pro-Humphrey sources. Such results occurred because Humphrey and his supporters concentrated on attacking Nixon, while Nixon spent proportionately more time discussing his own qualifications rather than attacking Humphrey.

The only major difference in coverage was quantitative. People in the largest cities and in the Northeast had more stories available to them on various topics than people in smaller towns and other regions. At the extreme ends of the spectrum, the *New York Times* had an average of ten campaign stories daily during the last month of the campaign, compared to an average of four daily stories for the *Topeka Daily Capital*.

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Issues, Settings, and Options

Somewhat less than half (44%) of the informational items in the press concerned political issues which the candidates would have to face, political settings in which these problems would be likely to occur, and the options from which the candidates would have to make their choices. Several trends stand out in coverage: (1) The range of issues touched upon was fairly wide but omitted a number of crucial issues. (2) The bulk of discussion concentrated on a few issues only, leaving the remainder skimpily covered. (3) When the relation of candidates to issues was discussed, the focus was on a somewhat different spectrum of issues for each contender. This difference on issues made comparisons difficult, especially since the press left the comparisons largely to the reader to make on his own. (4) Even for the well-covered issues, discussion was superficial. It delineated the problem and the candidates' preferences, but it paid little attention to the range of available choices and to the political settings in which options would have to be exercised.

Among the 28 issues which were mentioned ten or more times in the newspaper sample, ten issues accounted for 72 percent of the total. The Vietnam war, nuclear weapons, and American foreign policy ranked first, fifth, and eighth, respectively, in frequency. Law and order, race relations, riots and demonstrations were fourth, seventh, and tenth. The remaining high-priority issues related to partisan domestic politics such as discussion of the candidates and their campaign techniques in terms of partisan loyalties, mention of the possibility of television debates among them, and analysis of successes and failures of the Johnson administration. Information on the remaining topics was slight, dropping well below 100 mentions in the entire sample. Comparison with other presidential election years indicates that the breadth of coverage and concentration on key issues were average for presidential contests.[10]

There were many other issues which might have been covered. The *Congressional Quarterly*'s January 1968 forecast of issues likely to become prominent during the campaign included 12 additional topics. They were education, foreign aid, trade, disarma-

[10] We examined a limited amount of comparable data for 1960 and 1964 to reach this conclusion. Also see G. H. Stempel, "The Prestige Press Meets the Third-Party Challenge," *Journalism Quarterly*, 46 (1969), 699-706. Stempel analyzed space allotted in the press and partisanship for 1960, 1964, and 1968, and found coverage similar for all three elections.

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ment in general, corruption, the draft, health and medical care, gun control, transportation, national morality, pollution, and inflation. For a variety of reasons related to the mass media's conception of what constitutes "news" in a campaign, these and other issues were ignored, despite their importance. Consequently, examination of issues, though by no means neglected, fell short of the completeness that our ideal model seems to require.[11]

Issue emphasis varied for the candidates, making comparisons difficult on issue positions discussed for a single candidate only. The Nixon candidacy was discussed most often in relation to (1) the Vietnam war, (2) Nixon's political rivals, (3) possible public debates with Nixon's rivals, (4) *foreign policy in general*, (5) the policies of the Johnson administration, (6) campaign techniques, (7) the control of nuclear weapons, (8) the preservation of law and order, (9) *problems of poverty*, and (10) *prospective associates in the winner's administration*. For Humphrey, the order of frequency of attention was (1) the Vietnam war, (2) Humphrey's political rivals, (3) possible public debates with Humphrey's rivals, (4) the control of nuclear weapons, (5) campaign techniques, (6) *the job market*, (7) *race relations*, (8) the preservation of law and order, (9) the policies of the Johnson administration, and (10) the 1968 party conventions. On seven out of the ten issues mentioned most often in stories about the Nixon or Humphrey campaigns the positions of the two candidates could thus be compared. The italics indicate the three issues which appeared among the top ten for only one of the major party candidates.

The focus of attention varied somewhat more for the Wallace candidacy. Rank orders of frequency of mention of campaign issues by the sampled papers were as follows: (1) the Vietnam war, (2) the preservation of law and order, (3) *the control of riots and demonstrations*, (4) *race relations*, (5) Wallace's political rivals, (6) *foreign policy in general*, (7) *candidate appraisal by opinion polls*, (8) campaign techniques, (9) possible public debates with Wallace's rivals, and (10) the control of nuclear weapons. Italics indicate those issues which ranked high for Wallace only or were discussed for only one major candidate, in addition to Wallace.

[11] J. W. Ellsworth, "Rationality and Campaigning: A Content Analysis of the 1960 Presidential Campaign Debates," *Western Political Quarterly*, 18 (1965), 798-799. Ellsworth contends that more and better-reasoned issues are brought forth when candidates meet in face-to-face debates than when they mount separate platforms.

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Overall, the reader could learn most about Nixon's and Humphrey's stands on issues of domestic partisan politics (41% of total coverage). Whether such issues deserved top coverage is a moot question. Press information on positions involving foreign affairs was next in fullness of coverage (32% and 28% respectively), followed by economic policy (15% and 18% respectively), and social problems (12% and 13% respectively). The order was different for Wallace: social problems were the prime focus of discussion of the Wallace campaign (39%), with economic policy in last place (11%), and domestic policies and international politics taking middle positions (25%).

Coverage of various areas of domestic and foreign affairs information for each candidate ranged from the low of 11 percent allotted to Wallace's economic policies to the high of 41 percent allotted to Nixon's domestic partisan politics and policies. This disparity reflects the great unevenness of press information on various types of political issues. Besides being uneven, coverage was confusing for the reader seeking information on the issue positions of individual candidates. Stories quoting candidates stressed different issues than stories commenting about the candidates. When critics covered the same issues as the candidate himself, the reader often had to make sense out of completely contradictory appraisals and value judgments. The welfare policy of the Johnson administration, for example, might be called a pillar of the Great Society, saving the nation from internal strife, or a politically motivated give-away scheme bound to destroy the economic health of the nation.

It was difficult also to decide which issues were indeed the crucial ones on which the candidates' fitness should be weighed most heavily. Newspapers gave little guidance to the reader in evaluating candidates' own claims of the merits of their positions against conflicting claims of observers. The reader who had determined from whom he was willing to accept advice, or was looking merely for information to rationalize a choice which he had already made, would have little difficulty in filling his information needs.[12] But the undecided reader was apt to flounder.

Besides variations in issue emphasis, variations in the breadth of discussion are also important in the quest for political knowledge.

[12] For a discussion of the prevalence of selective attention habits, see P. F. Lazarsfeld, B. Berelson, and H. Gaudet, *The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), 80-83.

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Nixon and Humphrey were quoted repeatedly on one-third more issues than Wallace. When one compares the remarks of commentators, the picture is even worse for Wallace. Commentators discussed twice as many issues in relation to Humphrey and Nixon than in relation to the third-party standard bearer. Even if Wallace did not supply the necessary data himself, commentators could have obtained information on his positions and could have presented it. Without such equalization of coverage, the reader was obviously handicapped in making a reasoned choice.

Personal and Professional Qualities and Political Philosophy

Overall, 56 percent of the informational items in the sample dealt with characteristics of the candidates rather than with issues. Again, several trends were noticeable. The most striking feature was the preponderance of information on personal rather than professional qualities of each of the candidates. All other information about the candidates was rather limited in quantity and scope. Unlike issue discussion, the breadth of coverage on characteristics of the candidates was quite similar for all contenders. On the average 23 qualities were discussed repeatedly for Humphrey and Wallace and 25 for Nixon. However, the specific qualities which were emphasized varied, once more making comparisons difficult. As with issues, the press made little effort to supply readers with explicit comparisons of the candidates. Candidate appraisal was also complicated because the comments of the candidates themselves on many of their qualities and those of their often hostile critics clashed. If the same candidate was described as both having and lacking a given quality, such as integrity, the reader who accepted both remarks with an open mind was apt to be confused. Again, the newspapers did little to ease the average reader's burden. There seemed to be a concerted attempt to report in a neutral fashion, with only 2.5 percent of all news stories, aside from editorials, cartoons and columns, expressing discernible opinions about the political facts which they were reporting.

Better than 77 percent of the candidate characteristics covered in the stories dealt with various personal qualities. For purposes of analysis, we grouped these items into three categories. The leading category, "Personal Attributes," constituted 37 percent of all responses. It includes such qualities as integrity, ability to inspire confidence, compassion, and ability to project leadership. All of

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these are personality traits which one would expect to find in leaders, regardless of their fields of expertise or occupation. They tell the reader whether the candidate seems fit for high executive position, but they bear little relation to the specific duties of the presidency.

A second category of information, "Style," which contributed 22 percent of the total, gives data on the candidates' manner of operation. It includes such matters as forthrightness in approach, restraint, and evidence of intellectualism. All these traits are widely noted characteristics of style which affect a man's ability to command the trust and confidence of others. However, they do not provide the kind of specific information required by the reasoned-choice model or the average voter.

The third category contains comments about ability to project a good "image," as distinct from comments dealing with actual or potential achievements. Image qualities constituted 18 percent of the information total dealing with the candidates as persons.[13] Ability to project the psychologically reassuring image that the candidate would be able to unify the nation and that he could cope with crucial problems like race relations were stressed most often. Image qualities, unlike general personal traits, were related directly to the duties of the presidential office.

Only 19 percent of all informational items dealing with the candidates referred to professional capacities. Moreover, the spectrum of capacities and experiences with which press stories dealt repeatedly was narrow, with only three facets singled out for close attention. Candidates were discussed in terms of their capabilities to cope with foreign affairs, their ability to maintain law and order, and their skill in sustaining good relations with the public, especially the young people and blacks. While the areas of concern singled out were crucial ones in 1968, the focus of attention certainly seems limited. Information about many other types of experiences was needed to fully evaluate the skills required for the presidency. Organizational and administrative expertise, and ability to cope with fiscal matters and economic problems are but a few which might well have been considered.

General political philosophy and organizational changes which

[13] Many scholars consider presidential skill in projecting an image of ability most crucial. See Elmer E. Cornwell, *The American Presidency, Vital Center* (Chicago: Scott, Foresman, 1966), 23.

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a president might wish to institute to harmonize with his philosophy were almost totally ignored. Professional literature on the American presidency is concerned a great deal with the active versus the passive philosophy of conducting the office, with the centralization or decentralization of activities at the federal level, or with the respective roles of the president and Congress in foreign-policy making.[14] Yet very little was reported in the press about these matters. Questions of possible power shifts among the branches of government or between the state and national level, were also given short shrift. Only Wallace emphasized the need for greater power for the president—and that in relation to the Supreme Court. Republicans favored dispersion of power away from the federal level, but this fact was rarely touched upon during the campaign, except occasionally by Wallace.

On the whole, as Table 1 shows, the focus and tenor of discussion of presidential qualities were quite similar for Humphrey and Nixon, but not for Wallace. This similarity permitted a reasonable amount of comparison between the major contenders, but left Wallace in a category by himself. Since millions of Americans took the Wallace candidacy seriously, it was regrettable that the press failed to include more information containing comparable personal and professional characteristics about him.

For Nixon, the ten characteristics mentioned most often were, in order of frequency: (1) man of principle, (2) acts with restraint, (3) inspires confidence, (4) compassionate, (5) ability to conduct foreign affairs, (6) forthright style, (7) conveys image of versatility, (8) strong style, (9) *conveys leadership image*, and (10) *capacity to communicate with the public*. A comparable list for Humphrey is: (1) man of principle, (2) compassionate, (3) acts with restraint, (4) inspires confidence, (5) forthright style, (6) conveys image of versatility, (7) strong style, (8) *possesses leadership qualities*, (9) *conveys image of national unity*, and (10) ability to conduct foreign affairs. Except for the italicized characteristics and precise rank order, the two lists are identical. Furthermore, three out of the four qualities which are not shared in a list of ten would have been shared if the list had been expanded to twelve qualities. Discussion

[14] For example, see W. Koenig, *The Chief Executive* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964), 13-15 and J. M. Burns, *Presidential Government* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), 8-31.

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TABLE 1

*Press Version of Personal and Professional Characteristics of the Candidates**

Characteristics	*Favorable Comments*			*Unfavorable Comments*			*Normative Comments*			*Row Totals*		
	RMN	*HHH*	*GCW*	*RMN*	*HHH*	*GCW*	*RMN*	*HHH*	*GCW*	*RMN*	*HHH*	*GCW*
Personal Attributes	11%	14%	6%	22%	23%	15%	5%	6%	2%	38%	43%	23%
Style	8%	9%	20%	11%	11%	6%	3%	3%	2%	22%	23%	28%
Capabilities	9%	9%	12%	6%	4%	9%	5%	3%	2%	20%	16%	23%
Professional Image	6%	5%	3%	5%	5%	11%	6%	5%	3%	17%	15%	17%
Philosophy	2%	2%	6%	0%	0%	2%	1%	1%	1%	3%	3%	9%
Column Totals	36%	39%	47%	44%	43%	43%	20%	18%	10%			

*Percentage figures for each candidate are based on the total number of references made by the press to his personal and professional characteristics. The total number of references for each candidate were: Nixon (RMN), 2,545; Humphrey (HHH), 1,927; Wallace (GCW), 1,309. A comment is "favorable" if the quality is listed as an asset for the candidate and "unfavorable" if it is listed as a liability. "Normative" comments indicate that the candidate ought to possess the quality.

of Wallace's characteristics showed five qualities shared with one or both of the major party candidates and five qualities, identified by italics, shared with neither: (1) man of principle, (2) *populist style*, (3) *race relationship image*, (4) *capacity to keep law and order*, (5) *capacity to control dissent*, (6) strong style, (7) *philosophy of government decentralization*, (8) compassionate, (9) capacity to communicate with the public, and (10) acts with restraint.

Comments about the characteristics of the candidates were more often unfavorable or normative than favorable (Table 1). The nonselective reader's impression would be therefore, that the candidates available for choice were seriously deficient in many qualities presidential contenders ought to have. This may have contributed to reduced interest on the despairing readers' part about gathering campaign information, and being able to make a good presidential selection. One reason for the heavy stress on the negative aspects of the candidates was that the major contenders campaigned heavily via attacks on the opposition rather than stressing their own qualities. The press reflected this trend. Humphrey devoted 56 percent of his remarks to Nixon, 6 percent to Wallace, and only 38 percent to his own record. Nixon devoted 47 percent of his remarks to Humphrey, 4 percent to Wallace, and 49 percent to himself. Only Wallace concentrated on his own record with 69 percent of his remarks, leaving 24 percent for Nixon and 7 percent for Humphrey. Wallace's emphasis accounts for the higher percentage of favorable comments about him compared to Nixon and Humphrey.

If the voter internalized press information essentially as it was supplied to him, what information would he have available? As indicated, his task of absorbing and using the information to compare candidates would be difficult. He would be tempted to make his choices on the bases of personal qualities and a few key issues. Only if he had a willingness to pay attention to skimpily covered facts and opinions from the press and the intelligence to carefully assemble the pieces of the jumbled information puzzle could the diligent reader find a fair share of necessary data for a reasoned-choice model in selecting a president.

The Public Sample

We shall now analyze the information criteria with which the public appraised the 1968 candidate scene and compare them to the

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TABLE 2

*Public's Version of Assets and Liabilities of the Candidates**

Characteristics	Favorable Comments			Unfavorable Comments			Row Totals		
	RMN	HHH	GCW	RMN	HHH	GCW	RMN	HHH	GCW
Leadership, Personality, Education	8%	6%	3%	8%	9%	7%	16%	15%	10%
Integrity, Trustworthiness	4%	8%	7%	9%	5%	9%	13%	13%	16%
General Personal Capacity	13%	9%	2%	7%	5%	5%	20%	14%	7%
General Capacity to Deal with Issues	4%	2%	4%	4%	3%	3%	8%	5%	7%
Capacity to Deal with Specific Issues	8%	7%	10%	5%	11%	7%	13%	18%	17%
Philosophy	1%	1%	2%	1%	1%	12%	2%	2%	14%
Approval for Unspecified Reasons	1%	1%	1%	10%	12%	18%	11%	13%	19%
Circumstantial Reasons	5%	2%	1%	1%	2%	1%	6%	4%	2%
Self-interest, Class Interest	1%	4%	2%	2%	1%	3%	3%	5%	5%
Party Affiliation of Candidate	3%	6%	1%	5%	5%	2%	8%	11%	3%
Column Totals	48%	46%	33%	52%	54%	67%			

*Percentage figures for each candidate are based on the total number of references made by the public to assets and liabilities of each candidate. The total number of references for each candidate were: Nixon, 1,692; Humphrey, 1,719; Wallace, 1,713.

ideal reasoned-choice model. Conclusions about information used by the public are based on data from a nationwide sample of interviews conducted by the Michigan Survey Research Center between November 6, 1968, and February 24, 1969.[15] We analyzed replies to the following open-ended questions which allowed respondents to give up to five answers:[16] "Now I'd like to ask you about the good and bad points of the two major candidates for president. Is there anything in particular about (name of candidate) that might make you want to vote for him? Is there anything about (name of candidate) that might make you want to vote against him? What is that? Anything else?" Assets and liabilities were coded separately for each of the three candidates (Table 2).

It seemed reasonable to assume that the answers to these questions would reveal what kinds of criteria people considered in making or buttressing their political decisions.[17] Furthermore, the criteria mentioned as important for presidential selection would indicate the areas in which mass media information was likely to be sought, found, and used. If the press contained certain types of information which the public did not use, this information was deemed comparatively unimportant for the choices which had to be made.[18] The survey responses provide few clues to neglected areas of needed

[15] We recoded the newspaper data to correspond to the Michigan coding and vice versa. Conversion to the Michigan categories was relatively simple since these categories were far more general than the newspaper coding. Obversely, conversion to newspaper categories was difficult. To preserve the greater detail of the newspaper analysis, we decided to report these data as originally coded. However, comparisons are based on recoded newspaper data.

[16] We compared the pattern of first answers with the pattern of subsequent answers and found them quite similar. On a table of rank orders of frequency, the frequencies of two-thirds of the second, third, fourth and fifth answers were within two ranks of the first answer. Since multiple-answer respondents were in a minority, we used first answers only for much of our analysis to avoid giving undue emphasis to responses from one part of the sample.

[17] The responses are viewed, of course, in the light of usual reservations about survey research data. Respondents may cast their answers into a framework of presumably "acceptable" answers; they may express those thoughts which are articulated most easily and neglect others; they may know a great deal more than they care to reveal.

[18] The public's tendency to retain desired information only and forget the rest is discussed in Campbell et al., 153. Of course, what the public deems important is conditioned by available information. In fact, the emphasis which the press and electronic media place on various items of information through placement in a paper or program, through comparative length of coverage and repetition, and in other ways, may tell the public fairly well what should or should not be deemed important.

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information because respondents rarely mentioned information items other than those which the press had covered. Items like pollution, inflation, or the draft, which had been neglected by the press, were likewise ignored by the public.

The newspaper sample provided fairly uniform information on a nationwide basis. It is more difficult to generalize about information demand and use in the public sample. In 1968, there were moderate variations in press use in the four geographical regions of the country and in communities of differing sizes. These were matched by variations in the quantity of responses about the candidates and in the types of answers given. For instance, newspaper reading tended to be lowest in rural sections and in the South. Respondents from these areas usually gave fewer than average reasons for their choices of candidates. Their reasons also corresponded less closely to press information and tended to be more general and party-oriented than those of the average voters.

Within distinct geographic regions and communities, the nature and quantity of responses varied somewhat, depending on the age and education of the respondents and on their party affiliation. However, the differences were not great; basic response trends were similar everywhere. Thus, the general picture, based on data from the entire nation, distorts only moderately what one would find in separate pictures for the smaller geographical units. Nor would the picture differ drastically if the data were grouped by age, educational attainments, or party affiliation. This justifies using the national picture in the discussion which follows.

Although the information supplied by the press and the survey responses cover much common ground, there are important differences. Comparisons can be made between information on issues and on presidential qualities and philosophies. But for one-third of the answers given by the public, comparison was difficult: people's reactions were either vague and general, or based on standards which were not stressed in the press.

The criteria of selection which were relatively unique to the public include answers assigning merits or demerits to candidates because of their party affiliation; seven percent gave the nominee's party as the chief reason for approval or disapproval. While newspapers supplied information on party affiliation of the candidates, they noted it as an identification rather than a criterion for choosing a president. Another eight percent of all public responses cited miscellaneous reasons with no direct counterpart in the press. For ex-

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TABLE 3

Percentage of Respondents with 1–5 Reasons for Accepting or Rejecting Specific Candidates

Candidates	Accept No. of Reasons					Reject No. of Reasons				
	1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*5*	*4*	*3*	*2*	*1*
Nixon	54%	40%	30%	17%	11%	2%	6%	16%	30%	55%
Humphrey	50%	34%	23%	12%	7%	4%	9%	20%	38%	61%
Wallace	38%	24%	14%	8%	4%	5%	13%	28%	51%	73%

ample, respondents accepted or rejected candidates for their good or bad attitudes or actions regarding certain categories of people (such as the indigent, the uneducated, businessmen, laborers, and so on). Others believed that candidates should be endorsed as "the lesser of several evils" or because it was good to change parties regularly. Fourteen percent of the respondents merely expressed general favor or disfavor for the candidates without detailing any reasons. A respondent may have been merely unwilling or unable to articulate his reasons. Most of the answers seem to be judgments based on the general personal qualifications of the man, rather than on his policies. In other instances, the formation of general likes and dislikes may have involved considerations of the candidates' policies and personal qualifications for the specific task of the presidency.

Although 79 percent of the public claimed to be greatly or moderately interested in the elections, large numbers of respondents knew very little about the candidates.[19] In the case of each candidate, an average of 45 percent of the respondents could not express any reasons for their choice of a president. Many interviewees had ample information only about their own selection. This narrowness is obviously incompatible with the concept of reasoned choice wherein people weigh the qualifications of all contenders.

Beyond first answers, responses drop even more sharply (Table 3). Only 25 percent of all possible answers were given (assuming each respondent could have expressed five reasons each for approval and disapproval of each candidate). An average of 63 percent of the respondents could recite liabilities, primarily for disfavored can-

[19] Since there is a strong correlation between interest in elections and information acquisition, the public probably was comparatively well informed in 1968. For a discussion of the relationship between interest and exposure to campaign news, see Lazarsfeld et al., 76-79, 124-125.

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didates, compared to 47 percent who could mention assets. Since nonvoters generally cited an even number of assets and liabilities for the candidates, partisanship must be considered with negative newspaper comments as possible explanations for the preponderance of negative answers.[20]

Information Use in 1968

If the public used a reasoned-choice model in 1968, one would expect that candidate selection included much information on candidates' stands on issues and reactions to candidates' personal and professional qualifications for the presidency. If the press, indeed, furnished the bulk of current data for decision-making, one would also expect the public's view to reflect mass-media deficiencies in the variety and depth of their coverage on issues and candidates. Lack of correspondence between press information and survey responses would raise questions about the public's conception of its information needs and how it uses material furnished to it by the press.

Issues, Settings, and Policy Options

A comparison of press information and survey responses reveals that public information is drawn heavily from the press. Significantly, media images and public images show the greatest similarity where newspaper reading is greatest.[21] But despite shared appraisal standards, there are differences in emphases and specificity: The choice criteria mentioned by the public were more limited and broadly expressed than the criteria mentioned in the press. The result was a sharply diluted and somewhat distorted reflection of press images.

In the public sample, 23 percent of all replies dealt with issues compared to 44 percent issue content covered in press stories. However, these figures are not fully comparable. For instance, only 16

[20] The effects of partisanship on perception are discussed in R. S. Sigel, "Effects of Partisanship on the Perception of Political Candidates," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 48 (1971), 486-493.

[21] For an analysis of the comparative predominance of the press in supplying public affairs information see Clarke et al., and Dale Vinyard and Roberta S. Sigel, "Newspapers and Urban Voters," *Journalism Quarterly*, 48 (1971), 486-493.

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percent of the issues mentioned by the public indicated specific policy areas. The remainder of the references to issues merely stated approval or disapproval of policies in general, without specifying what issues were involved. A statement that "I like his foreign policy" obviously tells us nothing about the specific issues which were considered in order to choose a presidential nominee. It does not even tell us whether the respondent knew the candidate's stands on foreign policy. So, too, respondents failed to indicate whether they had considered the political setting in which policy options would be exercised.

The number of specific issues mentioned by the survey respondents was skimpier than the roster presented in the press.[22] Vietnam, law and order, race problems, past and prospective associates of the candidates headed the list with 79 percent of the responses. The remaining issues, in order of frequency, were campaign tactics, price controls, social security, welfare, Medicare, miscellaneous specific domestic issues, miscellaneous specific foreign policy issues, farm policy, labor policy, government spending, communism, education, and the draft. Table 4 lists specific issues mentioned by the press, recoded to make them comparable to the public reactions in the sample. The two columns referring to public responses about the nominees summarize replies given to the general information question about the good and bad characteristics of the candidates which influenced voting choices, and replies indicating the most important reasons for preferring or rejecting a candidate.[23]

As in the press, different candidates were evaluated according to different issues; there was a rough correspondence between press and public emphases. Nixon was mentioned most frequently in connection with Vietnam, campaign tactics, and law and order. For Humphrey, prime issues were his association with President Johnson, Vietnam, and race problems. Wallace was judged mainly by his stands on law and order and on race which accounted for 83 percent of issue-related responses involving him. Vietnam was

[22] However, it was far better than one would expect from a comment in *Elections and the Political Order*, 153: "It is not at all unusual that a voter who exposes himself to an information presentation that is 95 percent current issues and 5 percent personal background of a political personality comes away with the personal oddments burning in the memory and the rest lost."

[23] For the text of the rating question and further comment, see pp. below.

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TABLE 4

*Comparison of Frequency of Mention of Specific Issues by the Press and Rated and Unrated Public Responses**

Issues	*Papers*	*Unrated Public*	*Rated Public*
International Politics	27%	27%	28%
Vietnam	18%	26%	28%
Nuclear Weapons	8%	–	–
Communism	1%	–	–
Domestic Politics	37%	23%	27%
Candidates and Associates	19%	16%	18%
Campaign Techniques, Conventions	18%	7%	9%
Polls	3%	–	–
Social Problems	22%	47%	39%
Law and Order, Riots, Crime	15%	21%	10%
Civil Rights, Voting Age	7%	18%	14%
Social and Economic Welfare	–	8%	15%
Economic Policy	14%	3%	10%
Taxes, Economy, Government Spending	7%	1%	10%
Labor Policy	2%	1%	–
Business Policy	1%	–	–
Farm Policy, Conservation	1%	–	–

N = Papers: 2,854; Unrated Public: (omitting miscellaneous issues) 770; Rated Public: 129.

*Unrated responses are based on the first response to a question asking for reasons for voting for a candidate on a specific issue. Rated responses indicate the most important reason for voting. Comments referring to issues in general, rather than specifically, have been omitted.

in third place on the Wallace spectrum. Issue considerations were involved in 24 percent of the comments about Wallace, 23 percent about Humphrey, and 21 percent about Nixon. As in the press, the spread of issues over which the respondents ranged was widest for Nixon. Altogether, issues were political liabilities for Humphrey and assets for Nixon and Wallace. Positive replies on issues were particularly important for Wallace; those who favored him cited approval of his policies far more often than other types of reasons.[24]

Table 4 shows that roughly one-fourth of the comments in all three candidate groupings referred to foreign affairs; domestic concerns was the area of prime interest. This distribution parallels the press data. In other issue areas, press and public emphases diverge.

[24] Forty-three percent of pro-Wallace comments related to issues. For observations on the importance of issues in the Wallace candidacy, see Converse *et al.*, *1096 ff.*

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The press had shown great interest in the partisan aspects of the campaign, presumably because it believes partisan confrontation interests and excites its readers. The public, when questioned, was less receptive than the press and also showed less concern about economic subjects. But the most startling difference is the much heavier emphasis which the public placed on social issues, both in the number of times mentioned and in the importance assigned to them. If one uses comparative frequency as an indicator of the relative importance of a topic for presidential selection, then the people and the press differed markedly in the subject areas deemed most important for candidate evaluation.[25]

Personal and Professional Qualities and Political Philosophy

If one includes responses expressing general approval or disapproval of the candidates, then 62 percent of all appraisal criteria cited by the public involved judgment of the candidates' characteristics, rather than their policies. As in the press sample, general personality traits received heaviest exposure (42 percent) compared to professional qualifications (14 percent) or political philosophy (6 percent). The public and the press were also similar in appraising each candidate on an equally wide spectrum of traits. However, Wallace's assets were judged on fewer than average dimensions, while more than an average number of traits was used to recite and relate his liabilities.

Personal characteristics were divided into two broad categories for the public sample. One dealt with leadership traits, personality, and education; the other included traits of integrity and trustworthiness. Table 5 paraphrases survey answers and ranks the ten most important assets and liabilities mentioned for each candidate. It shows that integrity was deemed an important personal quality for all of the candidates, which corresponds to the emphasis of the press.

In the press, characteristics of style and professional image could be easily distinguished from the more general remarks about per-

[25] This finding supports the Sigel and Vinyard contention that people are more interested in press information than press advice. See R. S. Sigel and C. D. Vinyard, "Newspaper Power Revisited," Midwest Political Science Association paper, 1971, 7 ff.

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TABLE 5

Public's Rank Order of Assets and Liabilities of Each Candidate *

Assets	*RMN*	*HHH*	*GCW*	*Liabilities*	*RMN*	*HHH*	*GCW*
				Leadership, Personality, Education			
Strong Man: Decisive, Aggressive	9	–	8	Fanatic; Craves Power; Demagogue	–	–	4
Well-Informed; Realistic; Sensible	–	7	–	Weak; Indecisive; Vacillating	–	5	–
				Integrity, Trustworthiness			
Man of Integrity, Principle, Ideals; Moral	6	4	4	Lacks Integrity; Unprincipled; Dishonest	1	3	–
Outspoken; Tells It like It Is	–	–	5	Not Outspoken; Won't Take Any Stand	10	–	–
Sincere	–	8	–	Wouldn't Gain Confidence of All Groups	–	–	9
				General Personal Capacity			
Good Man; Well-Qualified; Capable	2	3	9	Not a Good Man; Nonqualified; Not a Good Pres'dt.	8	10	6
Experienced; Gov't. or Political Experience	1	1	–	He Is a Loser: Diehard	4	–	–
Successful Record	–	6	–	Poor Speaker; Windbag	–	8	–
				General Capacity to Deal with Issues			
I Like His Policies (Unspecified); Would Handle Foreign Policy Well	8	–	2	Don't Know Where He Stands; Position Unclear	6	–	–
Experience Abroad	5	–	–	Don't Agree with His Policies	–	–	10
				Capacity to Deal with Specific Issues			
Stand on Vietnam, Hard or Soft	3	5	7	Stand on Vietnam, Hard or Soft	5	4	–
Stand on Law and Order, Hard Line	7	–	1	Connection with Johnson Administration	–	1	–
Stand on Civil Rights, Race Problems	–	9	6	Stand on Civil Rights, Race Problems	–	–	2
				Philosophy			
Favors States' Rights, Local Control	–	–	3	Too Radical; Too Extreme; Too Reactionary	–	–	3
				Racist; Bigot	–	–	5

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TABLE 5 *(continued)*

Assets	*RMN*	*HHH*	*GCW*	*Liabilities*	*RMN*	*HHH*	*GCW*
				Approval or Disapproval for Unspecified Reasons			
I Just Like Him	—	—	10	I Just Don't Like Him	2	2	8
				Emphatic "No"	7	6	1
				I'm Not Voting for Nixon (Humphrey, Wallace)	9	—	—
				Circumstantial Reasons			
He'll Bring a Change; Time for a Change	4	—	—	Time for a Change; Won't Change Johnson Pol's	—	7	—
Lesser of Two (Three) Evils	—	10	—				
				Self-Interest, Class Interest			
				Bad for Negroes	—	—	7
				Party			
He Is a Republican (Democrat)	10	2	—	He's a Republican	3	—	—
				Supports Democratic Platform	—	9	—

*N for Assets = Nixon, 1,254; Humphrey, 992; Wallace, 821. N for Liabilities = Nixon, 784; Humphrey, 1,002; Wallace, 1,429. Rank based on all answers given to general information question, up to 10th rank.

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sonalities. The public responses, as coded in the Michigan survey, did not readily lend themselves to these distinctions. The pattern does not mean that style and image were not noted. Rather, they formed an integral part of answers which were worded far more broadly than the more precise press stories. Elements of strength, rather than restraint, seemed to be the preferred style of the public. In image-creating, the heaviest emphasis was on an image of expertise denoting ability to cope with a variety of unspecified problems. Though the press used style and image material differently than the public did, its data were ample for the types of personality distinctions which the public made.

In the realm of professional capabilities, many survey answers were so general that it is difficult to tell how much specific information about professional capacities respondents considered. Very few of the replies went beyond mentioning experience in general terms. Yet, even though the respondents' answers were more vague than the press commentary, they do indicate that press and public shared a substantial concern about professional capabilities.

Data on candidate philosophy are distorted by the large number of responses referring to Wallace's philosophy—80 percent of the total. Wallace was chided primarily for being a racist, a fanatic, and consequently too radical. He was praised for favoring states' rights and local control. The two other candidates were praised and condemned in more general terms for liberalism or conservatism; specific characteristics and dimensions were unclear. Beyond these broad matters, there was only a tiny sprinkling of answers which alluded to changes in governmental organization determined by the candidate's philosophy (e.g., centralization vs. decentralization, changes in the role of the Supreme Court). Again, the manner in which the public dealt with questions of political philosophy and the manner in which the press handled these subjects were quite similar.

Table 5 gives a comparative view of the characteristics which the public voiced as most important in judging each candidate. Like the press, the public appraised Humphrey and Nixon by personality, professionalism, and philosophical criteria which were more nearly alike than the criteria by which Wallace was measured. For Nixon and Humphrey, the chief assets were general experience

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and qualifications; for Wallace, the major advantage that was stressed was his hard line on law and order. Chief liabilities for Nixon and Humphrey were negative judgments concerning their integrity and a general dislike felt toward them. Disapproval of Wallace was based primarily on general dislike and his stand on civil rights. For all the candidates, expressions of approval were usually particularized, indicating specific assets such as education, warmth, fiscal prudence. Opinions of dislike were commonly generalized, such as "I just don't like him." Fifty-three percent of all responses referred to liabilities. As Table 2 (p. 81) shows, there was a preponderance of liability assessments for all the candidates, but the edge was slight for Nixon, somewhat greater for Humphrey, and at almost a two-to-one ratio for Wallace.[26] Even though press coverage of Wallace had contained many pro-Wallace views, public responses in the aggregate did not mirror this favorable trend.

In addition to asking respondents for reasons which might make them vote for or against various candidates, the Michigan survey also asked them: "What would you say is the most important reason you voted (would have voted) for[candidate]?" This questionnaire item gave respondents a chance to delineate those reasons which were most crucial for their final choice and, presumably, the areas in which they had or needed the most information. Respondents were permitted to give replies which related to the political parties or replies which focused on the candidates.[27] Given the option of stressing the party or the man, only 10 percent of the answers stressed the party. To this low figure, one must add those remarks which cited the candidate's party affiliation as an asset or a liability to him (Table 6). But even with this addition, the figure is low at 15 percent. Our data therefore substantiate a trend noted by other observers of recent elections: the emphasis on party as a prime determinant for voting decisions seems to be declining. In its place, there is a far heavier emphasis on a can-

[26] Since the survey tapped sentiment after the election, the more favorable cast of Nixon responses provides support for the view that a slight delay in the election date would not have changed the outcome. Many observers have speculated that the upturn in pro-Humphrey responses in pre-election polls close to the election date indicated that Humphrey could have won a few days later.

[27] Three replies could be given. As in the case of general questions about the candidates, the answers were similar enough so that we could omit secondary replies.

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TABLE 6

Comparison of Rated and Unrated Appraisal Criteria *
(Percentage Figures)

	Rated	*Unrated*
Issues — General	9%	7%
Issues — Specific	10%	16%
Capabilities — General	19%	14%
Leadership, Personality, Education	6%	14%
Integrity, Trustworthiness	6%	14%
Philosophy	2%	6%
Approval — Unspecified	10%	14%
Circumstantial Reasons	17%	4%
Self-interest, Class Interest	6%	4%
Party Affiliation	15%	7%

*Rated appraisals report data which respondents labeled as most important. Unrated appraisals report first responses on reasons for liking or disliking candidates. Responses focusing on parties *per se*, rather than the candidate's relation to the party, have been omitted.

didate's personality and his general ability to handle the presidency.[28]

We had expected that the criteria mentioned most frequently to have been used for candidate selection would also be the criteria said to be the most important. But this was not the case. As Table 6 shows, there was a considerable difference between matters mentioned most often in response to a general inquiry about choice criteria and matters labeled most important.[29] The causes of the discrepancy are not readily apparent. Circumstantial reasons, self-interest, and party affiliation account for 38 percent of the reasons cited as the most important, compared to 15 percent when measured by the frequency of general responses (See Table 6). If

[28] Walter de Vries, in a speech, December 1970, to a University of Maryland Conference on "Strategies in the New Politics." De Vries presented graphic evidence, based on 1968 Michigan data, of the switch in voter attention from a priority of "party—group affiliation—candidates—issues" to a priority of "candidate personality and ability—issues—party—group affiliation."

[29] Results were different when one tallied the answers of those people who had a single answer only for the questions about candidate assets and liabilities. We had thought that party might be particularly salient for them. And so it was, with 18% of the answers referring to party. But issues also figured above average (25%). Personality factors, by contrast, were exceptionally low with leadership qualities at 4% and integrity at 8%. The remainder of the categories did not differ substantially from multiple-answer respondents.

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one considers circumstantial reasons as less compatible with a reasoned-choice model than criteria related to issues and candidates' characteristics, one must conclude that a Gresham's law operates ordaining that the less valuable criteria crowd out the more valuable ones when the voter finally steps into the voting booth.

The Usefulness of the Reasoned-Choice Model

Our analysis of the campaign information supplied by the press in the 1968 presidential campaign and the information which the public claims to have used in choosing candidates reveals a rather loose fit between the supply and the use of campaign information. Moreover, criteria chosen by the public are further removed than criteria given by the press from the ideal reasoned-choice model which rationally weighs proposed policies and candidate qualifications. As in other years, people in 1968 seemed to ignore much of the available data.[30] Large numbers apparently had no opinions which they could express about the various candidates, and comparatively few could cite more than one characteristic by which to judge candidates. Ignoring much of the press offering was not a question of disinterest in 1968. After all, 39 percent of the public had claimed to be very much interested in the campaign and 40 percent were somewhat interested. Only 11 percent had claimed no direct exposure to campaign information in newspapers, television, or radio.

Cognitions or certainly their expression, were hazy. The number of specific policy issues, or specific presidential professional capabilities or philosophies mentioned in the public sample was sharply below press coverage. One can ascribe this attrition of the people's knowledge only partially to the manner of press presentation. While the alternatives were not clearly stated, it was not prohibitively difficult or tedious for the average readers to obtain a far wider information base than they apparently used. Criteria such as party, self-interest, and circumstantial reasons which are not part of the ideal reasoned-choice model were prominent in the

[30] One can only speculate about the nature of other kinds of data which the public might have used, had it been available. For instance, some people might be delighted with comparative psychological appraisals, astrological forecasts, or graphological findings. The press has been singularly unimaginative in its coverage of presidential campaigns, as the nationwide uniformity of press data shows.

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public's perception of candidates. Certainly these findings contradict V. O. Key's comment that "In the large, the electorate behaves about as rationally and responsibly as we should expect, given the clarity of the alternatives presented to it and the character of the information available to it."[31]

If the public neglected the reasoned-choice model, what kind of model did it use? The evidence shows that the public used what may be called a "politico-choice model." The terminology is borrowed from a series of models devised for analyzing the roles of public officials, especially legislators. Legislators perform as delegates, trustees, or politicos. "Delegates" act according to instructions from their well-informed constituents. "Trustees" use their own judgment to act in what they perceive as the best interests of their constituents. Since the details of decision-making are left to trustees, their constituents need not inform themselves specifically about issues and policy options. Their chief task is selection of an official who seems generally trustworthy to guard their interests and is capable of making all needed decisions. "Politicos" are a cross between the delegates and the trustees—independent trustees in many decisions, and instructed delegates in others which are of particularly keen concern to their constituents.[32]

Similar models can be used for the presidency. The presidential role may be viewed as that of delegate, trustee, or politico. Depending on the type of president the public wants, the essential criteria for candidate selection vary. Survey research has shown that the public rejects the delegate model in practice, if not in theory. It prefers a trustee or politico in the presidential role.[33] The model of choice which the public used in 1968 seems well tailored to the selection of a politico president. In fact, the politico-choice model employed in 1968 makes far better use of limited

[31] V. O. Key, *The Responsible Electorate* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), 7.

[32] For greater detail, see H. Eulau, J. C. Wahlke, W. Buchanan, and L. C. Ferguson, "The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke," *American Political Science Review*, 53 (1959), 742-756. Also see their *The Legislative System* (New York: John Wiley, 1962), *passim*.

[33] See, for instance, D. A. Graber, *Public Opinion, the President and Foreign Policy* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968), 339-345, and sources cited there; M. Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), 73-94; J. D. Barber, "The President and His Friends," American Political Science Association paper, 1969, 7-8.

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supplies of time and knowledge than the ideal reasoned-choice model.

The selection of a politico implies that one needs to know, in a very general way, whether the candidate is trustworthy and capable. Except for those issues and capabilities which are uppermost in the public mind, the choice of a politico does not require specific knowledge of the policies or the skills which a candidate has to have to cope with a particular situation. Information supply and information demand in 1968 were compatible with these requirements. The candidates and the press stressed generalities about the candidates' trustworthiness and capabilities, and public perceptions shared this emphasis.

Does the politico-choice model qualify as a reasoned-choice model of sorts, even though it does not conform to the ideal pattern? This article argues that it does because it matches means to ends—knowledge acquisition to knowledge requirements of the tasks to be performed by the president.[34] Concentration on the general personality qualities of candidates is not only tailored to the needs of selecting a politico president, but it is also sound given the capacities and inclinations of the average voter. Information about personal qualities is the only information which the average layman, remote from the political scene, can appraise intelligently.[35] Nor need one decry the heavy emphasis on personal qualities as forced acceptance of a poor presidential measuring scale. Surely personality characteristics are crucial. People may properly feel that a president who is "a good man, capable and experienced" can

[34] It may, therefore, be the most rational model after all. As M. Brewster Smith points out, rationality can be judged by the steps in the decision process as well as by the product of the reasoning process. "Rational decisions viewed as products are ones that select appropriate means to attain specified goals at acceptable costs, within a self-consistent framework of positive and negative goal values and in terms of an accurate appraisal of the situation of action." "Personality in Politics: A Conceptual Map, with Application to the Problem of Political Rationality," in O. Garceau, ed., *Political Research and Political Theory* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), 94. Also see G. M. Becker and C. G. McClintock, "Value: Behavioral Decision Theory," *Annual Review of Psychology*, 18 (1967), 239-286.

[35] Reasons for heavy stress on personal qualities are further analyzed in R. S. Sigel, "Images of the American Presidency," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 10 (1966), 123-137; F. Greenstein, "Popular Images of the President," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 122 (1965), 523-529; and W. R. Brown, *The Presidential Image in the Campaign Biography* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1960), 141-144. Shapiro, 117, corroborates that highly personalized information is deemed most salient for voting.

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tackle any kind of problem. At the time of the election it may be uncertain in which areas a candidate's severest tests will come. Therefore it may be best to concentrate on general leadership qualities and characteristics of integrity and trustworthiness, rather than dwelling on specialized competence in a variety of areas.[36] Even political scientists and historians, who presumably are sophisticated about the essential qualifications for the presidency, put heavy emphasis on the importance of general personality characteristics.[37]

The choice of a politico permits the mass public's endeavor to influence policy on a few major issues through its candidate choices. In 1968, the crucial issues on which one-fifth of the respondents wanted to hinge their approval or disapproval of a candidate were Vietnam, law and order, and civil rights. On these issues, the public considered seriously the candidates' stands. While these were a small portion of the issues facing the country, one could hardly expect the average person to pay full attention to a much larger spectrum of issues. Moreover, in selecting these issues, the average voter probably weighed a number of other issues and candidate qualifications which were discussed in the press.

If the object of candidate appraisal is a politico choice, then many of the data which are normally excluded from a reasoned-choice model become rationally quite acceptable. For instance, a choice based on following one's party's lead becomes a reasonable method of selection as long as the average individual trusts his party.[38] If he does not need to know details about the candidates'

[36] The situation is somewhat different when one of the candidates is an incumbent. President Eisenhower was judged more heavily on his current, rather than past, record and on his policy positions during the 1956 campaign than in 1952. But the differences were slight. Personal qualities were by far the dominant criteria in both elections. Campbell et al., 299-302.

[37] See, for example, T. A. Bailey, *Presidential Greatness* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966), 129-216; Grant McConnell, *The Modern Presidency* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), 75-84; and Richard Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York: John Wiley, 1964), 169-170.

[38] M. Brewster Smith, 97. It has been argued that party-based choices are not rational because "The average voter does not know his party's position . . . policy opinions are very loosely or anachronistically linked to party preferences at any point in time." Converse et al., footnote 1, 1118. But if a trustee relationship is rationally defensible, then the voter can place the party in a trustee position. The number of so-called party choices has been frequently exaggerated. A voter affiliates with a party because he shares its outlook on politics. Hence his choices, however made, are apt to coincide with the choices made by party leaders. The fact that the best-informed voters tend to abandon their party less often than more poorly informed voters supports the supposi-

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policy stands and qualifications, he can leave candidate selection to party leaders who can evaluate the candidates better than he can. Even as knowledgeable a person as Justice Learned Hand has confessed willingness to rely on the advice of political experts: "I have neither the time nor the ability to learn the facts, or to estimate their importance if I knew them. I am disposed to accept the decision of those charged with the responsibility of dealing with them."[39]

If the voter has once determined that the party represents his interests, he need not reexamine this choice unless, of course, evidence raising doubts about the wisdom or trustworthiness of party leaders comes to his attention. Such doubts have apparently been rising in recent years. Many people have lost faith in the wisdom of the parties to represent their interests and to select the right candidates. They are therefore resuming more of the choice themselves so that the number of people who cite party as their chief criterion in a presidential election is declining. This does not necessarily mean that voters will deviate more often from their party's choice; rather, they may settle for the same choice, but on the basis of their own appraisal, instead of party guidance. As political competence mounts among the electorate with rising levels of education, one would expect to see more independence in choosing a candidate, even if the parties recapture the confidence of their followers.

Some of the circumstantial reasons cited for electoral choices make good political sense, too. The feeling that "it's time for a change," which helped to propel Nixon into the presidency, is based on the fear that corrupting influences mount when power is entrenched too long in the hands of one party or one candidate. If one believes that endorsement by party leaders stamps each of the contenders as sound presidential material, then one can make one's choice dependent on the rule that change is good *per se*. Nor is self-interest an unsound criterion for choice. Political idealism may prescribe that political choices should be made with the general welfare in mind rather than personal interest. But the average person is hard put to judge what the general interest requires. He does know where his shoe pinches and may well assume that what

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tion that voting along party lines does not necessarily mean unreasoned acceptance of party choices. On this point, see V. O. Key, 53.

[39] Learned Hand, *The Spirit of Liberty* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1952), 93.

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benefits him or his class is good for at least part of the nation.

Overall, the criteria used by the public in 1968 for appraising presidential candidates were sound and well suited to the making of "politico choices"; the press supplied ample information, although the public used only a selected portion. V. O. Key's compliment, though based on somewhat different assumptions, seems well deserved: "In American presidential campaigns of recent decades, the portrait that emerges . . . is . . . one of an electorate moved by concern about central and relevant questions of public policy, of governmental performance, and of executive personality."[40]

The fact that the supply of press information seems to be quite sufficient for present public needs should not lead to complacency about the adequacy of electoral knowledge. Though the public now uses only a fraction of the information offered and is content with a politico choice, it may want to utilize more in the future, especially if public confidence in political elites continues to decline.[41] The classic rational-choice model, discussed at the start of this article provides guidelines for the type of knowledge which is useful when citizens try to make more independent choices. Even for the politico-choice model, it would be helpful to have much greater clarity of presentation in the media and greater point-by-point comparisons of candidates and issues. More ample evaluations of the political significance of differences found among candidates and their programs would permit voters to judge better the alternatives presented to them. As has been suggested, the average person lacks the time and resources to make his own comparative analyses from the raw materials which the press currently supplies.

Even more important, in a society where the mass public depends on experts to identify candidates and to appraise them in the manner described by the reasoned-choice model, well-informed opinion leaders are needed.[42] The chief sources of facts and interpretations for these leaders are newspapers because direct political experiences are, of necessity, quite limited. The newspapers do

[40] *Op. cit.*, 7.

[41] The beneficial effects of wide coverage of election news by the mass media are discussed in Berelson et al., 229-230, 245.

[42] The division of labor between attentive and mass publics is discussed in D. J. Devine, *The Attentive Public: Polyarchical Democracy* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970), 31-35, 59-61, 120-122. For a view opposing such a division of labor, see Jack L. Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy," *American Political Science Review* (1966), 285-295, 391-392.

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not now serve this clientele adequately. Hence, it is not surprising that these opinion elites are among the foremost critics of deficiencies in information found in the press. Since the opinion elites are a crucial part of the politico-choice model prevalent today, their unmet information needs deprive the general public of essential resources of knowledge and judgment for prudent presidential selections.

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Is There a Revisionist Thesis on the Origins of the Cold War?

MICHAEL LEIGH

Recent historical analyses of the cold war have generated a critical literature which is devoted to the elaboration of categories distinguishing the different interpretations. Typically, the field has been divided into two or three contending "schools": the "orthodox," the "revisionist," and perhaps the "liberal" or "realist."[1] Each school has been identified by its substantive historical judgments and by its historiographical assumptions. Recently some critics have acknowledged that existing categories are somewhat *simpliste* and have introduced further elaborations as, for example, between "hard" and "soft" revisionism.[2] But despite

[1] See, for example, Christopher Lasch, introduction to Gar Alperovitz, *Cold War Essays* (New York, 1970) or Ronald Steel, "Did Anyone Start the Cold War?" *New York Review of Books*, September 2, 1971.

[2] In the introduction to his recent book, Maddox recognizes these two subdivisions within the revisionist "school." But at the beginning of the first chapter he seems to disavow this insight with the remark that "much of the existing revisionist or 'New Left' literature on the subject amounts to little more than extended footnotes on interpretations [William A.] Williams first put forward." These contradictory statements illustrate the problems encountered when one seeks to impose a common label on a diverse body of literature. These problems are compounded by the generic yet undefined use of the term "New Left." Robert James Maddox, *The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War* (Princeton, N.J., 1973), 4 and 13.

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new sensitivity to differences among revisionists, the major categories have been retained.

These categories are inappropriate, misleading, and have been in part responsible for the sterility of the debate over the origins of the cold war. More specifically, this essay will argue that the term "revisionism" does not provide a useful demarcation within the literature. Critical analysis commonly refers to a "revisionist thesis,"[3] that is, a series of historical judgments. Yet there is little consensus on the boundaries between "revisionist" and "non-revisionist" historiography. This lack of consensus reflects the diversity which in fact exists among scholars who have been designated "revisionists" even over their own protests.[4]

This inquiry is designed to compare widely accepted characterizations of "revisionism" with the actual propositions of selected revisionists. The necessary limitations of length dictate selectivity in its choice of issues. It does not claim to exhaust the historical and methodological arguments raised by critics of revisionism, but rather to consider some representative and controversial examples. In each case it is hoped that the criterion for selection is clearly defined.

The first section is a summary of the "revisionist thesis" as it has appeared to various scholars. The next contains an inventory of historical propositions drawn from studies by six "revisionist" historians; the propositions refer to three controversial issue-areas. This inventory is scrutinized to determine whether a consistent thesis does indeed run through the six revisionist accounts.

Even if it were found that there is close agreement among the "revisionists" themselves, it would not follow that they constitute a separate "school"; to do so their conclusions would have to differ significantly from the conclusions of "orthodox" or at least "non-revisionist" historians. To ascertain whether the differences *between* the historical judgments of the two schools are as great as,

[3] See, for example, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Origins of the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 46, No. 1, October 1967, 24-25.

[4] Maddox, op. cit., 123, refers to Diane Shaver Clemens' work *Yalta*, O.U.P., 1970 as "revisionist" despite the author's own observation that her conclusions differ from those "reached by previous American diplomatic scholars—both of orthodox and revisionist persuasions." *Ibid.*, 274. For a sympathetic review of Maddox's book by Francis Loewenheim, together with rejoinders by Clemens and other "revisionists," see *The New York Times Book Review*, June 17, 1973. For a more critical review see Ronald Steel, *The New York Review of Books*, June 14, 1973.

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or greater than, those *within* them, revisionist propositions are compared with those of three "non-revisionist" writers who serve as a sort of "control group."[5]

The Purported Revisionist Thesis

In its extreme form, Arthur Schlesinger notes, the revisionist thesis is that:

> after the death of Franklin Roosevelt and the end of the Second World War, the United States deliberately abandoned the wartime policy of collaboration and, exhilarated by the possession of the atomic bomb, undertook a course of aggression of its own designed to expel all Russian influence and to establish democratic-capitalist states on the very border of the Soviet Union.[6]

Schlesinger's account of the revisionist thesis conforms with the version which is generally accepted. This account can be illustrated by a comparison with another critic's summary of the thesis. Ronald Steel, who has occasionally been regarded as a revisionist himself,[7] observes that, among the revisionists:

> there is *general agreement* [italics added] on the origins of the cold war: that American policy after the death of Roosevelt caused the Soviet Union to tighten its hold on Eastern Europe, and that there was no objective threat to American security to account for the uncompromising anti-Soviet attitude of the Truman Administration.[8]

Perhaps the most contentious element of the revisionist thesis, as the "thesis" is perceived by other scholars, is the claim that certain features of the American economic system limited the options of American decision-makers in their dealings with the Soviet Union. John Lewis Gaddis, in the conclusion of his own study of the origins of the cold war, formulates this element of the revisionist thesis as follows:

> Leaders of the United States had become convinced, revisionists assert, that survival of the capitalist system at home required the unlimited expansion of American economic influence overseas. For this reason

[5] Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., Louis J. Halle and Herbert Feis. For discussion on the "control group" concept, see n.12.

[6] Schlesinger, 24-25.

[7] Henry Pacher, "Revisionist Historians and the Cold War," in Irving Howe, ed., *Beyond the New Left* (New York, 1970), 175.

[8] Steel, "Did Anyone Start the Cold War?"

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> the United States could not recognize legitimate Soviet interests in Eastern Europe, Germany or elsewhere.[9]

The "thesis" abstracted in these three quotations is alleged to form a leitmotif throughout revisionist analyses of the key issues involved in the sources of the cold war. This allegation will be examined in the following section.

Actual Propositions in Works of Revisionists

Although there is little consensus on the boundaries of revisionism, it is not difficult to determine who the leading revisionists are thought to be. The selection of revisionists here is based on widely shared critical opinion, supported in several cases by the historians' own declared intentions to "reassess," "rectify" or "re-examine" received notions about the origins of the cold war. One standard of judgment which will *not* serve is that suggested by Maddox who refers to revisionism as the work of "a number of scholars more or less identified with the New Left." Apart from the vagueness of the term "New Left," such a criterion would omit the seminal contributions of D. F. Fleming and William A. Williams, the doyens of revisionism, on chronological grounds alone.[10]

In addition to the work of five "well-established" revisionists—D. F. Fleming, William A. Williams, Gabriel Kolko, Gar Alperovitz, and David Horowitz—the sample includes that of Diane Clemens. Clemens' study of the Yalta Conference has been described by reviewers as "revisionist," despite the author's own observation that her conclusions differ from those "reached by previous American diplomatic scholars—both of orthodox and revisionist persuasions."[11]

Other "revisionist" historians have been excluded in order to allow the addition of three non-revisionists whose interpretations provide a check on whether particular conclusions are indeed pe-

[9] John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947* (New York, 1972), 357.

[10] More seriously, Fleming's pioneering "*revisionist*" study could not survive Maddox's stipulation that "in general the terms 'New Left' and 'revisionist' are synonymous when applied to interpretations of how the cold war began." Maddox, 39. For a refutation of the revisionist/New Left equation see Robert W. Tucker, *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore, 1971) 9. Maddox escapes his difficulty by dubbing Fleming "an exception."

[11] See n.4.

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culiar to revisionism.[12] The works of Herbert Feis are generally agreed to represent "semi-official" State Department history, not least because of the author's privileged access to the Department's archives. Arthur Schlesinger Jr.'s 1967 article on "The Origins of the Cold War" in *Foreign Affairs* is a liberal critique of earlier American foreign policy from the perspective of the "liberal establishment" in the mid-1960s. And while Louis Halle's *Cold War as History* has been the subject of divergent interpretations, few would quarrel with the description of the author as "scarcely a revisionist."[13]

From the multitude of questions surrounding the beginnings of the cold war, three have been selected as the focus of analysis: continuity of policy between Roosevelt and Truman; spheres of influence; and "atomic diplomacy." In selecting these questions we are guided by the salience of different issue-areas in the critical literature. Wilfrid Knapp, for example, has observed that "from the many points at issue in the present argument about the transition from World War Two to the Cold War those which stand out most clearly are the relationship between Roosevelt's policy and that of Truman, the question of spheres of influence, atomic diplomacy and the Polish question."[14]

Schlesinger, J. L. Richardson, and André Fontaine emphasize the ancient problem of spheres of influence as well as the contemporary problem of the atomic bomb. Of course there are additional issues that might have been the objects of differing interpretations. But the analysis is restricted to only these three, first, because as the touchstones of controversy, there is the common belief that "revisionist" and other accounts diverge on these issue-areas. Second, the issues can be represented by a question sufficiently precise to extract clear responses, thus facilitating comparison. And, last, while the questions may be succinctly drawn, their elucidation implicates the major assumptions thought to be associated with revisionism.

[12] The inclusion of a non-revisionist "control grup" is vital if we are to have some means of assessing the validity of any particular characterization of "revisionist historiography." In his book Maddox fails to provide such a "control" and hence is open to the criticism that his charges *even if valid* may apply equally to non-revisionist studies.

[13] Wilfrid Knapp, "The Cold War Revised," *International Journal*, vol. XXIII, No. 3 (Summer 1968), 344.

[14] *Ibid.*, 349.

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I. *Change of Policy between F.D.R. and Truman: The Revisionist Thesis*

Most characterizations of the "revisionist thesis" emphasize its contention that Truman's succession to the presidency occasioned a new, strident, and aggressive policy towards the Soviet Union. In this respect, the thesis is held to attribute the demise of the Grand Alliance to changes within the American leadership, while other accounts of the origins of the cold war stress changes in external circumstances to which the United States reacted. Does the assertion of discontinuity in American foreign policy indeed characterize revisionism?

The following survey finds half of the revisionist sample in agreement with the discontinuity hypothesis, namely Fleming, Alperovitz, and Horowitz. The remainder of the sample—Williams, Kolko, and Clemens—concur in the nonrevisionist judgment that the transition from Roosevelt to Truman did not interrupt the flow of American policy toward the Soviet Union. Each scholar arrived at his conclusion on the basis of his own independent studies and assumptions; there is no implication that these were identical where historical judgments agree.

D. F. Fleming[15] discovers an abrupt shift in the foreign policy of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations which he attributes to the personal qualities of Roosevelt, lacking in his successor. Roosevelt was firm with the Soviets but he sought to *minimize* the "inevitable" postwar disagreements; Truman was quick to *maximize* them and to be tough:

> It is altogether probable that if Roosevelt had been able to finish his fourth term in the White House, there would have been no Cold War.[16]

William A. Williams considers that American policymakers are more constrained by factors other than personality.[17] Although in part an internationalist by disposition, Roosevelt operated within the tradition of "Open Door Expansion." If he ever entertained alternative assumptions, inertia among his advisers and subordinates ruled out fundamental reappraisals.[18] While Roosevelt

[15] D. F. Fleming, *The Cold War and Its Origins* (New York, 1961).

[16] *Ibid.*, 215.

[17] William A. Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York, 1959).

[18] *Ibid.*, 205. Williams notes on p. 220 that "It is simply not possible to account for the continuence of the Open Door policy by blaming Roosevelt's

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had been "ambivalent" in his policy toward the Soviet Union, Truman was "enthusiastic" and "militant." But these differences in style scarcely masked a shared adherence to the "traditional approach to American foreign policy."

Gar Alperovitz, like Fleming but unlike Williams, assigns a significant role to the individual policymaker.[19] The constraints imposed by the foreign policy process still left sufficient scope for striking innovations when the administration changed. There was a "great gulf between [Truman's] view and the view of his predecessor" which had been one of "cooperation with the Soviet Union."[20]

Gabriel Kolko minimizes the contribution of Roosevelt to the formulation of foreign policy, depicting outcomes during his tenure as the product of pressure from his advisers:[21]

> When his advisers decided his views were impractical they sought to cajole and subtly persuade him to accept their views, a task that was never too difficult, if only for the moment.[22]

Truman inherited and retained most of Roosevelt's advisers until the end of the war. Policy innovation was reduced to phraseology: "If the content was the same, the style and pronunciation were different. It was the same policy but in another coating."[23]

Diane Clemens attempts to demonstrate that Truman "set out to implement the Yalta agreements by changing them."[24] But even for Roosevelt, the Yalta spirit had been emphemeral and was called into question before his death. Clemens takes exception to Alperovitz's claim that Truman's foreign policy was basically a departure from his predecessor's: "Roosevelt in Washington and in conversations with his advisers demonstrated many of the views and attitudes that found a logical conclusion in the Truman administration."[25]

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successors, for the President did not carry through on persistent Russian overtures for major economic assistance to help them rebuild their shattered economy. Had Roosevelt done this it would be more meaningful to charge his successors—or the Russians—with sabotaging his plans for the future."

[19] Gar Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam* (New York, 1965).

[20] *Ibid.*, 22.

[21] Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War* (New York, 1969).

[22] *Ibid.*, 315.

[23] *Ibid.*, 382.

[24] Clemens, 269.

[25] *Ibid.*, 279.

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David Horowitz shares Fleming's assessment that a working relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States existed at the time of Roosevelt's death.[26] But Truman's abrupt reception of Molotov, soon after taking office, signaled that the "Russian policy of the new Administration was predicated on a very different set of assumptions. A striking new emphasis was present, one which seemed far removed from any attempt to 'minimize the general Soviet problem.' "

The "Non-Revisionist" Interpretation

Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., comments that "while the idea that Truman reversed Roosevelt's policy is tempting dramatically, it is a myth."[27] The case for continuity is based on the low pass to which relations with the Soviet Union had already come when Roosevelt died. *Louis Halle* does not address the continuity question directly but his deterministic framework allows little scope to the individual:[28] "If statesmanship could still have averted the Cold War in 1942, after that it was too late."[29] In the crucial early years of Truman's administration, Halle notes, partially relaxing his determinism, Truman "had not yet acquired the mastery of his job that might have enabled him to override the advice of seasoned counsellors whom he had inherited and who surrounded him."[30]

Herbert Feis's chapter heading "The Roosevelt-Truman Continuity of Policy" leaves little room for conjecture.[31] Unlike Schlesinger, Feis holds to an optimistic interpretation of Roosevelt's last words on Soviet-American relations; in this respect "semi-official" history agrees with the revisionism of Alperovitz and Horowitz. But Feis's assessment of Truman's piety is delicately qualified: "Truman made up his mind that he would not depart from Roosevelt's course or abandon his ways—until and unless they should have definitely proved to be futile" by the behavior of the U.S.S.R.[32]

The question of continuity clearly does not sustain the hypothesis of "general agreement" among revisionists on salient issues

[26] David Horowitz, *The Free World Colossus* (New York, 1965).
[27] Schlesinger, 24n.
[28] Louis J. Halle, *The Cold War as History* (New York, 1967).
[29] *Ibid.*, 43.
[30] *Ibid.*, 94.
[31] Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin* (Princeton, N.J., 1957), 596.
[32] *Ibid.*, 599.

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involving the start of the cold war. There does appear, however, to be general agreement among the nonrevisionists with whom half the revisionists agree.

II. *Spheres of Influence: The "Revisionist" Thesis*

Did Roosevelt acquiesce in the Churchill-Stalin agreement of October 1944? This question focuses on the problem of *spheres of influence* in the transition from Grand Alliance to cold war. Stalin's impression of the American attitude to divided responsibility in the Balkans is crucial to any evaluation of subsequent Soviet and American behavior vis-à-vis Eastern Europe. Substantiation of charges of unilateralism against either party depends, in part, on the perceived status of early spheres-of-influence initiatives.

In this case the hypothesis of "general agreement" among the revisionists gains some support. Only Kolko disagrees with the conclusion that Roosevelt gave at least his *de facto* assent to the "percentages" agreement. Evidence from this issue for a consistent "revisionist thesis" is vitiated by the fact that Feis's semi-official history reaches the same conclusion as the majority of the revisionists.

Fleming traces the discomfiture of Hull and Roosevelt during the Soviet-British negotiations over the Balkans, but he notes that in June, 1944, the president agreed to a trial proposal. Despite Washington's insistence on the provisional nature of the October agreement, "the Russians assumed thereafter that they had been given predominance in the Balkans."[33] Since the agreement was not expressly superseded at Yalta, Fleming infers that Roosevelt gave it his tacit consent.

Williams, unlike Fleming, stresses the tension between Hull's hopes of re-establishing an open door in Eastern Europe and the self-denial inherent in the spheres of influence accord. But Roosevelt *did* agree to the October pact on a trial basis and, more significantly, acquiesced in Britain's move in Greece: "Both in fact and in the eyes of the Russians that committed Roosevelt on the eve of the Yalta conference to the agreement worked out between Churchill and Stalin."[34]

Alperovitz admits that Roosevelt felt "qualms about the idea of

[33] Fleming, 189.
[34] Williams, 222.

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a division of responsibilities, but there was little he could do about it." Just as the agreement was suggested by the accomplished facts of the forces' position, its endorsement occurred, *de facto*, through action in accord with its provisions.[35]

Kolko concurs in the judgment that spheres of influence arose from the military situation in 1944–45, but attaches no significance to the Stalin-Churchill pact. Forewarned that Churchill did not speak for the Americans, "Stalin was aware that his conversation with Churchill would mean little even if he could trust the Englishman. Churchill too was aware of his limited freedom and powers in regard to the Americans. Any agreement was bound to be worthless."[36]

Clemens disagrees. Stalin assumed that Churchill, fresh from bipartite collusion in Quebec, spoke also for Roosevelt when he came to Moscow. Cables from Roosevelt stressing that only "the three of us" could resolve outstanding questions at first shook Stalin's confidence in Churchill's authority. But, finally, the warmth with which Roosevelt's cable after the meeting commended the conversations gave every indication of American acquiescence to be sealed at a tripartite meeting.[37]

Horowitz makes only a parenthetical reference to Roosevelt's doubts about the plan.[38] The president was ready to recognize the *de facto* division of Europe both to secure the defeat of Germany and to contain the "very real prospect of revolution in Western Europe."

The "Non-Revisionist" Interpretation

Schlesinger finds that "idealism and realism joined in opposition to the spheres of influence solution"[39] and that Hull and Hopkins restrained Roosevelt whenever he was tempted by it. According to *Halle*, any such solution was "abhorrent" to the American idealistic principle of self-determination. But the substantive conclusion's of *Feis's* study are closer to those of Fleming, Alperovitz and Horowitz. After weighing the "meagre and non-committal" as-

[35] Alperovitz, 133.
[36] Kolko, 144.
[37] Clemens, 71.
[38] Horowitz, 59. See also David Horowitz, *Imperialism and Revolution* (London, 1969), 84–85.
[39] Schlesinger, 39.

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pects of Roosevelt's response against his more enthusiastic messages to Stalin and Churchill, Feis concludes: "In short the evidence is that Roosevelt had come to agree with Churchill that some such arrangement as the one reported was advisable, if not essential."[40]

Thus the spheres-of-influence question is one which finds five of the six revisionists ranged against two of the three non-revisionists. It is noteworthy that the exception in each school, Kolko and Feis respectively, is a scholar generally regarded as a prime exemplar of its "approach." Feis, who has never been accused of sharing the economic assumptions of the revisionists, reaches the same conclusion as the majority of them do. Both Kolko and Williams take as axiomatic that a spheres-of-influence policy conflicted with the expansionism inherent in the Roosevelt and Hull postwar foreign-economic policy. Yet they are able to reach opposite conclusions on the spheres-of-influence question. Historical judgments, even on key issues, seem to cross party lines.

III. *Reasons for Using the Atomic Bomb: The "Revisionist" Thesis*

Did military considerations determine the use of the atomic bomb against Japan? The issues which this question implicates must be distinguished from the points surrounding the influence of America's brief atomic monopoly in the diplomacy of succeeding years. There is no *necessary* relationship between the two sets of issues; it is possible, for example, to view military considerations as predominating in the decision to use the bomb, but to acknowledge that possession of the bomb did influence subsequent American diplomacy in Eastern Europe. In general terms this reasoning is the position of Fleming and Kolko, although their assumptions and the variables which they stress are different. The other revisionists find that military considerations did not determine the use of the atomic bomb against Japan. Rather, they point to the political, diplomatic, and economic objectives which, allegedly, dictated the decision.

Fleming believes that the use of the atomic bomb may be explained by pressures from the military and other interested groups. It was "easy enough for [the military] to dread a huge mopping-up

[40] Feis, 451.

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operation with estimates of initial casualties as high as 50,000." "Strong domestic political reason(s)" reinforced this pressure since any redeployment of men from Europe to the Far East would have been extremely unpopular." In addition, the "natural impulse"of men who had invested immense amounts of time, money, and skill in the Manhattan Project was "by no means an inconsequential element."[41] Fleming concludes that the desire to forestall Russian entry into Manchuria influenced the *timing* but not the fact of atomic bombardment.

Williams contends that the military arguments, while not to be discounted, do not explain sufficiently either the use or the timing of the atomic attack: "The United States dropped the bomb to end the war against Japan, *and thereby stop the Russians in Asia and give them sober pause in East Europe*" (author's italics).[42]

Alperovitz states unequivocally that economic, political, and diplomatic objectives determined the use of the atomic bomb against Japan. "From any rational military point of view Japan was already defeated."[43] "The bomb was used not because there were no alternatives but precisely because American policy makers wished to avoid the political consequences" of not using the bomb.[44] These consequences consisted in Soviet domination of Manchuria and North China. It was hoped that the attack on Hiroshima would preempt a Soviet declaration or, failing that, end the war before Soviet forces had penetrated far into North China.

Kolko's analysis of the political and military factors behind the atomic decision is the opposite of Alperovitz's at almost every point. After the New Mexico test Truman "necessarily came to the conclusion that the Russians could no longer be kept out of the war, were probably still needed, and the existence of the bomb would not pressure them on a political level."[45] Truman's conclusion arose "necessarily" from the momentum of bureaucratic decision-making. Use of the bomb was the least risk option toward which the entire mechanism of military planning had been moving.

The decision to use the atomic bombs is strictly beyond the purview of *Clemens'* study, although a favorable reference is made to Alperovitz's interpretation. *Horowitz's* position closely reflects

[41] Fleming, 298.
[42] Williams, 254.
[43] Alperovitz, 106.
[44] *Ibid.*, 110.
[45] Kolko, 560–561.

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that of Alperovitz but is far less cautious: "The desire to keep the Russians out [of Manchuria] would seem to have been the primary reason for the use of the atomic bombs."[46]

The "Non-Revisionist" Interpretation

In *Schlesinger's* view "the revisionist argument that Truman dropped the bomb less to defeat Japan than to intimidate Russia is not convincing [although] this thought undoubtedly appealed to some in Washington as at least the advantageous side effect of Hiroshima."[47]

Halle argues that perceived military needs led to the atomic attack but that this perception was distorted by a "neurotic exaggeration" of Japanese aggression and inhumanity. Exhaustion in Washington precluded a search for alternative means to end the war. *Feis* does not invoke perceptual or bureaucratic factors to explain the decision to use the bomb; rational military considerations were sufficient.

Despite similar substantive judgments by four of the six revisionists, no consistent interpretation emerges from the sample. Like the non-revisionists, Fleming acknowledges the salience of military considerations, though tempered by domestic pressures. Kolko, too, on the basis of very different assumptions, denies the predominance of diplomatic aspirations in the atomic bomb decision.

The following figure attempts to summarize the positions which have been examined in all three issue-areas. It will be recalled that the three questions were: (1) Was there basic continuity between the foreign policy of Roosevelt and Truman? (2) Did Roosevelt acquiesce in the spheres-of-influence agreement of October, 1944? (3) Did military considerations determine the use of the atomic bomb against Japan? The yes indicates an affirmative answer from the author in *Figure* 1 and the no, a negative:

Inspection of the figure fails to reveal any clear "revisionist thesis" across issues and between writers. Only Alperovitz and Horowitz respond to the issues according to the revisionist paradigm suggested by the critical literature:

Truman *did* depart radically from Roosevelt's policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union; Roosevelt *did* acquiesce in the Moscow

[46] David Horowitz, *The Free World Colossus*, 58.
[47] Schlesinger, 46.

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FIGURE 1

	Continuity	Spheres of Influence	Atomic Bomb
Fleming	no	yes	yes
Williams	yes	yes	no
Alperovitz	no	yes	no
Kolko	yes	no	yes
Clemens	yes	yes	no
Horowitz	no	yes	no
Schlesinger	yes	no	yes
Halle	yes	no	yes
Feis	yes	yes	yes

agreement; and military considerations *did not* determine the use of the atomic bomb against Japan. Other revisionists concur in one or two of these judgments. Curiously, Kolko, whose assumptions reflect most closely the neo-Marxian elements of the model attributed to revisionism, takes the position opposite to that of Alperovitz on all three issues. Furthermore, the pattern of his responses is identical to that of the "liberal" representatives and differs from Feis's semi-official version only on the Moscow meeting. Feis agrees with the revisionist majority on this issue.

These findings challenge the claim that there is "general agreement" among revisionists over key issues on the origins of the cold war. A "revisionist thesis" does not ineluctably appear through the six treatments of these important questions. The inclusion of a non-revisionist "control group" in the survey alerts us to the fact that even on the issue where five out of six "revisionists" concur, their judgment is endorsed by the "semi-official" historian. At the very least, these findings suggest that the network of assumptions attributed to the revisionists is neither as consistent nor as constricting as is often implied.

Conclusions

The "revisionist thesis" which is often thought to pervade certain studies of the origins of the cold war is not universally present in the works which have been examined here. Indeed, historical

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judgments running contrary to the "thesis" and more in accord with "semi-official" or "liberal" accounts were found in many cases. The "conceptual model" which many critics believe they have discerned beneath the historical judgments of the revisionists can be found in the original studies only in greatly attenuated form. Several elements of the critics' model of revisionism cannot be found at all.

At best, the "revisionist thesis" with its attendant conceptual model is an "ideal type" explanation of the origins of the cold war, corresponding to the position of no one scholar. As such it can provide a useful model to be tested against the results of empirical research. But even to perform this heuristic function the model requires a radical overhaul to remove its internal inconsistencies.

At worst, the "thesis" is a stereotype imputed to several scholars by critics who disagree with their conclusions. This stereotype is reinforced by attempts to discredit the revisionists' use of documentary sources without any examination of the research practices of nonrevisionists. Part of the present purpose is to question the validity of the categories in terms of which the debate over the origins of the cold war has been conducted. Since neither the historical judgments nor the underlying assumptions of the so-called revisionists correspond with those of the stereotype, and since there is considerable overlap between the judgments of scholars who have been assigned to contending "schools," the term "revisionism" might profitably be excluded from further use for describing some particular interpretation of the origins of the cold war. Analytic categories lose their value when the differences *between* them are no greater than the differences *within* them. Valid distinctions can, of course, be drawn between different explanations of the origins of the cold war but the distinctions should reflect genuine points of demarcation. The abandonment of the generic term "revisionism" will hopefully encourage students of the cold war to look at new data about what led to American-Soviet conflict in a more dispassionate and less polemical light.[48]

Some steps have already been taken in this direction and have

[48] Alternatively the term "revisionism" might be redefined to designate the gamut of scholars who view American foreign policy as dictated by other than purely altruistic motives. For even "the position that the United States behaved during the immediate post-World War II period in much the same manner great states have behaved in the past is revisionist when placed alongside an orthodox historiography of the cold war." Tucker, 9.

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begun to produce interesting results. Gamson and Modigliani have shown that the resources and techniques of political science can usefully be adapted to research on the emergence of the cold war.[49] Gaddis' study contains an interesting analysis of the impact of public opinion on American foreign policy, a set of variables which had been largely ignored in the heat of debate.[50] It is striking that these innovative works defy categorization in terms of the critics' contending "schools." Although disparate in their approaches, such studies share a common concern with the psychological dimension in American-Soviet relations and a willingness to adopt standards of judgment which, if not scientifically "objective," are at least explicitly stated. Other studies investigating the relationship between American domestic opinion and the development of the cold war are under way.[51]

It cannot be predicted whether new modes of research will tend to confirm or disconfirm any of the interpretations which we have considered. Indeed, it is hoped that they will produce in the scholarly community a higher tolerance for ambiguity and complexity about the factors that "really" caused particular disagreements, such ambiguity and complexity corresponding more closely to the nuances of actual historical situations. The argument is that a better understanding of the origins of the cold war can emerge if new explanations of particular conflicts are evaluated and debated on their merits, rather than simply labeled and pushed into predetermined categories which seem to embody nearly as much vituperation and distortion as the rhetoric of the cold war itself.*

[49] William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani, *Untangling the Cold War* (Boston, 1971).

[50] Gaddis, *passim*.

[51] For example see Michael Leigh "The Impact of Public Opinion on American Foreign Policy, 1937-1947" (Ph.D. dissertation, Political Science Department, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; forthcoming, 1974).

* I am indebted to Michael J. Bonn for his careful comments on earlier drafts of this essay.

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The Iranian Crisis of 1945-46 and the Cold War

GARY R. HESS

In its response to the Iranian crisis of November 1945 to June 1946, the United States reoriented its postwar policy toward the Soviet Union, shifting, in the terminology of the era, from "appeasement" to "getting tough." The crisis resulted from the Soviet Union's reluctance to withdraw troops from northern Iran and its encouragement of a separatist political movement in Azerbaijan. Urging the Iranian government to take a strong stand in the United Nations, and persistently supporting Iran in the fledgling international organization, the United States achieved its first diplomatic victory of the cold war. The Soviet Union withdrew its forces in the spring of 1946 and, by the end of the year, the Tehran government asserted its control over Azerbaijan.

Despite its significance, American policy during the Iranian crisis has not been fully studied. Early accounts of the incident, some of which were written by officials involved in decision-making in 1945-46, held that the United States acted appropriately in the face of a Soviet effort to dominate Iran.[1] Recent writings on the origins of

[1] Robert Rossow, Jr., "The Battle of Azerbaijan, 1946," *Middle East Journal*, 10 (1956), 17-32; Joseph M. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks* (February 21-June 5,

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the cold war, however, underscore the complexity of the crisis. From the perspective of revisionist historians Gabriel and Joyce Kolko and Lloyd Gardner, the United States, beginning in World War II, aggressively sought to dominate Middle Eastern oil. The Soviet maneuvering in Iran represented a concern over its security, but the American pursuit of the "open door" refused to tolerate any Soviet influence and led to the vigorous pressures that forced the Russian retreat.[2] In a restatement of the orthodox interpretation of the cold war origins, the late Herbert Feis acknowledged some sound historical and political bases for Soviet policy in Iran, but he implicitly accepted the objectives of American policy. John Lewis Gaddis, in *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947*, stresses the influence of public opinion on Truman's "get tough" approach. By early 1946, Washington perceived its options toward the Soviet Union as limited between accommodation and firmness; contrary to the revisionist position, Gaddis argues that the United States realistically did not have the opportunity to follow a course more appreciative of Soviet interests and problems. The pressures of public opinion and partisan politics, as well as Truman's conviction that the policy of accommodation had failed, forced the change in American diplomacy.[3]

1947) (New York, 1955), 50-58; Nasrollah Saifpour Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy: Powderkeg in Iran* (New York, 1954), preface by Wallace Murray, x-xi, *et passim*; George Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948; A Study in Big-Power Rivalry* (New York, 1948), foreword by George V. Allen and 263-315. Michael Kahl Sheehan, *Iran: The Impact of United States Interests and Policies, 1941-1954* (Brooklyn, N.Y., 1968), 27-32.

[2] Lloyd C. Gardner, *Architects of Illusion; Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949* (Chicago, 1970), 211-215; Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power; The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954* (New York, 1972), 235-42. Briefer revisionist accounts are offered by Barton J. Bernstein, "American Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Cold War," *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration*, edited by Barton J. Bernstein (Chicago, 1970), 40-41, and by David Horowitz, *The Free World Colossus: A Critique of American Foreign Policy in the Cold War*, rev. ed. (New York, 1971), 83-84. D. F. Fleming, *The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960*, Vol. II: *1950-60* (Garden City, N.Y., 1961), 340-48, is mostly critical of America's handling of the incident in the United Nations. A useful summary of the revisionist interpretation is provided by Justus D. Doenecke, "Revisionists, Oil, and Cold War Diplomacy," *Iranian Studies*, 3 (Winter 1970), 23-33. In "The United States, Iran, and the Cold War," *ibid.*, 2-22, Richard Cottam maintains that there is no evidence of oil interests constituting significant influence on United States policy prior to 1954. Cottam treats the 1945-46 crisis only briefly and sees American policy as reflecting what Washington perceived to be necessary defensive moves against the Soviet Union.

[3] Herbert Feis, *From Trust to Terror; The Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950*

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Now that nearly all of the American documentary record of the crisis is available, the scholar can reexamine what the factors were that influenced American policy. It turns out that there is no "single factor" explanation that is satisfactory. Rather, it was a confluence of both national security and domestic considerations that caused the American government to take the "tough stand" that led to one of the first United States-Soviet conflicts of the cold war.

I

The crisis had its origins in Allied operations in Iran during World War II, with the first serious Russian-American differences occurring in late 1944. British and Russian forces invaded Iran in August 1941 to assure the use of Iranian facilities for Allied supply lines to the Soviet Union. In their occupation zone in the northern provinces, the Soviets curtailed the activities of the Iranian army and gendarmerie, interfered with Iranian administration, and cultivated the establishment of the Communist-led Tudeh Party.[4] Although the American military presence was more restricted than that of the British and Russians, the United States established strong ties with the central government in Tehran. The Persian Gulf Command, numbering some 30,000 men, administered and developed Iranian transportation facilities, distributed Lend-Lease to Iran, and transshipped Lend-Lease supplies to the Soviet Union. At the invitation of the Iranian government, the United States sent several missions to assist the Iranians in various areas, including the training of the army and gendarmerie.[5]

In January 1943, the Iranian government appointed Arthur C. Millspaugh as director-general of finance and gave him wide authority to reorganize the nation's chaotic financial administration. Millspaugh, who had served in a similar capacity twenty years earlier, brought a staff of sixty Americans and initially made substantial progress despite conservative opposition in the Majlis (parliament). By early 1944, Millspaugh's plans were the source of difficulties with the Soviets and the Iranians. Millspaugh insisted

(New York, 1970), 63-70, 81-87; John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947* (New York, 1972), 309-23, 353-61.

[4] George Kirk, *The Middle East in the War* (New York, 1952), 466-73; Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran*, 193-215.

[5] *Ibid.*, 271-79; J. C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Dilemmas; The Background of United States Policy* (New York, 1953), 21-24.

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that an American whom he had appointed as director of finance of Soviet-occupied Khorassan should be permitted unrestricted travel, but Soviet officials limited his travel privileges. As Millspaugh tried to change the Russian decision, even the American chargé in Tehran reported to Washington that he appeared determined to seek trouble with the Russians. More importantly, Millspaugh's bullying tactics in dealing with recalcitrant Iranian officials led to strong criticism in the Majlis, press, and cabinet. The Shah, twenty-three-year-old Muhammad Riza, let American officials know of his interest in replacing Millspaugh. At length, the State Department informed the Iranians that it would not take exception to such action. After futile pleas for support from Washington and in the midst of continuing opposition in Tehran, Millspaugh finally resigned in February 1945.[6]

Millspaugh's failure, however, did not affect the general strengthening of American-Iranian ties. As early as 1943, the State Department had outlined ambitious American objectives in Iran which were supported by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Higher State Department officials endorsed a proposal of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs that American influence should be directed toward ending the half-century of British and Russian competition in Iran. Secretary of State Cordell Hull noted that more than ideals were involved: "Likewise from a more directly selfish point of view, it is to our interest that no great power be established on the Persian Gulf opposite the important American petroleum development in Saudi Arabia."[7]

[6] Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran*, 263-89; Chargé in Iran (Richard Ford) to Sec. State, Dec. 24, 1943, Dept. of State Decimal File 891.51A/961; Ford to Sec. State, Feb. 11, 1944, *ibid.*, 891.51A/1030; Memorandum, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Feb. 7, 1944, *ibid.*, 891.51A/1000; Ford to Sec. State, March 8, 1944, *ibid.*, 891.51A/1043; Ford to Sec. State, Aug. 13, 1944, *ibid.*, 891.51A/8-1344; Ambassador in USSR (Harriman) to Sec. State, Dec. 11, 1944, *ibid.*, 891.00/12-1144; Memorandum, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs to Sec. State, Dec. 14, 1944; *ibid.*, 891.00/12-1144; Ford to Sec. State, Feb. 7, 1945, *ibid.*, 891.51A/2-745; Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to Sec. State, March 18, 1943, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1943*, Vol. IV: *The Near East and Africa* (Washington, 1964), 517-18; Dreyfus to Sec. State, Aug. 29, 1943, *ibid.*, 535-36; Dreyfus to Sec. State, Oct. 21, 1943, *ibid.*, 547; Ford to Sec. State, April 25, 1944, *FRUS 1944*, Vol. V: *The Near East, South Asia, and Africa; The Far East* (Washington, 1965), 397-99; Ford to Sec. State, May 22, 1944, *ibid.*, 405-06. (References to *Foreign Relations* volumes will be abbreviated as follows: *FRUS* followed by year of documents, volume number, page number, with volume titles and facts of publication included in first references to a given volume. The titles of officials will be noted only if their positions are not stated in the text.)

[7] Hull to Roosevelt, Aug. 16, 1943, *FRUS 1943*, IV, 377-79; Memorandum, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Jan. 23, 1943, *ibid.*, 331-36; Acting Sec. State

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The first Big Three meeting brought Roosevelt to the Iranian capital. During the conference, he provided the initiative for the Declaration on Iran, by which the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union agreed to respect Iranian integrity and to assist Iran in alleviating its economic problems.[8] Roosevelt quickly sought to breathe life into the latter pledge. After the conference, he wrote to Hull:

> I was rather thrilled with the idea of using Iran as an example of what we could do by an unselfish American policy. We could not take on a more difficult nation than Iran. I would like, however, to take a try at it. The real difficulty is to get the right kind of American experts who would be loyal to their ideals, not fight among themselves and be absolutely honest financially.[9]

This program, however, met strong opposition in the State Department, especially from Assistant Secretary Dean Acheson who wrote that "this plan may easily turn out to be more than an innocent indulgence in messianic globaloney."[10] The State Department assured the White House that the existing special missions provided the basis for achieving Roosevelt's objectives.[11]

In terms of its influence on American-Soviet relations, the most important aspect of the American penetration of Iran was the State Department-backed bid by American companies for oil concessions. By early 1944, the American-owned Standard-Vacuum Company and Sinclair Oil Company, together with the British Shell Company, were negotiating with Iranian officials. Washington and London apparently failed to anticipate the mission to Tehran of a Soviet delegation headed by Sergei I. Kavtaradze, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. Arriving in September, the Kavtaradze delegation demanded five year petroleum exploratory rights in the five northern provinces.[12] On October 16, the Iranian government postponed all oil concession discussions until after the war. Kav-

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(Welles) to Minister in Iran (Dreyfus), March 13, 1943, *ibid.*, 343; Dreyfus to Sec. State, April 14, 1943, *ibid.*, 355-59.

[8] Declaration on Iran, *ibid.*, 413-14; William H. McNeill, *America, Britain, and Russia; Their Co-Operation and Conflict, 1941-1946* (London, 1953), 365-66.

[9] Roosevelt to Hull, Jan. 12, 1944, Dept. of State Decimal File 891.00/3037.

[10] Acheson to Under Secretary (Stettinius), Jan. 28, 1943, *ibid.*, 891.00/1-2844. Acheson's interference in the project was protested by Wallace Murray, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs; Murray to Sec. State, Jan. 31, 1944, *ibid.*, 891.00/1-2844.

[11] Acting Sec. State (Stettinius) to Roosevelt, Feb. 18, 1944, *ibid.*, 891.00/3037.

[12] Kirk, 473-81; Lenczowski, 216-18; Hurewitz, 25.

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taradze, the Soviet press, the Tudeh Party leaders and press criticized the Iranian policy, frequently blaming the United States and Britain for the decision. These Soviet criticisms of the Iranian action disturbed State Department officials who dispatched a mild protest to Moscow reminding the Soviet delegation of its pledge to respect Iranian sovereignty.[13]

During the oil controversy, the Soviets intensified their political activities in Azerbaijan. As noted in the reports of Samuel B. Ebling, the American consul at Tabriz, the Soviets took advantage of traditional separatist sentiment in Azerbaijan which had been reinforced by the Shah's recent effort to centralize commercial activities in the capital. Moreover, the Soviets skillfully managed to appear as reformers while avoiding antagonism of the landlords and business community.[14]

In the midst of these developments in Azerbaijan and appeals from the Iranian government for American support against the Soviets,[15] George Kennan, the chargé in Moscow, analyzed Russian interests and goals. According to Kennan, the reason for the Kavtaradze mission was not an oil concession but rather apprehension of foreign penetration, coupled with concern over prestige. The Soviets were determined to prevent another power from exploiting northern Iran and, as Kennan observed, they might have thought that the United States opposed their political goals in northern Iran.[16]

In an effort to accommodate the Russians, President Roosevelt suggested that Ambassador Averell Harriman discuss with the Soviet leaders the establishment of an international trusteeship which would construct and administer a free port in Iran at the head of the Persian Gulf and a railway system from the port to the Soviet Union. Secretary of State Edward Stettinius and Wallace Murray, Director of the Division of Near Eastern and African Affairs in the State Department, opposed the scheme, arguing that it would appear imperialistic and would be the source of problems

[13] Acting Sec. State (Stettinius) to Ambassador in USSR (Harriman), Oct. 30, 1944, *FRUS 1944*, V, 462-63; Lenczowski, 218-22.

[14] Ebling to Sec. State, July 19, 1944, Dept. of State Decimal File, 891.00/7-1944; Ebling to Sec. State, Sept. 25, 1944, *ibid.*, 891.00/9-2544; Ebling to Sec. State, Oct. 9, 1944, *ibid.*, 891.00/10-944; Richard W. Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran* (Pittsburgh, 1964), 118-24.

[15] Memorandum of Conversation by Under Secretary (Stettinius), Nov. 3, 1944, *FRUS 1944*, V, 466-67.

[16] Kennan to Sec. State, Nov. 7, 1944, *ibid.*, 470-71.

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with both Russia and Britain. When informed of these criticisms, Roosevelt dropped the plan.[17]

II

The desirability of an American-Russian understanding on Iran was accentuated in early 1945 as the Iranian government increasingly looked to the United States for support against the Soviet Union. In January, Mohammed Shayesteh, the Iranian minister in Washington, pressed with Stettinius and Murray his government's view that Soviet occupation policy warranted consideration at the forthcoming Yalta Conference. When the United States and Britain attempted at Yalta to raise the question of Allied troops withdrawals from Iran, the Soviets declined consideration.[18] Frustrated at that level, the Iranian government in late February sought British and American approval of a plan to send Iranian troops into the Russian occupation zone to pursue Kurdish tribesmen who had been pillaging towns in southern Iran. The Iranian government was reluctant to request Russian permission to enter the occupation zone since that would appear to acknowledge Soviet political control. Ambassador Leland Morris warned Washington:

> I suspect he [the Shah] is prepared to order them forward if given [the] slightest encouragement. He is reluctant to ask Russian permission and I suspect may be disposed to create [an] incident which would force British and Americans to take [a] stand with respect to Soviet interference with Iranian forces.[19]

As Morris suggested, the State Department shied from a confrontation and advised Iranian consultation with Soviet authorities, who permitted one Iranian infantry batallion to proceed from Tabriz to Mahabad but refused entry of Iranian troops from outside the Soviet zone.[20] The Iranian government continued to seek support from the

[17] Roosevelt to Stettinius, Dec. 8, 1944, *ibid.*, 483; Stettinius to Roosevelt, Dec. 18, 1944, *ibid.*, 484-85; Memorandum, Murray to Sec. State, Dec. 19, 1944, *ibid.*, 485-86. (Hull resigned as Secretary of State on Nov. 27, 1944 and Roosevelt appointed Stettinius as his successor.)

[18] Memorandum of Conversation by Stettinius, Jan. 18, 1945, *FRUS 1945*, Vol. VIII: *The Near East and Africa* (Washington, 1969), 360; Memorandum of Conversation by Murray, Jan. 18, 1945, *ibid.*, 361; Memorandum, Director, Office of European Affairs (Matthews), Feb. 27, 1945, *ibid.*, 362-63.

[19] Morris to Sec. State, Feb. 22, 1945, *ibid.*, 361-62.

[20] Acting Sec. State to Morris, Feb. 27, 1945, *ibid.*, 363-64.

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United States,[21] but embassy officials in Tehran remained skeptical of Iran's objectives. On May 5, Morris reported that he found much accuracy in the Russian contention that the entry of Iranian forces would only provoke unnecessary trouble.[22]

With the end of the European war, the Iranian government on May 19 requested that the Allies withdraw their forces within six months. By the terms of the 1942 Tripartite Agreement signed by Britain, Russia, and Iran, Allied occupation forces were to be withdrawn within six months of the ending of hostilities with Germany and her associates. The British and American governments questioned the Iranian interpretation of the treaty, but nonetheless began to withdraw.[23]

Yet the Tehran government, beset with an internal crisis heightened by Russian and British political maneuvering in the Majlis, appealed to the United States to pressure for a quick Russian and British withdrawal. Wallace Murray, the new American Ambassador in Iran, was receptive to the appeals of the Prime Minister and the Shah who impressed Murray with his dedication to reform. Accordingly, Murray, whom Herbert Feis characterized as a "splenetic individual," seconded the Iranian requests for American support and for consideration of the Iranian situation at the Potsdam Conference. To prove American good faith and to eliminate any pretext for a continuation of the Russian occupation, Murray urged the immediate withdrawal of all American forces. A total Allied withdrawal, he believed, offered the best assurance against Soviet domination.[24]

At the Potsdam Conference, President Harry S. Truman promised that the remaining American troops (some 5,000 men servicing military installations) would be withdrawn within sixty days. The British and Russian governments, however, committed themselves only to the immediate withdrawal of their units from Tehran and

[21] Morris to Sec. State, March 19, 1945, *ibid.*, 366-67.

[22] Morris to Sec. State, May 5, 1945, *ibid.*, 367-68.

[23] Feis, *From Trust to Terror*, 63; Memorandum, Acting Chief, Division of Middle Eastern Affairs (Minor) to Acting Sec. State, June 2, 1945, *FRUS 1945*, VIII, 375-76; Acting Sec. State to Ambassador in Iran (Murray), June 12, 1945, *ibid.*, 378.

[24] Feis, 65; Murray to Sec. State, June 19, 1945, *FRUS 1945*, VIII, 381-83; Murray to Sec. State, June 20, *ibid.*, 383; Murray to Sec. State, June 26, 1945, *ibid.*, 384-86; Memorandum, Acting Chief, Division of Middle Eastern Affairs (Minor), June 18, 1945, *ibid.*, 380-81; Murray to Sec. State, July 20, 1945, Dept. of State Decimal File 891.00/7-2045.

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postponed further discussion until the foreign ministers' meeting in late September.[25]

Before that conference, the war against Japan suddenly ended. In the following months, a number of questions, including the Allied occupation of Iran, became more pressing and undermined the wartime coalition. Indeed the lines of the American-Russian differences over Iran took more definite shape. The Soviets tightened their hold on northern Iran, denying Iranian requests to dispatch gendarmes into the Soviet zone and ignoring the ensuing Iranian complaints. As reports of these developments reached Washington,[26] American policy was being defined in such terms as to preclude any Soviet influence. In a memorandum of August 23, Loy Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, discussed the expansion of American economic influence, especially oil and aviation rights, expanded trade, and investment. An American, British, and Russian commission should be established, Henderson held, with the purpose of assuring Iranian sovereignty by eliminating foreign rivalries.[27]

American officials regarded Soviet actions in Azerbaijan as a threat to these goals. A Soviet-sponsored "Democratic Party" of Azerbaijan was established and issued a call for the province's autonomy. In a September 17 analysis of the situation, Henderson maintained that any Soviet influence would seriously weaken Iran and urged renewed pressures on Britain and Russia to withdraw their forces.[28]

Prior to the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin suggested that troop withdrawals be discussed at the conference. Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov replied that since the Soviet Union was committed to the 1942 tripartite agreement, no discussion was necessary. Bevin seized upon the Molotov note to remind the Soviets that it meant withdrawing by March 2, 1946, six months after the formal Japanese surrender. At the council meeting of September 22, the British, Russian, and American governments took note of the British and Russian pledge to leave before March 2.[29]

[25] Feis, 64-65.

[26] Fatemi, 265-66; summary of messages from Ambassador to Iran (Murray), Aug. 19-Sept. 1, 1945, *FRUS 1945*, VIII, 400.

[27] Memorandum, by Henderson, Aug. 23, 1945, *ibid.*, 393-400.

[28] Memorandum, by Henderson, Sept. 17, 1945, *ibid.*, 410-411; Feis, 66.

[29] Bevin to Molotov, Sept. 19, 1945, *FRUS 1945*, VIII, 413-14; Molotov to Bevin, Sept. 20, 1945, *ibid.*, 414; Bevin to Molotov, undated, *ibid.*, 414-415; Molotov to Bevin, undated, *ibid.*, 415.

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Despite these promises, Murray still pressed Washington to secure immediate withdrawals. In a message of September 25, he warned that Soviet dominance of the north, if unchecked, could result in the exclusion of American economic interests. Henderson in Washington and Kennan in Moscow both seconded Murray's analysis of Soviet objectives.[30]

In early October, the tempo of the Azerbaijan autonomy movement intensified. The Tudeh Party formally dissolved itself, with its members joining the Democratic Party, which reiterated its demand for autonomy and spoke of Azerbaijan's hopes for Russian protection. At the head of the Democratic Party was a long-time communist leader, Sayed Jafar Peeshavari. During the next few weeks, reports circulated in Tehran of Soviet-inspired uprisings in Azerbaijan and of the Democratic Party's effort to seize control of the provincial government. Telegraphic and air communication between Tabriz and Tehran was curtailed.[31] While American officials inclined to view the autonomy movement as the result of Soviet intrigue,[32] Tabriz consul Ebling viewed the Democratic Party as representative of "liberal" influences. In a letter of November 16, Ebling reported that educated Azerbaijanis feared that a Russian withdrawal would be followed by the central government's suppression of the Democratic movement and the reestablishment of reactionary elements.[33]

By mid-November the incidents in Azerbaijan became a matter of serious international concern. On November 19, an Iranian army unit destined for Tabriz was reportedly halted by a Soviet garrison at Qazvin. The Iranian government immediately protested to Moscow and sought American support. Its chargé in Washington averred that if the United States permitted Soviet infringement on Iranian sovereignty, no small nation would have confidence in the promises of the major powers.[34] Reviewing the situation in Tehran, Murray advised: "I should like to renew urgently my recommendation that [the] Russians (and British also) be asked to withdraw entirely from Iran at once. If Russians decline I think they should be

[30] Murray to Sec. State, Sept. 25, 1945, *ibid.*, 417-19; Henderson to Murray, Sept. 27, 1945, *ibid.*, 423-24; Kennan to Sec. State, Oct. 1, 1945, *ibid.*, 424.

[31] Fatemi, 262-67; *New York Times*, Oct. 22-23, 1945.

[32] Murray to Sec. State, Nov. 19, 1945, *FRUS 1945*, VIII, 431-33.

[33] Ebling to Sec. State, Nov. 16, 1945, Dept. of State Decimal File 891.00/11-1745.

[34] Memorandum of Conversation by Henderson, *FRUS 1945*, VIII, 435; *New York Times*, Nov. 20, 1945.

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called upon in plainest terms to show cause for remaining in the absence of any military necessity."[35]

The State Department requested accurate and thorough information from the Tehran Embassy, especially on the reported interference at Qazvin. Murray, however, was hard-pressed to determine events; in an effort to gain information, he requested Soviet permission to dispatch an embassy car to Tabriz, but Soviet authorities delayed acting on the matter. Yet, Murray could relay to Washington that high Iranian officials had confirmed that the Soviet military had halted Iranian troops at Qazvin.[36]

That confirmation, coupled with Murray's calls for action, resulted in the decision to confront the Soviets. On November 23, Washington instructed Ambassador Averell Harriman to deliver a note to the Soviet government in which the United States explicitly denied that the Soviets had authority under the Tripartite Treaty to restrict the Iranian army and suggested that all Allied troops be withdrawn before January 1.[37]

While awaiting the Russian reply, the State Department received discouraging reports from Murray. In a meeting with the American ambassador, the Russian chargé in Tehran defended the Soviet action at Qazvin on the grounds that the Iranian gendarmes would provoke unrest. Reliable sources in Tehran were predicting that Soviet pressures would lead to the fall of the government headed by Ibrahim Hakimi. On November 25, the British consul at Tabriz managed to get a flight to Tehran, carrying with him messages from Ebling. These reports confirmed Democratic Party control of most towns of Azerbaijan; moreover, the central committee of the party had constituted itself as the "National Congress" claiming a right to self-determination in the name of the Atlantic Charter and demanding a "national government" within the Iranian State. Having finally secured travel passes, Murray immediately dispatched emissaries to Tabriz who reported that the Democratic Party lacked substantial popular support and would collapse without Soviet support. Also Murray learned from Iranian officials of the Soviet bargaining position in the discussions between the two governments. In return for a military withdrawal, the Russians expected an oil concession in the northern provinces, internal air transportation rights, and a

[35] Murray to Sec. State, *FRUS 1945*, VII, 436-37.

[36] Murray to Sec. State, Nov. 20, 1945, *ibid.*, 437-38; Murray to Sec. State, Nov. 22, 1945, *ibid.*, 442-43; Sec. State to Murray, Nov. 22, 1945, *ibid.*, 443-44.

[37] Sec. State to Harriman, Nov. 23, 1945, *ibid.*, 448-50; Feis, 65-66.

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"special position" at the port of Pahlivi on the Caspian Sea. (The Russians had controlled that port until 1921.)[38]

III

In Washington the new Iranian ambassador Hussein Ala warned Henderson on November 28 that a Soviet coup in Tehran appeared imminent and pressed for a show of American support of the Iranian government. While presenting his credentials to President Truman the next day, the ambassador took the occasion to reiterate his call for American support:

> In this critical situation I earnestly beg you, Mr. President, to continue to stand up for the rights of Iran, whose independence and integrity are being trampled underfoot. Your country alone can save us, for you have always defended moral ideas and principles and your hands are clean. I know you will not shirk your responsibility to the world.[39]

In Moscow on the 29th, Molotov delivered the Soviet reply to the American note. Maintaining that the events in northern Iran constituted an uprising against the central government, the Soviet government reaffirmed its dedication to the Tehran Declaration and the troop withdrawal policy established by the September British-Russian exchange of notes. On these grounds, the Soviets declined reconsideration of the withdrawal schedule.[40]

During the next few days, the American government's fear of being presented with an autonomous Azerbaijan as a *fait accompli* seemed about to be realized. The Democratic Party made an open bid for power. The Democratic-dominated provincial Majlis, constituted on the basis of a November 28 election which the Tehran government considered illegal, convened on December 7 and established a provincial government with Peeshavari at its head.[41]

As the autonomy movement gathered momentum, State Department officials concluded that, despite the intransigence of the Soviet note of November 29, the Iranian issue had to be reopened at the Moscow meeting of the foreign ministers. Harold Minor, recently

[38] Murray to Sec. State, Nov. 23, 25, 26, 28, 1945, *FRUS 1945*, VIII, 445, 454-56, 465-66.

[39] Ala's remarks to Truman, *ibid.*, 461; Memorandum of conversation by Henderson, Nov. 28, 1945, *ibid.*, 461-62.

[40] Harriman to Sec. State, Nov. 30, 1945, *ibid.*, 468-69.

[41] Fatemi, 269-75; Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-67* (New York, 1968), 426.

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designated chief of the Middle Eastern Affairs office, traveled to Tehran; his reports reinforced the recommendations of Murray. Following a meeting with Hakimi on December 11, Minor cabled Washington that the Soviets planned an "unscrupulous aggression" intended, from the base in Azerbaijan, to influence the central government with the long-term objectives of encircling Turkey and penetrating throughout the Middle East. The next day Murray reported that Democratic control of virtually all of Azerbaijan had brought a "state of terror." Meanwhile in Washington, Henderson urged Byrnes, about to leave for Moscow, to raise the Iranian issue with Bevin and Molotov. Henderson based his argument largely on a point that became increasingly important in the shaping of American policy in Iran: Iran was a test of Big Power respect for the sovereignty of smaller nations.[42]

Outside the White House and State Department, some voices were criticizing American policy and urging moderation. An editorial in the *New Republic* warned that the United States was being dragged into the traditional British and Russian rivalry in Iran. In *The Nation*, Freda Kirchwey argued that Soviet interests necessitated influence in northern Iran and indeed could provide Azerbaijan with necessary reform.[43] In a press conference on December 4, South Dakota congressman Karl Mundt challenged the American promise to withdraw its forces by January 1, observing that the military missions were to continue. Mundt commented: "It's reasonable to suppose that this is one reason for Russia's reluctance to withdraw from Iran."[44] While ignoring the latter point, the State Department acknowledged that, at Iran's request, the missions to assist the Iranian gendarmerie and army indeed would remain. Another *New Republic* editorial took up Mundt's criticisms and charged that the United States was acting aggressively and siding with reactionary elements.[45]

Within the State Department, the only questions about the course of American policy were raised implicitly in the long-delayed letters of Ebling. The Tabriz consul's messages of November 26 and 27

[42] Minor to Henderson, Dec. 11, 1945, Dept. of State Decimal File 891.00/12-1145; Henderson to Sec. State, Dec. 11, 1945, *FRUS 1945*, VIII, 488-90; Murray to Sec. State, Dec. 12, 1945, *ibid.*, 490-91.

[43] *New Republic*, Dec. 3, 1945, 731-32; *Nation*, Dec. 29, 1945, 725-26.

[44] *New York Times*, Dec. 4, 1945.

[45] Memorandum, Henderson to Under Sec. State (Acheson), Dec. 7, 1945, Dept. of State Decimal File 891.50/12-745; *New York Times*, Dec. 5, 1945; *New Republic*, Dec. 31, 1945, 887-88.

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finally reached Washington on December 14. Recounting the events of mid-November which he labeled "one week of liberal aggression," Ebling underscored the complexity of developments: the apparent lack of coordination between Soviet authorities and Democratic party leaders; the inclination to blame the Democratic movement on the Soviets while ignoring the serious economic problems of the province; the widespread fears that the Tehran government would suppress the "liberals" and bring back the conservative leaders and policies; the imperative need for Tehran to adopt a benevolent and reformist policy in Azerbaijan.[46]

This subtle appraisal, however, paled when contrasted with the urgent calls of Murray and Minor for American action. They warned that the only Iranian course would be appeasement unless the United States gave strong support.[47] Thus at the Moscow conference, the United States raised the Iranian issue. While Byrnes was concerned primarily with peace treaties for Bulgaria and Rumania, and the control of atomic energy, he attempted to discuss the Iranian matter with Molotov who bluntly denied Russian interference and reaffirmed that the withdrawal procedure had been resolved. Not satisfied with the foreign minister's position, Byrnes on December 19 pressed the question with Stalin who took an equally adamant stand; the Russian premier maintained that Soviet troops were being retained to protect the Baku oil fields which were threatened by the hostility of the Iranian government and the unstable conditions within Iran. Stalin further argued that the retention of troops was justified by the 1921 Russian-Iranian treaty permitting Russia to send troops into Iran should internal disturbances occur. At another meeting with Stalin on the 23rd, Byrnes warned of the likelihood that Iran would file a complaint against the Soviet government at an early meeting of the United Nations. Stalin reaffirmed the Soviet dedication to the Tehran Declaration, and took the occasion to label the Hakimi government hostile to the Soviet Union.[48]

At that point, the British government, which viewed the Azerbaijan situation as a threat to its Middle Eastern interests but was

[46] Ebling to Sec. State, Nov. 26, 1945, Dept. of State Decimal File, 891.00/11-2645; Ebling to Sec. State, Nov. 27, 1945, *ibid.*, 891.00/11-2745.

[47] Murray to Sec. State, Dec. 15, 1945, *FRUS 1945*, VIII, 496-97; Minor to Henderson, Dec. 17, 1945, *ibid.*, 501.

[48] Gaddis, 276-81; Feis, 66-68; Ulam, 426; Harriman to Sec. State, Dec. 23, 1945, *FRUS 1945*, VIII, 510-11; Harriman to Sec. State, Dec. 28, 1945, *ibid.*, 517-19.

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less inclined than the United States to seek immediate troop withdrawals, took the initiative. On the 24th, Bevin proposed the establishment of a Big Three commission to help the Iranian government, especially in implementing political and social reform. Byrnes and other American officials gave lukewarm support to the joint commission; rather the United States preferred direct Iranian assertion of its sovereignty. The Soviet response to the British position fluctuated between initial hints of a modified acceptance to an eventual virtual veto.[49]

To many Americans, the Moscow Conference confirmed the impossibility of compromising with the Soviets. The peace treaties for Bulgaria and Rumania seemed to assure a continuation of Soviet domination in eastern Europe and thus violate the promise of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe. The Soviet obstinacy on atomic energy and Iran signified more difficulties ahead. As the new year opened, American policy changed: this reorientation evidenced most immediately in Iran.[50]

As the American army units left Iran January 1, 1946 and the British reaffirmed their promise to leave before March 2, the Iranian government made plans to file a complaint before the United Nations. Anticipating the American response to such a step, State Department officials adhered to the position stated by Acheson on December 24: the United States would support the Iranians in order to assure the preservation of the United Nations. The British, however, still hoped to salvage the Tripartite Commission which was certain to be sabotaged by any Iranian initiative in the United Nations. Accordingly the British sought American cooperation in attempting to dissuade the Iranians, but Byrnes, upon the advice of Henderson and Acheson, rejected the British suggestion. American leaders were concerned over British objectives; in a message of January 10, Murray suggested that the British opposed any United Nations investigation because they were anticipating the establishment of a British-supported autonomous Khuzistan.[51]

On January 19, Iran filed its complaint before the Security

[49] Feis, 67-69; Harriman to Sec. State, Dec. 28, 1945, *FRUS 1945*, VIII, 517-19; Kolko, 237

[50] Gaddis, 276-90; Feis, 54-55.

[51] Acheson to Harriman, Dec. 24, 1945, *FRUS 1945*, VIII, 512-13; Memorandum of Conversation by Acheson, *FRUS 1946*, Vol. VII: *The Near East and Africa* (Washington, 1969), 293-94; Murray to Sec. State, Jan. 4, 1946, *ibid.*, 294-95; Murray to Sec. State, Jan. 10, 1946, *ibid.*, 299-301.

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Council, charging Soviet interference in its internal affairs and calling for a United Nations investigation. In America, the Iranian appeal was immediately interpreted as a test of the United Nations; editorials in the *New York Times* and columnists Anne O'Hare McCormick and Joseph and Stewart Alsop strongly endorsed United Nations action.[52]

Secretary-General Trygve Lie, however, believed the American-encouraged Iranian action was premature; in his memoir, Lie wrote:

> So here we were right in the middle of a great-power war of maneuver and propaganda in the United Nations before the "cold war" had started, before that term had even been invented. I was greatly disturbed, feeling that the Iranian government should have given direct negotiations a longer trial. After all, Norway had had a very positive and satisfactory experience with the withdrawal of Soviet troops. A little more private prodding would probably bring results.[53]

Indeed the prospects for negotiations improved on January 20 when Prime Minister Hakimi resigned. The Shah requested that Qavam Saltaneh head the new cabinet; Qavam, who took office on the 27th, was friendly toward the Soviet Union, purged many pro-British officials, and quickly suggested high-level direct negotiations.[54]

IV

For the Soviet Union, the Iranian complaint cast it as a defendant in the first meeting of the Security Council and must have confirmed fears that the United Nations would operate under American direction.[55] On January 24, Andrei Vyshinsky, head of the Soviet delegation, formally responded to the Iranians; denying interference in Iran, Vyshinsky reiterated the Russian arguments that Soviet troops were permitted under the 1921 Soviet-Iran treaty and the 1942 Tripartite Treaty and, also, that the Azerbaijan movement represented popular aspirations.[56]

Despite Russia's protests, the Security Council agreed to discuss the Iranian case. Behind the scenes, the Soviet government assured

[52] *New York Times*, Jan. 21 and 23, 1946; *Washington Post*, Jan. 25, 1946.

[53] Trygve Lie, *In the Cause of Peace; Seven Years in the United Nations* (New York, 1954), 29-30.

[54] Ulam, 426-27; Lenczowski, 295.

[55] Kolko, 238.

[56] Vyshinsky to Security Council President, Jan. 24, 1946, *FRUS 1946*, VII, 309-11.

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the United States that it was prepared to negotiate and suggested that the Security Council restrict itself to a statement approving of negotiations with the understanding that it would be informed of progress. Stettinius, head of the United States delegation opposed this approach, ". . . because it was of paramount importance at this moment to keep world confidence and world respect for the Security Council and I could not make any commitment that I would not insist upon some formal action. . . ."[57] Accordingly the Russian approach was rejected and instead the United States introduced a resolution which retained the Iranian complaint on the agenda and called upon Iran and the Soviet Union to keep the Council informed of negotiations. As this resolution was adopted on January 30, it seemed to many observers that the United Nations had ". . . met successfully its first great test as the world's authority in international disputes."[58]

On February 19, Qavam arrived in Moscow at the head of the Iranian delegation to negotiate with the Soviets. During the following three weeks, Qavam met with Stalin twice and with Molotov four times, but progress was nil. The Soviets pressed for recognition of Azerbaijan's autonomy, a joint oil company for development of the northern provinces' resources, and retention of some troops for an indefinite period.[59]

In the meantime, the United States government waited anxiously to see if the Soviets would withdraw before March 2. During this interlude, several factors were shaping decisively the thinking of high American officials toward the Soviet Union. On February 9, Stalin delivered a forceful public address, stressing the incompatability of communism and capitalism and implying the inevitability of future wars. Republican party criticism of Truman's "appeasement" policy mounted and was climaxed by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg's February 27 speech vigorously demanding the adoption of a forthright, uncompromising policy. Finally, George Kennan's lengthy dispatch of February 22 analyzing Soviet postwar objectives provided an intellectual justification for such a policy. Following an appraisal of the Soviet government's belief in the innate antagonism between communism and capitalism, Kennan warned that

[57] Stettinius to Sec. State, Jan. 28, 1946, *ibid.*, 316-17.

[58] *New York Times*, Feb. 1, 1946; Memorandum of conversation by Charles B. Noyes (special assistant to Stettinius), *ca.* Jan. 30, 1946, *FRUS 1946*, VII, 322-24.

[59] Lenczowski, 295-96; *New York Times*, Feb. 9, 12, and 18, 1946; Feis, 81.

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the Soviets constantly were seeking to increase their strength and influence. The chargé d'affaires wrote:

> Whenever it is considered timely and promising, efforts will be made to advance official limits of Soviet power. For the moment, these efforts are restricted to certain neighboring points conceived of here as being of immediate strategic necessity, such as Northern Iran, Turkey, possibly Bornholm. However, other points may at any time come into question, if and as Soviet political power is extended to new areas. Thus a "friendly" Persian Government might be asked to grant Russia a port on the Persian Gulf.[60]

Later in his dispatch, Kennan emphasized the Soviet use of local Communist parties, citing Iran as an example of where Communists were pressuring unfriendly governments. Finally, Kennan held that the success of the West depended on the cohesion and vigor it could muster against the Soviet challenge.[61] The trend in American policy was evident in Byrnes' February 28 speech before the Overseas Press Club; having been reprimanded by Truman for his concessions at the Moscow Conference, Byrnes affirmed: ". . . we must make plain that the United States intends to defend the [United Nations] Charter. We will not and we cannot stand aloof if force or the threat of force is used contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter."[62]

Thus the United States was disinclined to accept any Soviet delay in withdrawing its forces. On March 2 *Izvestia* announced that troops were being withdrawn from northcentral and northeastern Iran, but other units would remain until the situation "clarified." Senator Tom Connally, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, set the tone of the American response: "I favor Russia's getting out of Iran with her army today, March 2. . . . We should take a position that we know is right and stand there. . . . We must meet the issues as they come and let the consequences be the result."[63]

By March 5, a crisis situation prevailed. On that day, the United States protested to Moscow, holding that it could not remain indifferent to violations of the Tripartite Agreement and Declaration of Tehran, calling again for immediate troop withdrawals. The same day, Robert Rossow, who had replaced Ebling as the Consul at Tab-

[60] Kennan to Sec. State, Feb. 22, 1946, *FRUS 1946*, Vol. VI: *Eastern Europe, The Soviet Union* (Washington, 1969), 701-02; Gaddis, 290-304.
[61] Kennan to Sec. State, Feb. 22, 1946, *FRUS 1946*, VI, 706-08.
[62] *New York Times*, March 1, 1946.
[63] *Ibid.*, March 3, 1946; Feis, 81.

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riz, sent an urgent cable to Washington reporting ominous Russian troop movements; some 500 trucks loaded with ammunition and supplies and twenty tanks were being deployed in the direction of Tehran, while two regiments of cavalry with batteries of artillery attached were moving toward the Turkish border. In addition, truck convoys loaded with Soviet troops had been arriving in Tabriz from the direction of the Soviet frontier.[64] Finally, it was also on March 5 that former Prime Minister Winston Churchill delivered his "iron curtain" address, which strongly influenced the development of American popular attitudes toward the Soviet Union. Churchill recounted the Soviet expansion of the previous year and warned that only military strength was respected by the Kremlin. The speech was generally regarded as representing the thinking of the Truman administration; indeed the president was aware in advance of the nature of Churchill's remarks and lent his tacit endorsement by introducing Churchill to the Fulton, Missouri, audience.[65]

During the next few days, Byrnes and Murray prepared for a diplomatic showdown. As additional reports from Rossow indicated troop deployments toward Tehran and the Turkish and Iraqi frontiers, Byrnes carefully studied a map of Azerbaijan and concluded (according to the recollection of Henderson's assistant): "Now we'll have to give it to them with both barrels."[66] In a meeting on March 8 of high State Department officials, Acheson argued that while the United States should inform Moscow of its awareness of the troop movements, it should leave the Soviets the opportunity to withdraw gracefully. In accord with this approach, the Department sent another note to the Soviet government requesting an explanation of the troop deployments in northern Iran. But at the same time, Byrnes was determined to wage the issue publicly. Already the State Department had released the text of the March 5 protest to Moscow, and if the Soviets failed to respond satisfactorily to that note, Byrnes was prepared to raise the issue in the Security Council.[67]

In Tehran, Murray encouraged the Shah and Qavam to renew

[64] Sec. State to Kennan, March 5, 1946, *FRUS 1946*, VII, 340-42; Rossow to Sec. State, March 5, 1946, *ibid.*, 340.

[65] Gaddis, *U.S. and Origins of the Cold War*, 307-09; Louis J. Halle, *The Cold War as History* (New York, 1967), 102-03.

[66] Memorandum on Events Relative to Azerbaijan Issue, March 1946, prepared by Edwin M. Wright, August 1965, *FRUS 1946*, VII, 346-48; Rossow to Sec. State, *ibid.*, 344-45.

[67] Sec. State to Kennan, March 8, 1946, *ibid.*, 348; *New York Times*, March 6, 1946.

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their grievance in the Security Council. Having just returned from his fruitless negotiations in Moscow, Qavam met Murray on March 11 and reported that while the Soviets had defended the retention of troops and denied involvement in Azerbaijan politics, they had pressed most forcefully for the joint oil company. In response, the prime minister had maintained that a new Majlis would have to be elected before foreign oil negotiations could take place, but that elections were impossible as long as Soviet troops remained. Murray urged Qavam to stand firm and all but promised strong American support. During a meeting with Qavam on the 14th, Murray emphasized the necessity for Iran to speak in its own defense as long as it was free to act independently. Murray shared the fears of many observers in Tehran that a Soviet-inspired coup would soon be attempted. He warned Qavam that the Russians might occupy Tehran and drew parallels between rumored Soviet actions and Hitler's method of seizing power in European countries.[68]

The American press reflected the official concern. A *New York Times* editorial posed the question asked by much of the American public: "What does Russia want?" After reviewing the increase of Soviet influence after the war, the editorial pointedly asked: "Where does the search for security end and where does expansion begin?"[69] Walter Lippmann had been endeavoring to resolve that question. During the early weeks of 1946, Lippmann called for a moderate approach toward the Soviet Union in the Middle East, based on a balance of power in the area, recognizing Russia's "legitimate" (but not exclusive) interests in the Balkans, Turkey, and Iran. Stalin's February 9 speech and the tensions in Iran, however, eroded Lippmann's hopes of Russian-American understanding. His March 12 article, titled "Black Week," warned that America and Russia had reached the point where it "may be easier to fail than succeed."[70]

Yet to a government and public to whom "negotiations" had become synonymous with "appeasement," Lippmann's warnings had negligible influence. American officials were determined to force the Iranian issue in the Security Council. When Qavam expressed reluctance to file a complaint that would be regarded by the Soviets as an

[68] Murray to Sec. State, March 11, 1946, *FRUS 1946*, VII, 350-54; Murray to Sec. State, March 14, 1946, *ibid.*, 354-56; Lenczowski, 297-98.

[69] *New York Times*, March 14, 1946.

[70] *Toledo Blade*, March 12, 1946; Barton J. Bernstein, "Walter Lippmann and the Early Cold War," *Cold War Critics, Alternatives to American Foreign Policy in the Truman Years*, edited by Thomas G. Paterson (Chicago, 1971), 31-32.

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unfriendly act, Murray again counseled that Iran's case would be weakened if it failed to stand on its own.[71] On March 16, Byrnes delivered another forceful public address, which included a clear warning to the Soviets on the Iranian issue: "The United States is committed to support the Charter of the United Nations. Should the occasion arise, our military strength will be used to support the purposes and principles of the Charter."[72] The next day Kennan cabled Washington, adding his opinion that the Soviets were preparing to force Iran within their sphere of influence:

> . . . I consider it almost a foregone conclusion that Soviets must make some effort in immediate future to bring into power in Iran a regime prepared to accede to major Soviet demands, particularly continued maintenance of Soviet armed forces in Iran and granting of oil concessions. This effort will be made of course through subservient Iranian elements without direct responsibility of Soviet aid. Soviet forces in Iran will serve this scheme by sheer force of intimidation and if necessary by preventing any forceful interference with its execution.[73]

On March 18, Ambassador Ala requested that the Iranian item be placed on the Security Council agenda when the council convened in New York a week later. Again, Secretary-General Lie believed that efforts at direct negotiation should be continued; he recalled:

> I was disturbed by the inexcusable delay in the Soviet troop withdrawal. Nevertheless, I thought that a debate in the Security Council now would probably intensify rather than ease the dispute. Moreover, I felt that the U.S.S.R. could be persuaded to evacuate Iran, as it had evacuated Norway and the Danish island of Bornholm, if it could do so without too much embarrassment. Cynical as Soviet policy might be, it was unwise to assume that considerations of prestige, of "face," meant nothing to Moscow. If the Russians were hauled before the Security Council, I felt, they would strive to prove to the world that it was not their side that was in the wrong; rather than withdrawing, they might bend their energies to show they were justified in staying. On the other hand, there was a good chance of inducing them to evacuate, through sustained and serious private negotiation.[74]

On March 19, Gromyko requested that the Security Council meeting be postponed from March 25 to April 10, on the grounds

[71] Murray to Sec. State, March 15, 1946, *FRUS 1946*, VII, 356-58; Sec. State to Murray, March 15, 1946; *ibid.*, 360.

[72] Jones, 54-55.

[73] Kennan to Sec. State, March 17, 1946, *FRUS 1946*, VII, 362-63.

[74] Lie, 74-75.

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that negotiations were already in progress. A new Soviet ambassador, Ivan Sadchikov, had just arrived in Tehran and had begun discussions with Qavam. Both the American and British governments feared that the requested delay would only enable the Russians to achieve their goals in Iran. Thus Byrnes immediately informed Lie that when the Security Council convened, the United States would move that the Iranian matter be placed at the head of the agenda. On the 21st, newspapers reported Truman's firm opposition to Gromyko's request. This vigorous diplomacy was welcomed in the press, which continued to look upon the American position as saving the United Nations and as an overdue response to Russian aggressiveness.[75]

As the United States was preparing for the Security Council showdown, the Iranian government again hesitated. By March 22, Sadchikov and Qavam appeared on the verge of a negotiated settlement, based on a Russian withdrawal in return for joint Iranian-Soviet exploitation of the northern oil resources. The earlier Soviet claim that it could retain troops indefinitely was now dropped; withdrawal would result almost certainly in the collapse of the Azerbaijan separatist movement. In a conversation with Murray, Qavam hinted at his inclination to accept this settlement; the Iranians still feared, he noted, the consequences of embarrassing the Soviets in the United Nations. Moreover, he was prepared to accept the legitimacy of the Soviet claim that Iran had discriminated against Russia in making its earlier foreign oil concessions. Qavam sought to allay American concerns by offering the United States a similar oil concession in Baluchistan. This resolution of the crisis satisfied Murray. As he cabled Washington, an Iranian-Soviet *quid pro quo* would reflect at least a partial United Nations victory since the Soviets would probably have pushed their earlier demands had not the United States stood firm in the United Nations.[76]

On the 25th, the day the Security Council convened in New York, Tass announced that by agreement with the Iranian government, all Soviet troops would be withdrawn within five or six weeks, provided nothing unforeseen occurred. The "unforeseen" in the communiqué probably referred to Security Council consideration of the Iranian complaint. Indeed, the next day Gromyko requested that, in view of the accord, the issue be withdrawn from the agenda. And that same

[75] *New York Times*, March 18-22, 1946; *Washington Star*, March 21, 1946.

[76] Murray to Sec. State, March 22, 1946, *FRUS 1946*, VII, 369-71; Murray to Sec. State, March 23, 1946, *ibid.*, 373-75.

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day, United Press correspondents received assurances from Stalin that an agreement had been reached.

But in the Security Council, Secretary Byrnes, heading the American delegation and thus dramatizing the importance which the United States attached to this issue, demanded that Gromyko present evidence of Iranian acceptance of an agreement with the Soviet Union. On the 27th, the Council voted, nine to two, to accept the Iranian item, whereupon Gromyko walked out of the Council chamber.[77]

While forcing the question, Byrnes must have been aware that the Iranians had not accepted all of the Soviet terms. On March 25, Murray cabled Washington that Qavam informed him that Sadchikov had just presented three notes, promising troop withdrawals within six weeks "if nothing happens," proposing a joint oil company to develop the northern reserves, and offering intercession between the Tehran government and Azerbaijan. Qavam indicated his willingness to accept the first two notes although with some modifications. But the Prime Minister insisted on dealing directly with the Azerbaijan government. Two days later as the Security Council was denying the Russian postponement request, Murray cabled that Qavam was requesting: (1) that the Soviets eliminate the conditions on withdrawing their forces; (2) that the oil company be constituted on an equal basis (rather than the fifty-one percent Russian controlling interest proposed by Sadchikov); (3) that the area of the company's exploitation not include areas contiguous to Iraq and Turkey; (4) that land would constitute the Iranian share of the capital, with the Soviets providing technical personnel and equipment.[78] While a settlement had not been reached as the Soviets claimed, likewise the two governments were close to agreement. Most important, the Soviets had publicly committed themselves to withdrawal, which even though conditional would have been difficult, in light of world attention, to reverse. The Western indignation in the United Nations had likely been instrumental in the Soviet decision.[79]

Given these developments, the American determination to insist on further public diplomacy seems unnecessary. To the American

[77] Kennan to Sec. State, March 25, 1946, *ibid.*, 378-79; Statement by Byrnes before Security Council, March 26, 1946, *ibid.*, 382-83; Feis, 83-84; Kolko, 240; Gaddis, 311-12.

[78] Murray to Sec. State, March 25, 1946, *FRUS 1946*, VII, 379-80; Murray to Sec. State, March 27, 1946, *ibid.*, 385-87.

[79] Ulam, 427.

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leaders, however, the issues in Iran had become blurred with the need to sustain the United Nations; while justifying his position in the Security Council on the 27th, Byrnes wrote to Acheson of his fear that "the United Nations will die in its infancy of inefficiency and ineffectiveness."[80] The American press enthusiastically endorsed the American support of Iran's case in the United Nations.[81]

On March 29, the Security Council, with Gromyko still absent, adopted Byrnes' proposal calling on Iran and the Soviet Union to report by April 3 on the progress of negotiations. Although the resolution was denounced in the Soviet press, the Soviet government on April 3 informed the Council that negotiations had produced an understanding on troop withdrawals. Ala's report, however, maintained that the negotiations had not yet produced positive results. Accordingly, the Security Council adopted an American resolution which accepted the Soviet assurances on withdrawal and planned to review the case on May 6.[82]

While the Council thus retained its cognizance of the issue, that same day Qavam and Sadchikov reached agreement by which: (1) the Soviets promised unconditionally to withdraw all troops by May 6; (2) a joint Irano-Soviet oil company, with the Soviets holding a majority interest, would be established, subject to approval of the Majlis; (3) Azerbaijan was recognized as an internal Iranian affair, with the Iranian government responsible for reaching peaceful accord with Azerbaijan and implementing necessary reform. On balance, the agreement represented a reasonable compromise, with the Soviets achieving their oil objective and the Iranians gaining their demands on withdrawal and Azerbaijan.[83]

Also on April 4, Walter Bedell Smith, the new ambassador to Moscow, met with Stalin and Molotov, thus providing a rare opportunity to discuss the situation with the top Soviet leaders. Reflecting the dominant American mood, Smith began the conversation by asking bluntly: What did the Soviets want? How far were the Soviets going? In a lengthy reply, Stalin spoke specifically about Iran. The premier candidly acknowledged that pressure had been exerted to force the removal of Hakimi, who had been un-

[80] Byrnes to Acheson, March 27, 1946, *FRUS 1946*, VII, 389-90.
[81] *New York Times*, March 26-April 1, 1946.
[82] *Ibid.*, March 30, 1946; Feis, 85.
[83] *New York Times*, April 5, 1946; Lenczowski, 299-300; Feis, 85-86; Murray to Sec. State, April 4, 1946, *FRUS 1946*, VII, 405-07; Stettinius to Sec. State, April 4, 1946, *ibid.*, 407-09.

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friendly to the Soviet Union, especially Russian oil interests. Stalin was bitter over the American opposition to the Soviet request for a United Nations postponement. Yet Stalin assured Smith that the promise to withdraw would be fulfilled.[84]

Given the Soviet resentment over the United Nations actions, it was not surprising that Gromyko, in a letter of April 6 to the Security Council president, requested that the Iranian item be withdrawn from the agenda. Byrnes, however, took the lead against the Russian request, and the Council again supported the American position.[85]

This determination to retain the issue resulted in part from fear that the Soviets still planned to remain in northern Iran. From Tabriz, Rossow informed the State Department that withdrawal had not yet begun; moreover, he questioned whether the Soviets intended to leave before May 6. Aside from these considerations, the hard line in the United Nations was still paying important domestic political benefits. Throughout the first week of April, editorials consistently praised the American position as vindicating the United Nations; the title of one *New York Times* editorial summarized public sentiment: "This was the Purpose." In the Senate, Connally, Warren Austin, and others spoke of the triumph of United Nations principles. Senator Claude Pepper of Florida expressed the only criticisms, arguing that the United States was becoming the guarantor of British imperialism. Pepper questioned why Byrnes was not also demanding the withdrawal of British troops from other Middle Eastern countries and the recognition of Indonesia's self-determination.[86]

The Iranian government, however, threatened to undercut the American stand. On April 11, Qavam informed Murray that, under pressure from Sadchikov, he was prepared to request also that the Iranian item be withdrawn from the Security Council agenda. In response, Washington urged Tehran to stand firm, arguing that withdrawal of the item would retard the development of the United Nations into a strong peacekeeping agency. Reluctant to antagonize either the Americans or Russians, Qavam at first temporized. But on April 15, the day Gromyko renewed his demands in the Security

[84] Smith to Sec. State, April 5, 1946, *FRUS 1946*, VI, 732-76; Walter Bedell Smith, *My Three Years in Moscow* (Philadelphia, 1950), 50-54.

[85] *New York Times*, April 7-9, 1946; Stettinius to Sec. State, April 8, 1946, *FRUS 1946*, VII, 410-11.

[86] Rossow to Sec. State, April 4, 1946, *ibid.*, 404-05; *New York Times*, April 4-9, 1946.

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Council, Qavam, under renewed pressure from Sadchikov, finally agreed to request removal of the item from the Council's agenda.[87]

Despite the Iranian request, the United States insisted on Security Council retention of the issue. On the 16th, Stettinius argued that the Council had power to continue the question since the principal factor in the Iranian complaint was the presence of Soviet forces still in northern Iran. Indeed that military presence, Stettinius suggested, influenced the Iranian withdrawal request. The American position antagonized not only Gromyko, but Lie as well. While acknowledging that Gromyko's criticisms of the Security Council action had frequently been unfair, Lie believed that the Council was obliged to remove the complaint; should further difficulties ensue, Lie reasoned, the issue could be raised again.[88]

In the following days, Soviet units withdrew from most of northern Iran. On May 6, the Tabriz consul cabled that reliable sources indicated a withdrawal from Azerbaijan except for a couple of frontier towns. In accord with the April 3 resolution, Ala informed Lie that the Soviets had withdrawn from all provinces except Azerbaijan on which the information was incomplete. Stettinius proposed that the Council continue the issue until May 20 when the Iranian government should present a formal report on the withdrawal; with Gromyko absent, the Council quickly accepted this recommendation.[89]

During the interim, Qavam and Ala followed independent courses, as the premier sought to avoid further antagonism of the Russians while the ambassador, with American encouragement, worked for United Nations support against Soviet interference. In a letter to the Security Council president, Ala on May 20 charged that the Soviets were interfering in Iran's internal affairs and that it had been impossible for Tehran authorities to determine whether the Russians had evacuated Azerbaijan. The next day, however, Qavam instructed Ala to report that a government inspection commission

[87] Murray to Sec. State, April 11, 1946, *FRUS 1946*, VII, 417; Sec. State to Murray, April 12, 1946, *ibid.*, 419-20; Murray to Sec. State, April 16, 1946, *ibid.*, 426-27.

[88] Stettinius to Sec. State, April 16, 1946, *ibid.*, 427-31; *New York Times*, April 17-20, 1946; Lie, 79-86; Andrew W. Cordier and Walter Foote (eds.), *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Trygve Lie, 1946-1953* (New York, 1969), 39-43.

[89] Rossow to Sec. State, May 6, 1946, *FRUS 1946*, VII, 449, footnote 18; Stettinius to Sec. State, *ibid.*, 450-51; Acheson to Stettinius, May 7, 1946, *ibid.*, 452-53.

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confirmed the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Azerbaijan.[90] Ala and Stettinius, however, declined to accept the report from Tehran. The American ambassador termed the report incomplete and recommended that the Council not drop the issue. In an impassioned speech before the Council, Ala pleaded for recognition of Soviet interference. His performance impressed Stettinius, who wrote that "... Ala had made up his mind before the meeting that this was his last chance to speak out and that he could serve his country by speaking today. . . . Ala has intentionally taken his political life in his hands by speaking out so courageously today."[91] Ala's action violated his instructions and resulted in Soviet protests to Qavam, who ordered Ala to withdraw his May 20 letter. The new ambassador to Iran, George V. Allen, urged that the United States drop the question in view of the lack of substantive evidence of Soviet interference and Qavam's unwillingness to pursue the issue.[92]

Following the withdrawal of Soviet troops and of the Iranian complaint, the public phase of the Iranian crisis ended. Its legacy, however, affected two developments which enabled the United States to solidify its position in Iran.

First, the Iranian government, with strong American backing, finally asserted its dominance over Azerbaijan. For several months after the troop withdrawal, Qavam followed a conciliatory policy which seemed to invite continued Soviet influence in Azerbaijan. In June, an agreement between the Tehran government and Peeshavari granted far-reaching concessions to the autonomy movement. In August, Qavam added Tudeh party members to his cabinet. Communist-inspired strikes and riots disrupted the operations of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.[93]

Throughout this period, American officials were concerned that Iran might still fall under Soviet influence. Allen encouraged the Shah to stand firm and warned Qavam of adverse American reaction to his pro-Russian policy. In Washington, Ala continued his independent course; he told Byrnes that Qavam would be unable to resist Soviet pressures. Rossow reported from Tabriz that Soviet agents were effectively controlling Azerbaijan's politics.[94]

[90] Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to Sec. State, May 21, 1946, *ibid.*, 469; *New York Times*, May 21-23, 1946.

[91] Stettinius to Sec. State, May 22, 1946, *FRUS 1946*, VII, 476, note 45; Sec. State to Stettinius, May 21, 1946, *ibid.*, 471-72.

[92] Allen to Sec. State, May 25, 1946, *ibid.*, 484-86.

[93] Lenczowski, 300-06.

[94] Memorandum of Conversation prepared by office of Sec. State, June 1, 1946,

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By late September, Qavam, facing strong criticisms at home, inclined toward a firm policy. He now sought assurances of American financial and military assistance. Byrnes quickly accepted a Near Eastern Affairs Division proposal to provide a development loan through the Export-Import Bank and military equipment necessary for the preservation of internal stability. At the same time, the United States urged Qavam to delay the holding of parliamentary elections until the government exercised full control of all Iran; since the Soviet oil concession could be confirmed only by a newly elected Majlis, this tactic would force Moscow to decide between continued support of Azerbaijan and its oil interests. An analysis by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the strategic importance of Iran reinforced the State Department's position. According to the Joint Chiefs, the oil resources of Iran would be vital to the Soviets in any major war; moreover, Soviet domination of any part of Iran could threaten the Western oil interests in Saudi Arabia and Iraq. With this backing of Washington, Qavam decided, by early November, to occupy Azerbaijan, by force if necessary. Allen encouraged this step, bringing to Qavam's attention the findings of the American Embassy that the people of Azerbaijan, disillusioned by the Peeshavari government, would welcome Iranian control.[95]

As Qavam prepared to dispatch an Iranian army unit into Azerbaijan, the Soviet Union repeatedly warned that this would be considered an unfriendly act. Again Allen, on instructions from Washington, urged Qavam to carry through and to inform the Security Council of Iran's intention to assert its sovereignty in Azerbaijan.[96] On December 11, an Iranian force entered Tabriz and the Peeshavari government quickly collapsed. Indeed the Iranians were enthusiastically welcomed by the people of Azerbaijan, who strongly preferred domination by Tehran rather than by Moscow. The Soviet willingness to forego its influence in Azerbaijan probably resulted from several factors, including the realization that the sentiment for autonomy had been exaggerated and that the oil concession remained the more desirable long-term Soviet objective.[97] But Ameri-

FRUS 1946, VII, 491-93; Rossow to Sec. State, June 5, 1946, *ibid.*, 494-95; Allen to Sec. State, June 10, 1946, *ibid.*, 496-97.

[95] Allen to Sec. State, Nov. 8, 1946, *ibid.*, 545; Sec. State to Acheson, Oct. 3, 1946; *ibid.*, 521; Memorandum by Henderson to Acheson, Oct. 18, 1946, *ibid.*, 533-36; Memorandum by Coordinating Committee of State, War, Navy Departments to Maj. Gen. John Hilldring, Oct. 12, 1946, *ibid.*, 529-32.

[96] Acheson to Allen, Dec. 2, 1946, *ibid.*, 551-52; Allen to Sec. State, Dec. 11, 1946, *ibid.*, 559-60.

[97] Consul at Tabriz (Sutton) to Sec. State, Dec. 12, 1946, *ibid.*, 661-62; Cottam,

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can officials were equally correct when they attributed the Soviet decision to an unwillingness to confront again strong opposition in the United Nations. Ambassador Smith wrote from Moscow on the 27th: "Had the issue been solely between [the] U.S.S.R. and Iran, [the] Soviet Army might now be in Zenjan. But because of Qavam's appeal [the] issue threatened to become [the] concern of the United Nations with [the] U.S.A. actively interested in it. It was these considerations which presumably gave [the] Kremlin pause. Iran is no stronger than [the] U.N. and [the] U.N., in the last analysis, is no stronger than [the] U.S.A."[98]

The second postcrisis development resulted from the Iranian assertion of authority in Azerbaijan. With the way now cleared for elections, the Majlis convened in July 1947. As it considered the Soviet-Iranian oil agreement, the United States gave its support to those opposing ratification. In a speech before the Irano-American Cultural Relations Society, Allen promised American support should rejection result in difficulties with the Soviet Union:

> The United States has no proper concern with proposals of a commercial or any other nature made to Iran by any foreign government as long as those proposals are advanced solely on their merits, to stand or fall on their value to Iran. We and every other nation of the world, however, do become concerned when such proposals are accompanied by threats of bitter enmity or by a statement that it would be dangerous for Iran to refuse. . . . Patriotic Iranians, when considering matters affecting their national interest, may therefore rest assured that the American people will support fully their freedom to make their own choice.[99]

Allen's initiative proved important, if not decisive, in the Majlis' decision to reject the oil agreement.[100] Thus the basic Soviet objective in Iran since the 1944 oil controversy had been lost. In the struggle for power in Iran, the United States was victorious.

The success of the United States during the Iranian crisis and its aftermath emboldened its leaders to enforce the "get tough" line elsewhere. The essentials of the "containment" policy, formally enunciated in the spring of 1947, had certainly crystallized during the Iranian showdown. As Lippmann predicted early in the crisis,

126-29; Christopher Sykes, "Russia and Azerbaijan," *Soundings* (Feb., 1947), 47-52. Sykes was a British correspondent who accompanied Iranian forces into Azerbaijan.

[98] Smith to Sec. State, *FRUS 1946*, VII, 566-67.

[99] *New York Times*, Sept. 12, 1947.

[100] Lenczowski, 311.

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the two powers had indeed reached the point where it was easier to fail than to succeed.[101]

This study underscores the complexities of the motivations behind the American and Soviet positions in one of the first major conflicts of the cold war. While Russian policy reflected traditional objectives, it failed to comprehend the American response to bullying the Tehran government and leaving troops in northern Iran. While the importance of commercial and economic objectives cannot be discounted, the dominant factor shaping American policy was that Soviet actions were seen against the background of a vivid memory of Munich. Americans thus regarded their position on Iran as a test of Western firmness and especially as a means of demonstrating the workability of the international peace-keeping system centered in the United Nations. Obviously coincidence was an important element in the shaping of American policy: the Iranian situation intensified just at the moment that disenchantment with the Soviet Union became part of the American consensus and when the convening of the United Nations presented an opportunity to prove the effectiveness of collective action to prevent war.

[101] *Toledo Blade*, March 12, 1946.

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Iran and Control of Its Oil Resources

JANE PERRY CLARK CAREY

Oil has been largely responsible for financing most of Iran's economic development since World War II, paying almost half of all the expenses of government, and providing the largest share of the country's exports and foreign exchange. Because of Iran's location bordering on the northern part of the Persian Gulf, the lack of pipeline connections with Europe, the closed Suez Canal, and the consequent necessity of transportation westward around the Cape of Good Hope, most of Iranian oil exports go to the Far East, especially to Japan. Only a very small amount is shipped to the United States—far less, for instance, than the shipments of the Arab countries,[1] of which Iran is not one. Iranian oil revenues have

[1] An estimated approximate 4.6 percent of Iranian crude oil exports are shipped to the United States (British Petroleum Company, December 10, 1973). In the first nine months of 1973, imports of crude oil and its products into the United States averaged 6,087,000 barrels per day. Of this amount, in thousands of barrels, 21,758 came from the Persian Gulf Arab countries of Saudi Arabia (18,744), Kuwait (1,335), Qatar (777), the Arab Emirates (1,082) and the other Arab countries of Libya (6,258), Algeria (13,201) and Tunisia (308) together supplied 19,767. In the same period, Canada supplied 35,039, Venezuela 16,657 and Nigeria 13,201. *Only 6,835 came from Iran (Platt's Oilgram News Service.* November 2, 1973).

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been growing steadily in recent years, and since the latter part of 1970 have surged upward so rapidly that they have left the considerable earnings of earlier years far behind. Despite the growing oil earnings, the Shah of Iran and the major oil companies operating in that country have hammered out agreements which brought about a drastic change of policy. By it Iran has obtained a far greater role than it formerly had in the whole drama of oil production. Iran, rather than the foreign oil companies, has the controlling hand in oil operations, while the companies continue as necessary operators under contract, and as those responsible for finding the finances to expand oil production and export.

Since the 1950s, a large percentage of oil earnings has been invested in Iran's economic and social growth by means of four development plans: the first began in 1949 and the fourth ended in March 1973. Hard on its heels has followed a fifth plan which also relies heavily on oil revenues for development.[2] Oil earnings have provided, in addition, an increasing share of the expenses of government, among which defense ranks very high. If these other expenses do not swallow up the amounts allocated to development, the new oil revenues will be so large and Iran's oil power so great that they may change the pace of the development program of Iran, shift various of its emphases, and push the country far into the ranks of the developed countries of the world. Iran's heavy dependence on its petroleum earnings, including oil primarily, but more recently including natural gas as well, presents serious problems to the country's future: both are expandable resources which do not have everlasting production capacity into the indefinite future. For all the present richness of its supplies, decades hence Iran may not have any more oil. So it is already turning its attention to possibilities for nuclear power development.

During the eighty-odd years since oil was discovered in Iran, the country has moved from complete ignorance of its petroleum wealth to become in 1972-73 the second top producer in the Middle East, with somewhat over one-quarter of all Middle Eastern oil production and nine percent of all the world's output.[3] Iran also has

[2] The first development plan was intended to run from 1949-1956, but was cut off in 1954; the second ran from 1955-1962; the third from September 1962 to March 20, 1968; the fourth from March 21, 1968, to March 20, 1973. The Iranian year runs from March 21 of one Gregorian year to March 20 of the following year.

[3] *BP's Statistical Review of the World Oil Industry, 1971*, London, the British Petroleum Company, Ltd., 1971. Table p. 6.

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ranked second in the amounts of payments received from the international oil companies for royalties and income taxes. In the intervening years of petroleum discoveries, world thinking about the division of oil profits and, ultimately, the control of oil production has changed markedly. The producing countries rather than the producing companies have increasingly come into positions of control. Iran is one of the few oil-rich countries which has been growing in economic power and apparently in political stability as well.

The Background of Iran's New Oil Power

The present oil power of Iran has been reached only after long and hard struggle with a hostile nature since 1908. That year fortune smiled on William Knox d'Arcy, an English solicitors' clerk who had made considerable wealth in Australia and had then taken a small British group with him to Iran to explore for oil as a way of investing his funds and finding adventure.[4] On May 26, they found oil in commercial quantities in the Zagros mountains not far from the ruins of a Zoroastrian temple at Masjid-i-Suleiman, where, many centuries earlier, escaping natural gas had kept an eternal flame alight. The next year d'Arcy founded the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, a name which was later changed to Anglo-Iranian and finally to British Petroleum.

In 1914 the British government purchased conditional control of the then Anglo-Persian Oil Company because of the scarcity of oil supplies for the British navy; with the coming of war, the navy had shifted from coal to oil for fuel. That same year also witnessed the beginning by Anglo-Persian of the great Abadan refinery at the head of the Persian Gulf. In two more years a pipeline had been completed from the oil fields to the refinery.

Although the oil in the ground had always been Iranian government property, it was not until the wave of post-World War II nationalism culminating under Prime Minister Mossadegh in March 1951 that the refineries and other physical properties belonging to the British were taken over by the Iranian government, and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) was created.

It was scarcely realized then that NIOC was destined to become a powerful arm of the government, granting concessions to oil com-

[4] Parts of the historical discussion have appeared in Jane Perry Clark Carey and Andrew Galbraith Carey, "Oil and Economic Development in Iran," *Political Science Quarterly*, New York, Vol. LXXXV, No. 1, March 1960.

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panies of various countries, primarily on its own terms; operating its own programs far into the international sphere and becoming the first state-owned company of any Middle Eastern country to extend its activities into Europe; forming corporations wholly owned by it, in various fields; constructing, owning, and operating a large fleet of oil tankers; building and owning a huge international pipeline running from the south of Iran north to, and just across, the border of the USSR; and joining with foreign concerns in large petrochemical and other ventures.

Immediately after the nationalization of oil in 1951, production began to decline, and the new organization of NIOC had no power to save it: the oil flow was all but entirely dependent on export, and that market was gone. Within three years, output had sunk to such a small trickle that large injections of foreign aid were used to keep the Iranian economy alive.

The Iranian Oil Agreement of 1954

The tide turned in October 1954 and the most important phase in Iranian oil history began when a consortium for oil exploitation was formed by a powerful group of international oil companies, organized as the Iranian Oil Participants Ltd.,[5] usually referred to as the Consortium companies or group. In this venture, which took over the former Anglo-Iranian interests, the British Petroleum Company, Ltd. (BP), as that company's successor, secured by far the largest share, with 40 percent. A British-Dutch company, Royal Dutch Shell (later becoming Shell Petroleum, N.V.) acquired 14 percent. Although the American oil companies together got 40 percent, each of the five participating companies—Gulf Oil, Socony Vacuum (later Mobil), Standard Oil of California, the Texas Company (TEXACO), and Standard Oil of New Jersey (then ESSO but later

[5] The Iranian Oil Participants is essentially a holding company made up of two Operating Companies: (1) *Iraanse Exploratie en Producti Maatschappji*, N.V. (Iranian Oil Exploration and Producing Company, N.V.); (2) *Iraanse Aardolie Raffinage Maatschappji*, N.V. (Iranian Oil Refining Company, N.V.). Both are incorporated under Netherlands law. The latter company runs the Abadan refinery. As required by Iranian law, each Consortium member company set up a Trading Company registered in Iran. The Trading Companies, acting independently of each other, purchased the crude oil and gas at the wellheads from NIOC in the "Agreement Area", and either resold it for export or refined it and sold the refined products for export. See "The 1954 Oil Agreement," *Annual Review*, Iranian Oil Operating Companies, New York, 1972, p. 26.

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EXXON)—acquired eight percent. A French company, the *Compagnie Française des Pétroles*, secured six percent. In 1955, with each of the five American companies giving up one percent of its interest, another American group, IRICON (American Independent Oil, Atlantic Richfield, Charter Oil, Continental Oil, and Standard Oil of Ohio) together secured the small total of five percent made up of the amount relinquished by the five existing American members of the Consortium who were thus left with seven percent each. The American total therefore remained at 40 percent and still continues as such. The percentages of the other companies, i.e., the British, British-Dutch, and French remained untouched. Many people, forgetting that even by 1973 all the American companies together still had only a 40 percent interest in the Consortium, believe that these companies dominate Iranian oil production.

In the same month of October 1954 which had seen the formation of the Consortium group of companies, an agreement was negotiated between them and the government of Iran, and the flow of oil, which had been stopped in the Mossadegh years, was resumed. By the terms of this accord, ownership of oil and gas deposits, transportation, and refining facilities, including the great Abadan refinery, continued to be in the hands of the Iranian government. The members of the Consortium were given exploring, drilling, producing, and refining rights in the southwestern section of the country (the "Agreement Area"), and they were also given the right to operate the Abadan refinery. The remainder of the country was left to NIOC, which continued as a state-owned and state-operated company for exploration, production, and disposition of the non-Agreement area.

The Consortium's companies not only produced the oil in their Area but paid for it at the wellhead. This was a constant reminder that the oil was still Iranian property until shipment began. For their services, the companies were allowed to receive their operating costs, plus a fee for each cubic meter of oil produced or refined. Although NIOC provided the supporting services such as health and medical care, housing, education, welfare, and employee training in the Area, the Operating Companies were required to refund NIOC its costs. Still other and more important conditions were laid down for the companies, notably the progressive reduction of the size of the Agreement Area. Through their trading companies, established under Iranian law, the Consortium members were required to deliver petroleum and its derivatives, including gas, to

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NIOC for use within Iran. (These and other provisions were to be of great importance in the 1973 negotiations between Iran and the Consortium companies.) During the intervening years between 1954 and 1973, consumption of oil and gas has progressed rapidly, and the companies have produced more oil each year. They were anxious to increase their profits before possible oil depletion or adverse political action. The Iranian government, furthermore, pressured the companies for greater production to provide it with larger funds for its own development and other governmental expenditures. Gas was becoming increasingly important in industrial development and Iran began to see in it possible financial and other benefits to the country.

Changing Division of Profits

The crux of shifts in Iranian thinking and in growing bargaining power may be seen primarily in the changing provisions of the Consortium agreements with Iran for division of profits. In 1948 the British company secured 82 percent of the profits on each barrel of oil, and the Iranian government secured 18 percent—an arrangement with which the Iranian government became increasingly dissatisfied.[6]

By the 1954 agreement, one-half of the Consortium members' profits on operations within Iran were paid to it as income taxes. Royalties, amounting to 12½ percent on oil produced for export, were also paid into Iranian coffers, but they were set off against the tax payment. The combination of the two resulted in the 50-50 formula of half the profits to Iran and half to the Consortium companies. Following the completion of these arrangements after 1954, Iranian oil income began to gain rapidly. Since then, it has run in seven-league boots.

Although when negotiated the 50-50 formula was hailed in Iran as a victory for obtaining a much larger share of profits, the country became increasingly restive under its terms. Gradually, too, Iran came to resent an arrangement which gave one large group of foreign companies the decision as to the rate at which Iranian oil resources could be developed and who was to develop them. By 1957, Iran had begun to look for a higher percentage of profits, and to

[6] Jahangir Amuzegar, "The Oil Story: Facts, Fiction and Fair Play," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 51, No. 4, July 1973, p. 679. Although the article discussed Middle East oil products generally, the same figure applied to Iran.

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cast its glance toward other-than-Consortium members who might be persuaded to join those operating in the country. By a law of that year, NIOC was given responsibility for the development of all petroleum resources outside the Agreement Area, and some two-thirds of the rest of the country was thus made available for concessions to other companies as Iran saw fit.

The first oil company to become interested in taking up concessions in this new area was the Italian AGIP-Mineraria. It joined NIOC in forming the *Société Italo-Iranienne des Pétroles* (SIRIP) and was followed immediately by the Pan American Oil Company (not a Consortium member). The latter joined NIOC in the formation of the Iranian Pan American Oil Company (IPAC). Soon various companies were formed in partnership with NIOC to take up concessions for oil exploration and development. These companies gambled on the success of a new formula by which a foreign company and NIOC were to divide profits effectively giving 75 percent to Iran and 25 percent to the foreign firm.

Similar to arrangements with the Consortium companies, the Iranian government received 50 percent of its profits as income taxes, but under the SIRIP and IPAC arrangements, it also secured an additional 25 percent of each company's profits, thus making a total of 75 percent. The agreement required Iran, through NIOC, to put up capital, which the Consortium did not have to do. Both SIRIP and IPAC have found oil in their concessions; the Iranian government therfore has had to pay half the development costs, and also repay its share of exploration expenses.

So anxious was Iran to forward exploration by other than Consortium members, and so appealing did the 75-25 profit plan seem to it, that before long NIOC entered six more similar agreements in other areas of the Persian Gulf for any oil discovered. Covering twenty-four companies in all—twelve American, seven German, three French, one Italian, and one Indian—these agreements provided somewhat greater advantages to Iran than the SIRIP and IPAC programs.

All these agreements appeared merely to serve as a means for chipping away gradually at the *structure* of foreign profits—but not the *amount*—from oil production in Iran. In 1966, however, the foundations of the edifice seemed further shaken by a new arrangement providing amounts of profit running from 89 percent to 91 percent for Iran. In that year, in a contract between NIOC and a French group of companies, *Entreprise des Recherches et d'Activ-*

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ités Pétrolières (ERAP), the French agreed to work for NIOC as contractors in exploring for oil in five on-shore and two off-shore districts of larger size than those of the Consortium today. ERAP agreed, furthermore, to pay all exploration and development expenses initially, to lend NIOC the money for these costs, and to receive repayment only if oil were found in commercial quantity. As always, all crude oil at the wellhead belonged to NIOC, but under this type of compact, half the production was handed over to it as a "national reserve." In return for providing risk capital, ERAP had the right to buy from NIOC, under certain conditions, between 35 percent and 45 percent of the remainder of the oil discovered over a twenty-five year period. If NIOC so desired, ERAP would market a considerable amount of NIOC's share of any oil discovered, and receive a sales commission for it.

By 1972 NIOC had entered more ERAP-type agreements, but with somewhat better terms for Iran. In 1969, NIOC had made a contract with a group of five West European companies, and the following year, with the American Continental Oil Company (CONOCO). The agreement with the West European group, however, stated that its operation would extend only to 1994, and that no extensions would be allowed. After setting aside one-half of any commercially usable quantities of oil discovered, and which conform to certain specifications, the contracting companies were to receive 45 percent of the production from the remaining half of the area. This West European group of companies also committed itself to buy a considerable amount of NIOC's share of the production, but if that is not sufficient to pay for certain expenses, particularly for extraction of the oil, the companies have to bear all the costs of exploration.

Similar in scope, the CONOCO pact applies to areas which the 1954 agreement had required to be progressively relinquished by the Consortium companies from their Agreement Area, and which were allotted in part to CONOCO. Exploration rights are granted for only seven years and the areas must be relinquished by the end of the seventh year. If, however, oil is discovered within that period, the producing wells may be operated for twenty-five years. Containing guaranteed minimum expenditure and bonus clauses, the agreement also stipulated that within five years from the start of the first commercial operations, NIOC is to assign Iranians to directing, operating, transporting, and loading operations in the new organization.

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Willing to accept the new requirements, a group of Japanese companies made a similar type of contract with NIOC in 1971 to establish a new company, INEPCO. It was to operate in the northwestern part of the province of Luristan, in the western part of Iran, not far from where the Consortium companies have also been exploring. The Japanese group was followed almost immediately by two others also willing and ready to work under the type of agreement described above—AMERADA-Hess and Mobil, both of the United States. AMERADA-Hess set up BUSHCO, operating in the south near Bushehr (Bushire), while Mobil established HOPCO to work in the strategically located Straits of Hormuz leading to the Persian Gulf.

Modifications in Oil Accords: Markets, Revenues, and Prices

Even the 75 percent and 25 percent arrangement and the ERAP-type contracts, which were so widely heralded in Iran and other oil-producing countries, were far from definitive in the story of Iranian oil agreements. A new chapter was added in 1970 when world inflation was soaring, while the tax reference or posted price of crude oil[7] remained at $1.63 per barrel for light crude oil as it had been for some time. Anxious to secure a rise in that price, and to increase its own power in oil arrangements, Iran engineered an agreement with the Consortium members at a meeting held in Tehran in November 1970. From then on the prices of both heavy and light crude began to rise rapidly and steadily as the result of a series of meetings, beginning in 1971 at a second Tehran gathering. For the five years for which this 1971 agreement was hopefully if not successfully planned to last, a percentage and a cents-per-barrel rise in posted prices were scheduled to begin as of June 1971.[8] At the earlier Tehran meeting, it had been agreed that income taxes on oil output were to be raised from 50 percent to 55 percent for all Consortium members, but in the second Tehran agreement, the rise in these taxes was made to apply to all companies operating in the various parts and countries of the Persian Gulf.

Not long after this accord, the *de facto* devaluation of the dollar

[7] A posted price is a tax reference price for a producing company for crude oil, agreed to by a country and the oil companies operating in it. A posted price is *not* a price used for marketing or commercial purposes (in those cases it is discounted).

[8] From $1.63 to $1.72 per barrel for heavy crude; from $1.71 to $1.79 for light crude.

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reduced the amount of revenue which many producing countries received for their oil because it was valued and priced in American dollars in those countries. As Iran was—and still is—paid in British pounds sterling for its oil, the Iranian government made a gain in its oil revenue in dollar terms.[9] It did, however, have to pay West Germany and Japan more for imports of manufactured goods and services because the West German deutsche mark and the Japanese yen had been revalued against the dollar at a higher rate than sterling. Because of the complicated world financial picture, another agreement—this one signed in Geneva on January 20, 1972—followed close on the heels of the pact signed at the second Tehran meeting; and as a result the posted price of oil was again raised.[10]

Iran's economic and physical conditions and the terms of its agreements differ from those of the other Persian Gulf states. The Iranian population is larger than that of all the other oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf coasts together: Abu Dhabi, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the smaller ones of Bahrain, Dubai, and Oman. Iran's outlook, therefore, differs from that of states which, like itself, have much money but unlike it, have small populations and little scope for the economic development on which Iran has spent so much of its oil revenue in recent years. The Shah, furthermore, has been so knowledgeable regarding oil matters that in 1972 he decided to follow a fairly independent path in his relations with the oil companies operating in his country. Although supporting them in their endeavors, he withdrew from the gulf-producing countries' negotiations which resulted in a participation agreement between the oil companies and Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, and Qatar, signed on December 20, 1972.

A further enormous price jump took place on October 16, 1973,

[9] The Iranian gain in oil revenues came only in dollar terms and remained the same in sterling terms. As its obligations were in British sterling, the Consortium payments became higher under the revaluation which changed the value of the American dollar from $2.40 to $2.60 to the British pound. So the Iranian government made a profit of 20 cents on each British pound of revenue. The West German deutsche mark and the Japanese yen were revalued against the dollar at a higher rate than pounds sterling, and thus imports of goods from those countries rose in price by more than the rise in the value of oil and other revenues (British Petroleum Company).

[10] From $1.79 to $2.17 for light crude and from $1.72 to $2.125 for heavy. According to the agreement, posted prices were expected to become $2.608 per barrel of light crude and of heavy, $2.553 on January 1, 1975, but events changed these figures before that date. All discounts and sales expenses of 0.5 cents per barrel, formerly granted Consortium members, were cancelled.

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when Iran, like the other Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), unilaterally raised the posted price by 70 percent, and also decided to continue to raise it progressively each month in accordance with a complex formula representing a modification of the Geneva Agreement of 1972.[11] The October 16 action, furthermore also brought a fixed 40 percent differential between the market price for oil and the posted price (which is never the market price). The same day's action also allows NIOC a percentage of the Consortium companies' oil beginning at 300,000 barrels a day in 1973 and gradually increasing until 1985 when the amount will reach 1,500,000 barrels a day.[12]

In just two more months an auction was held of some of the NIOC portion of this oil, and the world energy shortage, together with the Arab embargo of certain oil shipments had made demand grow so enormously that prices at the auction rose as high as $17.50 per barrel. Although this extraordinarily high price applied only to these particular sales, it indeed proved to be the handwriting on the wall of future price rises. On December 24, 1973, spearheaded by the Shah, the Persian Gulf State members of OPEC (Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Abu Dhabi) raised the posted price for a barrel of their oil to $11.65, to take effect January 1, 1974. Within the lapse of only three years, the posted price of this oil had risen from $1.63 per barrel of light crude oil to $5.11, and than had taken what may be a far from final jump to $11.65.[13] Nor have other oil-producing countries been slow to follow this lead.

In common with all Middle East oil arrangements, the 1954 agreement between the Consortium members and Iran had a time limit. The Operating Companies believed they had an all but tamper-proof arrangement which would allow their operations to continue until 1979 when they alone would have options for renewal for three periods of five years each. Suddenly, on January 23, 1973, during the celebrations of the tenth anniversary of the "White Revolution" for social reform in Iran, the Shah announced a change in policy which gave the Consortium companies two alternatives for continuation of their oil extraction in Iran. The first would allow

[11] For formula see "OPEC'S Price Action Complicates Use of Geneva Formula," *Petroleum Intelligence Weekly*, November 5, 1973.

[12] Information supplied by EXXON. See also *The Economist* (London), November 17, 1973, p. 128.

[13] For auction prices, see *New York Times*, December 16, 1973. For decision of December 24, 1973, see *idem.*, December 25, 1973.

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them to continue operations under their present agreement no longer than 1979 when they would have to join "the long queue" to buy Iranian oil without any preferential treatment. Under such an arrangement, Iran must get the same financial yield per barrel on oil exports as the other Gulf states secure under their participation contracts. The Consortium members, furthermore, would be required to make such investments as necessary to raise their production and export capacity to 8 million barrels per day instead of the 5 million barrels of late 1972. The second alternative would allow the oil companies to enter a new long-term agreement now instead of 1979 as had been agreed on in 1954, but their control would be completely handed over to Iran, and they would be mere purchasers under contract. Their contracts would last from twenty to twenty-five years at preferential discount prices. The Shah also indicated that if the oil companies chose the first arrangement but declined to make the investments necessary to raise the capacity to 8 million barrels per day, Iran "would undertake the work itself."[14]

Although the proposals offered some possible tax advantages for American Consortium companies, in general the members of the Consortium found themselves between what they regarded as "the devil and the deep blue sea." Indeed they had a hard choice. Believing that the second of the two alternatives presented the lesser of the two evils, it became the basis for negotiations between them and Iran at a meeting in St. Moritz at the end of February 1973.

A new agreement reached at that meeting will take effect when ratified by the Majlis (parliament) of Iran and will run for twenty years from March 21, 1973. NIOC becomes the operator but retains the Consortium operating companies for an initial period as service contractors. This arrangement will automatically be extended for a similar period unless either party to the agreement decides to terminate its contract. Production and export capacity will be expanded to reach Iran's hoped for 8 million barrels a day by 1976 "if technically and economically feasible."[15] NIOC will put up the investment for the projected expansion "but the companies would be prepared to find the finances."[16] Estimates put the amount at about

[14] See "Shah Says Iran Will Not Renew Consortium Agreements After 1979," *Middle East Economic Survey* (Middle East Research and Publishing Center, Beirut, Lebanon), Vol. XII, No. 5, January 26, 1973; "Iran and the Consortium," *Weekly Review of Iranian Press and Radio*, Iranian Oil Participants Limited, No. 914, January 25, 1973.

[15] Information from British Petroleum.

[16] *Middle East Economic Survey*, March 2, 1973, pp. 5-7.

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$1.2 billion, including some "secondary recovery" projects such as flooding reservoirs to pump oil that would not otherwise rise to the surface under its own pressure. Although NIOC will keep a certain amount of crude oil for direct marketing in addition to that held for domestic requirements within Iran, the bulk of Iranian production for some time will continue to be marketed through the Consortium companies.

Increasing Oil Production and Earnings

Oil production and revenues had been expanding both before and after the conclusion of the 1954 agreement. By the years of Iran's Third Development Plan (1962-67), the country's needs for economic and social development were increasing so rapidly that even expanding oil production under the 1954 agreement was not enough at existing prices to pay the development costs; amounts up to 80 percent of the oil revenues were earmarked for the years of the Plan. By the beginning of its last year in 1967, Iran had become increasingly sure that unless its oil revenues became even greater and exports other than oil and traditional farm products were successfully promoted, the country would face serious deficits in its trade balance.[17] The Fourth Development Plan (1968-73) stipulated that its objectives could be met only if oil offtake increased at an average annual rate of approximately 16.8 percent.[18] Therefore the Iranian government pushed the oil companies to raise their output quickly and steadily. Only by so doing could the oil companies attain the Fourth Development Plan goals for oil production, or meet the quotas which the government set for each year of the Plan and which were rising in amount each year.

Despite the rising quotas, the number of new companies, and the variety in their types of contract, the lion's share of the steadily increasing output has always been the prize of the Consortium.[19]

[17] *Annual Report and Balance Sheet* as of March 20, 1968, Bank Markasi, Iran, pp. 163-164.

[18] *Fourth Development Plan*, Tehran, 1970, p. 43. The Plan also stated that based on the value of production, the average annual growth was to be approximately 15 percent. *Ibid.*

[19] Oil production figures are usually given in either longtons (2,240 lbs.) or barrels, and only occasionally in metric tons (2,204 lbs. or 1,000 kg.). Longtons are referred to as tons in this study. The Consortium Operating Companies and NIOC generally use barrels. Iranian light crude oil at 34.3 API is specific gravity 0.8550, and 7.505 barrels per longton; light at 31.3° API is spec. grav. 0.8708, and 7.371 barrels per longton. *BP note*, Dec. 4, 1972. See also "Conversion Factors

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During the years of the Third Plan, the Consortium companies supplied 90 percent of all crude oil[20] and by far the greatest portion of the large oil exports. Even with growing offtake and exports by the smaller companies, the Consortium members in 1970 supplied 90.58 percent of all the crude oil output of Iran. The next year they averaged well over 4 million barrels per day,[21] while the first six months of 1972 brought still higher production.[22] The end was not yet in sight. The NIOC-Consortium agreement of 1972 led to an estimate of 8 million barrels a day, or 400 million tons per year, for the decade of the 1970s,[23] while the St. Moritz agreement of 1973 in its terms embodied the demand for the 8 million barrels per day. The Consortium companies, however, know that the costs of producing that amount will be so great that they will have to find new reserves, bring in small and remote fields at inevitably high costs, and find ways of increasing the flow of wells that have ceased to

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in the Oil Trade," *Petroleum Press Service*, London, Vol. XXXIV, No. 7, July 1967, last page unnumbered. It must also be noted that oil company reports end on December 31 of each year and so differ from Iranian reports ending with the Iranian year on March 20. So Iranian and Consortium, American and British figures are not comparable with Iranian in this regard.

TABLE OF INCREASE IN THOUSANDS OF BARRELS OF OIL PRODUCTION IN IRAN, 1962-1971

	Consortium	*Other Companies*	*Total*
1962	1,302	18	1,320
1963	1,444	31	1,475
1964	1,655	37	1,692
1965	1,808	79	1,887
1966	2,018	95	2,113
1967	2,467	130	2,597
1968	2,704	137	2,841
1969	3,101	174	3,375
1970	3,496	333	3,829
1971	4,144	392	4,535

Mimeographed Tear Sheet, Iranian Oil Operating Companies, 1971. See their *Annual Review*, 1972, p. 5, which gives their average production as 4,183,930 bbls.

[20] *Annual Report*, Bank Markasi, Iran, 1968, p. 164.

[21] In 1971, the Consortium's crude oil production averaged 4,183,038 bbls. per day, an increase of 19 percent over 1970. *Annual Review*, Iranian Oil Operating Companies, 1971, p. 27. During the first six months of 1971, the average was 4,109,000 bbls. per day, but it rose to 3,373,000 for the corresponding period of 1972. *Middle East Economic Survey* (London), July 17, 1972, Table unpaged.

[22] "Iran's Big Deal," *Petroleum Press Service*, August 1972, p. 284.

[23] "The Oil Story," Amuzegar, *Foreign Affairs*, pp. 679-680.

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produce at their original capacity.

While the smaller oil concerns operating in Iran have no such vast production to their credit as has the Consortium group—their aggregate production in 1971 was only some one-eighth that of the Consortium—[24] their output was not small in anything but proportion. These companies are far newer than those of the long-established Consortium, some are still only in the exploring stage, and comparatively few had come into production by the early part of 1973. In the first five months of the preceding year, however, their combined output had amounted to approximately 450,000 barrels per day; it was expected to reach 550,000 by the end of the year, and to double that amount in the not-too-distant future.[25]

As oil revenues have been related primarily to the quantity of production, the possibilities for increasing oil income formed the whip which goaded foreign companies and NIOC itself into more and more production each year. From 1962 to 1967, with output of just under half a million tons for the entire period, oil revenues came to $2,800 million.[26] In the one year 1969, Iran earned $937.8 million or approximately one-third of the total for all the Third Plan years. With rising production, 1970 netted the country $1,092.7 million and 1971 brought it $1,869.6, considerably over half the Third Plan years' earnings. The year 1972 brought still greater returns, and it was estimated that the 1975 figures would reach at least $3,100 million.[27] The 1972 agreement brought even higher production and revenue estimates for the years ahead. What will happen as the result of the 1973 agreement and the control of NIOC over former Consortium operations is still in the lap of the gods.

While insisting on the further rise of oil production in the decade of the 1970s, Iran had already realized by 1970 that increasing revenues could not be secured without production marching *pari passu* with the growth of income. Thus the rise in oil prices and the change in income taxes from 50 percent to 55 percent brought an upward

[24] In 1971, the Irano-Italian Oil Company (SIRIP) produced 3.3 million tons (an 80 percent rise over 1970); the Iranian Pan American Oil Company (IPAC), 7.2 million (a 35 percent rise); the Iran Marine International Oil Company (IMINICO), 3.9 million (a 220 percent rise); the Lavan Petroleum Company (LAPCO), 7.8 million (a 6 percent reduction); NIOC, 0.7 million (a 15 percent rise). *Annual Report*, Industrial and Mining Development Bank of Iran, 1972, pp. 34-35.

[25] "Iran's Big Deal," p. 284.

[26] *Annual Report*, Bank Markasi, Iran, 1968, pp. 163-164.

[27] "Iran: The Persian Empire After 2,500 years," *Weekly Bulletin of the Krediet Bank*, Brussels, 26th year, No. 48, December 17, 1971, p. 511.

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rush of revenue to Iran greater than the proportionate increase in production. In 1971, offtake from the Consortium companies' wells grew by less than one-quarter more than the preceding year, while payments by those companies to Iran rose by over 70 percent.[28]

In addition to its payments to the Iranian government of nearly $8 billion in income taxes and royalties between 1962 and 1971,[29] the Consortium companies have invested large amounts of capital in Iran,[30] and this has been instrumental in the growing oil production of the years covered under the 1954 agreement. Highly important among the large capital expenditures of the Consortium companies have been those for the upbuilding and expansion of their wells, pipelines, and installations generally. Under the 1973 agreements, the expansion of production and export capacity to reach the 8 million required by the agreement will, by approximately 1978, involve further great cost for the companies.

The capital investments made by the Consortium companies are highly impressive. Perhaps the most outstanding has been the development of Kharg, a small offshore island in the Persian Gulf. By the 1970s, the loading facilities of the island had been developed far more than the mere promise they had been when the author first visited there in 1959. At that time, oil installations were little beyond the planning stage, superintendents, technicians, and workers alike were living in tents, trailers, and barracks. Within the

[28] *Annual Review*, Iranian Oil Operating Companies, 1972, p. 37.

[29] *CONSORTIUM PAYMENTS TO IRAN IN $ MILLIONS*

1955	90.5
1960	385.3
1961	301.2
1962	333.8
1963	398.1
1964	469.7
1965	522.4
1966	593.4
1967	736.7
1968	817.1
1969	937.8
1970	1,092.7
1971	1,869.6
Total	7,771.3

Source: Background Information, Paper No. 15, Petroleum Information Foundation, Inc., New York, August 1972, Table 1.

[30] 358.7 British pounds sterling, the equivalent of 71,479 rials. *Annual Review*, Iranian Oil Operating Companies, 1971, p. 27.

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twelve years to 1971, jetties had been constructed which were capable of accommodating several supertankers, each of a million tons capacity; two enormous oil storage tanks, each holding one million tons, had risen and were already full, while a third was under way; and pipelines to bring oil underseas from the mainland wells to these tanks had been constructed. Even a man-made island was rising from the deep waters of the Gulf beside the island to accommodate one supertanker with half-a-million tons' capacity and another one with 300,000 tons' capacity at the same time, while arrangements were being completed to pump the oil into them simultaneously and speedily. NIOC and foreign firms had come into the Kharg picture and were already producing petrochemicals and other products from plants on the island.

Growing Non-Oil Producing Activities of NIOC

Although NIOC (National Iranian Oil Company) has been in the business of oil exploration and production in those areas it decided to keep and explore for itself under the 1954 agreement, this activity has been far from its most important one in recent years. In general, during the period from 1954 to 1973, NIOC discoveries have not been remarkable, and have been comparatively small in size. Its oil production amounted to less than that of any of the other companies of Iran, whether inside or outside the Consortium. During these years, the NIOC's importance has been found rather in its position vis-à-vis the various oil companies, and in its growing number of varied and far-flung enterprises. The numerous subsidiaries which it wholly owns, such as the National Iranian Gas Company, the National Iranian Tanker Company, and the National Iranian Petrochemical Company have served to make its power still greater as its activities grow in importance and numbers.

Within Iran the distribution and sale of all petroleum products and natural gas for internal consumption has been reserved to NIOC since the 1954 agreement, and the Consortium Operating Companies have been required to make specified deliveries of such products to it. To secure wider distribution of gasoline, kerosene, and fuel oil within Iran, NIOC has set up a chain of outlets, located chiefly in villages far from other centers of distribution.[31] Since 1967 NIOC

[31] *Annual Report*, Industrial and Mining Development Bank of Iran, 1972, p. 35.

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has also provided considerable credit to rural cooperatives to aid in buying such products, and has thus been providing fuel for tractors and trucks, decreasing the use of the formerly omnipresent donkey for transportation, and helping to substitute oil products for wood and dung when cooking or heating.

Heretofore, most of the oil refined in Iran has been processed by the Abadan refinery.[32] As the Shah has been anxious for some time to have oil produced in the country processed to the largest extent possible in Iranian owned-and-operated refineries, NIOC has been devoting much attention to extending Iran's refining capacity. Hence the year 1970 saw the completion in Tehran of a large new refinery, while enlargement and modernization of the existing one at Kermanshah was pushed forward. Another refinery was under construction at Shiraz. So large was the expenditure on the last refinery that for the year of its construction (also 1970) it amounted to almost 40 percent of all Fourth Plan development payments for the whole oil sector.[33] As the Shah has also long been desirous of having new refineries near points of increasing demand in Iran, other refineries are in prospect, especially in the Gulf area which is projected as a good location for the rapidly expanding Japanese market.

NIOC has not confined its refining activities to Iran but has extended them abroad, and is planning to expand them still further. The first such extension took place in 1965 when NIOC joined with Iranian Pan American (IPAC) in partnership with the government of India to set up a refinery at Madras at an initial cost of some $46 million. The Indian government and public together hold just under three-quarters of the investment, while the remainder was divided equally between NIOC and IPAC. To feed the plant through about 20 years, India agreed to import approximately 40 million tons of oil produced in Iran by the IPAC wells. All has not been smooth sailing for the refinery, however; internal problems held India up for four years, and at the end of seven years it had made use of only some 6 million tons of the agreed-upon amount of oil.

[32] In 1971, for example, of the 33.2 million cubic meters of crude oil refined in Iran, 24.5 were processed in the Abadan refinery, 5.3 million in that of Tehran, and the rest at Kermanshah and in two topping plants. *Annual Report*, Industrial and Mining Development Bank of Iran, 1972, p. 35.

[33] Out of Rls. 10,500 million allotted to oil and gas for 1970, payments for the Fars Refinery near Shiraz amounted to Rls. 1,288 million, or 38.9 percent of the total allocation of development payments for the whole oil sector for that year. *Annual Report*, Bank Markasi, Iran, 1971, p. 67.

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Of the quantity used, almost half was imported into India in the one year of 1971 alone.[34]

Later NIOC went still further afield. By agreement with the South African and French companies, SASOL and TOTAL, NIOC became a partner in building the Sasolburg Refinery in Salisbury, Rhodesia, and agreed to provide 70 percent of the refinery's crude oil requirements when it began production in 1971 Meanwhile, NIOC completed an agreement giving it a refinery to be built at Liège, Belgium; and in Greece it has proposed to join with Niarchos' interests in the Irano-Greek Oil Refinery and Distribution Company, which would hold two-thirds of the existing Aspropyrgos refinery near Athens, while the Greek government would have one-third.

By 1972 NIOC's foreign enterprises other than refineries were already growing in number and in kind, while still other new projects were planned or under way. Early among them, for instance, were undertakings from 1965 to 1969 to supply Afghanistan's petroleum needs, and to manage the fueling operations at its international airports at Kabul and Ghandahar. In a widely differing operation, NIOC agreed to train in Algeria the employees of the Algerian National Oil Company (SOMATRACH).

Through NIOC's negotiations, Iran found other oil markets outside the regular Consortium channels by entering into barter agreements with various East European countries.[35] The oil so used, however, has come from the amount set aside for Iran from Consortium production. Beginning in 1965 and 1966, Iran agreed to supply Romania with $100 million of crude oil in return for tractors, plows, and other farm machinery, and for the construction of a tractor assembly plant in Tabriz. Early in 1967, a similar agreement was entered into with Czechoslovakia by which that country agreed to build a machine tool-and-pump factory in that same city in return for oil deliveries. By 1970, when the author visited Tabriz, the

[34] *Annual Report,* Industrial and Mining Development Bank of Iran, 1972, p. 35.

[35] By January 1970, Iran's planned deliveries of crude oil under barter agreements with East European countries were:

Romania	10 million tons over 5 years
Czechoslovakia	up to 50 million tons
Bulgaria	2.4 million tons, 1967-1970
Hungary	1 million tons, beginning 1969

Source: George Lenczowski, *Soviet Advances in the Middle East,* U.S. Interests in the Middle East Series (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972), pp. 34-35.

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Czech and Romanian plants were well under way, and a training center for apprentices had been started at the tractor plant (where English-speaking Czech instructors were teaching English-speaking Iranian workers). By that same year NIOC had undertaken to supply oil to other East European countries in return for manufactured goods and technical services, while Yugoslavia was building a topping plant on Lavan island.

Most dramatic of NIOC's foreign ventures occurred in 1972 when it became the first state-owned company from a Middle East oil exporting country to seek oil rights abroad. With the creation by NIOC of the Iranian Oil Company (U.K.), Ltd., and by BP of the BP Petroleum Development, Ltd. (each wholly owned by its parent company), NIOC and BP joined in a partnership called the Iranian Oil Company of the United Kingdom, Ltd. Resuscitating the 50-50 formula for division of profits, the two new companies were jointly granted two exploration blocks in the North Sea not far from the Shetland Isles, with BP acting as operators. It was reported in the autumn of 1972 that BP might eventually take part in crude-oil selling opportunities developed by NIOC, which might tend to favor government suppliers in consuming countries. "Likewise, NIOC, teamed up with BP, might advance the Iranian desire to move further internationally into marketing, as well as production and refining."[36] By 1973 the Iranian dream of such a move, especially in production, seemed to be on the road to realization.

In the negotiations which led to the 1973 agreement, the Shah showed himself astute, knowledgeable, and far-seeing in oil matters. Under his guidance, aided by his Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda, himself a former oil man in NIOC, and by other Iranian experts, the growing power of NIOC was increased still further. No longer a tyro in the oil and gas business, NIOC had become a power to be reckoned with in various important international economic affairs, even before the new agreement. With the Consortium now merely the operating agent for the NIOC owners, the power and responsibilities of NIOC will be increased even more. There is a danger, nevertheless, that the organization might become top-heavy if the trend toward even greater power continues unabated.

[36] Press Release, Public Affairs and Information Department, BP, March 23, 1972. See also *Petroleum Intelligence Weekly*, London, September 13, 1971.

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Utilizing Iranian Riches in Natural Gas

The uses for Iran's wealth in natural gas are of more recent origin than those for its oil. Ever since the beginning of commercial oil production in Iran, its landscape has been dotted in various places with flares of burning gas, a large by-product of crude oil from its wells. In 1959 in the southwestern province of Khuzestan, gas flares stretched like beacons far beyond the human eye; the gas was entirely wasted until the process of gas liquification and other uses were developed. For almost a decade later, Iran's large gas fields continued to be almost entirely undiscovered and unexplored.

Gas utilization for energy and raw materials became of rapidly growing world interest in the late 1950s and the decade of the 1960s. With its large quantities of natural gas, Iran is in an exceptional position to help meet the increasing domestic and international demands. At home, the standard of living has been rising rapidly, and many people are moving in a steady stream from the countryside and towns to the cities (especially to the capital, Tehran). Industry is booming; and the agricultural pattern is changing from one of mere subsistence to one of modern mechanization; there is private ownership of small land and combinations of small plots of land for efficiency.

To search for ways of using the natural gas instead of flaring it, to hunt for new gas fields, and to control the growing, important new gas industry, NIOC created the National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC) in 1965 as another of NIOC's fully owned subsidiaries. With perfection of the process of liquifying gas, and with construction of more pipelines, use and sale of greater quantities of gas became possible, and the search for new sources became more rewarding.

The country's needs have been soaring for more gas: for its cities, towns, and villages; for more chemical fertilizers for its agriculture; and for plastics and various petrochemicals, which use natural gas as a raw material, for its industry. Iran's need for foreign exchange has grown with its burgeoning industry and the country is still in need of large quantities of imported machinery and supplies. With the change in its life patterns, the new petrochemicals will, it is hoped, add greatly to foreign exchange from exports. By 1972 the large new shipments of gas to the USSR were adding meaningfully to

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Iran's industrial agricultural resources. These shipments were being paid for by the building of factories, an integrated steel mill, and even farm silos in the provinces.

For some time before the formation of the National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC), the Consortium companies had been looking for new gas fields, and had been exploring possibilities for making the waste gas accompanying their oil production both useful and profitable. Using some of the gas in their own operations, they gradually increased the amount so that by 1971 they were utilizing some two-thirds of their own gas in this way.[37] They also have been selling part of their gas to NIGC for transportation and consumption within Iran,[38] and by 1972 had made large quantities available. These companies also had been turning part of their gas into liquid, and by that same year they had four plants for gas liquification at work and a fifth one commissioned.

Other companies have also been active in the production and sale of liquified natural gas from Iran. For instance, in 1970, NIOC of Iran, ERAP of France, and CETO of Japan signed an agreement in Osaka for the sale to Japan of 3 million tons of Iranian liquid gas per annum for the next 20 years.[39]

Trans-Iranian Pipeline to the USSR. The midpoint of the 1960s brought a dramatic use to Iran for its otherwise wasted gas. The project involved the construction of a pipeline from the southern Iranian oil fields throughout the country and across the border to the USSR, and the shipment of gas through this pipeline. Although the USSR has both oil and gas in its own subsoil, it prefers to sell some of its supplies to obtain foreign exchange, and then to import from other countries, notably its next-door neighbor, Iran. In 1966, therefore, the USSR and NIGC entered an agreement by which the USSR was to purchase Iranian gas.[40] For many reasons, not ne-

[37] The plants processed an average of 1,025 million cubic feet of gas per day in that year as compared to 742 million in 1970. The raw natural gas liquids amounted to 11,800,000 barrels in 1971, compared to 8,270,000 in 1970. *Annual Review*, Iranian Oil Operating Companies, 1971, p. 8.

[38] In 1971 gas available by the Consortium companies amounted to an average of 958 million cubic feet per day. *Annual Report*, Bank Markasi, Iran, 1971, p. 9.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 55.

[40] See Summary of Agreements of October 6, 1965, and January 13, 1966, *Pravada*, reprinted in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. XXII, No. 2, New York, February 1966; see *Kayhan International*, Tehran, October 29, November 9, 1969. On February 19, 1967, the USSR agreed to lend Iran $286 million for the pipeline, the steel mill at Isfahan, and the machine tool factory at Arak. See George Lenczowski, *Soviet Advances in the Middle East*, p. 33, and also John A.

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glecting the political and economic advantages of expanding its ties to other than Western countries, Iran agreed to supply the USSR with 7 billion cubic meters of gas per year beginning in 1970, and to increase the amount to 10 billion between 1976 and 1985 when the situation will be reviewed. The $650 million costs of building a pipeline to transport the gas from the southwestern oilfields of Iran to Astara on the western coast of the Caspian, just across the border in the USSR, were to be supplied to Iran in the form of credits from the USSR. By 1972 total expenditures for the main trunkline alone were reported to have already reached $632 million, plus various other costs for ancillary projects, such as a gas refinery complex on the pipeline route, all paid for by loans from countries other than the USSR.

Once the pipeline credits are paid for, the gas is expected to finance many state-owned projects in Iran such as: the Russian-built Aryamehr steel mill near Isfahan; the machine tool and heavy machinery plant at Arak between Shiraz and Isfahan; silos and other agricultural facilities in the Iranian provinces; and hydroelectric installations, and regulation of the Aras River on the northwestern border of Iran and the USSR and the Atrak River in northeastern Iran. With delivery of the gas at Astara, the credits advanced for these projects are gradually to be repaid at a rate of $6.6 per thousand cubic meters, generally considered low by international standards.

The pipeline, reported to have the largest diameter of any such line in the world, has a much greater carrying capacity[41] than the gas to be supplied to the USSR alone. The balance is to be used for Iran's own rapidly growing gas needs. To transport the gas to its destinations within Iran, spur lines have been built leading from the main trunkline to various cities, such as Shiraz and Tehran. Traversing some 1,100 kilometers of rugged territory, pumped 8,000 feet high over parts of the high Zagros mountains, the pipeline had already carried gas to Astara by October 1970, when it was designated by the Shah as the National Iranian Gas Trunkline. By that time, spur lines were already under way to serve the industrial and, ultimately, the household needs of the cities connected to them, so that eventually it will take gas to the many villages along

Berry, "Oil and Soviet Policy in the Middle East." *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 26, No. 2, Spring 1972, p. 158.

[41] Carrying capacity was set at 15.6 billion cubic meters of gas yearly. "Iranian Gas Trunkline," *Iran Oil Journal*, Tehran, December 1970, p. 6.

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the path of the main trunkline.

By March 1972, more than 5½ million cubic meters had been sent through to Astara, and nearly 3½ million cubic meters had been shipped and sold within the country for domestic consumption.[42] In the city of Isfahan, large industrial concerns, including the neighboring Aryamehr steel mill, were already supplied with gas, while smaller industries, office blocks, hotels, and bakeries were just beginning to get supplies. In parts of Tehran, gas was coming into use, especially in factories. In Shiraz, gas from the spur line and from recent discoveries in the city suburbs was providing enough fuel and energy for many houses as well as industries.

Despite the growth of gas liquification plants, the beginnings of the trunkline shipments, and gas used by petrochemical plants on the island of Kharg and at Abadan, less than half the production of natural gas was utilized in 1971, and thus flaring continued.[43] But the trunkline was still in its early stages; further gas liquification plants were under way, and the future of petrochemicals and their use of gas still lay largely ahead.

Use of Gas for Chemical Fertilizers and Petrochemicals. In the late 1950s and the decade of the 1960s, country after country in rapid succession joined the procession of builders of petrochemical plants which use oil or gas as raw materials. Like steel mills, great petrochemical complexes became a kind of status symbol.

Iran was in a fortunate position because of its large amounts of oil and natural gas. Although a small, poorly located chemical fertilizer plant was built near Shiraz in the late 1950s, the country has been turning its attention more recently to petrochemicals. It has been wise enough to realize, however, that for such large projects foreign exchange and technical know-how are needed as well as oil or natural gas. After the formation of the National Iranian Petrochemical Company in 1964 as another wholly owned NIOC subsidiary, Iran was ready to begin cooperative petrochemical ventures with foreign concerns. More than two years after its formation, the National Iranian Petrochemical Company had entered agreements with the B. F. Goodrich Company (75 percent the National Petro-

[42] *Idem.*, May 1972, p. 8.

[43] Of 36,800 million cubic meters produced, only 15,600 were utilized. Of this amount 1,400 million were used in the Kharg Petrochemical Plant, and the balance of 10,000 million was used in the two Consortium liquified gas plants and fed to the Iranian Gas Trunkline. *Annual Report*, Industrial and Mining Development Bank of Iran, 1972, p. 34.

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chemical Company and 25 percent Goodrich) for construction of a PVC (polyvinyl chloride) detergent and caustic soda plant at Abadan; another with AMOCO (50-50 percent) for sulphur plants on Kharg Island; and a third with IPAC (also 50-50 percent) at the large gas fields of Masjid-i-Suleiman, where oil had been discovered so many years ago, and which are now turning out to be rich in gas as well. By October 1969 the Abadan and Kharg projects had already begun production and were, within three years, able to meet all existing domestic needs for plastic raw materials and detergents, while exporting some sulphur and liquid gas.[44]

The largest and most ambitious Iranian petrochemical complex up to 1972 came with a decision of the National Petrochemical Company in 1967 to join with Allied Chemical of the United States on a 50-50 basis in a petrochemical and fertilizer complex at Bandar Shapur, on the northwestern part of the Persian Gulf not far east of Abadan. Allied Chemical, faced with problems at home, first reduced its interest to one-third ownership and then planned to withdraw entirely in 1973, except for the provision of marketing and technical services under NIOC supervision of the National Iranian Petrochemicals. Buying Allied Chemical's equity[45] with payments to be spread over 1973 to 1979, Iran is considered by some to have acquired a white elephant, but by others to have an acquisition which will increase exports and natural gas uses and enhance even further the position of NIOC and its subsidiaries.

By 1971 ammonia and sulphur for some of Iran's fertilizer needs were already being produced, together with various solid fertilizers. These are being sold through National Petrochemical's subsidiary, the Fertilizer Distributing Company, and its centers in various Iranian villages. Some sulphur was also being exported to the world market directly from the plant.

It was estimated that the Bandar Shapur complex would cost some $232 million, including long-range loans from other countries besides Iran. They failed, however, to include some items which are important for the functioning of the complex, and so the final costs will inevitably be higher. In any case, the costs have bitten deep into the credits allotted to industries and mines under the

[44] *Idem.*, 1970, p. 29. By 1972 about 95 percent of total detergent production was supplied by these plants. *Idem.*, 1972, p. 28.

[45] Allied Chemical's original investment was $26 million; the purchase price by the National Petrochemical Company was $21.6 million. See *Allied Chemical News Release*, December 3, 1970; also "Iran's Largest Petrochemical Company," *Iran Oil Journal*, December 1971, pp. 6-7.

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Fourth Development Plan. During the first three years of the plan, from 1968 to 1971, the project, together with the steel mill near Isfahan, had cost over two-thirds of the total amount of credits approved for all industries and mines for the five years of the Plan. In addition it had taken three-quarters of all actual Plan Organizational disbursements. During the fourth year, however, Plan Organization expenditures for petrochemicals decreased somewhat because the Kharg and Abadan plants were already supplying many local needs.

More complicated and even more vast petrochemical ventures are contemplated. The first such development stems from an agreement of October 1971 between the National Iranian Petrochemical Company and Mitsui of Japan. Adjacent to the Shapur establishment, the new complex will manufacture different types of chemical and petrochemical products from its next-door neighbor. In 1972 the cost of the new Irano-Japanese plants become some $450 million.[46] With participation on a 50-50 basis, cash payments of $100 million are to be made in equal shares provided by National Petrochemical of Iran and the Mitsui Companies of Japan, while the balance will be financed by loans and credits from Japanese sources.[47]

Oil and Gas Resources and Iran's Future

While intent on constantly increasing production and especially revenue from oil and gas, the Shah, his NIOC and other officials know that their great wealth in these resources and their country's dependence on them pose serious problems for the future. They realize that Iran, with some 15 percent of proven world crude oil reserves and vaguely estimated but assuredly large percentages of world gas reserves, has the capacity to increase oil production by some 15 percent per annum for several decades.[48] They also know, however, that eventually the end of the line will come. So NIOC is at work making studies of future supplies, and the Shah has looked

[46] *Annual Report*, Industrial and Mining Development Bank of Iran, 1972, p. 30.

[47] Annual production of the complex is expected to be about 500,000 tons of olefines, 450,000 of aromatic compounds, 250,000 of caustic soda, 300,000 of ethylene chloride, and 150,000 of polyethylene, *Ibid.*, p. 28. See also "One of the World's Largest Petrochemical Plants for Iran," *Iran Oil Journal*, October 1971, p. 11.

[48] *Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East*, 1970 (UN Publication E/CN.-11/986, Bangkok, 1971), p. 221.

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ahead by such actions as convening a conference in Tehran in November 1973, which included foreign experts, for discussions of Iran's need for rapid development of nuclear energy.

Meanwhile the Iranian economy's dependence on oil and gas has been growing steadily. In 1969-70, for instance, these two sources of energy provided 18.6 percent of its gross domestic product, 48 percent of its central budget reserves, and 73 percent of its total export earnings.[49] Under the agreements of 1970-72, Iran became even more heavily dependent on its oil resources for vitally needed foreign exchange and domestic funds. Even the large gas shipments to the USSR brought problems: they might link the two countries together more closely politically as well as economically than Iran would wish.

For this and other reasons the Shah is anxious to lessen the high degree of his country's dependence on its oil products, which will not last forever. Nor does the Shah wish other countries to buy only its oil. In the words of Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda, oil and gas must become only the sugar on the national cake. Already other raw materials, notably copper, are coming into their own; a small but growing amount of machinery for Iran's burgeoning industry is now manufactured inside the country instead of being imported at high cost in foreign exchange; and agriculture, the most depressed sector of the economy, is slowly changing in type, thanks to the Shah's program of land reform, cooperative organization, and development of large-scale mechanized farming. As these innovations and modernization in industry and farming help change the picture of Iran's exports and imports, and so of its need for large amounts of foreign exchange, less dependence on oil and gas exports will begin, albeit slowly.

World demand for oil as a present source of energy is so great that more and more pressure for Iranian gas and oil will be coming from other countries. While the oil and gas supplies last, Iran will probably be willing to supply demands for them. Countries desiring to buy these resources, however, must realize that "the era of cheap energy is past, and that they must be prepared to pay the true cost of their daily amenities powered by oil. . . . No measure of saber-rattling and name-calling on either side can obscure the common interests of the oil-producing nations and the consuming public in maintaining a stable and abundant supply of oil at reasonable

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 223.

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prices."[50] Although opinions may differ as to the definition of reasonable prices, the realization that other countries must pay the true cost of their daily amenities was certainly borne home in 1973 and early 1974 with vigor. Iran will no doubt continue to try to increase its income from oil and gas, but as one of the top producers, it has an especial interest in keeping a stable and abundant supply flowing to foreign countries as long as possible.

[50] "The Oil Story," p. 689.

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Book Reviews

The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy by *Robert D. Putnam. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1973.—xii, 309 pp. $10.95.*

Political Alienation and Political Behavior *by David C. Schwartz. Chicago, Aldine Publishing Company, 1973.—xvi, 286 pp. $9.75.*

In Britain and Italy, Putnam reports, partisan political hostility is declining, unwillingness to compromise is declining, and (in Italy) a view of the world as conflictful is declining—but ideological thinking is constant in Britain and increasing in Italy. Schwartz's pre-Watergate view is that "American politics has become the politics of alienation"; moreover, political involvement, at least in the ghetto, leads to greater political alienation and not back into a rapprochement with what is called (ironically, no doubt) "the system." How eagerly, yet gingerly, do we turn to such findings as these for explanations of what is happening to us on our way to our rendezvous with progress and perhaps also for some tracings of the future.

Putnam rewards the reader who turns thus in his direction, for, with a mixture of energy and skill, he has persuaded ninety-three members of Parliament and eighty-three Italian *deputati* to reveal to him and his unconcealed tape recorder their metapolitics: their uses of coherent abstract systems of ideological thinking, their basic, rarely articulated views of the nature of the world as an arena of conflict or as a field of harmony, and their ideals of liberty, equality, and democracy. With a combination of content analysis—exhibiting an appropriate concern for the subtlety of the material—and questionnaire analysis, Putnam interprets this hard-won verbal data to illuminate the underlying premises guiding the thinking of these politicians. The wearied professional public, now long inured to research reports in which the infor-

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mation smothers the meaning, will find relief in Putnam's use of arguments in a more literary tradition: Aristotle, Schumpeter, and Dahl on democracy, Plato and Burke versus Hobbes and Marx on conflict, and so forth. Although perhaps lacking depth here, a more extended treatment would not have added much to the special virtues of this book. In any event, there is an admirable and successful attempt to make the data speak to the great issues of government.

What do we learn? Unlike the general public, members of parliament, especially in Italy, refer immediate issues to larger philosophies of society, reason synoptically, employ historical contexts, and explicitly employ concepts of socialism, democracy, capitalism, and so forth; they think ideologically. Within this elite group, the extreme leftists and rightists tend to be more ideological than those in the middle, but while they tend to reject more than others "the established political and social arrangements," they are not less committed to democratic processes. Further, and here Putnam scores on Shils, the ideologues are *not* more dogmatic, not more authoritarian, not more hostile to compromise, not disdainful of political expediency, and not more marked by social distrust or moral absolutism. In short, those things that have been said to characterize political ideologues (though sometimes in another sense, the word ideologue is so slippery) do not do so. Further, the younger MPs and *deputati* are, if anything, more ideological (in Britain, anyway) than the older ones, a finding which Putnam, after examining alternative explanations, interprets as a historical change not attributable to life-cycle differences, selective mortality, or years in office.

Seeing the world as an arena of conflict has consequences: it encourages a "bargaining" political style under circumstances where compromise is considered unlikely (as in Italy) rather than "problem solving" in a search for integrative solutions (as in Britain). Curiously, the conflictful view of the world does not seem to affect the way a politician thinks about poverty issues but does affect the way he deals with economic planning, perhaps because planning explicitly deals with who gets what. The more a member sees the world as conflictful, the more leftist he is likely to be, and, of course, vice versa. This conflictful view of the world seems to be produced by working-class origins (once ideology and socioeconomic status are accounted for, there are no differences between parties), and it is an enduring perception, partly, perhaps, because it is never articulated and hence not subject to persuasive influence. In some sense it is a legacy of history, for it seems to characterize people who came to adulthood in periods of conflict. Thus the older British politicians are much more sanguine about social harmony than the older Italians, but the younger politicians of both countries view the world, in this respect, through the same lenses. Perceptions of radical social conflict are declining in Italy, but not in Britain. It will seem strange

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to scholars in the future if it should turn out that Italy is a model of stability and progress and Britain of instability and backwardness.

While Putnam deals generously with these kinds of larger issues and (with more difficulty) with historical inference, Schwartz illuminates the causes and behavioral consequences of the single attitude of political alienation. In this treatment, political alienation is redefined as "estrangement—a perception that one does not identify oneself with the political system." Through some sixteen overlapping special studies (three experiments and several surveys of which eleven rely in whole or in part on mailed questionnaires), the work tests a predisposition-activation model of the process and consequences of becoming alienated. Alienation is the product of three perceptions or attitudes: a sense of threat arising from the perception of basic conflict between what the polity is doing and what a person wants it to do (value conflict), a sense of one's own political inefficacy, and a sense that the political system is not responsive.

Unlike other studies (and there are many), Schwartz finds that alienation is not a product of lower-class status (and consequent feelings of inefficacy) or of middle-class status (and consequent perceptiveness about political values), or of generalization to the polity of a broader cultural estrangement; political alienation, as it is measured here, is politics-specific and is distributed more or less evenly throughout the status hierarchy—at least in these days of widespread education and of what scholars (but not their respondents) generally call "affluence." Since he is interested in the behavioral consequences of political alienation, Schwartz explores the way in which such alienation is related to the behavioral orientations Merton once proposed: conformism, reformism, withdrawal, and so forth. These preferred ways of coping imply, for the alienated and the nonalienated alike, particular modes of behavior, such as sit-ins and other forms of protest or accommodation.

The theory has the virtue of specificity in that it fills in some psychological and social mechanisms operating in this murky attitude-behavior domain, and the empirical research makes plausible much of the theoretical formulation. But there is an inelegance of treatment (the measures of alienation are not the same in several tests), the presentation is sometimes difficult to follow, and the findings are presented as though the purpose of the inquiry were to prove the theory rather than to explore a problem. There is a self-justificatory quality to the presentation that seems to me out of place.

In the end, Schwartz suggests that the reason "American politics has become the politics of alienation" is not so much the rise of political alienation, for we have always been alienated, but rather because of an increased relevance of politics to our daily lives and especially because of a changed behavior pattern: less withdrawal and more activism. On

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the basis of his research done in the 1960s, Schwartz concludes that we will increasingly employ an activist, participatory, and perhaps even revolutionary political style in the service of our enduring estrangement from politics. Like many of the rest of us, Schwartz fails as a prophet, but since his prophecy does not rest on his research results, the theoretical formulations and research reports do represent a useful interpretation of some of the "little refusals" we have made to our unsystematic political system.

ROBERT E. LANE
Yale University

Presidential Television *by Newton N. Minow, John Bartlow Martin, and Lee M. Mitchell. A Twentieth Century Fund Report. New York, Basic Books, 1973.—xvi, 232 pp. $8.95.*

In their aptly titled *Presidential Television,* the authors have lassoed a herd of problems, given them a name, and exhibited them for scrutiny. It is a useful and absorbing contribution.

That television has given the president unique power to seize the spotlight, hold the initiative, define terms of national debate, and confound opponents is widely enough recognized. Here, details of that power are explored in considerable detail. A presidential request for television time, the authors tell us, has never been rejected. Aside from this, a president has countless television strategies at his disposal:

> He may make a formal address, hold a press conference, consent to an interview, telephone an astronaut, go to a football game, receive a visiting chief of state, take a trip abroad, or play with his dog on the White House lawn. He may send his family, his cabinet members, or his political allies before the cameras. In almost every case, he, and he alone, decides. His ability to choose when and how to appear without cost before millions of viewers is completely unmatched by his political or Congressional opponents (p. 17).

All this has given him, as Fred Friendly puts it in his foreword to *Presidential Television,* an "electronic throne."

The authors argue persuasively that this development has undermined our checks and balances. The Supreme Court has shunned the electronic spotlight because any attempts it might make to explain its decisions would tend to amend them. Congress as an institution has shunned the spotlight by excluding cameras and microphones from its main deliberations. Individually, Congressmen have pushed into the spotlight, but they have drowned each other in a babel of voices. Only in occasional telecasts of committee hearings has Congress found a weapon comparable to those available to a president.

The authors review in detail the television frustrations of Congress,

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opposition parties, and citizen groups, and bravely suggest ways in which their relative impotence in relation to the presidency might be remedied. These include suggestions for: specially scheduled prime-time sessions of Congress, available to television cameras, at which major issues would be debated and voted on; formulas for opposition responses to presidential television appearances; periodic "national debates" scheduled between elections, organized by the major parties and broadcast "simultaneously by all networks"; and formulas for giving candidates television access in "voter's time." The proposals seem admirably sensible but would unquestionably be attacked by broadcasters as horrendous invasions; all would conflict with another function of the television franchise, which Roy Thomson compared so memorably to "a license to print your own money."

Considering the seriousness of problems discussed in *Presidential Television*, the impact of the discussion seems mild, unless one remembers other aspects of presidential power. When a president can order secret paramilitary adventures and putsches; can order an invasion of a country with which we are not at war; can actually keep such an invasion a secret from the American public for many months; can finance the glorification of his policies by tapping the treasuries of corporations enriched by those policies, then we are enmeshed in a fantastic series of interlocking problems. *Presidential Television* throws valuable light on one aspect of those problems.

ERIK BARNOUW
Columbia University

Research on Human Subjects: Problems of Social Control in Medical Experimentation *by Bernard Barber, John J. Lally, Julia Loughlin Makarushka, and Daniel Sullivan. New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1973.—viii, 263 pp. $10.50.*

In their study of clinical experimentation on human subjects, the authors of *Research on Human Subjects* have made a most significant contribution to both the fields of medical ethics and of the sociology of science. The accelerated pace of medical research and the notable advances in pharmacology and surgery have brought with them increasing reliance on clinical experimentation on human subjects, bringing with it increasing concern for the safety and dignity of the experimental subject. This concern has been expressed in a variety of statements of principle, from the Nuremberg pronouncement responding to the outrage at Nazi butchery in the name of investigation to the Helsinki Declaration, and to later restatements by medical congresses. All of these require experiments to

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have a scientific purpose, and ask that risks be commensurate with possible benefits. All call for informed consent of the subject and practical steps for his protection. Some guidelines for the protection of subjects used in new drug investigations subject to FDA supervision and in other clinical experimentation funded or sponsored by the National Institutes of Health have been framed in the past few years, and federal legislation to provide broad legal protection for human subjects is presently pending. The growing volume of literature on the subject was recently enhanced by another Russell Sage sponsored study, namely the work of Dr. Jay Katz on *Experimentation with Human Beings*.

The literature had heretofore been either highly theoretical or based on a variety of parades of horrors drawn from particular abuses collected by particular authors. The study by Bernard Barber and his colleagues is the first, however, to bring to bear sound sociological and statistical analysis on research institutions, medical and biological researchers, and on their practices and attitudes. In a soundly conceived study, data were collected by questionnaires from all of the institutions in the country in which biomedical research on human subjects is done, and intensive interviewing was done of all researchers in two selected institutions that typified common types of such institutions. The results of the two studies meshed closely, and documented the dubious state of affairs in clinical research that had long been suspected though never clearly demonstrated. Using six hypothetical research protocols, involving many degrees of risk and varying possibilities of therapeutic compensation to the subject, the study found that though the majority of researchers would seek informed consent from subjects, as many as 23 percent would proceed, in a fairly risky procedure, without such consent. On the issue of consent, "there seems to be more consensus . . . than there is on the issue of how much risk is too much in proportion to the therapeutic and other benefits . . ." (p. 37). In a hypothetical high-risk, antidepressant drug study, half the researchers would have sought revision of the protocol to protect subjects, though the other half would have proceeded without change—in spite of the fact that the drug had potentially serious side effects *and* that a number of patients in the control group in a mental hospital were suicidal and would have been denied treatment during the course of study. One of the hypothetical protocols involved a hazardous thymectomy (excision of the thymus) proposal involving high risks, high scientific benefits, but no proportionate therapeutic benefits. Seventy-two percent responded that they would not attempt the study—yet 28 percent would have taken the risk!

The study contains intriguing data on the risk-benefit ratio that will be regarded as adequate justification for hazardous clinical experimentation. A profile of the researcher inclined to take major risks with his subjects also emerges. He is a fairly youngish go-getter who has been very produc-

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tive in terms of the number of scientific papers published, but he has not as yet had the recognition he thinks he deserves.

A detailed statistical analysis of the structures, processes, and efficiency of the peer group review of clinical experimentation, as developed during the last 20 years or so, demonstrates that peer review committees "have shown at least some efficacy in their assigned task of safeguarding the welfare and rights of the human subjects of biomedical research . . ." (p. 161) but find that a great deal of such research still gets by without passing a formal review procedure. An interesting subsidiary finding shows that peer review committees are likely to reject, require modification of, or cause the withdrawal of considerably more than the usual small percentage of research proposals if the regulatory scheme provides for a formal appeals procedure for the committee's determination. A significant analysis of the data shows that medical schools have not provided any ethical leadership in advancing the acceptance of peer group review.

The recommendations for policy change and reform are suitably low-keyed and include a call for improved "ethical socialization" in medical schools and in the course of medical training generally. They also include a call for improved peer group review, in part by the inclusion of clinicians not engaged in research, and of nonprofessional outsiders, members of the "community" who have a stake in patient protection. Although the authors speak softly on the issue of "external" legal controls, their message is clear—self-regulation must play an important part, but ultimately the protection of clinical subjects is a matter of law. In view of recent developments in that direction, the work could not be more timely.

FRANK P. GRAD
Columbia University Law School

Academic Transformation: Seventeen Institutions under Pressure *edited by David Riesman and Verne A. Stadtman. New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973.—xx, 489 pp. $12.50.*

This volume demonstrates once again that a collection of essays by different authors, even when the pieces individually maintain high quality, can produce an overall contribution which is disappointing. The sum of the parts is not easily made a whole, an integrated account, in such a multiauthor situation.

What we have here is a set of essays on university responses to the sundry pressures and tensions of the last decade. A group of distinguished scholars was asked by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education to prepare "case studies" of academic transformations as these occurred, roughly between 1964 and 1971, at sixteen diverse American colleges and universities and the University of Toronto. The considerable merit of *Aca-*

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demic Transformation is achieved in the rich descriptive detail of many of the accounts, in the individual insights they provide into gains and losses accompanying recent academic change, and through cogent documentation of how unresolved problems bred in the transitional turmoil of the 1960s remain prominent in higher education's agenda of the 1970s. The chapters by Philip Altbach on the University of Wisconsin, by Nathan Glazer on CCNY, and by Burton Clark on Wesleyan serve well to exemplify these contributions.

The weaknesses of the volume result from the original conception and design, rather than from execution of the design. For one thing, as David Riesman notes in his typically insightful epilogue to the volume, schools were not selected for inclusion so as to represent the spectrum of college and university experience of the period. Institutional visibilty appears to have been a decisive criterion. Visibility in most cases here is the end product of high academic standing, and there is something to be said for concentrating on the "pacesetters." Still, what Riesman describes as "somewhat haphazard selection" resulted in unfortunate omissions—the fact, for instance, that not one southern college has been surveyed.

More troubling is a lack of uniform analysis, which co-editor Verne A. Stadtman calls attention to in his introductory essay: "A galaxy that consists of diverse colleges and universities *described in different ways from different perspectives* by differing people yields indistinct constellations. It does not, certainly, display a grand pattern." (Emphasis is the reviewer's.) Reading over the seventeen case studies, one simply cannot find them speaking to each other or to any widely shared themes. So much occurred in higher education over the last decade that, in the absence of a common analytic focus, the disparity of commentary here defies generalization.

The one effort at broadly integrative interpretation is Riesman's epilogue, and the excellence of this essay results from the author's almost unique familiarity with the landscape of American higher education, not from any pulling together of the case study data.

Academic Transformation is interesting because its subject commands our attention and because of the quality of the individual accounts. The absence of a common frame for analysis, however, greatly detracts from lasting value as a piece of social science research.

EVERETT CARLL LADD, JR.
University of Connecticut

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Setting National Priorities: The 1974 Budget *by Edward R. Fried, Alice M. Rivlin, Charles L. Schultze, and Nancy H. Teeters. Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1973.—xx, 446 pp. Cloth: $8.95; paper: $3.95.*

This fourth volume in a series begun in 1970 carries on the important analysis of the federal budget. It conspicuously differs from the earlier volumes in the uniqueness of the budget it treats and the nature of the options that budget offers. The president's budget for 1974 differs from other recent ones in its reduction of domestic spending below the point it otherwise would have reached and in its emphasis on transferring some choices among expenditures to the state and local governments through general revenue sharing. In this volume, the priorities to be set in domestic policies concern "strategies" or ways of achieving ends rather than the ends themselves as in the three earlier volumes.

No brief summary can do justice to the large amount of information and analysis presented in this book. For each domestic strategy, it examines the specific tools available, the reasons for federal expenditures, the uses made of the funds, the inequities and ineffectiveness as well as the successes of current programs, and imaginative possible alternatives. In a section on "Foreign Policy and National Security," the rising costs and changing composition of the defense budget are analyzed against the background of alternative international roles for the United States.

The primary purpose of *Setting National Priorities: The 1974 Budget* is to clarify the issues and offer choices. It supplies "building blocks" consisting of various alternatives and their costs projected over the next three to five years. These units are assembled to form a number of budgets and the reader himself may rearrange them into still other budgets more nearly satisfying his own set of priorities. Besides the ready-made "building blocks," each reader is encouraged to add blocks of his own design. The study assumes relatively little disagreement as to domestic goals such as reducing poverty and inequality, improving public services, and cleaning up the environment. However, wide differences of opinion are believed to exist regarding amounts which should be spent and the ways the goals should be pursued. On these bases, the current volume classifies the domestic programs by four means or strategies: redistribution of income, helping people to buy essentials, grants for social programs and investment in the environment, and general revenue sharing.

The projections of the budget over the next three years lead to the conclusion that unless taxes and expenditure policies are very much altered, the federal budget will permit few changes before the fiscal year 1977. This conclusion is held in the face of the anticipated rise in revenue resulting from economic growth and the cuts in domestic programs in the president's 1974 budget. But the study goes on to point out certain possi-

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ble changes in taxes and defense policies which it is believed will provide additional resources permitting budget changes even before 1977. While the choices among strategies are difficult, over the period to 1978 significant changes will be possible in budgetary resources and priorities.

Yet the forecasts are not made in a static world. The current fiscal year already has brought two economic events not anticipated in the projections of the budget to 1978, namely the steep rise in prices over the first half of fiscal 1974 and the energy crisis with its damaging effects on employment and economic growth. The authors have added that although prices were rising faster than anticipated (note 5, p. 11 and note 1, p. 414), the projections still hold, since both revenues and expenditures will rise. In contrast, the current shortages of energy may affect the conclusions, since a reduction in energy cannot be expected to affect economic growth revenues and expenditures with the same symmetry as inflation.

If there is any reader as yet unfamiliar with this series, he should not be deceived by the title into expecting a description and critique limited narrowly to the 1974 budget. Instead, he will find a survey of contemporary economic issues and a remarkably useful compilation of both statistics and nonquantitative information important to an understanding of government's role in the economy. The federal budget serves to coordinate the wide-ranging discussion. The budget accounting for one-fifth of the GNP affects every economic sector and the welfare of all citizens; any changes in this powerful instrument will have repercussions throughout the economy. In short, this book on the 1974 budget contains not only current data and time series for budget items, but also information on many other subjects including income distribution, tax programs and theory, intergovernmental fiscal relations, the operation of consumer subsidies, and government grants and other transfers. The student of public affairs will do well to add it to his reading list for his own information or for any course dealing with the present-day United States, whether it be the introductory course or an advanced seminar.

MARION HAMILTON GILLIM
Barnard College, Columbia University

The Bench and the Ballot: Southern Federal Judges and Black Voters *by Charles V. Hamilton. New York, Oxford University Press, 1973.—x, 258 pp. $7.95.*

The eight years between the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 provided a "concentrated drama" about the registration of black people. There were many actors in that drama, but among the major ones were federal district judges who manned the

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federal courtrooms in the South. It is this aspect of the struggle—the role of federal courts and judges in the registration of blacks—that provides the focal point of Hamilton's volume.

The study details the role of federal courts and judges by examining some 15 cases in four states—Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee. Specifically, the study "analyzes the different judicial styles and temperaments of various Southern judges in their conduct of the mandate given them by Congress" under the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960. From this analysis Professor Hamilton discerns three distinct judicial types or styles, the judicial aggressor (chapter 5), the judicial resistor (chapter 6), and the judicial gradualist (chapter 7). In addition to usual data sources such as written reports, the author conducted interviews with attorneys of the Justice Department and Southern black registration workers. He also had access to certain "official files" of the Department of Justice. But perhaps his most fruitful (certainly his most skillfully used) data come from various trial court records (see, for example, p. 133).

Hamilton writes well, and his catchy titles, including the title of the volume, constantly whet the appetite. As a general chronicle of one aspect of the civil rights struggle, Hamilton's volume may be read with profit. His meticulous detailing of the efforts of blacks and their allies to increase and secure black voter registration and his vivid description of variations in judicial enforcement of congressional mandates are indeed worthy contributions. The study is strengthened throughout by vignettes that will rankle those who hold a decent respect for mankind.

As a contribution to political science, the significance of Hamilton's study is that in the main it reinforces findings that have been made in earlier studies. He tells us, for example, that the posture of the president (and administrative institutions such as the Department of Justice) is important in the realization of civil rights objectives such as voting. Consider, for example, his contrasts between Eisenhower and Kennedy (pp. 74-87) and the more recent position of Nixon (pp. 243-245). He further explains that variation in the judicial behavior and temperament of different federal judges is perhaps more important to the outcome of given conflicts than any structures or standards emanating from or inherent in the judicial process (p. 219). Note, for example, the stark differences between the behavior and styles of Judge Frank Johnson of Alabama (the judicial aggressor, chapter 5) and Judge Harold Cox of Mississippi (the judicial resistor, chapter 6).

Hamilton, of course, is well aware that similar general conclusions have been reached in earlier studies, as shown by the skillful use of such works as J. W. Peltason's *Fifty-eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School Desegregation* (1962). One still hopes that Hamilton and others will tackle and give us the benefit of their knowledge about

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those aspects of civil rights where more attention is needed. One such problem, for example, is listed by Professor Hamilton himself at the very end of his volume when he notes "that [the civil rights struggle] must begin to give greater attention to solutions that link political and economic concerns" (p. 250). Certainly it should, but could not political scientists at least discuss and analyze conditions or obstacles that permit or retard such solutions? And what about taking the next step of offering solutions?

Reviewers often review what they wish an author had written rather than what he actually writes, and that could well be true in this case. But an author who whets a reviewer's appetite as Hamilton did, should expect to be pushed yet further.

LUCIUS J. BARKER
Washington University

Black Men, White Cities: Race, Politics, and Migration in the United States, 1900-30, and Britain, 1948-68 *by Ira Katznelson. London and New York, Oxford University Press, 1973.—viii, 219 pp. $9.95.*

Ira Katznelson's *Black Men, White Cities* deserves careful attention from students of American urban politics. Its publication comes at a time when the inadequacy of the American pluralist paradigm for structuring analysis of urban political life has been fully recognized. It is now more than a decade since the civil rights movement began to reveal in practice the weaknesses of pluralism in theory. The structure of inequality in America is recognizably patterned in ways that severely challenge the pluralist observations that participation through group representation, multiple points of access, and ease of entry into the system usefully characterize the political system for stigmatized or relatively powerless groups.

While a sound and accurate description of the American political system remains an urgent intellectual task for grounding practice or further developing empirical theory, students of American politics have not, on the whole, taken the next step of developing alternative approaches to the pluralist perspective. Most works, if they are at all critical of prevailing conceptions, seem endlessly resigned to patching the pluralist quilt. Katznelson, however, does take the necessary next step. In the process he has written a monograph that should be of great interest not only to students of American politics but also to those interested in comparative politics and the politics of race.

Black Men, White Cities treats the incorporation of black migrants to

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cities in the United States and colored immigrants to Britain into political life at times when these groups were on the threshold of the great migrations that would later make these populations important foci of conflict. Katznelson focuses on black migration to New York and Chicago in the first third of the present century, and colored migration to cities in Britain following the Second World War. The comparisons are structurally apt by encompassing years when the minority populations represented similar proportions of the population, although chronologically the beginnings of these periods were separated by a half-century.

In both cases political leaders of dominant white groups anointed minority leadership and circumscribed their options, creating clientelistic relations with minority communities characterized by one-sided power relationships. This pattern contrasts with the incorporation of white immigrant groups into city politics on considerably more reciprocal terms. Katznelson proceeds to argue persuasively that the early linkages of minority groups to established political elites significantly structured the future recruitment, mobility, style, and expressed values of black and colored leaders. At least in the United States case, established group elites influenced political life in black communities long after blacks became a significant proportion of the population of northern cities. Indeed, the lack of relatively autonomous bases for black politicians in the United States through the 1950s and early 1960s has frequently been commented upon, but without as persuasive an explanation as the historical/structural perspective advanced by Katznelson.

The case studies of the early efforts of American blacks and British colored populations to establish links with national and local political leaders and organizations are held together by elegant introductory and concluding discussions. These sections deal with the potential for analyzing the relations of dominant and subordinate racial groups by focusing on the structural determinants of the choices available to minority communities. The author builds on the perspective that understanding the ways in which elites structure the choices available to nonelites may lead to and ultimately provide a more comprehensive understanding of behavior than perspectives characteristic of much current research on American politics. The latter studies take the alternatives as "given" and seek to explain variance within previously established limits, the origins and stability of which remain uninvestigated.

Katznelson's contribution is not to draw attention to the observation that alternatives structure behavior, but rather to investigate in detail the specific ways politically debilitated groups had their choices structured for them, thus developing a model for the empirical study of "choice structuring." In his last chapter Katznelson reviews the elements of empirical theory that would comprise a social control perspective, of which "choice structuring" is one dimension, and advances the outlines of an

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argument that places a considerable portion of black political behavior in this framework. Katznelson's work suggests the basis for studying social control in American cities systematically and comparatively. Thus he contributes to the enterprise of advancing the rigorous study of American politics unfettered by an American pluralist analytic framework and an extreme version of its behaviorist methodological companion.

MICHAEL LIPSKY
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

CORE: A Study in the Civil Rights Movement, 1942-1968 *by August Meier and Elliott Rudwick. New York, Oxford University Press, 1973.—xii, 563 pp. $15.00.*

This case study of an important civil rights organization provides a wealth of material covering a critical period in the direct-action protest struggle for civil rights. Meier and Rudwick trace with meticulous precision the development of CORE (Congress of Racial Equality) from its inception by a small band of devoted, predominantly white activists intent on implementing Gandhi's notions of *satyagraha* on American soil to its transformation into an all-black nationalist organization. The book is thorough in its documentation, including extensive interviews with participants and examination of their papers, as well as using other voluminous primary and secondary sources. The authors have performed their historians' role of data-gathering admirably.

CORE pioneered in the sit-in strategy of the civil rights movement, but it was never quite able to attract a mass following among blacks. This inability was a constant worry to the leaders, and the problem became increasingly a vexing one as the organization moved into the South as well as into the black central cities of the North. Serious decisions had to be made which, many members (black and white) felt, violated the basic principles of the original group. A key one was whether CORE should adopt a deliberate policy of choosing only black leaders for local chapters and even to head the national organization as a means of increasing its appeal to the black masses. Another problem was whether CORE should abandon its rigid philosophical position on nonviolence. It was quickly evident that such a position simply did not appeal to large numbers of blacks whom the organization wanted to involve in its protest movements. There is very much in CORE's history to be learned about civil rights protest, organizational leadership and recruitment, and especially the conduct of social protest under crisis situations.

This book is encyclopedic; it is also exceptionally tedious reading. The authors become so immersed in intricate detail that frequently the

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reader does not get a sense of the dynamism occurring during those turbulent times. This is particularly the case in the early 1960s with the Freedom Rides. The book chronicles events in local CORE chapters all over the country, but it is difficult to follow the account when each section jumps around—from Brooklyn to St. Louis to Seattle to Los Angeles back to Cleveland to Columbus, etc. One loses the thread the authors are attempting to weave. The materials could have been organized better. The major problem is not that the book is boring, but that the substantive story is lost frequently in a maze of names, places, memos, and dates.

On balance, however, this book will be more useful than not. The facts *are* there. We could use many more detailed accounts of activist organizations during the period after World War II. There will be many disagreements over the interpretations and even the reporting of those facts, but this, of course, is frequently the case.

CHARLES V. HAMILTON
Columbia University

The Politics of the Black "Nation" *by Matthew Holden. New York, Chandler Publishing Company, 1973.—235 pp. $5.95.*

The White Man's Burden *by Matthew Holden. New York, Chandler Publishing Company, 1973.—284 pp. $5.95.*

Professor Holden set for himself the task of writing a systematic analysis of the race problem in America. In these companion volumes he nas not only done so, but has offered us a plan for bringing the races together.

The works are collections of essays on the definition and implications of racial schism in America. In *The Politics of the Black "Nation,"* Professor Holden presents the problem of race schism as a "republican crisis." The nation has to reconcile two sociocultural "nations" (Afro-American and Euro-American) within its borders. He believes that the internal dynamics of the black "nation" as well as the responses of the white "nation" will determine the nature of this reconciliation. Holden claims that white social scientists and journalists have misunderstood the internal politics of the "black nation" simply because they do not understand the political behavior of their own nation. He believes blacks, on the other hand, have resisted a rational examination of their politics because to do so would challenge their image of themselves. This resistance has resulted in a distorted picture in previous works on the subject of what the nation faces in its race problem. Holden suggests that the problem of the black "nation" is the competitive nature of black organizations and leadership. This competition has prevented the development of rational planning for

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the black "nation." He also believes that there is class struggle within the black "nation." Although Holden regards this as natural, the division of "bourgeoisie" and "folks" will further divide the "nation's" capacity to deal with the white "nation." These and other forces account for the fragmented nature of black internal politics—a situation which, unless arrested, will perpetuate the schism between the "nations."

Despite the racial schism, whites and blacks are involved in an inescapable interdependent relationship. If the two nations could admit to this fact, they would move a long way toward solving their problems. Holden advocates a five-year plan (1971-76) to reconcile or make domestic peace between the two nations. He suggests focusing these five years on the education of blacks in a changing and technological society, on the development of income support for the immobile black poor, and on programs for changing occupational allocations and availablity among working blacks. He believes that a change in the economic conditions of blacks will be a major step toward domestic peace. The five-year plan also includes creation of a new organization for collective deliberation within the black community. This organization would perform three functions: it would provide an emergency information network, monitoring and administrative mechanisms, and an institute of strategic assessment and forecasting (a black think tank). Finally, Professor Holden calls for diplomatic recognition of the Euro-American and Afro-American nations.

The White Man's Burden also uses as its theme the two-nation concept. An unofficial apartheid which manifests itself in institutional racism, and the belief in white supremacy, has resulted in a devaluation of nonwhites in America. This devaluation is reflected in the relative power of distribution between "nations." This situation has exacerbated the possibility of internal war. Such a war cannot be avoided by what Professor Holden calls "degenerative incrementalism"; a fundamental change is necessary.

The author believes peace-making is the only rational course and he sees this peace-making as a white man's burden. Blacks have a role to play, but whites are the key to change. In other words, black internal politics cannot solve the problem; a change in white external politics is needed. Whites can change the situation by ending institutional racism, and rejecting the racial implications of their ethnic and managerial conservatism. Whites must do this because the survival of the nation as a whole is at stake.

Professor Holden's pragmatic approach may be reassuring, but it is not always convincing. His theoretical position is that of an arena pluralist: he believes that public policy is made by effecting compromises among competing interests. It follows that an effective interest group is one that has a reasonable degree of unity and a viable conflict strategy. Professor

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Holden's attention to leadership, coalition-building, and goal-setting (his five-year plan) reflects this thinking. Arena pluralists tell us that we must be willing to negotiate in order to resolve problems. Since Professor Holden believes that the internal politics of blacks is most significant when it interacts with the white external world, the issue becomes how do we as blacks position ourselves to deal with the white "nation"? In order to negotiate, diplomatic recognition must become the first order of business for this peace-making enterprise. I am not sure what whites want from blacks. (Is it freedom from personal violence?) However, I do agree with Professor Holden that what blacks want from whites is equal opportunity. The only element missing from his scheme is a mechanism for selecting representatives for both sides. Also, if these representatives are selected, how binding will their agreements be for their respective nations as a whole?

Professor Holden presents very convincing and practical arguments for economic integration and personal security. He maintains that blacks and whites will benefit from the domestic peace that will result from this free society. He may be right. Nevertheless, to limit black goals to open participation within the present society seems to ignore the larger question of the long-range direction of our society as a whole. Although this moral responsibility is not solely the Black Man's Burden, it is not something that can wait until blacks realize their political and economic goals.

The underlying theme in both books is alarm at the direction in which the struggle for civil rights is headed. Nevertheless, the author is also optimistic and believes that that direction will change if both nations realize they need each other. He confirms his belief in the worth of the system and the values it generates, and opts for participation of blacks along social class lines. He is advocating new operating tools for blacks in dealing with the white external world. He also wants American society to make its domestic peace and be the *one nation* as it really is.

Blacks are now in a period where collective action and confrontations are no longer appropriate. The crusades for value transformations of the Dr. Martin Luther King variety seem to have exhausted their audience. If there is a lull in the racial struggle or a shift of national attention from it, then it may be a time for blacks to reflect, plan, and regroup. Professor Holden's book can be instructive in that regard.

WILBUR RICH
Columbia University

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J. Edgar Hoover: The Man in His Time *by Ralph de Toledano. New Rochelle, N. Y., Arlington House, 1973.—384 pp. $8.95.*

C. I. A.: The Myth and the Madness *by Patrick J. McGarvey. New York, Saturday Review Press, 1972.—240 pp. $6.95.*

The FBI and the CIA occupy largely secret worlds. Although these two books provide a few glimpses into their respective realms, neither claims to be a fully documented addition to scholarly literature. Instead, they convey sweeping judgments based on partial impressions.

Ralph de Toledano's laudatory biography of J. Edgar Hoover reviews the record of a public official whose impact on American civil liberties has yet to be accurately measured. The value of this popularized account is limited, unfortunately, to a few original passages in a narrative drawn mainly from previously published materials. The absence of footnotes presents a tremendous obstacle to verification. Nevertheless, as a close and sympathetic journalistic observer of the FBI since the 1940s, de Toledano does supply apparently reliable details about two episodes.

First, the account of Hoover's ambiguous relationship with Senator Joseph R. McCarthy is a useful contribution to the historical record. It confirms the FBI director's practice of supplying McCarthy with FBI reports (but not raw files). Beyond pointing the senator "in the direction of suspect individuals," Hoover enjoyed "a very real kind of friendship" with McCarthy. Nevertheless, their association fell short of a full-fledged political alliance. When he came in conflict with Attorney General Herbert Brownell, McCarthy "cut off open contact with Hoover and limited himself to highly guarded association with highly trusted Hoover aides." Moreover, the director avoided risking the FBI's institutional prestige by virtually repudiating McCarthy in critical situations (pp. 279-287).

Second, de Toledano offers a plausible explanation of why Hoover in his last years became irascible, defensive, and "more certain that his way was the right and only way" (p. 24). This decline is attributed to "a series of changes in the FBI's top personnel, as the men who had stood between Hoover and outside hostility left his employ." The departure of Louis B. Nichols had the greatest impact. "If Hoover made a bad decision, Nichols was at once sufficiently a diplomat and a pragmatist to persuade him to change it." To a lesser degree the men who followed Nichols —Alan Belmont, Robert Wick, and Cartha D. (Deke) DeLoach—carried on the task of "interceding for the Bureau with the world" and "interceding for the world with Hoover." William C. Sullivan, who assumed this post in 1970, failed to exercise the tact and political skill needed to protect Hoover. One FBI source described Sullivan's role in relation to what has become known as the "Huston plan" since the 1973 Watergate hearings:

> Strangely enough, where they locked horns, the Director was taking the

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> "civil rights" position and Sullivan was gung-ho for action. Everybody was jumping on the Bureau for taking the law into its own hands. The Director was sensitive about this and he put a partial "hold" on the use of wiretaps and microphone surveillances. He also put his foot down on what we call "surreptitious entry" and the "bag job". . . . It got to the point where Sullivan and the Director were barely talking to each other. . . . Then the White House switched its line and began calling for what Sullivan had pushed for to begin with—and this made the Director even more jittery. He felt that Sullivan was undercutting him, and he fired him (pp. 339-342).

Thereafter Hoover himself began "handling the small details of Bureau public relations" and "his direct line to the White House was no longer dependable." Persistent rumors that he would be replaced led some subordinates to bypass the director and deal directly with Justice Department executives. For the last months of his life, Hoover "became more aloof and embittered" (pp. 353, 357). Despite its brevity this volume is a perceptive analysis of FBI politics under President Nixon—a subject worthy of more intensive investigation.

In contrast to de Toledano's uniform praise of the FBI, Patrick J. McGarvey attempts to reach a general audience with criticism of the CIA. Relying upon an insider's frustrating experience and access to office gossip, as well as references (again unfootnoted) to published works, he contends that the entire foreign intelligence community needs radical structural reform and new leadership. His specific allegations—inertia, interagency rivalry, lack of responsibility and accountability, suppression of unconventional analysis, waste and duplication of effort, preoccupation with secrecy, demoralized personnel—are familiar features of large modern organizations. They can be disastrous in foreign intelligence, McGarvey argues, because they affect "the fate of the free world." Focusing on technical intelligence collection methods, he fears that incidents like the *Pueblo* seizure are likely to recur as a result of uncontrolled bureaucratic momentum.

The author makes a strong case for appointing an outsider as Director of Central Intelligence, as President Nixon has briefly attempted to do since James Schlesinger in early 1973. Preoccupied with satisfying the president and the press, CIA professional Richard Helms had little interest in administrative problems. On the other hand, outsider John McCone challenged his subordinates to defend their analyses and plans, won a reputation for objectivity, and created a mechanism for centralized policy formulation. With the McCone precedent in mind, McGarvey calls for a skilled and impartial administrator "with no internal fiefdoms to protect," capable of questioning the existing order of things in the foreign intelligence community.

JOHN T. ELLIFF
Brandeis University

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Kissinger: The Uses of Power *by David Landau. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972.—ix, 270 pp. $5.95.*

In attempting to account for Nixon's appointment of Henry Kissinger as his special advisor and, subsequently, secretary of state, it is easier to speculate about Nixon's selection of Kissinger than about Kissinger's acceptance of these positions. Whatever else he may be, Kissinger is a scholar and an intellectual, and it is probable that Nixon, surrounded as he was by corporate mediocrities and house lawyers, was aware of his need, to adapt a phrase, for at least one gold filling in a mouthful of decay. An insecure man, Nixon perhaps realized that he was most insecure of all in the area of foreign policy for, apart from a few trips abroad, Nixon gave little evidence prior to 1968 that he was very much interested in the complexities of world politics and America's foreign relations. In dealing with the Russians and the Chinese, Nixon may have reasoned, he required someone who combined expertise with personal loyalty, that is, someone who was acceptable to a variety of foreign policy communities and diplomatic clienteles but not so acceptable as to be capable of wheeling and dealing behind the president's back. Kissinger, moreover, was unlikely to develop a case of "Potomac Fever" as has happened with other White House advisors, and no doubt he had some positive value for Nixon, not despite of, but because of the fact that he is Jewish and from Harvard. As Kennedy had his crown prince and court intellectual in the persons of his brother and McGeorge Bundy, so Nixon has his private confessor in Billy Graham and, in Kissinger, his high priest of *réal politique.*

While Henry can be a jester on and off stage, he is never a fool; and yet who but a fool would accept high office in the Nixon administration after Watergate and Agnew? Since there is no evidence that Kissinger is in there for the money, his motivations for holding office in this most odoriferous of administrations must lie elsewhere. David Landau suggests that these motivations have someting to do with Kissinger's past as a "bitter, frustrated, insecure academic." Kissinger, according to Landau, owes his ascent power less to "raw intellectual energy" than to "his personality" and smooth ability to manipulate Nixonian foreign policy in directions that he thinks desirable. Kissinger, a non- or even anti-ideologist, is convinced, argues Landau, that interests rather than ideologies are the essential force in world politics, and it is this view he has managed to "sell" in the inner circle by a combination of "presence," "composure," "charm," "elaborate ceremony," "tact," and despite his German accent "one of the most attractive voices ever to hold forth in Washington—not at all misshapen, poorly pitched or shrill, but soft and lyrical, and at the same time deep, authoritative, deliberate, careful; whimsical yet also profound, the kind of voice that creates sympathy and confidence. . . ."

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Landau does not dwell on the irony involved in Kissinger's being able to persuade Nixon, hitherto regarded as an anti-Communist ideologue second only to Joe McCarthy, that a *détente* with Communist China and the USSR would advance American interests in Vietnam and elsewhere. Perhaps he was even right about this, although there are increasing signs, as this is being written, that the *détente* is more likely to be shorter than longer. But there can be little doubt that the Nixon-Kissinger relationship is based as much on shared insecurities and reciprocal needs for respect and assurance as on shared convictions. For each man, if biographical materials are any guide, suffers from a severely damaged self-image, and while each insists that no such wound exists—Kissinger going so far as to declare that his youth in Nazi Germany "is *not* a key to anything"—each eagerly seeks and responds to expressions of feigned or genuine regard. Kissinger, moreover, all of his adult life, has assiduously sought out and attached himself to powerful men, among whom Nelson Rockefeller and Nixon are the most recent examples; it is almost as if his sense of himself was dependent upon his closeness to those in commanding authority positions.

So the mystery behind Kissinger's acceptance of Nixon appointments is perhaps less a mystery after all. We do well to remind ourselves, furthermore, that a bargain between power and intellect is all too easily struck, as witness the relationships between Truman and Acheson, Eisenhower and Dulles, Johnson and W. W. Rostow. Rostow, a notably intelligent man, once went so far as to hail Johnson as "the Churchill of the Pacific," which may suggest that of all the corruptions of power, none is so insidious as its corruption of intellect, and of all the perversions of intellect, none is so pathetic as its seduction of power. Kissinger has not yet suggested that Nixon is another Churchill, but in view of the Nobel Peace Prize award, for which he consciously or unconsciously must feel grateful to his boss, we may not have heard the last reference to Churchill in the context of American presidential performance.

ARNOLD A. ROGOW
City University of New York

The Culture Factory: Boston Public Schools, 1789-1860 *by Stanley K. Schultz. New York, Oxford University Press, 1973.—xiii, 394 pp. $11.50.*

In describing the emergence of the Boston public school system, Stanley K. Schultz has developed an excellent case study, rewarding in its factual richness, and intriguing in its portrayal of the school controversies from the past which seem so familiar today. His analogy to the industrial

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process—Boston educators wanting to educate the largest number of children for the least amount of money in the smallest amount of time—is less successful and the factory model does not seem destined to replace the more common asylum model as a result of this work. Certainly the factory imagery is apparent in the reports of the Boston School Committee as the city industrializes and the school as a knowledge industry becomes an educational symbol, but Schultz gives us too little in his analyses to sustain the analogue.

Boston is a city of educational "firsts" as the author points out again and again in the book. Boston leaders hired the town's first schoolmaster in 1635; by 1645 tax support for public schooling had become one of the town's largest expenditures. In the early eighteenth century when education was largely supplied by private academies and schoolmasters in New York and Philadelphia, Boston had already laid the foundations for a system of public education. After 1710 the responsibility for maintaining the city schools and insuring their quality was transferred from the Selectmen (city council) to a committee of five leading citizens, most of them ministers. By 1789 Boston had passed an Education Act which laid "the foundation of the first comprehensive system of public schools in any American city" (p. 14). The character and so the values of the school committee also changed. The committeemen were appointed to visit and report periodically on the condition of the schools. Its composition was to be no less imposing than its task. Elected annually and including one member from each of the city's twelve wards, the committee was to be composed of leading citizens from the "honored professions"—political leaders, judges, clergymen, merchants, lawyers, and physicians.

The committee, however, was not without controversy and its changing composition reflected the changing social times. By the mid-1800s the shift to secular leadership paralleled (1) the decreasing importance of Puritan religious leadership as a guiding force in community life and of religious values as a major guide to education, and (2) the increasing importance of commerce as the city became an industrial center. The process of industrialization in Boston gradually brought about a change in educational philosophy; education for business became as important, if not more important than, education for building the moral character of the child.

If, as Schultz declares, Boston's public school system was one of the best early systems in the nation, we find that teachers were badly trained, schools were overcrowded and poorly ventilated, badly situated and ill-equipped. Schultz carefully balances the favorable and unfavorable reports of school conditions noting that (1) school reformers like to complain, often exaggerating bad conditions to get more money for the schools or to advance their own schemes for reform, and (2) the early schoolhouse—never as good as it was reputed to be, was still in an idyllic

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country setting. The critics saw the city as wicked and depraved and in criticizing the schools were just as often criticizing the new urbanism.

This volume is best on the years 1820 to 1860 and best when large social movements and trends are considered. The author fails, however, to relate these movements to any body of social theory and so loses the opportunity to transform an excellent case study into a major analytic work. A major theme in this part of the book, for example, is the education of the immigrant and black poor. Schultz nicely contrasts the ideals and rhetoric of school planners advocating education of the poor with the lack of sufficient tax dollars to carry out the schemes. He does not, however, comment directly on one of the most interesting contemporary value conflicts in American education, which is also seen in engaging retrospect in Boston educational history: the pervading ideal of education as the major vehicle for social change. Waiting for people to be educated to give them equal rights seems to have been as common a delaying tactic in early Boston as it is today.

FRANCIS A. J. IANNI
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The American Woman: Her Changing Social, Economic, and Political Roles, 1920-1970 *by William H. Chafe. New York, Oxford University Press, 1972.—xii, 351 pp. $7.95.*

Women's Suffrage in New Zealand *by Patricia Grimshaw. New Zealand, Auckland University Press, 1972.—xx, 151 pp. $7.75.*

The New Woman; Feminism in Greenwich Village, 1910-1920 *by June Sochen. New York, Quadrangle Books, 1972.—xi, 175 pp. $6.95.*

These three books present different aspects of feminism, viewed chronologically and culturally, yet they reinforce each other in reaching a significant common conclusion that in no part of the twentieth century, early, middle, or late, have the ultimate goals of feminists been achieved. All the authors convey directly and indirectly some difficulties in defining these goals because the emphases of feminists have varied with the circumstances of particular times and places.

As a national state, New Zealand led the world in 1893 in granting women the right to vote. In the United States only the territories of Wyoming (1869) and Utah (1870) preceded New Zealand; Colorado (1893) and several other western states achieved women's suffrage before World War I. Patricia Grimshaw confines her book, *Women's Suffrage in New Zealand*, to the decades of the active movement for the vote, the 1860s to the 1890s. Grimshaw states cautiously that the early success in

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New Zealand was due in part to its character as a pioneering society in which the scarcity of women resulted in men's taking their ideas seriously. However, she emphasizes the New Zealanders' links with feminism overseas; the political liberals were aware of the parallel movements in England and America. Both John Stuart Mill's advocacy of feminism in the 1860s and the influence of the Women's Christian Temperance Union in the 1870s affected the thinking of humanitarian reformers in the developing communities of New Zealand. Moreover, by the 1890s women constituted one-half of the university students in New Zealand and a significant proportion of the paid workers. Women in all classes responded to the efforts of both the WCTU and the suffrage workers. Although the timing of the actual passage of the suffrage legislation was favorable in 1893, because of agitation for several reforms, the "motivation, the ideas, the hopes, the training in organization, and the leadership stemmed from a whole generation of developing feminism, among some men as well as many women. Basically, the Act passed because the traditional status of women in society had been radically altered in New Zealand over the preceding decades, so paving the way to political emancipation" (p. 118).

Students of American feminism will find the Grimshaw account of interest for comparative purposes, but they will wish that it had not ended with the suffrage victory. In the last, brief chapter, "Post Mortem on the Suffrage," Grimshaw observes of New Zealand, as Chafe does of the United States, that neither the hopes of feminists nor the fears of antifeminists were fulfilled. On the one hand, women were not "unsexed" by being permitted to vote, but on the other hand, they did not purify partisan politics. Making particular references to *post*-1920 feminism in the United States, Grimshaw then concludes that political enfranchisement has not led to equality of the sexes anywhere. What happened in New Zealand after its auspicious beginning? It appears that suffrage was an external badge of feminism that did not bring economic or social equality in New Zealand any more than it did in the United States.

Even before American women gained suffrage, however, some advocates (a minority within a minority) recognized that the vote would not resolve the underlying issues in "the woman question." At the time, during the Progressive Era when the suffrage movement was becoming increasingly respectable and less militant, rebels of a younger generation concerned themselves more with liberation in sexual mores and self-fulfillment as writers and artists than with the vote. June Sochen's study, *The New Woman; Feminism in Greenwich Village, 1910-1920,* focuses upon five representatives: Crystal Eastman, Henrietta Rodman, Ida Rauh, Neith Boyce, and Susan Glaspell. Three had graduated from college, two had training in social work and law, and one was trained in teaching. Growing up either in the city or state of New York, or in the Middle West,

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all regarded New York City as the place to achieve their dreams of being free, independent, and creative. The five further defied convention by marrying and having children while insisting on also having careers. In this limited circle, intellectual brothers, husbands, and friends, including Max Eastman, Hutchins Hapgood, George Cram Cook, Floyd Dell, and John Reed, encouraged the aspirations of the women.

The ideology of Greenwich Village feminists, whether male or female, was partially political, based on the writings of Charlotte Perkins Gilman. Gilman agreed with Lester Frank Ward, Edward Bellamy, and other intellectuals who believed that socialism would provide the equality of the sexes which industrial capitalism barred. The females, however, espoused the principle of economic independence as a means of reaching cultural independence.

Although the five wrote books and worked in some organizations, during and after World War I, they diffused their energies in many causes, including peace and birth control—causes which the majority of their sex publicly ignored. Both in successes and failures the Greenwich Village feminists anticipated the ambivalent mixture of personal and social concerns of the intellectuals and reformers of the 1920s.

But most American women would not know for several decades the possibilities of choice with which the Greenwich Villagers experimented. William Chafe's *The American Woman* provides a substantial overview of the social, economic, and political roles of women in the United States from 1920 to 1970. He proceeds on the assumption that "sexual inequality is rooted within the social structure itself, through the allocation of different spheres of responsibility to men and women" (p. viii), and then he takes as his point of reference women's ability to earn a living during the last fifty years. Chafe's thorough statistical presentation dispels the conventional view of the impact of World War I on women at work. He notes that only 5 percent of the women war workers had never worked before and that World War I did not launch a new era opening doors for women to be employed. In fact, the "relative size of the female labor force was thus established at a stable level a full decade before either World War I or woman suffrage, and grew by only five-tenths of 1 percent in thirty years" (p. 55). As Chafe stresses, the most important upsurge of female employment occurred from 1900 to 1910, the period which precedes his study. Chafe speculates that "If a revolution had taken place in women's work, it occurred at the beginning of the century, not after 1920" (p. 55).

Chafe surveys "public perceptions of woman's 'place,' and the impact of events such as war and depression on the nature of women's sphere" (p. ix). He shows also how American women lost the opportunity to operate as a pressure group when they did not form a political bloc. Thus, by the mid-1920s, shrewed politicians realized that they had nothing to fear from voting women; they voted either like their husbands or not at

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all. Moreover, fundamental differences developed among the postsuffrage leaders of women's organizations: most middle- and upper-class reformers favored protective, albeit discriminatory, legislation for working women, while a few radical feminists demanded that women face the challenges and, if necessary, the hardships of full equality.

Chafe also takes into account that educated, white, middle- and upper-class women represent only one segment of their sex. He considers over time the changing factors of class, ethnicity, and race, as well as shifts in age and marital status of female workers. Whereas in the 1890s the typical woman worker was single and under twenty-five, by the 1940s and increasingly in each decade thereafter, middle-aged wives and mothers of school-age children joined the labor force in significant proportions. As a result, Chafe claims, the changes in women's economic role since World War II prepared the way for the current "revival of the drive for equality" (p. 249).

Chafe has confirmed our awareness of the need to differentiate women within various groupings to which they belong: educational, occupational, religious, ethnic, and racial. His book is an invaluable starting point for historians wrestling with the problem of studying women's divided responses to family, work, and career in the twentieth century.

BARBARA MILLER SOLOMON
Harvard University

G. Stanley Hall: The Psychologist as Prophet *by Dorothy Ross. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1972.—xix, 482 pp. $14.50.*

Frederick Jackson Turner: Historian, Scholar, Teacher *by Ray Allen Billington. New York, Oxford University Press, 1973.—x, 599 pp. $17.50.*

American historians have only just begun to show critical interest in the history of their own scholar-teacher calling. Compared with what is known about the social origins of businessmen, of career patterns of politicians, even the development of a professional self-consciousness among mechanical engineers, the sociology of the emergent American professoriate of the late nineteenth century remains *terra incognita.* With few notable exceptions, the historians who traditionally turned their hand to the history of higher education did so to celebrate an institution or eulogize a university president. The growing interest in intellectual history after World War II did result in a closer examination of certain nineteenth-century professors, but usually with the emphasis on their formal ideas rather than their roles as academics or discipline-builders. The two books reviewed here are in this tradition of intellectual biogra-

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phy (the first began as a dissertation under Richard Hofstadter, the second is dedicated to Merle Curti), but not the least of their virtues is the insight they provide into the process of academic professionalization during the formative years of the American university.

Dorothy Ross disproves the bromide that a biographer must actively like his (her) subject to do it justice. In both senses of the adjective, *G. Stanley Hall: The Psychologist as Prophet* is a critical biography. One of the first Americans to study psychology under William James at Harvard in the 1870s, the fledgling science's most assiduous publicizer as editor of the *American Journal of Psychology* and professor of psychology at Johns Hopkins in the 1880s, later founder and twice president of the American Psychological Association, Hall was a difficult man to like. Intensely ambitious, intellectually defensive, and jealous of the success of others in *his* field, he nearly succeeded in permanently alienating James—no easy task. Contrary to Hall's account of the early troubles at Clark University, over which he presided from its founding in 1889 to his death in 1924, Ross convincingly argues that they were not all the result of its benefactor growing weary of benefacting, but were also attributable to Hall's inability to get along with his young faculty. Having struggled hard and long—he was forty before he had a steady teaching position and sixty before his principal work, *Adolescence*, was published—he refused to ease the way for those coming after him. Instead, he bargained relentlessly over salaries and promotions. Little wonder the best of them left for Chicago at their first opportunity.

By contrast, Billington's *Frederick Jackson Turner* is a most engaging fellow, anxious to please and unstinting with his time, even when it kept him from his own work. Such a man, apparently, is hard for a biographer to fault. Conceding that the twelve-year-old Fred was eliminated from a spelling-bee for stumbling over "satellite," Billington notes that it was "a less common word than today." More seriously, he never satisfactorily explains why Turner wrote so little after "The Significance of the Frontier in American History." Published in 1893 when Turner was thirty-two, the essay made his reputation and made inevitable his leaving Wisconsin in 1910, where he had been raised, trained (except for two years at Johns Hopkins), and taught for the happiest years of his life, for Harvard, where he never quite fitted in. Could it be, despite its growing acceptance, that Turner doubted his own thesis and feared elaboration might disprove it? Better to keep still, or, as Turner did in his last years, take up the more modest theme of sectionalism, while expending whatever energies remained in the politics of the American Historical Association. Billington does not say this but he does provide enough clues for a less charitable reader to surmise it.

Their differing approaches aside—and these undoubtedly reflect different psychological makeup of their subjects—both biographers present

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compelling studies of men who made it up the greasy pole to academic eminence. Turner's climb was easier than Hall's, and with less psychic cost exacted, but this might be attributable only to Turner's coming on the academic scene fifteen years later when there was a greater demand for scholars. Yet neither was so naive as to believe that professional recognition was simply the result of scholarship; both developed and exploited their extensive contacts, engaged in self-publicity, capitalized on outside offers to consolidate their positions in one institution, then moved on whenever doing so constituted a move up. We need more biographies as richly detailed as these before a definitive portrait can be drawn of this first generation of professional academics. Nonetheless, Professors Ross and Billington have already told us enough to make us realize that such a portrait will not lack for warts.

ROBERT A. MCCAUGHEY
Barnard College

The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War *by Robert James Maddox. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1973.—ix, 169 pp. $7.95.*

New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians: The American Revisionists *by Joseph M. Siracusa. Port Washington, N. Y. and London, National University Publications/Kennikat Press, 1973. —ix, 138 pp. $6.95.*

To speak of a revisionist "school" of United States diplomatic history may be doing an injustice to the variety of viewpoints represented, but a sufficient common denominator exists to distinguish its members from orthodox historians such as Richard Leopold and Norman Graebner. That common denominator is a tendency toward unicausal interpretations of the course of American foreign policy from McKinley's imperialism to the Vietnam War, interpretations which stress the economic motive above all others. Inevitably, a reaction has set in, and the two critiques in question form part of a growing antirevisionist historiography.

Maddox serves up a series of trenchant essays on seven prominent New Left histories: *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* by William Appleman Williams; *The Cold War and Its Origins* by D. F. Fleming (who, as Maddox notes, is more of an unreconstructed Wilsonian than a New Left revisionist); *Atomic Diplomacy* by Gar Alperowitz; *The Free World Colossus* by David Horowitz; *The Politics of War* by Gabriel Kolko; *Yalta* by Diane Shaver Clemens; and *Architects of Illusion* by Lloyd C. Gardner. The purpose of the exercise is straightforward: to focus on the authors' analyses of the origins of the cold war and test their evidence against their

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own sources. In some cases this narrow focus does injustice to an author, notably Clemens, with much of whose work on the antecedents and progress of the Yalta conference Maddox has no quarrel. Therefore Maddox's sensational claim that "these books without exception are based upon pervasive misusages of the source materials" (p. 10) sweeps beyond his own terms of reference. The investigation nevertheless uncovers a depressing degree of deception.

Some of the authors, like Williams, expect their readers to accept by an act of faith the proposition that American leaders were impelled to challenge the Soviet Union's security interests in East-Central Europe by a desire for an Open Door. The absence of relevant documentary evidence, the repeated allied promises to restore the East Europeans' right of self-determination, the negligible American commercial interest in these countries do not impede these revisionists from transforming an acknowledged and unexceptionable subsidiary objective into a covert but dominant motive. Only a gross manipulation of sources allows Alperowitz, like Williams and Fleming before him, to argue that Truman reversed Roosevelt's policy of cooperation with the Russians and used atomic weapons against Japan primarily to intimidate Stalin into abandoning his quest for a subservient buffer zone—a quest that, on Stalin's own admission, could not succeed through free elections, but one which the revisionists invariably describe as legitimate. In the process the authors juggle with chronology, skim over contrary evidence such as Roosevelt's disillusionment with Stalin after Yalta, and when all else fails resort to insinuation. Kolko's account of German troop deployments prior to the Ardennes offensive and Soviet-American differences over Poland's western borders, Clemens' allegations of systematic American violations of the Yalta accords over the restructuring of the Polish provisional government, reparations, and zonal arrangements also fail Maddox's elementary test, which demonstrates that they are either totally erroneous or rest on the shakiest of documentary foundations. Gardner's more sophisticated history, while avoiding some of the revisionist myths already noted, advances the thesis that American policymakers' fear of a domestic depression and leftward shift drove them to seek a liberal world order based on unrestricted trade and investment. The latter principle undoubtedly represented an American consensus. Where Gardner fails is in finding convincing evidence for the alleged fears and for the linkage between the basic principle and the origins of the cold war.

Maddox's verdicts are harsh. He denounces, for instance, Gardner's work as "history by irrelevant evidence, misused quotations, jumbled figures, and distortions of documentary materials" (p. 158). Some of his corrections border on the trivial and will arouse apprehensions in the most meticulous of scholars. This reviewer may be accused of similarly petty academic one-upmanship for pointing out that both Maddox (p.

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113) and Kolko (p. 584) err in referring to an American ambassador in Albania, when in point of fact diplomatic relations with that country consisted of an exploratory mission that was soon withdrawn without the granting of recognition. On balance, however, the evidence lends greater weight to Maddox's judgment than to the New Left's ideological flights of fancy. The revisionist distortions are too flagrant, too massive, too systematic to be dismissed as falling within the range of acceptable scholarly license and of perhaps inevitable mechanical error. The predictable New Left apologia, that American policymakers were motivated by such deeply and consensually held values that they required no verbal expression, and that this in turn necessitated rather more imaginative treatment of sources than is normally the rule, is well known. However, the manipulation of evidence to capture some heretofore unseen spirit of "internalized" values is not scholarship but a political act, and the result is not history but polemic.

Inspired by economic determinism, hostile to the economic structure of the United States, the New Left revisionists engaged in an historical exercise that, particularly in light of Maddox's investigation of their methodology, only reaffirms the inadequacy of unicausal theories. As Siracusa points out, theirs is an "historiography of protest," spurred by a perception that behind almost every American action in the international sphere since the Spanish-American War lay the explicit or implicit motive of the Open Door policy, dictated by capitalist expansionism and destined to obstruct desirable revolutionary change at home and abroad. Such unicausal approaches, by purporting to explain everything, explain nothing. The Siracusa book offers a useful survey of revisionist historiography, concluded by a chapter of scholarly opinions mostly unfavorable to the New Left historians. The author himself opines that much of the revisionist thesis lacks intellectual validity.

An optimistic assessment of the debate might be that the revisionist tendency forms part of a healthy dialectical process progressively clarifying history, but that is scant excuse for the methodological malpractice perpetrated by the historians of the New Left, a malpractice that ill serves their cause. How does one explain the publication and phenomenal popularity in academe of such flawed works? Weariness with sterile cold war rhetoric, disillusionment inspired by the Vietnam tragedy, the stimulative effect of an imaginative if simplistic thesis, and the reappearance of an intellectual syndrome of the thirties, *pas d'ennemis à gauche*, have all played their part. One can only hope that the next generation to rewrite history will temper its political impulse with greater prudence and respect for the basic canons of scholarship.

BENNETT KOVRIG
University of Toronto

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War and Politics *by Bernard Brodie. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1973.—ix, 496 pp. $8.95.*

In his fourth decade of explaining strategy to Americans, Bernard Brodie has chosen a form favored by senior military experts in England: a rambling collection of essays that delivers judgments on the important wars of this century. The volume is rich in personal observations, learned in the classical strategists, and committed to shaping military thinking for a new generation. Often, as when Brodie flays the generals of World War I, the reader is reminded of B. H. Liddell Hart or Michael Howard.

War and Politics is addressed to Clausewitz's fundamental question about combat: *De quoi s'agit-il?* Brodie observes that Americans, with a nuclear arsenal, have often provided no more clear-headed answers than the leaders of the armies of 1914. It seems that "to attempt to express reason is, under a wide variety of wartime circumstances, to risk the label of 'defeatist' the penalties for which are always unpleasant and sometimes extreme" (p. 26). Americans, Brodie argues, have found a variety of ways to compound this problem. Our military institutions reward parochial minds, and civilians defer to the narrow judgments of men in uniform. In the 1960s policy-makers achieved independence but failed to define the goals of the new forces they commanded. Brodie draws on the national debate over "limited war" and "vital interests" during the Korean and Vietnam campaigns to make his case. One lesson of these interventions is concise and bitter: "restraint in the application of force—in order to keep that application compatible with its purpose—may make the force applied ineffective for its purpose" (p. 358). It is a measure of the breadth of Brodie's critique that he laments the impact of Maxwell Taylor as much as Curtis LeMay; both Robert McNamara and Henry Kissinger give poor answers to Clausewitz. Yet this book is not a testament of disillusionment. Brodie approves the main line of American cold war military policy. He is as sanguine about nuclear weapons now, one gathers, as when he first suggested the prospect of deterrence in 1945. He is comfortable in the world the strategists have made (p. 275):

> That violence should continue indefinitely to take the specific institutional form known as war . . . is now decidedly questionable. This could be wishful thinking, but we are not obliged to deny important visible changes simply because they happen to be in a direction we like.

In a work that notes the fate of Ivan S. Bloch's learned prophesies at the turn of the century, this statement is a form of courage.

In *War and Politics* Brodie's speculative remarks frequently yield the largest dividends. His account of *post*-World War II military policy is less useful as a narrative than as a guide to the moods of groups of strategists (Brodie is particularly good on the view from RAND). His theoretical analysis of the causes of war is less impressive than his sensitivity to

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how language has been debased by the historians and statesmen who have tried to explain campaigns.

Readers are likely to be disappointed that Brodie does not carry his analysis and speculations further on a number of issues. His narrative of America's atomic policy is marred by his refusal to take the arguments of cold war revisionists seriously. Whatever the weaknesses of revisionists, they have opened a range of questions about how decisions are reached in an American wartime government. Brodie does not join issue with recent scholarship on the crucial decisions about the bomb in 1945, and apparently he has been too angry to see how some of the revisionists' work complements his own. Also, Brodie has not fully exercised his historical imagination. Though he makes good use of the classical strategists for insight and example, he seldom draws useful analogies to American wars before 1917. He dismisses the Indian wars, for example, as "in large part forays of extermination" (p. 108) without seeing the parallels to the limited wars against guerrilla forces in our century. Further, *War and Politics* is disappointing in the way it leads the cheers for a psychological approach without pursuing this method. Brodie does a real service by unearthing some obscure psychoanalytic literature on "filicide" (the murdering of a son or daughter; also, the parent who commits such a murder); perhaps the Oedipal situation explains why old men send the young generation to battle, but the author does not explore how this concept may be relevant to the wars he studies. Psychohistorians will be interested to know that a man with Brodie's experience entertains some of their simplifying hypotheses—such as that "in strategy we are dealing with instrumentalities . . . with a conspicuous degree of phallic symbolism, as in the self-propelled missile" (p. 389). But psychohistorians will not find information here that will help them test this way of looking at American military policy.

Finally there is a larger problem with *War and Politics:* Brodie's strategy as an advocate is not impressive. He presents an "absurdly simple theme" that "the question of *why* we fight must dominate any consideration of means" (p. vii). How great must be the obstacles to a point of view this reasonable that has been resisted so long! Brodie has studied how institutions prevent Americans from appreciating the costs of war; he has an even sharper eye for the intellectual failures of the men who shaped military policy in the 1960s. Yet Brodie has no clear plan to attack this resistance—save Clausewitz's style of biting exhortation. This approach has seldom impressed Americans and, indeed, if we grant all the inertia and "foolishness" that Brodie detects, it is hard to see how *War and Politics* can change military decision-making. This seems to me regrettable.

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A Secret War: Americans in China, 1944-45 *by Oliver J. Caldwell. Carbondale, Ill., Southern Illinois University Press, 1973.—xx, 218 pp. $5.95.*

Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy *by Russell D. Buhite. Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell University Press, 1973.—xiv, 342 pp. $14.50.*

The Pacific War of 1941-45 was fought out on grand scale, by land, sea, and in the air. In China the military engagements between the United Nations and Japan were paralleled by guerrilla warfare against the Japanese forces—and also by various intramural feuds within the China-based American military and diplomatic establishments. In addition there was the quarrel between the Sino-American Cooperation Organization (SACO) headed by Nationalist secret police chief Tai Li, with United States Navy Commander Milton E. Miles functioning as his deputy, and "Wild Bill" Donovan's Office of Strategic Services (OSS). SACO ran a combined intelligence-gathering, guerrilla-warfare operation; but where OSS originally had a part in the operation, division grew, a break came in December 1943, and SACO continued on its peculiar way until the end of the war—while OSS went another.

Professor Oliver J. Caldwell was born and educated in China, and he served there with OSS in 1944-45. In his *Secret War*, he gives an account of that service, with particular reference to SACO-OSS operations and the discord between the two organizations. His work indeed offers information and "local color" of interest, but it is loosely organized, marred by various factual errors, devoid of documentation, and short of hard substance regarding the chosen subject.

Caldwell says that, apart from commanding SACO, Tai Li headed a coalition of secret societies that had been formed for the purpose of waging a "secret war" against the Japanese. He computes the men under Tai's command, "and the affiliated secret societies," at 7 million, and holds that "If Tai Li had used his weapon against Japan, he should have been able to drive them [sic] back into the coast cities, and to have freed completely the Chinese interior" (p. 24). Given the actual performance of the Nationalist regular forces (numbering some 3 million men) in the field, one can only view with skepticism that estimate of the potential of the "secret war." Professor Caldwell judges the SACO operation to have been "a disaster." That proposition may legitimately be entertained; but this book does not prove the argument.

Professor Russell D. Buhite's *Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy* was meticulously researched, and constitutes first-rate biography; it also offers new insights into the history Hurley helped to make. The prime focus in foreign affairs is on the World War II period, when Hurley first acted as something in the nature of a roving envoy for President

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Franklin D. Roosevelt and then, in 1944-45, served as ambassador to China.

Buhite analyzes Hurley's handling of his first assignment, resolution of the contention between Chiang Kai-shek and Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell, and describes how Hurley, after supporting Chiang's demand for Stilwell's recall, next undertook to reconcile the Nationalist regime and the Communist revolutionaries. But Hurley acted on the basis of faulty first premises. Thus it is not surprising that some of his political judgments evoked disagreement from the experienced Foreign Service officers (FSOs) serving in the embassy under him—and from the several FSOs who had been assigned earlier to Stilwell's command and were still on the staff of Stilwell's successor, Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer.

Hurley equated such disagreement with disloyalty. Buhite initially (p. 184) evinces sympathy with that position, but later observes that "His [Hurley's] apparent insecurity led him to throttle dissent and to insist on limitation of the wide range of reporting on conditions in China so freely carried on under his predecessor and so necessary in the execution of an ambassadorial assignment" (p. 321).

The muzzling of the knowledgeable China Service officers contributed to Hurley's defeat. Seeing failure of his mission looming up, in November 1945 he abruptly resigned as ambassador to China. The reason for failure is to be found in a summary sentence by Buhite: "In a word, Hurley was ignorant of China, of the Chinese Communists, and of the nature of the struggle" (p. 316). He next plunged into American domestic politics, carrying with him his ingrained animosity for the foreign-affairs bureaucracy. He assumed a position on the "China Question" that was at least aligned with that of the McCarthyites and the China lobby. Buhite aptly entitles the chapter devoted to this part of Hurley's life "Politics of Frustration and Revenge," and offers a summary characterization: "In this period, as earlier, Hurley's ego was a major factor, but so too were fear, suspicion, insecurity, and rage, all of which emerge much more vividly in the postwar Hurley personality" (p. 302).

Thus, after having contributed so heavily to a grossly mistaken expression of our China policy, Patrick J. Hurley ended his public career by fanning the flames of McCarthyism.

O. EDMUND CLUBB
United States Foreign Service (Retired)

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Foundations of American Independence: 1763-1815 *by J. R. Pole. Indianapolis, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1972.—xix, 275 pp. Cloth: $8.00; paper: $3.25.*

In a text obviously intended for college courses, J. R. Pole offers a tightly written narrative which summarizes political events and seeks, as he explains, to open "broad lines of interpretation." Like his formidable *Political Representation in England and the Origins of the American Republic* (1966), this new book is smoothly written, includes fine ironic asides, and is not afraid to make judgments.

The narrative begins with the obligatory tour through the colonies, from New England to Georgia, and a thoughtful review of British policy revisions after 1763 which alienated Americans. Taking the long view, Pole writes, "Although the British attempt to rule the colonies was misjudged, it was not altogether misconceived. The problems that British ministers fumbled were real problems. . . . The truth that the Americans were to discover for themselves was that, whatever their objections to British tyranny, the colonies could not stand alone, and could not stand without government. . . . In renouncing British government and British sovereignty, they became heirs to Britain's problems in America" (pp. 31-32). In the subsequent narrative Pole describes the way colonists sought to substitute their own solutions—of which the Constitution was the culmination—for those proposed by the British. The Constitution was a response to "the threat of a real dissolution of the fragile structure of continental government"; Hamilton subsequently sought to create "a society that looked toward a full participation in international commerce . . . a society moving rapidly in capital development . . . aims [which] contravened the vision of innumerable farmers and planters . . ." (p. xvii). Pole's is an interpretation of the Revolution which stresses political and economic factors; there is, in fact, virtually no discussion of the military course of the war, but there is a very fine chapter on the economics of war and independence, and a probing one on the intensity of religious feeling that accompanied the Revolution. "American society," Pole concludes, "was forced to realize its own identity through the exigencies of political action" (p. xvii). It is perhaps no accident that this volume appears in a series edited by Jack P. Greene, who recently argued a similar case in this journal. (See "The Social Origins of the American Revolution: An Evaluation and an Interpretation," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 88, No. 1, March 1973, 1-22.)

Behind Pole's survey lurks the best of current scholarship: with Bailyn, Pole argues that the revolutionaries "believed British tyranny to be a product of British corruption." Much of the work of E. James Ferguson is summed up in Pole's careful statement: "The former army officers, the businessmen, and the political leaders who had come to believe in a

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union transcending their states in many cases had practical interests that a union would serve; and these interests were not without a share in imparting a continental breadth to their vision" (p. 188). These debts are acknowledged in a general way in the bibliographical essay which concludes the book, but there are no footnotes; the text, in effect, challenges the reader to take Pole's conclusions on faith. My undergraduate students were dismayed at the absence of reference either to original sources of specific quotations or to the historiographical debates which lay behind these chiseled summary statements. They insisted, persuasively I think, that a narrative which does not justify its interpretations by footnote is engaged in camouflage; they resented being spared the other side of historiographical controversy.

Another editorial decision about which I have reservations is the choice of illustrations. There are some unusually interesting ones: Kosciusko's portrait of Thomas Jefferson with a laurel wreath, George Washington surrounded by a symbolic chain made up of the seals of the 13 states. But there are also four formal—and familiar—portraits, several views of buildings and towns, a handful of scientific inventions; instead of an exploration into the iconographical history of the early republic, we are offered eight pages of miscellaneous images about which it is impossible to conclude anything. The maps, however, are clear, well drawn and well reproduced, placed at the relevant portions of the text, and very helpful.

LINDA K. KERBER
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The Influence of the United States on Canadian Development: Eleven Case Studies *edited by Richard A. Preston. Durham, N. C., Duke University Press, 1972.—xii, 270 pp. $7.75.*

Over the years the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center has produced many useful volumes; this, the fortieth volume in the series, is one of the best. It shows a firm editorial hand on the part of Richard Preston, it asks a number of interesting and sometimes important questions, and it provides more answers than one is entitled to expect of eleven essays by twelve scholars. Read in conjunction with Volume III, Number 1, of *The American Review of Canadian Studies,* which is devoted to "The Impact of Canada on North America," these eleven case studies provide a useful smorgasbord from which one may sample the work of some of the most interesting scholars in the field of Canadian-American relations. To be sure, there are omissions, and some of these are significant: nothing on religion, nothing on education below university level, nothing on highway patterns, nothing on conservation practices, nothing on the pre-

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cedents by which Canada achieved autonomy (perhaps too much of an old chestnut to be included), and surprisingly—given Preston's editorship—nothing on defense. There are also omissions of proof, for this reviewer at least often looked for the missing footnote so that he might judge how a particular author had reached a particular conclusion. Still, one should be happy for a smorgasbord even if some of the main courses seem to be missing.

Preston opens the volume with a "plea for comparative studies of Canada and the United States and of the effects of assimilation on Canadian development." One is unlikely to argue with such a plea, for Canada and the United States comprise an obvious, important, and unusual opportunity for comparative work. Carl C. Berger provides an interesting historiographical essay on the old Carnegie Series on the relations of Canada and the United States, showing how they have become part of the history they set out to record. Allan Kornberg and Alan Tharp write perceptively of the American impact on Canadian political science and sociology and provide a useful corrective to the shriller inaccuracies of Robin Mathews. Mildred Schwartz examines American influences on the conduct of Canadian politics in an entertaining essay, and Andrew Hill Clark says a number of historically valid as well as controversial things from the perspective of a geographer when he turns to how the United States helped underdevelop the maritime provinces. Two essays strike this reviewer as slightly less substantial, one by Irving Abella on American unionism, communism, and the Canadian labor movement; the other by Carl F. Klinck on Washington Irving, James K. Paulding, and others. I am quite unable to judge the merit of Alexander Hull's very short essay on "The Americanization of French in Windsor." Four other essays are closer to being genuine case studies in that they focus far more narrowly upon a specific problem within a larger framework: Carl E. Beigie on the automotive agreement of 1965, Robert Gilpin on direct American investment in French- and English-speaking Canada, Lawrence B. Lee on American influences in the development of irrigation in British Columbia, and Robert Babcock on "Samuel Gompers and the Berlin Decisions of 1902" —the last perhaps the most interesting and unusual of the group of four.

Some few years ago the Yale and McGill university presses jointly announced a new series of comparative studies on the United States and Canada. The announcement proved premature, the project abortive, perhaps the time too early. With this volume Professor Preston and his coauthors have demonstrated that the time may be nearer when, as he noted, "scholars with knowledge of both countries" may be able to get on with the task.

ROBIN W. WINKS
Yale University

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Fleet Street Radical: A. G. Gardiner and the *Daily News* by Stephen E. Koss. Hamden, Conn., Archon Books, 1973.—399 pp. $12.50.

The first two decades of the twentieth century were a halcyon era for the British newspaper press, and for the political editor. A. G. Gardiner, editor of the *Daily News* (1902-19), was an outstanding symbol of it. On the Liberal side, he was rivaled only by J. A. Spender and C. P. Scott; his newspaper provided the only mass-circulation, London-based, radical antidote to Northcliffe's *Daily Mail*. Professor Koss's welcome and readable biography rightly concentrates on the period as editor of the *Daily News*, and largely bypasses the years before 1902 and the later diminuendo down to Gardiner's death in 1946. Further, this is very much a political biography, which is appropriate for an editor absorbed with political comment rather than with the general problems of newspaper organization and management. Only in some pleasant discussion of Gardiner's ruminations as "Alpha of the Plough" in the *Star* does the author range widely beyond the narrow arena of national politics along the Fleet Street/Whitehall axis, and this is as it should be.

Down to 1914, Gardiner fought the good fight on behalf of all radical causes. On the home front, he was zealous for social and land reform, for curbing the Lords, for free trade and women's suffrage. In foreign affairs, he advocated disarmament and a rapprochement with Germany (while he retained an affectionate regard for "Jackie" Fisher's blue water doctrines). Lloyd George was Gardiner's happy warrior in these years: indeed, Gardiner somewhat relaxed his stern moral rectitude in playing down some of the odder aspects of the Marconi scandal. The outbreak of war with Germany in August 1914 was a disaster for Gardiner as for Liberalism generally. His simple faith in Liberal values was shattered at a stroke, and Lloyd George became the inevitable scapegoat for his anguish. Long before the battles over conscription or the downfall of Asquith, Gardiner had come to denounce and detest Lloyd George as a dictatorial demagogue, an intriguer, the unsavory associate of jingo press barons like Northcliffe. Lloyd George's "Celtic mind" Gardiner contrasted with the "phlegm, steadiness and obstinate patience" of Englishmen like Asquith, Grey, Long, and Kitchener. After December 1916, Gardiner's revulsion against Lloyd George was total and unforgiving. He placed an unreal faith in Asquith (whom he had earlier distrusted as an imperialist); he saw Woodrow Wilson as a transatlantic messiah. In the end, his attacks on the premier cost him his editorship as his employers, the Cadbury family, had retained their meed of admiration for Lloyd George since Boer War days. Gardiner's erratic relationship with Lloyd George raised him up as an eloquent radical tribune; in the end, it doomed him to querulous impotence.

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On the politics of the period, Professor Koss is an assured guide. It is not always easy to decide what direct influence on events Gardiner really had. The Gardiner Papers, which have been used to excellent effect, do not make it clear whether he provided more than an incidental leitmotiv of comment: even Asquith spoke scornfully of "the polysyllabic A.G.G." In particular, the accounts of the role of the press in the formation of the first coalition in May 1915 and Lloyd George's emergence as premier in December 1916 are somewhat tentative (although, admittedly, the author has written at length elsewhere on the former of these crises). On the other hand, Professor Koss is exceptionally balanced in his treatment of the internecine Liberal controversies, and he redresses many of Gardiner's wilder accusations against Lloyd George as a wartime leader and a peacetime negotiator. Many of the questions about Gardiner's role in responding to, or molding, public opinion remain, perhaps, unanswerable. But in placing Gardiner's journalistic career so firmly in its political setting, Professor Koss has provided a valuable service for all scholars of the period.

KENNETH O. MORGAN
The Queen's College, Oxford

The Methodist Revolution *by Bernard Semmel. New York, Basic Books, 1973.—viii, 288 pp. $10.95.*

Since Elie Halévy, in his classic volume, *England in 1815*, invoked Methodism to account for the "miracle of modern England"—the great and good fortune of England in being spared the agonies of a French Revolution—both the Halévy thesis and Methodism itself have been subjected to much analysis. There have been inquiries into the size, social composition, and political intent of the several Methodist groups, into the "progressive" or "regressive" effects of Methodist principles and values, even into the ideologies and partisan purposes of historians adhering to this or that view of Methodism. What we have not had, however, is a serious study of the theological content of Methodism. This is what Bernard Semmel has now provided. And he has done so with such precision and clarity that the discussion of the entire issue has been elevated to a new height. It cannot be expected that his book will still controversy; there is too much at stake for that. But it will make much of the old controversy seem mechanical and simplistic, and it will encourage us to take a more subtle view of the relationship between religious dogma and social reality.

Most commentators have coped with the complexities and ambiguities of Methodist doctrine by denying to it any firm or distinctive theology. E. P. Thompson, for example, in his usual colorful manner, has charged Wesley and his associates with "promiscuous opportunism" in theological

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matters. The fact is, however, that the Methodists had the remarkable influence they did as a result of their preaching, that what they preached was a doctrine (or set of doctrines), and that it was this doctrine that aroused the enthusiasm and devotion of a very considerable body of Englishmen. By attending to what they said and wrote, Semmel has been able to elucidate the unique character of Methodism and to locate the source of its strength.

Essentially what Semmel has done is to refine and expand upon Halévy's thesis, bringing to bear upon it concepts drawn from recent historical and sociological literature as well as a closer reading of sermons, tracts, and official reports. Thus he finds in Methodism a counterpart not so much to the French Revolution *per se* as to that larger movement characterized by Robert Palmer as the "democratic revolution of the eighteenth century." And he gives a new dimension to the thesis by interpreting Methodism not only as a liberalizing and democratizing ideology but also as a "modernizing" one, which facilitated the transition from a traditional society to a modern one and provided a community and a faith for the "new men" produced by the new society. The dogmas of free will and universal salvation were the religious equivalents of *liberté* and *égalité;* and the bands and societies organized by the Methodists were the existential realization, so to speak, of the idea of *fraternité*. By adhering to an Arminianism that strenuously rejected any hint of "speculative" antinomianism, it forestalled the "practical" antinomianism that might have issued in a revolution on the French model. And its mode of organization was similarly suited to its ambiguous role of fostering enthusiasm while preserving authority: neither a sect nor a church, it functioned, as Halévy put it, as the "High Church of Nonconformity." Taking a clue from Tocqueville, who saw the French Revolution as basically a religious phenomenon, Semmel sees Methodism as retaining the religious impulse of the revolution while resisting any attempt to politicize that revolution, thus avoiding the excesses inherent in a political upheaval.

On only one point is Semmel less than persuasive: his description of the "new men" who were so admirably served by the modernizing ideology of Wesleyanism. "It was the poor of the nascent proletariat of England's growing factory towns to whom Wesley's message was primarily directed, and who were, in the middle decades of the century, to respond to it with the greatest enthusiasm." One may wonder whether those who were flocking so enthusiastically to Wesley and Whitefield in the 1740s and '50s are best described in these terms. Halévy, to be sure, did think of the "industrial era" as starting about 1688; but recent historians tend to assign that period to a much later date. One might also be wary of "modernizing" the poor by describing them as "nascent proletariat" (or "proletariat" *tout simple*, as is done in other passages). Yet none of this discussion is essential to Semmel's argument. Wesleyanism could well have

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been the modernizing ideology Semmel makes of it without presupposing the existence of a proletariat. One could argue that the doctrine appealed to the laboring poor (a pre- or nonindustrial class) for a variety of reasons, religious, moral, and social, and that its modernizing effect emerged pari passus with the development of the proletariat. In this sense the doctrine may be regarded as the condition (or precondition) of modernity, rather than as its reflection or consequence. (One is reminded of the difference between Weber and Tawney regarding the "Protestant ethic," the one giving priority to the idea, the other to the economic structure.)

That this book should raise echoes of Weber and Tawney, no less than of Tocqueville and Halévy, suggests how very rich it is in its substance and implications. If Methodism was a central fact in the creation of modern England, Semmel's book is a major contribution to our understanding of that epochal event.

GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB
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Stalin: The Man and His Era *by Adam B. Ulam. New York, The Viking Press, 1973.—vii, 760 pp. $12.95.*

Stalinism was the most monstrous calamity ever to befall a country, outstanding not only for the magnitude of the suffering it caused but because, unlike war, plague, or famine, it was the work of the leaders acting in the name of the people. It was complex and contradictory in its evil, in its mingling of faith and cynicism, of promise, cruelty, and degradation; and we shall never fully understand it. It is hence the more welcome that Ulam has managed to cast considerable new light on this dark subject. This he has done both by mining a large amount of Soviet writing, memoirs, historical articles, novels, etc., especially of the period 1960-1965, when it was permissible to publish some of the truth about the dictator, and also by skilled and thoughtful analysis, judiciously putting together long-known facts.

Ulam's biography comes on the heels of that of Robert C. Tucker, *Stalin as a Revolutionary, 1879-1929*, reviewed by this reviewer in the December 1973 issue of the *Political Science Quarterly*. Aside from the restriction of Tucker's work to the first part of Stalin's career, the two are markedly different, and reading one is no reason not to read the other. Ulam's treatment is less psychoanalytic and more political. Most importantly, it concerns itself less with details of Stalin's personal life and more with his times. It is almost a history of Bolshevism, the Russian Revolution, and the Soviet state to the large degree that these affected and were affected by the person of Stalin—a history especially of Stalin's rise to power, collectivization, the purges, and of the Soviet role in

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world affairs, which dominates the last third of the book, from about 1938. Comparison must be tentative until Tucker finishes his Stalin trilogy, but from the evidence in hand it appears that Ulam is much more successful in making sense of the puzzles of Stalinism.

The Stalin portrayed here is very human. Sometimes patient and calculating, sometimes irritable and impetuous, rude even to Lenin on occasion, "Stalin was seldom cynical. He was sincere and obsessed" (p. 300), a believer in the revolution and Marxism as he understood them. He was a reader and a man of some culture and much practical sense. Ulam absolves him of some of the accusations often made; for example, he was not a collaborator of the tsarist police and was innocent of the deaths of Kirov and Gorky. He was inherently no worse than many of his rivals or enemies, who were merely somewhat less successful practitioners of force and guile. Ulam finds no great virtue in those who opposed him, from the Mensheviks onward; Trotsky particularly is viewed as not only autocratic but vain, disingenuous, and befuddled. All shared, for example, the assumptions leading to war on the better-off peasants *(kulaks)*. The system of terror was the invention of Lenin, not Stalin. Attacks on Stalin were frequently rather unreasonable, motivated by sheer envy.

Why, then, did hard-driving men go along with Stalin and permit or abet his excesses? Partly because he worked hard and made himself useful, perhaps indispensable. A man of the people when the day of the intellectuals of bourgeois origin was fading, he seemed best able to overcome the factionalism that threatened the party after Lenin; without him, the oligarchs at the center feared they would lose power entirely. Ironically, the worse things became because of Stalin's policies, the more necessary he became as the symbol and focus of unity in an essentially anarchic regime. He acted for the machine, so the machine supported him and eventually acquiesced in the purges that decimated it. Ulam's interpretation is the opposite of the Soviet claim that abuses were due to vagaries of Stalin's personality, while the party was faultless. Ulam shows in graphic detail how the arbitrary power of the party lent itself to the abuses which, with the special fears and tensions of the times, culminated in the monstrosities of Stalinism. The cliché about absolute power unfortunately happens to be true. The greater wonder is not that Russians bowed their heads to the dictator's sword but that liberal Western intellectuals of the 1930s echoed the deification of the crafty little man. The triumph of image and ideology over reason was not confined to the oppressed.

The impressive work done by Ulam is slightly marred by faults such as one can easily find in almost any big book packed with information. The copy editor nodded scores of times, and some errors may mislead. For example the statement (p. 363), that Hitler and company "certainly

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could [not?] set up a viable and long lasting regime of their own." Since there is no bibliography and works are often referred to by author only, it may take searching to find a citation; to find the Moshkov work referred to on page 345 one must go back to page 299. Golda Meir went to Moscow (p. 680) not as foreign minister but as ambassador. Sometimes the evidence hardly seems strong enough to sustain the conclusion, as that the Soviet Union became "a virtual satellite" of Germany in 1939 (p. 517) or that the Seventeenth Congress incubated a definite "plot" to elevate Stalin out of active leadership (p. 372 etc.). Points and comparisons are sometimes repeated; the book, like very many, would be better trimmed a bit.

But such blemishes are a small price for the extraordinary productivity of Adam Ulam, professor and Director of Harvard's Russian Research Center. The book is elegantly, often eloquently written and is well put together. It makes interesting reading for nonspecialists, yet is informative and illuminating for students of Soviet affairs. It is, as the publisher claims, an "important" work.

ROBERT G. WESSON
University of California, Santa Barbara

Czechoslovakia Before Munich: The German Minority Problems and British Appeasement Policy *by J. W. Bruegel. Cambridge, The University Press, 1973.—ix, 334 pp. $14.95.*

Czechoslovakia: The Party and the People *edited by Andrew Oxley, Alex Pravda, and Andrew Ritchie. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1973.—xxvi, 303 pp. $11.95.*

Bruegel's rather expensive but well-written and well-researched book must be regarded as an invaluable contribution to the existing wealth of literature dealing with this dramatic period of Czechoslovak history. The two major themes—German-Czech relations and the appeasement policy of the British government—are pursued without evident prejudice and with great thoroughness throughout the book. The author's use of personal experience, unpublished documents, and information obtained in interviews with some of the actors in this shameful tragedy enables the reader to gain new insight and helps to correct some of the misconceptions concerning this particular event and period in history. The author's treatment of the possibility of a viable Austria-Hungary and of the formation of the Czechoslovak republic dispels the old belief that the majority of Germans living in the new republic were opposed to it and sought union with the German Reich. At the same time he can show that the claim made by Nazi propaganda that the Germans in Czechoslovakia

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were treated as second-class citizens is not completely true and that the alleged mistreatment of the Sudeten Germans was essentially a fabrication by Henlein and the Nazi regime in the Reich. In fact, Bruegel makes it clear that there were in Czechoslovakia many Germans who worked actively for a viable solution of the minority problem and supported, with some reservations, the Prague government and the new republic.

The author describes in detail the role played by the British and the French in the dismemberment of the Czechoslovak republic, and shows how both the British and the French ignored the existence of the German-Czechoslovak Treaty of Arbitration and pressured Benes and his government into accepting the ever-increasing German demands. While it is possible that nothing could have stopped Hitler, Bruegel believes, as do many other scholars, that if Mr. Chamberlain and his Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax had been able to grasp the fact that the conquest of Czechoslovakia was just another step in Hitler's drive toward world domination, they would have recognized that no concession, regardless of how great, would have appeased Hitler. Only a show of force and a determination to stand by Czechoslovakia could possibly have stopped Hitler and the Nazis. Bruegel criticizes strongly the British leaders for their trust in Henlein, the Sudeten-German party leader and Hitler's tool in Czechoslovakia, and for their constant pressure upon the Czechoslovak government to commit suicide by giving in to Henlein's (and thus to Hitler's) demands. In light of the documentary evidence presented in the book, Bruegel's criticism appears to be highly justified. His criticism of Henlein and the Sudeten-German party does not prevent the author from giving credit to the German democratic forces inside Czechoslovakia as well as the German ambassador in Prague (Eisenlohr) for trying "to avoid catastrophe by spreading the truth" (p. 161).

One weakness of Bruegel's book is that he takes the Sudeten-German problem and treats it in isolation from other internal problems such as the steadily increasing demands of the Slovaks for autonomy and the possible effect of this struggle on the Prague government in its dealings with the Germans. It is possible that a unified Czech-Slovak stand could have strengthened the government's position. Moreover, it would be hard to imagine that the Prague government could afford to grant autonomy to the Sudeten-Germans without giving in to the Slovaks, who, after all, were not a national minority, but supposedly an equal partner of the Czechs.

Another small point of criticism is that the author's purpose was to deal with the German minority problem in pre-Munich Czechoslovakia, but he makes only a few references to the German minority (small as it was) living in the Spis (Zips) area and in and around Bratislava in Slovakia. This spare coverage, however, does not detract at all from the usefulness and the excellence of the book.

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Since 1968 a great number of books dealing with the short-lived experiment to create "democratic socialism" or "socialism with a human face" in Czechoslovakia appeared in the United States and abroad (each and every one giving us the "true inside story"). The present volume, *Czechoslovakia: The Party and the People*, claims to present a new point of view—not a historical account, but "a journey, in the words of the people involved, through the (revival) process" (p. ix).

The book is divided into seven chapters and includes over fifty contributions by "writers, journalists, politicians and workers," which according to the editors constitute a "representative selection of ideas put forward during the internal development in Czechoslovakia" (p. ix).

The "representative" quality of the selections can be questioned by simply looking at some of the sources and contributors. Approximately one-half of the contributions came from *Literarni Listy*, the weekly publication of the Czechoslovak Writers' Union, and almost all of the pieces are from Czech writers, journalists, or politicians. There are no selections at all from the very highly influential weekly of the Slovak Writers' Union, *Kulturny Zivot*, or the very outspoken youth daily in Slovakia, *Smena*. Nor are there included writings from some of the more conservative spokesmen, such as Kolder, Indra, or Bilak. To quote from one of the contributors in the book: " . . . the conservatives should get the full right to speak" (p. 168) and thus help to make the selections more representative.

To those who were unable to follow the Czechoslovak press during the so-called Prague Spring, *Czechoslovakia: The Party and the People* should make rather fascinating reading, but on the whole it is much narrower than its title suggests. One could even say that the title is rather misleading. Most of the selections in the book do not represent the views of the masses or the party's official position; rather they are the hopes and desires of certain individuals who wanted the revival process to move at a much faster pace, even going beyond the party's goals expressed in the Action Program. The editors, should, however, be complimented on their good work in translating the selections, on their introductory chapter that gives a comprehensive analysis of the Czechoslovak revival process, and on some of their editorial commentaries to certain chapters. They also bring to the readers' attention the fact that the people in Czechoslovakia "valued their intellectual leaders very highly" and that the role played by intellectuals in the political process and their influence on the people have always been very high (p. xiii).

At times, however, this reviewer felt that the editors misunderstood and misinterpreted the revival process in Czechoslovakia—especially regarding their editorial comments on the Action Program, the leading role of the party, and on the opposition. To say that the "long-heralded April Action Programme came as a disappointment . . . " (p. xxi) is a gross oversimplification. Disappointment to whom: to the editors or to a num-

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ber of progressive intellectuals who thought Czechoslovakia could be transformed in one sweep into a liberal democracy? Certainly—as is clear from survey of the daily press in Czechoslovakia—millions of Czechs and Slovaks, Communists and non-Communists alike, welcomed the Action Program and saw in it a hope for democratization and a brighter future. While it is true that the Action Program stated that the party's role was "not to become a universal caretaker," at no time was the party willing to "resign power" (p. 104) and to abandon its leading role in the society. On the contrary, as pointed out by a leading student of Eastern Europe, H. Gordon Skilling, "the leading role of the party was in fact to be retained . . . " and the program "did not endorse the principle of a formal, institutionalized political opposition." (See Skilling, "Opposition in Communist East Europe," in Robert A. Dahl (ed.), *Regimes and Oppositions*, 1973.) It was precisely at the time when the party was beginning to lose control over its own press and its own members, and was in fact losing its leading position in the society, that the Soviets became alarmed and started to exert pressure upon the Dubcek regime. To say, then, that the party's role was "ambiguously defined in the Action Programme" (p. 104) is a gross misunderstanding of the program since it devotes an entire section to the leading role of the party. This book then is really about some people in and out of the party expressing their views on the democratization process and not about the party and the people. In fact, the book merely presents some views on the democratization process from certain figures in and out of the party; despite its pretensions, it does not deal with the party and the people.

FRANK DINKA
Southwest Missouri State University

The State of Sociology in Eastern Europe Today *edited by Jerzy J. Wiatr, foreword by Herman R. Lantz. Carbondale, Ill., Southern Illinois University Press, 1971.—xxiv, 273 pp. $8.95.*

The accomplishments no less than the tribulations of sociology as an academic discipline can serve both to illuminate the general process of sociopolitical change in communist Eastern Europe and to highlight important differences between individual countries of that region. As long as Stalinist regimes held sway, sociology everywhere was suppressed as ideologically reactionary and politically subversive. Since the discipline's revival fifteen or so years ago, its development has been uneven. It has been beset by a host of novel problems, ranging from the theoretical issue of the precise relationship between "Marxist sociology" and historical materialism to such practical matters as the proper scope and focus of sociological research and the politically permissible degree of critical

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thrust. The state of sociology in Eastern Europe today is, therefore, of far more than mere academic interest.

The present volume, one in a series on "Perspectives in Sociology" under the general editorship of Herman Lantz, contains chapters on the status of sociology in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, each authored by one or more sociologists from each particular country. Jerzy Wiatr, a Polish political sociologist, provides a general introductory overview which guardedly alludes to the ideological obstacles and political problems confronting sociology throughout Eastern Europe.

Not surprisingly, the chapters on individual countries vary enormously both in the scope of their inventory of research and teaching and in the readiness of their authors to address themselves to basic dilemmas. In both respects, the chapter on the Soviet Union is simply embarrassing. It reveals little about what is actually going on in Soviet sociology; rather, it merely echoes the party's call that sociology "become a mighty weapon of social prognostication, planning, and management." Much the same instrumental note is sounded in the considerably more informative chapter on Poland, written by Professor Markiewicz of the University of Poznan. Reflecting the obscurantism of the last years of the Gomulka regime, Markiewicz stresses the need for "ideological consolidation" and further sees fit to warn his fellow Polish sociologists that their rank and prestige will depend on how effectively they serve the building of socialism. By contrast, the chapter on Hungary, while offering fewer details on the state of the discipline in that country, cautions against "manager sociology" in the service of the political authorities and enters a brief for a sociology that will contribute to "social progress" rather than to "the maintenance of the status quo." Its author, András Hegedüs, the sometime Stalinist premier, has himself been engaged in a major sociological study of bureaucracy; even the relatively tolerant Kadar government considers this project to probably partake of "revisionism."

The lengths to which a critical Marxist sociology might lead is indicated in the chapter on Czechoslovakia which acknowledges the discipline's contribution to the 1968 reform movement. The author, writing shortly after the Soviet invasion, expresses the hope that critical sociological inquiries might continue but that, alas, such examination scarcely proved possible with the tragic decimation of Czechoslovak intellectual life as a whole. The chapters on Rumania and Yugoslavia also document the time and place of their composition. While the former stresses the Rumanian contribution to "the sociological theory of the nation in socialism," the latter notes the preoccupation with "self-management" to the detriment of other areas of sociological investigation and laments the lack of coordination between various research institutes.

As "the first introductory guide to East European sociology—its status

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and prospects"—to cite the dust jacket—the book is necessarily a disappointment. Yet, almost in spite of itself, it does offer "valuable insights," which together with other, more complete and better balanced data may someday contribute to a genuine "sociology of sociology" in Eastern Europe.

MELVIN CROAN
The University of Wisconsin, Madison

The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970's *edited by William W. Whitson. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1972.—xxxiv, 390 pp. $18.50.*

Eighteen China specialists, some from the academy and some with the government or military but all with impressive credentials, were asked to assess trends in the dominant conceptions within the People's Republic concerning six questions: (1) the role of the military in society; (2) the execution of that role, and the degree to which professional military commanders should have authority over both material and human resources; (3) the criteria for the selection of future generations of generals; (4) the actual organization of military power; (5) appropriate strategies; and (6) appropriate tactics. A five-year time frame was specified.

This volume, like all discussions of present-day China, is subject to two hazards. Because of the difficulty of obtaining reliable information, the same limited source material occasionally leads to divergent interpretations that are difficult for the nonexpert to evaluate. The other is the danger of any projection being overtaken by events. A number of developments since 1970-1971, the year the articles were drafted, are not even touched upon. Yet despite the profound implications of Richard Nixon's visit to China, its admission to the UN, the disappearance of Lin Pao (the former Minister of Defense and Mao's heir apparent), and internal disputes that have wracked the military since 1971, the articles provide a very useful context for the nonspecialist of Chinese affairs.

An awareness of historical continuity contributes to our understanding of trends, though it does not explain everything. The legacy of the People's Republic was an institutional syndrome in which political ends and military means were fused. This syndrome fostered a dominant generalist ideology hostile to any development of military professionalism and in keeping with the assignment of soldiers to a variety of nonmilitary duties, including farming. The People's Liberation Army continues this tradition by performing a multiplicity of internally oriented roles in addition to its external mission of defense. Its personnel have functioned as a mobilizing and educational elite; one contributor to the volume speaks of the PLA as a "reserve bureaucracy."

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Apparently not all components of the Chinese armed forces share this orientation to the same degree. The Air Force, for example, more than the ground forces, is logically oriented more toward technological development to meet a possible external threat. Furthermore, with increasing differentiation, interservice rivalries over mission priorities and resource allocation are apt to mount. Part II and Part III of the book focus on a probable shift away from old field-army loyalties with military-region identification to the service-related identities of the new cohorts succeeding to military leadership and of the organizational structure of the various components of the Chinese armed forces.

One thread that runs through many of the discussions without being a major focus is the cultural revolution. An article on the role of Lin Pao is of course dated but nevertheless instructive, especially when read in conjunction with the articles on the "new gun-barrel elite" and the emergent military class.

The cultural revolution also highlights the question of loyalty to the civil regime. The amalgamation of military, political, and administrative power at the provincial level gives the question a meaning different from the one it has in the West. In 1971, so one writer informs us, all 29 of the newly elected provincial party committees were dominated by the professional military authority and, according to another, the PLA leaders provide the backbone of the leadership in virtually every province. There is agreement on the role of the PLA during the cultural revolution as an instrument used by the central authority to purge dissident elements in the local and regional party, but this does not mean that it will forever remain responsive, especially if the passing of Mao and Chou from the scene should unleash a succession conflict. On the other hand, the present dispersion of production centers that denies supremacy to any one military commander acts as a brake.

Many of the articles in the book touch on the strategic options of current doctrines. The Chinese continue to be preoccupied by the importance of psychological factors; immediate threats are likely to elicit preemptive responses. Yet, the planners apparently are also guided by a long-term goal: projecting an image that China need have no concern in any general war about limiting damage to itself. So far, however, conventional defense seems to continue to dominate their thinking. This image, in keeping with the origins of the PLA, may change under the impact of nuclear development. Such strategic concerns seem to have been among the main motives leading to the publication of this volume.

KURT LANG
State University of New York at Stony Brook

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Kinship and Community in Two Chinese Villages *by Burton Pasternak. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1972.—ix, 174 pp. $8.50.*

Those who are interested in the role kinship plays in the sociopolitical life of China in particular, and in large-scale complex socieities in general, will find Burton Pasternak's book extremely useful and worthwhile reading. It is a comparison of the social organization of two agricultural villages in South Taiwan: one, a village in which a single patrilineal descent group dominates intra- and intervillage social, political, and economic relations, and the other, a village in which a variety of corporate cross-kin associations integrate the community and mediate its extravillage relations.

In five tightly organized chapters, Pasternak explores some of the reasons for the differences between the two villages, examines the conditions under which patrilineal organization develops and prospers, and discusses the functions it fulfills in the two communities and in southeastern China. The author introduces the problems inherent in his subject in a brief introductory chapter and then proceeds to compare the agricultural systems, kinship organizations, and nature of integration within the two villages; he deals with such subjects as patterns of irrigation, land tenure and credit; the role of the family and other units of production in agriculture; agnatic relationships, marriage patterns, family types and division; and, the function of kinship and lineage, administrative structure, and cross-kin associations in fostering community solidarity. In the final chapter he analyzes and compares his findings with those of others who have investigated lineage in southeast China and Taiwan.

Pasternak presents new information and ideas about the development of lineages. When considering possible sources of agnatic variation in Taiwan and more generally in southeast China, he questions some of the more commonly accepted propositions regarding lineage development and concludes that: ethnic differences play some part in lineage development but are not crucial to it; strong Japanese government in Taiwan apparently had a limiting effect on the development of lineage, just as strong government did in traditional China; and, cooperation in the maintenance of local irrigation systems and the formation of strong localized lineages are not necessarily related phenomena.

Pasternak discusses in particular detail M. Freedman's (1958, 1966) and J. Potter's (1970) speculation that settlement under "rough frontier conditions" stimulated the development of single lineage communities. On the basis of historical and contemporary information which he examines, Pasternak believes that this is ". . . precisely what would not happen" (p. 138); "frontier conditions . . . by requiring extensive cooperation for defense and environmental exploitation among unrelated family and lineage fragments . . ." tend to inhibit the development of strong single

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lineage villages (p. 146). He concludes, therefore, that segmentary lineages (i.e., localized kin-based alliances), which depend upon "differential accumulation of wealth within the descent group" (p. 153), develop when external threats are few and competition for resources are limited.

Pasternak distinguishes these segmentary lineages from higher order lineages which depend upon internal kinship diversification and which develop when small agnatic groups aggregate in order to counter external threats and to derive a greater range of security. The distinction that he draws between kinship groups which "include rather than exclude members" helps to explain the different role each type of kinship group plays in local political organization and alliance systems, and to explicate the relationship between localized segmentary lineages and urban clans (the latter having been described for Taiwan by Morton Fried in 1966). Pasternak, therefore, expands our understanding of the ways in which the Chinese, in response to local conditions, utilize different kinds of corporate kin-based organization to build alliances within a single community or between several communities. In addition, by demonstrating that urban industrialism need not be determined to agnatic affiliation and organization, Pasternak deepens our insights into the role of kinship in a large-scale and sociopolitically complex society.

BERNARD GALLIN
Michigan State University

Cave Dwellers and Citrus Growers: A Jewish Community in Libya and Israel *by Harvey E. Goldberg. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1972.—xv, 208 pp. $14.50.*

Goldberg's study is a welcome addition to the current anthropological studies of various aspects of Israeli society. His study of a community of Libyan Jews that settled in an Israeli moshav (small-holders' cooperative village) makes a strong case for the resilience of traditional social and political institutions not only surviving, but playing a major role in aiding the successful adaptation to a new, modern sociopolitical environment. Goldberg's main theme is that "inherent within the political organization of the community was an institutionalized mechanism for coping with change, a mechanism that proved equal to the task of guiding the community during and after settlement in Israel" (p. 73). After a brief introductory chapter Goldberg reconstructs the communal life of the Jews in the Gharian, the section of Libya from which they emigrated to Israel. He stresses the central political role of the "sheikh" who was "the preiminent political 'broker' linking the community to the world around it" (p. 3). In the following chapters the author shows that in their transition from their cave dwellings in Libya to their new homes in the Israeli

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community which Goldberg calls Even Yosef, the community as a whole exhibits "a remarkable continuity in internal values and social-structural principles, coupled with its relatively rapid adjustment to the economic and administrative realities of moshav life" (p. 6).

Goldberg's main interpretation is that "the conjoining of stronger orientations toward the wider society with elite status within the community's structure constitutes an *institutionalized mechanism for coping with change*" (p. 6). His argument continues that the elites are the first to meet the sources of change in the community's environment, are the best-equipped members of the community to meet the new demands, and to the extent that they successfully meet the requirements of the new situation, they maintain their superior economic positions and preserve their elite statuses. While this interpretation is clearly and cogently argued, there are a number of problems in its application and gaps in data which leave this reviewer less than completely convinced that this study explains everything about the sociopolitical adaptation of these former cave dwellers in their new homes.

I shall briefly mention several of the problematic aspects of this work. Much of Goldberg's case is based on his interpretation of previous social and political institutions which he has reconstructed from historical records and from his informants' memories, but which he himself did not have an opportunity to observe. Even the crucial transition stage of the migration of the Gharian Jews to Israel and their first twelve years of settlement are based on similar sources and covered in a relatively brief chapter. And more problematic from the point of view of a political scientist is Goldberg's questionable methods of determining top leadership. He defines the "elite" as "all those who have been elected to the moshav committee and/or have held important administrative positions in the moshav since its founding to the present" (p. 95). His definition of the "elite" during the British Military Occupation is "seven individuals who were named by all informants as being members of the community elite during" this period. He continues, "We will consider these seven to be 'the elite' and all others to be 'non-elite' " (p. 100). Students of community power have long criticized overreliance on the determining of elites through the occupants of formal offices and through the reputational approach. Goldberg relates several fascinating accounts by informants of previous competition for power among expanded families and the emergence of a power hierarchy, but some of these accounts contradict each other and Goldberg does not develop them beyond illustrative stories. Conspicuous by their absence are the detailed analyses of extended case studies which characterize some of the better, recent anthropological studies of different aspects of Israeli society [e.g., S. Deshen, *Immigrant Voters in Israel* (Manchester, 1970,) and M. Shokeid, *The Dual Heritage* (Manchester, 1971)]. In a reference to "my daily visits to the village"

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one may assume that Goldberg did not live in the village; this situation may partially explain the sparcity of case analysis.

On the positive side, Goldberg makes an extremely well-argued case for the continuity of traditional values and culture, and the mechanisms of continuity and change in the socialization of the village youth. Taken as a whole *Cave Dwellers and Citrus Growers: A Jewish Community in Libya and Israel* is a most interesting work, and can be read with profit not only by those interested in Israel, but also by everyone interested in the fascinating resilience of traditional cultures in technologically modern sociopolitical environments.

MYRON J. ARONOFF
Tel Aviv University

Power and Politics in Africa *by Henry L. Bretton. Chicago, Aldine Publishing Company, 1973.—xiv, 402 pp. $12.50.*

In this thoughtful interpretation of postindependence political development in Africa, Professor Bretton's purpose, as he states at the outset, is "to lay bare the raw structure of politics: resources, production and distribution of wealth and income, public and private resource management, public finance and administration." In so doing, he hopes to close what he regards as a "major gap" in the study of politics in Africa, the economic dimension of unfolding political events. While he recognizes the usefulness of the detailed single country studies that have appeared in the past, he argues that most of them have not come to grips with the reality of power in Africa, which is closely tied to the allocation of scarce resources. Indeed, he argues, much social science analysis of Africa has abdicated the function of social criticism by its "emphasis on relative trivia such as drawing boundaries for local government, constructing designs of regional and provincial government, making electoral laws."

To correct this imbalance, the author engages in an extensive analysis of the economic bases of power and decision-making in the new African states. Much of the power now in the hands of African rulers derives from the fact that a large part of the continent's population is still at the subsistence level. The ability to control those factors which add, even incrementally, to the buying power of the subsistence farmer, bringing him to the point of entry into the cash economy, inevitably places enormous power in the hands of the political leaders. This concentrated power, limited to an educated elite, has resulted in strong national governments in whose hands resource allocation lies. It also serves to render virtually impossible the creation of viable institutions of local government and hence any meaningful popular participation. Converse-

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ly, the leadership of African nations is severely restricted in its real options in the making of foreign policy because of continuing dependence on external sources of financing for development.

Professor Bretton's emphasis on the economic factor produces an interesting and often challenging view of African politics. The difficulty is that, having seized on this analytical key, he tries to make it open every door, with the result that a one-sided interpretation emerges which fails to take into account the cultural realities of the African situation. No one who has worked in Africa doubts that economic considerations are a major cause of most political action (or inaction) on the continent. Belaboring the obvious does not necessarily provide a fuller explanation of African political phenomena.

The author insists that he is not an economic determinist—"one becomes associated in the reader's mind with simplistic economic determination. We hope that we have effectively dispelled any such impression." To *this* reader, at least, the impression was left that the economic explanation provides the only sound basis for understanding African politics. In his concentration on economics however, the author is led to making statements of such dubious simplicity as "it was all too clear that colonial rule had been a thinly disguised form of large-scale theft." The real point, it would seem, is that institution building in Africa has to go on within the framework of all the economic restraints resulting from the colonial heritage and from underdevelopment.

The authors of the literature on African political development have for the most part been aware of the considerations of self-interest and personal aggrandizement which have gone into decision-making on economic and political policy in the African states and have taken them into account in their recommendations for development planning and for the structure of African governments. Professor Bretton's volume performs a valuable service in pointing up the economic foundations of governing in Africa, but at the same time, by overstressing them, it fails to get at the heart of the complex process of African politics.

L. GRAY COWAN
State University of New York at Albany

The Ghanaian Factory Worker: Industrial Man in Africa *by Margaret Peil. London, Cambridge University Press, African Studies No. 5, 1972.—254 pp. $18.50.*

Two extreme approaches to social research can frequently be distinguished. In one, the researcher proceeds in a highly structured and focused fashion; hypotheses are carefully and usually narrowly defined, and the research effort consists in finding appropriate tests for these well-

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specified hypotheses. The other approach is more diffuse. It aims at a more or less extensive description and broad understanding of the general characteristics of a problem, a social group, a geographical region. Some "social surveys" represent the purest examples of this second type of approach, and Margaret Peil's study of factory workers in Ghana falls clearly in this group.

Ms. Peil interviewed 1000 carefully selected industrial workers in Ghana. She interviewed workers in different towns, workers employed in publicly and privately owned plants and workers of different levels of skill and education. She did her research over a three-year period (1966, '67, '68) and she did it carefully. Her questionnaire is long and detailed. It covers many different subjects; occupational mobility, job satisfaction, wages, migration patterns, styles of urban living and family ties, the extent of "modernity" of Ghanaian factory workers.

The results illustrate the virtues and also the deficiencies of the broad social survey. A great many interesting nuggets of information are generated. We learn, for example, that semiskilled jobs are attractive to middle-school leavers; that skilled workers have less schooling than the semiskilled; that voluntary quits remained common in the late 1960s, even at a time of extremely high urban unemployment; that the uneducated and those with vocational training found jobs more quickly than others; that among large numbers of the more educated workers, skilled manual jobs are preferred to increasingly dead-end and relatively low-paying white-collar jobs; that ethnic associations seem to be less extensive in urban Ghana than elsewhere in Africa; that factory workers are more monogamous than the Ghana population generally (only 8% had more than one wife as against 26% of all married males in 1960); that the average size of households was only 3-4 members; and that despite declining real wage incomes in the late 1960s, some 75% of the urban wage earners sent home remittances.

The difficulty with all this information is that there is at once too much of it and not enough—a problem common to most social surveys. It is hard to interpret many of the responses, and they do not help much in understanding basic issues about urbanization and development. The set of questions and answers on migration, for example, does little to advance our understanding of the migration decision. Nor do the discussions of job search, unemployment, education and occupational mobility shed much light on critical issues related to labor market structure and wage determination. The problem of course is the lack of focus inherent in this kind of study. It is not until well along in the book that we are told anything specific about why it is interesting or useful to study the Ghana factory worker; the first explicit hypothesis is on page 41. Ms. Peil recognizes the problem. She mentions in several places that she intends the study to be primarily a base-line effort which stakes out the terrain to be

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explored in more detail by later researchers. She also tries to pull her results together in the concluding chapter, where she briefly assesses the implications of her findings for the "Industrial Man" hypothesis (that factory workers in all societies tend to become homogeneous). Her conclusion is ambiguous: the Ghana factory worker is becoming "modern" in some ways, but retaining many traditional ties. This ambiguity is not surprising, since the "Industrial Man" concept is itself unclear in many respects.

This study, despite its limitations, stands out as a useful addition to the sparse stock of knowledge on industrial workers in the less developed world generally and Ghana in particular.

ELLIOT BERG
University of Michigan

Yearbook of the United Nations, 1970. *New York, Office of Public Information, United Nations, 1972. Vol. 24—xiv, 1177 pp. $30.00.*

With this volume the editors continue to meet the high standards of reporting which have made the *Yearbook* an indispensable reference aid for students and practitioners interested in the work of the United Nations and its related agencies. The editors fully satisfy all requirements of comprehensiveness, objectivity, and completeness. As pointed out in a review of the 1968 and 1969 Yearbooks (*PSQ*, June 1973, pp. 344-345), there are possibilities of somewhat reducing the number of pages without affecting the value of the volume to its users, which is something worth considering at a time of growing deficits and inflated prices. Serious efforts along this line would help to hold the line against those who may even see in the publication of the *Yearbook* an unjustified use of funds and staff. Not only are the editors to be commended for the quality of the *Yearbook*, but they are also entitled to commendation for being able to get the volume out so promptly after the events. A gap of only two years is quite remarkable.

LELAND M. GOODRICH
Columbia University

The United Nations System: An Analysis *by Mahdi Elmandjra; foreword by Gunnar Myrdal. Hamden, Conn., Archon Books, 1973.—368 pp., charts, bibliography. $16.00.*

This recently published book by one of the assistant directors-general of UNESCO is the most comprehensive, thorough, and perceptive analysis

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that has yet appeared on the nature, functioning, interrelationship, coordination, financing and, not least, the ultimate purpose of the vast and infinitely complex network of institutions (organizations, agencies, programs, commissions, committees, funds, institutes, boards, and secretariat units) that make up the United Nations system.

Mr. Elmandjra's volume would have been welcome at any time. For what the author rightly calls the "almost obsessional preoccupation of governments with the mechanisms of coordination," and the disproportionate time spent on coordination have long had serious implications for the efficiency of the system. But the book's appearance now is particularly opportune since the organization and orientation of the activities of the United Nations system are now the subject of so much attention within the U.N. itself and more particularly in the Economic and Social Council. Last May, the council decided among other things that

> in view of the profound changes in world-wide economic co-operation within the United Nations System which have taken place since the conclusion of the present agreements between the United Nations and the specialized agencies, the Council will review the existing agreements with a view to strengthening the coherence of the system and its capacity to fulfill, in particular, the objectives of the International Development Strategy in an effective and co-ordinated manner.

At the same time, the council has its own functioning under close study and many other aspects of the problem, including the council's relations with UNDP (U.N. Development Program) on the one hand and UNCTAD (U.N. Conference on Trade and Development), UNIDO (U.N. Industrial Development Organization) and UNEP (U.N. Environment Program) on the other, will no doubt also be closely scrutinized.

In a "postface," Sir Robert Jackson explains what he considers to have been some current misunderstandings, reflected in Mr. Elmandjra's book, of positions taken in the "Study of the Capacity of the United Nations System," published four years ago. This examination, too, is timely since many of the recommendations of the capacity study have not yet been fully considered.

Mr. Elmandjra does not draw conclusions or suggest solutions, and he attempts few evaluations of the performance of the system and of its different parts. However, on a number of points, his views clearly emerge and—while not necessarily shared by this reviewer—are worth pondering. For example, he implicitly absolves the specialized agencies and the U.N.-Agency Agreements of major responsibility by his masterly analysis both of the causes of the Economic and Social Council's weakness as the central instrument of systemwide coordination and of the way coordination problems have resulted from policies of the intergovernmental organs of the U.N. itself. Again, he brings out the disturbing effects not only of the U.N.'s tendency to avoid discussing activities financed by voluntary

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funds or their coordination with related activities financed from the regular budgets, but also of the impact of UNDP generally on program coordination. The author shares the position often urged in UNESCO against excessive concentration of authority in the UNDP and in favor of the operational work of each specialized organization whether financed from its assessed budget or by UNDP, being fully integrated with its basic research activities.

Although Mr. Elmandjra does not say so, if the governments represented in the U.N. have been collectively responsible for much of the trouble, the U.N. secretariat, in so far as it has been in a position to advise, cannot altogether escape blame. When one considers possible remedies, one should not underestimate the influence that can be exercized in the intergovernmental organs concerned, by the secretary-general and his senior officials, as well as by the executive heads of all the agencies and programs, individually or through the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination.

The United Nations System: An Analysis is of importance, first and foremost, to government representatives and international officials, but its interest is in fact far wider. Indeed, a debt is owed to Mr. Elmandjra by everyone, especially in political or academic life, who is concerned to enhance the effectiveness of the U.N. system as an instrument for promoting "social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom."

MARTIN HILL
UNITAR (U.N. Institute for Training and Research)

Modern Revolutions: An Introduction to the Analysis of a Political Phenomenon *by John Dunn. London, Cambridge University Press, 1972.—xiii, 346 pp. $14.50.*

Civil Wars in the Twentieth Century *edited by Robin Higham. Lexington, Ky., The University Press of Kentucky, 1972.—260 pp. $9.00.*

Intrasocietal political violence fascinates historians as well as social scientists, as evidenced by these two books, which ought to contribute to the lively dialogue among various disciplines. Professor Dunn's study of modern revolutions is an outstanding work with a distinctive erudition reminiscent of Toynbee throughout its pages. It is a rare study that dissects its topic from historical and theoretical standpoints and concludes that, ultimately, revolution may be a metaphor that resists all rational analysis. The author combines some insightful—and arguable—conclusions with a sure feeling for some of the major issues raised in the study of revolution.

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The author modestly aims "to assist anyone who wishes to think clearly, honestly and seriously about modern revolutions and who finds the conceptual and informational problems of beginning to do so slightly baffling" (Preface, p. x). *Modern Revolutions* examines eight revolutionary movements that were successful in establishing new political orders—in Russia, Mexico, China, Yugoslavia, Vietnam, Algeria, Turkey, and Cuba. Professor Dunn finds a number of elements present in each revolution, including political decay, mass violence, and the advent of novel and effective political elites (Preface, p. xi). Revolutions are not only social phenomena that create new political orders, but they are affected by past revolutionary phenomena. Thus we are led to think of revolution as "metaphor." Each successful revolution creates new images, heroes, villains, and myths that are adapted by other movements.

Dunn places modern revolution in its intellectual and political contexts in the introductory chapter that is provocatively entitled "The Ideological Dilemmas of Modern Revolution and Its Analysts." One such dilemma, which socialist revolutions seem to have demonstrated, is the need for authoritarianism in manner and effect before the liberation that Marx and Engels foretold would occur immediately can be achieved. Analyses of the dynamics and societal environment of specific revolutions follow. Information is drawn from scholarly works of history and social science, and effective comparisons are made among different revolutions. The book concludes with a stimulating chapter on "Approaches to the Ideological Assessment and Causal Explanation of Modern Revolutions." It summarizes some of the points made in individual chapters and stresses the teleological nature of revolution—its representation of future goals of liberty and equality for its proponents. In this respect, the metaphor of revolution—its political symbolism as future goal—may be as important as the objective social and economic circumstances in which revolution occurs. The last chapter presents insights that demand a rereading of earlier chapters.

It would not be possible for an edited book to emerge as the same *tour de force*, since few editors can weave themes and analysis into contributed articles as well as an individual author can control his own work. *Civil Wars in the Twentieth Century* surveys the phenomenon of domestic violence, with attention to a number of historical instances. It is a useful and illuminating survey, covering such diverse topics as the American, Spanish, Chinese, and Russian civil wars, American intervention in Vietnam, and the action of the United Nations in the Congo. There are three essays on the Nigerian civil war and an examination of internal violence in Ireland and Latin America.

The broad range of topics fails to validate or falsify any major thesis offered by the editor, especially the statement that civil wars differ "from

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all other revolutionary activity in being essentially, though not invariably, the work of right-wing reactionaries or conservatives seeking to keep arbitrary freedoms they enjoy or think they are entitled to exercise" (p. 1). Civil wars are complicated by their tendency to have international overtones, as the cases of Vietnam, Nigeria, and the Congo illustrate. The essay by Martin Edmonds, "Civil War, Internal War, and Intrasocietal Conflict: A Taxonomy and Typology," contains useful generalizations on the subject, but his typology could be improved with greater rigor.

The two books make definite contributions to the growing literature on social violence and complement each other in approach and in the cases examined. Both studies include excellent bibliographies.

ROBERT E. BEDESKI
Carleton University

Ideas and Procedures in African Customary Law *edited by Max Gluckman. London, Oxford University Press, 1969.—xiii, 316 pp. $11.50.*

African Law: Adaptation and Development *edited by Hilda Kuper and Leo Kuper. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1965.—viii, 275 pp. $7.50.*

It is regrettable that there have been few efforts at a synoptic review of either the impact of Western law on indigenous systems of African law or of the subsequent transformation of colonial law after independence. There exist both a proliferation of monographs on African law under the aegis of Sweet, Maxwell, and Butterworth which provide specific studies in criminal, civil, and contract law in various Anglophonic territories, and several more general compendia of essays by authors such as Allott, Elias, and Salacuse. However, only in these two volumes being reviewed has an effort been made to assemble a variety of juridical and anthropological opinions and experiences to define the nature, permutations, and prospects for African law. It is unfortunate that since their publication no further efforts have been made to deal more systematically with the issue of legal change in Africa or, by implication, with the phenomenon of legal pluralism throughout the developing world. Given the limitations of both books, one can only hope for further efforts of this kind.

The genesis and format of the two are similar: *African Law* began as an interdisciplinary seminar on "the adaptation and development of law in Africa" held at UCLA in 1963; the Eighth International Seminar in Addis Ababa in 1966 is the origin of *Ideas and Procedures*. Both

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books have extensive and valuable theoretical introductions. These address themselves to the general procedural and substantive problems of such research and provide an orienting focus and a validation for the essays which follow. Both volumes then present regrettably disjunctive and ill-integrated sets of essays by contributors from a variety of academic and administrative backgrounds. One might have hoped these essays would have provided the reader with a systematic introduction to the range of actual research being done in African law, but they serve only to render the field unnecessarily atomistic to the observer.

In the Kupers' book the first group of essays ostensibly deals with "traditional legal systems." Two of the four papers however focus on problems of change (Mayer and Mayer on Gusii law as a response to the tensions of social change and Forde on the integration of traditional Ibo law into the colonial system). Of the remaining two, Vansina's paper presents a regrettably idealized reconstruction of traditional Kuba law while Gluckman discusses "reasonableness and responsibility" in a number of African societies. All suffer from an unfortunate tendency to present a generalized model at best abstracted from "various communities" (Forde, 79). Their neglect of specific case material or specific allusions to the operation of the courts renders any real sense of historical process impossible. The final section of *African Law*, presented as "adaptation and directed change," again lacks internal coherence. It contains specific studies such as Anderson's useful review of the adaptation of Muslim law, the development of statutory law in French Africa (d'Arboussier), and customary family law in South Africa (Rubin), but also includes a now quite familiar summary article by Elias entitled, despite its brevity, "Evolution of Law and Government in Modern Africa." Allott in the final essay deals intelligently if briefly with certain problems of modernization, unification, and Africanization which face all postcolonial nations.

Ideas and Procedures, published four years later in 1969, expands the initial statement of *African Law*, but retains the same basic format with its attendant weaknesses and strengths. Again a long (81 pp.) and most useful introduction dealing with problems of research and basic procedural and substantive issues is followed by eighteen "special studies" which cover a range of problems on the impact of various European legal traditions on indigenous law. Organized to reflect the basic format of the introduction, five articles (Poirier, Ollennu, Richardson, van Velsen, Shack) deal with procedural questions of research and with the operation of the courts, another with codification in French territories (Deschamps), and a final one with the clarification of the legal personality in African law (Allott). The remaining articles reflect more substantive concerns: family law (Ramolefe, Smith, and Pauwels), property (Vanderlinden, Gluckman, and McDowell), liability in customary law (Mu-

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gerwa, Epstein, and Ibik), and contract (Schapera and Ghai). As in the Kupers' book, there is once again an unfortunate disposition, particularly in the summary articles of the first section, to extrapolate from specific studies or from the restricted evidence of regional law reviews to general statements about "African law." By contrast, in those essays which describe specific studies, there is a comforting amount of empirical data cited, and even the anthropologists, with the exception of Gluckman, seem grounded in both specific case material and court statistics.

Despite these various shortcomings, one must urge the student of African law or politics to explore both books, for they do set out, however unsystematically, the general problems which attend both the study and directed application of systems of law in Africa. If the reader finds himself buffeted by a welter of issues and interpretations, nevertheless these volumes provide, if nothing else, a fair view of the range of substantive and procedural problems encountered by both researcher and administrator in Africa today. Perhaps under the circumstances this is indeed the most realistic introduction to African law.

ELIZABETH E. HOPKINS
Smith College

Comparison of Economic Systems: Theoretical and Methodological Approaches *edited by Alexander Eckstein. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971.—366 pp. $15.75.*

Any symposium volume is notoriously hard to review because of its richness and diversity of content. This one is more homogeneous than many of its kind. It is the product of a conference on the scope, method, and theory of comparative economic systems, held at the University of Michigan in November 1968; the contributions are uniformly good.

An attempt is made to break out of what Eckstein calls the "ismistic" study of comparative systems based on the traditional "isms" such as capitalism, socialism, and fascism. The symposium is therefore primarily methodological. A major paper by T. C. Koopmans and J. M. Montias, "On the Description and Comparison of Economic Systems," attempts to set out the essential variables and relationships of economics, including the norms or desiderata by which various systems judge themselves or may be judged by others. This is followed by a paper by Leonid Hurwicz on "Centralization and Decentralization in Economic Processes," a positive rather than normative attempt at a descriptive model of centralization as a characteristic of the system. It draws a sharp and useful distinction between the centralization of information and of authority. Benjamin Ward's paper on "Organization and Comparative Economics: Some Approaches"

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is less rigorous, but is a stimulating account of major factors in making systems comparisons.

Besides Herbert Levine's "On Comparing Planned Economies," which is rather formalistic, the other essays in the book have more substantive than methodological interest. The major substantive paper is a long one by Abram Bergson on "Comparative Productivity and Efficiency in the USA and the USSR," with an interesting criticism by Evsey Domar and a reply by Bergson. Domar throws suitably cold water on the efficiency concept; Bergson defends himself rather vigorously against the charge of using mixed geometric and arithmetic indices. Domar, however, seems to me to make a very effective point, that we should really compare the USSR in 1960 with the United States in 1925, when it was at about the same level of development, to compare the efficiencies of socialist and capitalist economies.

The other substantive papers include a somewhat perfunctory study by Simon Kuznets, "Notes on Stage of Economic Growth as a System Determinant," and a pleasantly cantankerous paper by Alexander Gerschenkron on "Ideology as a System Determinant" with some very interesting historical illustrations. His paper is followed by controversy with A. O. Hirschman, which ends somewhat inconclusively. The symposium proper concludes with an excellent paper by Alexander Erlich on " 'Eastern' Approaches to a Comparative Evaluation of Economic Systems"; it is finally summarized, a little perfunctorily, by Morris Bornstein.

The objectives of the symposium seem eminently desirable. Comparative economics needs to get away from merely odious comparisons and a simplistic study of "isms" and to abstract polarized models into a realistic and descriptive framework, not only of the multidimensional spectrum of economic institutions, but also the multidimensional spectrum of criteria for appraisal. The symposium certainly succeeds in getting the subject off its old ground and moving it somewhat in the desired direction, though whether it moves it far enough may be argued.

Perhaps the most significant idea in the symposium is the need for what might be called functional comparisons, which will break down the similarities and differences among different systems by sectors of the economy and by institutions. One would love to see a comparative study, for instance, of Soviet bank managers and American bank managers. One thing that does not really emerge in the methodological chapters is the concept of the reference group. Whom do people have to please? Whom do they have to take account of? How are decisions really made? These questions cut across differences in institutional arrangements, and I would like to see more stress on them. It seems to me, also, and this may be a personal prejudice, that one of the principal keys to understanding the differences of different types of systems is missing from this volume.

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This is the distinction between the exchange economy and the grants economy. One suspects that the grants economy is appreciably larger in the socialist countries than in the capitalist ones, but how much larger we really do not know.

Another question I would like to see investigated is what syndromes of institutions are feasible and what are not? There must be something like a production possibility function for institutions. Thus, parliamentary democracy seems to be compatible with some degree of socialization, but not with larger degrees than some boundary level.

The comparison of systems almost has to be interdisciplinary simply because there are no sharp boundaries between economic and other institutions and behavior. The interdisciplinary nature of the subject is recognized verbally in this symposium, but not much is done about it. These papers are written by economists for economists. Economic anthropology is written out of the field, which is unfortunate; surely a great deal can be learned about the most essential economic functions from studying primitive economies. When I taught comparative economics, I started with Robinson Crusoe and went on to primitive economies, both of which were so fascinating and taught so much about the essential characteristics of economic systems that the old "isms" got rather short shrift. While the present volume, therefore, merits praise as a good beginning, I would like to see the movement which it initiated carried much farther, as part of a larger movement toward more scientific taxonomic structures in all fields.

KENNETH E. BOULDING
University of Colorado, Boulder

Lenin and the Comintern, Volume I, *by Branko Lazitch and Milorad M. Drachkovitch. Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, 1972.—xiv, 683 pp. $17.50.*

More than thirty years ago, the Hoover Institution published a remarkable and useful book on the origins of the Comintern: Olga Hess Gankin and H. H. Fisher's *The Bolsheviks and the World War: The Origins of the Third International* (Stanford, 1940). The mere fact that this book is still in print is eloquent testimony to its value; however, a promised second volume on the Comintern itself never appeared and historians have been much the poorer for its absence. The present volume is not offered as a continuation of the Gankin and Fisher work but it well might be and, indeed, whether the authors so intend it or not, it does complement the 1940 publication.

This is truly a major work, one of the most important works on the Comintern to appear in many years. The research that has gone into

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the preparation of this volume has been truly prodigious. Aside from the immense holdings of the Hoover Institution, the authors have had access to any number of personal papers and correspondence unknown to other scholars, much less consulted by them. A full bibliography is promised for a second forthcoming volume—and hopefully in this case a second volume will be published—but the documentation gives ample testimony to the scope of the authors' research.

The focal point of the volume is Lenin: Lenin, the obscure militant prior to 1917, Lenin, the leader of the Bolshevik regime, and most important, Lenin as the manipulator of all Comintern policy. The essence of the book is summed up in the authors' observation: "Russian Communism was the father, international Communism the child. Of course, when we say 'Russian Communism,' it would be more accurate simply to say Lenin, for he was the builder of those three historic revolutionary structures: the Bolshevik Party, Soviet Russia, and the Communist International" (p. 206).

Given the highly controversial nature of the material, it is highly likely that most readers will find themselves at odds with the authors on any number of subjects. This reviewer, for example, is in substantial disagreement on the nature of personal relationships between Lenin and the other Zimmerwaldians, Lenin's objectives in the Polish campaign of 1920, and several other issues. These are, however, disagreements of interpretation and do not detract from the validity of the authors' research and interpretation. The scholarship is not only massive but guided by integrity.

Only on minor issues does the book fall short. In view of the importance of the documentation, the publisher has made it singularly difficult to use the notes. Furthermore, considering the subject matter, the presentation is not as vividly presented as it might be. These minor failings, however, do not substantially detract from the enormous scholarly contribution of the work.

WARREN LERNER
Duke University

Studies in Ibo Political Systems: Chieftaincy and Politics in Four Niger States *by Ikenna Nzimiro. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1972.—xviii, 287 pp., illustrations and diagrams. $12.75.*

The four Niger states of the subtitle are Onitsha, Abo, Oguta and Osomari, situated along, or near, the east bank of the Niger in Nigeria's Eastern Region, and their inhabitants are members of the Ogbaru subgroup of the Ibo people. In this book, originally a Ph.D. thesis at Cambridge

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University, Dr. Ikenna Nzimiro gives a clear and workmanlike account of the traditional political organization of these kingdoms, their historical origins (as offshoots of the more celebrated Benin and Igala states), their functioning in recent times, and the ways in which the rulers, as a type of "divine king," are regarded.

For the student of traditional African polities, the theme of greatest comparative interest is the sophisticated system of checks and balances which is built into the political structure. As in other kingdoms in West Africa and elsewhere, the power of the "royals" is countered by that of the "non-royals" (these two categories are sharply distinguished), non-royals occupying, below the king, high political office, and a system of titles providing for the incorporation in the elite group of commoners as well as royals. A hierarchy of councils, the crosscutting obligations of age-grade membership, and the vesting of specialist palace offices in non-royal lineages also serve to bridge the gap between rulers and ruled. Like some other African rulers, but apparently more than most, the *Obi* of Oguta was also subject to a check from the distaff side; the ruler's senior wife sits on his throne at his right side, and "controls" him "by pinching him (ndubu) secretly; this action regulates his conduct at the council meeting" (p. 160).

The Ogbaru rulers also exhibit many of the trappings of "divine kingship," familiar elsewhere in Africa. The king "never dies" (when he does his death is kept secret), he has special praise-names and regalia, is subject to symbolic food restrictions, offers annual sacrifices on behalf of his people, and so on.

If there is a criticism to be made of Dr. Nzimiro's useful book, it is that it is not always entirely clear whether the systems as described still continue to function or did so until recently (all four kings have died since the field research was completed). More generally, it is unclear what has been in the past and, especially, what is likely to be in the future regarding the relationship between these traditional kingdoms and the superimposed national government of Nigeria. Such questions have assumed considerable importance elsewhere in Africa, but they were not the ones to which Dr. Nzimiro was addressing himself. However, his competent study very adequately fills a conspicuous gap in Nigerian ethnography and will be of interest to political scientists and social anthropologists alike.

The author might, however, note that the reviewer's initials are neither J.E. (p. 161) nor J.M.H. (p.278), but J.H.M.

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The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics, 1919-1969 *edited by Brian Porter. London, Oxford University Press, 1972.—x, 390 pp. $5.50.*

In 1919 the Woodrow Wilson Chair of International Politics was established at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth. Since it was the world's first chair in international politics, the event was a milestone in the formal academic study of international relations. These essays were collected and published to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of that event.

The list of contributions is imposing, including such notable scholars as Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Hans J. Morgenthau, F. H. Hinsley, Hugh Seton-Watson, Geoffrey L. Goodwin, Barbara Ward, A. W. Manning, and Herbert Butterfield. Even more impressive is the fact that the essays form a coherent volume; it describes and analyzes changes in international politics in the fifty years after the Treaty of Versailles as well as developments in the study of these phenomena. The material relating to the Woodrow Wilson Chair, its recipients, and the Department of International Politics at Wales also fits these broader themes. The collection consequently can be read with profit by those who have only a general interest in international politics as well as those who are professionally engaged in the study of this subject.

William C. Olson and Hedley Bull set broad themes with their introductory essays respectively on the growth of a discipline and the theory of international politics. Olson delineates the shift in emphasis in the academic treatment of international politics from studies that had as their goal an immediate and direct contribution to "peace," to studies emphasizing the seemingly more modest but thus far equally remote goal of "predictive capability" (p. 7). Bull sees the development of the theory of international politics dominated successively by idealist, realist and social scientific schools (pp. 33 ff).

The second part of the book, aspects of international politics, highlights the expanding functional and geographic dimensions of the subject. Its eleven essays cover a full range of conventional topics in international relations. Those by Michael Howard on the use of force, Alastair Buchan on technology, and Inis L. Claude, Jr. on international institutions are outstanding brief statements. Howard chronicles the way different significant actors have viewed the use of force, traces the fortunes of the doctrine of air power, and analyzes the development of revolutionary war. Buchan examines the international implications of five fields of technological change and endeavor: energy, transport, communications, medicine, and agriculture. Claude describes, explains, and assesses the significance of the growth in number, variety, and membership of international agencies.

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Interestingly the volume does not include a representative of what Bull terms the social scientific school although that viewpoint receives some attention and frequently sympathetic consideration. Yet the absence of a contributor from the social scientific school in such a volume marks an important difference between the currently predominant, academic treatment of international politics in the United Kingdom and in the United States. Perhaps Olson is correct when he speculates that in the next half-century the study of international politics may be fundamentally different on each side of the Atlantic (p. 26). On the other hand, some young British scholars are more behaviorally and quantitatively inclined, and there are those in the United States who maintain that American social science is ripe for a "postbehavioral" revolution. Thus divergence is not the only possible path for future scholarship.

Whatever one's preference for the various strands of scholarship that have emerged thus far, it would be hard to deny the basic judgment implicit throughout this volume: there has been little in international-relations scholarship that is cumulative. Bull is even more damning in his judgments. He maintains that:

> . . . thought about international relations is still slight and sterile, and if we compare the long record of what took place before 1919 with what has occurred since, the former is a good deal more impressive [p. 49].

He also notes that work in international relations theory in the twentieth century has been "overwhelmingly Western, predominantly Anglo-Saxon" (p. 54) and questions whether this is likely to result in "an adequate understanding of a world political system that is overwhelmingly non-Western" (p. 55).

Valuable as this volume is, it does little to disprove Bull's sobering evaluations. The *Aberystwyth Papers* properly commemorates the acceptance of study in international politics by the Western academy. Perhaps some day it will be appropriate to have a volume commemorating the fruits of this study.

HAROLD K. JACOBSON
University of Michigan

The Future of the International Legal Order, Vol. III: Conflict Management *edited by Cyril E. Black and Richard A. Falk. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1971.—vii, 413 pp. $12.50.*

This collection of eleven essays offers scholars and policy-makers useful approaches to the problems of conflict management in contemporary world politics. On the basis of current trends, the contributors attempt

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to forecast the prospects for legal control of: 1) internal and international violence, and 2) conventional and nuclear weapons. Eschewing esoteric models, the authors move carefully and intelligently from the past to the future in cogent, well-written chapters.

The prevailing focus remains the nation-state system, although many of the "central world order concerns" the authors discuss stem from the acceleration of interdependence and the impact of transnational processes. This concentration on the state, understandable given the common interest in the contribution legal norms may make, in no way diminishes the impact of the individual chapters. For example, in Rosalyn Higgins' treatment of internal war and international law, the inadequacies of existing codes and guidelines are highlighted by this orientation. Similarly, in John Norton Moore's detailed analysis of regional arrangements for world order, the inefficacy of action that challenges national authority is described effectively. On the other hand, as Daniel Wilkes observes in an imaginative review of territorial stability and conflict, there is danger in assuming that "the present nation-state system [is] a temporary one whose eventual demise makes it sound policy to simply survive the altercations it permits, one by one, until an ethos of greater co-operation arrives." He argues that "the trouble with this approach is that what we do *not* do today is shaping tomorrow as much as what we do attempt" (p. 209).

The tendency to wait for "the ethos of greater co-operation" to emerge is nowhere more evident than in issues arising from national control of conventional and nuclear weapons, as William Bader, Arnold Kramish, and Mason Willrich outline. These writers press for greater disclosure as an initial step toward feasible arms control measures. Drawing on insights derived from anthropology and social psychology, Michael Reisman asserts that we must capitalize on what we know about collective behavior, across as well as within frontiers, in order to strengthen the trends toward "the evolution of a global culture" (p. 334). Of course this "culture" is barely perceptible in the sphere of arms limitation which is characterized by "technical obstacles, strategic imperatives and asymmetries, conceptual confusions, and internal politics" (p. 337) according to Harold Feiveson.

In view of the current interest of political scientists in bureaucratic politics, Richard Barnet's brief concluding chapter is provocative. Noting that world legal order cannot be established on the basis of "consensus" without some notion of a "time scale," he proposes that we attempt to identify now the ways in which law can operate to change expectations. Barnet believes that if bureaucrats could view their own interests as better served by co-operative relationships than by the "manipulation of violence," they would contribute to a more peaceful, legitimate international system. Unfortunately, since most bureaucrats still form their

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own career expectations in the light of national rather than international concerns, such a process will be slow and unpredictable at best.

In sum, this recent book enhances the favorable impression created by the two earlier volumes in the series and whets the appetite for Volumes IV and V.

LINDA B. MILLER
Wellesley College

Leader and Vanguard in Mass Society: A Study of Peronist Argentina *by Jeane Kirkpatrick. Cambridge, Mass., The M.I.T. Press, 1971.—xxii, 262 pp. $12.50.*

Latin America generally and Argentina specifically pose problems for United States writing on comparative politics. A single case, such as Peronism, can turn up in the literature exemplifying everything from a "nationalist-revolution" led by "modernizers" (John Kautsky) to a "syncratic" regime representing the "last victory for the landed aristocracy" (Kenneth Organski). While Seymour Martin Lipset reduced Peronism to a working-class movement opposed by the middle and the upper strata, Organski found there the collusion of these same strata at the expense of the workers. Perhaps global theories require the little known case which, bent to the requirements of the theory, impart an aura of universality to categories derived from some other portion of the world. The reader ignorance required for this doesn't last forever, fortunately. In the case of Peronism, the day of procrustean "interpretations" is over—or should be, for recently two studies have appeared which are in English and solidly grounded in hard data.

The origins of the Peronist movement is the subject of Peter Smith's article in the *Hispanic-American Historical Review*, LII:1 (February, 1972). The composition and perceptions of the movement that survived both Perón's fall and an eighteen year diaspora, to return to power in 1973, are analyzed in Jeane Kirkpatrick's book. While Smith focuses on electoral and census data, Kirkpatrick draws on an opinion survey conducted in late 1965.

Kirkpatrick discovered that Argentina is not, as many supposed, a society rent top to bottom by cultural differences, class antagonism, or generational conflict. Considerable consensus exists on modern values: a manipulative view of the environment, a relaxed adherence to Catholicism, demands for active government, and so on. Ambiguities do exist in the political culture, but they are widely shared. Peronists are different from non-Peronists but not in such pronounced or isomorphic a fashion as to isolate them as a subculture. More an "orientation" than an organization, according to Kirkpatrick, Peronism comprised one-fifth to one-

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third of the citizenry in 1965. Only one- to two-fifths of all union members were Peronists, and of the Peronists scarcely half of them or their spouses were union members. (Lack of precision on Peronism is due to varying definitions of what it is to be a Peronist.) Accepting an inclusive definition, about half of the Peronists considered themselves middle class! To a surprising degree, then, Kirkpatrick found Peronism out of power resembling what Smith uncovered for Peronism coming to power: "... not a monolithic class or mass movement" (Smith, p. 68). What gives Peronism its working-class image is more its politics than its class composition. It is a "vanguard" advocating structural reforms more consistently than do union members as a group, the lower class as a whole, or any other sizeable portion of the Argentine public.

If this study has any weakness, it lies in the author's failure to consistently give a fresh reading to the data she has amassed. She adheres tóo often to conventional wisdom, such as the belief that Perón's initial following mainly consisted of *descamisados* "alienated and disoriented by the transition from a traditional rural to a modern urban society" (pp. 146, 209, 211). Smith's study shows the contrary: from the start, Perón drew more from the "old" working class than from recent rural-to-urban migrants. The influence of this conventional view, on others as well as Kirkpatrick, is seen in the persistent presentation of Peronists as people psychologically predisposed to authoritarian leadership. The rarely entertained alternative is that, in looking to strong leaders or in evincing suspicion of liberal-democratic procedures, Peronists were responding as rationally and instrumentally to their environment as any of us do.

From time to time, Kirkpatrick does comment on the extent to which Peronists have been excluded from politics and policy-making was reduced to an interelite struggle. Yet she persists in construing rank-and-file Peronist distrust of government figures as an example of the kind of "demonological interpretation" of events Lipset ascribed to "working-class authoritarianism." Peronists were more dubious of receiving fair treatment from officials than non-Peronists. But why attribute this to paranoia and insecurity when it seems a perception very much in touch with reality? More Peronists than others were likely to blame the government for the public's lack of understanding and interest in national affairs. Why explain this as an escape from personal responsibility or as a longing for some *patrón* to tell one what to think, when objectively Argentine administrations *have* engaged in an inordinate amount of obfuscation, especially in dealing with Peronism? Why not point out that this critique of elites is coupled with considerable faith in the capacity of nonelites? More Peronists than non-Peronists *denied* that "people don't care and don't try" to understand national affairs.

The survey included three questions dealing with interpersonal trust.

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Lumping them together, the author found Peronists more mistrustful than non-Peronists, more inclined to expect "indifference and profiteering in interpersonal contacts" (p. 122). In point of fact, her data reveal a split response: on two questions the Peronists appear more distrustful, while on the third more trustful. What Kirkpatrick missed are the several *meanings* of "people." If one lacks the status to command generalized respect in the larger environment, as many Peronists do, one may realistically believe that "people" (out there) "will take advantage of you." But if one enjoys solidarity within the *barrio*, among workmates, or through meaningful political affiliation, one may also believe that "people" (*el pueblo, my people*) "generally help one another." The data show Peronists responding affirmatively to this last statement more frequently than non-Peronists do. Thus, the blanket categorization of Peronists as nontrusting hardly seems a subtle interpretation of the data.

One wishes, then, that the author had cleared her head of "working-class authoritarianism" and the supposedly "Latin-Mediterranean" style of politics, and projected herself freshly and empathically into the lives of those whose opinions she tabulated. To do this would require spending some time in Argentina, talking to Peronists as if they were real people and not isolated responses to a questionnaire. While the data it provides are useful, this book exemplifies that style of research from afar (e.g., hiring a polling organization to do one's interviewing) that makes other people's politics look far simpler than one's own. Is not "condescension" the word we generally apply to such behavior?

ELDON KENWORTHY
Cornell University

Social Development: Critical Perspectives *edited by Manfred Stanley. New York, Basic Books, Inc., 1972.—xiii, 335 pp. $10.00.*

This volume critically examines some key terms which Western social scientists use to describe the non-Western world. In addition to "development" and its declensions, these include: "traditional vs. modern," "communal vs. associational," and "economy vs. society," which also correspond to the three main sections of the book. Through such conceptual analysis Professor Stanley hopes to increase theoretical and methodological self-awareness, something especially needed in a field often dominated by ideology or praxis. Yet this purpose is unevenly fulfilled by the essays which Professor Stanley has gathered. All are well crafted, and some are brilliant. But not all of them deal directly with the problem which Stanley defines at the outset, and the integration of the various levels on which the authors write is incomplete.

The initial paper, by Irving Horowitz, contrasts two approaches to

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development theory—intrinsic and extrinsic. The first focuses on counter-development attitudes of native populations, the second on social stratification at the international level. Not surprisingly, Horowitz calls for a fusion of the two perspectives. Bert Hoselitz's essay attempts to wed the functional theories of Parsons and Smelser to his own work on entrepreneurship. But the value of this effort is vitiated by Hoselitz's insouciance to phenomenological as well as neopositivist critiques of functionalist thought. The third essay, by Norman Birnbaum, sketches some consequences of the emergence of a "knowledge elite." This paper is insightful and suggestive, though not adequately documented, and it focuses more sharply on the book's central theme: the idealization of social science in the political context.

The second section, on community and association, begins with an all too brief *tour de force* by Benjamin Nelson. Here Nelson draws a map of "post-millennial views of the masks and faces of change," suggesting that adequate theories of development must take as their context the clash of civilizational cognative systems, the chief clash today being that between parochial loyalties and universalistic rationality. Adian Southall's paper offers a sophisticated and empirically well-grounded critique of normative economic theory and its unself-conscious application to African societies. Southall's approach is as interesting as his findings: his essay is a model of what might be called the political economics of theory as ideology from a participant-observer's standpoint. The third essay in this section, by Thomas Reiner, distinguishes three uses of the concept "region" and notes likely theoretical and practical consequences of each.

In the third section, on economy and society, C. B. MacPherson presents a critical history of rationalism in political and economic thinking in the West, and then suggests the inadequacy of such models as explanations of, or goals for, non-Western nations. In a similar spirit, George Dalton's paper calls for the creation of an "economic anthropology," the scope of which, unfortunately, he restricts to small scale, relatively closed economies. William Pooler's essay is on population and population theory. He argues that we do not have adequate knowledge of the causes of population increases and the relation of such changes to changes in social institutions. To fill this gap Pooler recommends the creation of a NASA-type population agency, possibly under United Nations auspices.

The final essay of the book, by Stanley himself, is the most original and brilliant of the collection. Distinguishing "technicism," as an ideology, from technology, Stanley goes on to trace the inner logic of this new spectre. He shows how technicism manifests itself within the polarity of "traditionalism vs. modernism" as the problem of alienation and the decline of the actor as a moral agent. In the realm of "economy vs. society," technicism delineates the market principle of politics, and with it the delegitimization of nonutilitarian values. In terms of "community vs. socie-

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ty," technicism gives rise to mass society and elitist social engineering. These relationships are not merely posited, however, but rather are decoded in terms of underlying logics and exemplified through a number of not-so-utopian scenarios.

It may be unfair to criticize an editor for what he does *not* include. Still, the theme of this volume cries out for extension in two directions: theoretically toward the neo-Durkheimians of France and the neo-Marxists of Germany, and practically toward the implications of such theory for social development planning. Of the first, in addition to Levy-Bruhl, Mauss, and Levi-Strauss, neo-Durkheimians include P. Fauconnet, G. Davy, M. Halbwachs, H. Hubert, R. Maunier, S. Cznarnowski, M. Granet, G. Glotz, P. Huvelin, and R. Hertz. These writers all have contributed to the elaboration of Durkheim's later ideas on the relationship of the categories and structures of consciousness to political and social change. A similar tradition has emerged from the early writings of Marx, and includes such theorists as Habermas, Drietzel, Berger, Holzner, Lukács, and others. Any anthology focusing on the presuppositions and political economics of development theory, particularly one for an Anglo-American audience, needs to be limned by these bodies of thought.

On the second point—implications for development planning—there would seem to be a contradiction of terms; for the concept "planning" is almost inseparable from the positivist and utilitarian thinking which Stanley rejects. But if this be the case, we must ask what "planning" would come to mean in a more existential and dialectical perspective. One can imagine some metaphors:

—planner as stage manager rather than script writer,
—planning as creating stock-shelves of options,
—planning as participatory learning,
—planning as political mobilization,
—design by users,
—design as the creation of protocols by which members' choices are expanded,
—users of facility as controllers of planning resources.

At present, work of the European thinkers cited above is generally not directly grounded in the planning process. On the other hand, more "existential" approaches to planning are generally uninformed by the kinds of philosophical and social theoretical perspectives which Professor Stanley has shaped. Despite some flaws, however, the present volume is a useful step toward such an integration. As such, it can serve as an antidote to bad faith and naive objectivism, as well as the starting point for the reformulation of a number of models and methods.

RICHARD H. BROWN
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

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

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

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

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